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Foreword
In March 2013, 22 social scientists from all over the world and from a wide range 
of academic disciplines found themselves in Quito, Ecuador, at the invitation of 
the International Social Science Council (ISSC). They were brought together by 
a shared desire to push forward the limits of knowledge on cities and their future. 
And push forward they did, as I hope you will find as you read this book that 
reflects some of the thinking started at the seminar. 
This gathering of researchers was the first seminar in the ISSC’s World Social 
Science Fellows Programme. With this programme, generously supported by the 
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), we hope to help build a net-
work of future social science leaders who will work together to help address some 
of the most pressing global challenges of our time, with particular relevance for 
developing countries. Sustainable urbanization is one such challenge, calling on 
the joint insights and contributions of scholars from different disciplines and dif-
ferent parts of the world.
Working with us on the first seminar in the programme, and critical to its 
results, were the former International Human Dimensions Programme on Global 
Environmental Change (IHDP, now part of Future Earth) and the Comparative 
Research Programme on Poverty (CROP), as well as our generous host, the 
Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, Ecuador, Area de Estudios Sociales y 
Globales. 
The greatest factor in making the seminar a success, however, was the 19 com-
petitively selected early career scientists and three senior scientists who came 
committed to developing new, multidimensional perspectives on transitions to a 
more sustainable future in urban areas. With a lot of hard work, a necessary sense 
of humour and the use of a surprising number of sticky notes, they developed a 
compelling sense of urbanities as spaces shaped by practices, experiences and 
imaginaries that are much richer and more complex than mainstream models of 
urban development have it. It is this ‘untamed urbanism’ that the Fellows and 
senior scientists explore in this book. As they say, ‘what matters is how we com-
prehend and work with both taming and untaming urban dynamics’.
And that it matters is clear. The world is faced with a number of converging 
crises (of climate, inequality, food, water, finance and social discontent) at a time 
when the majority of its population lives in cities. The challenge is on to find 
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effective, socially just and sustainable solutions. In seeking ‘productive disrup-
tions’ in our understanding of the issues at hand, the authors of this book boldly 
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Introduction
Why Untamed Urbanisms?
Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis and Mark Swilling
Cities can be understood as the product of multiple taming practices and strate-
gies, ranging from the techno-infrastructural domestication of nature to secure 
key resources, to the sociopolitical disciplining of the relational and organiza-
tional structures and behaviours that shape everyday life in cities. But cities are 
also profoundly untameable because they are a complex and often unintelligible 
web of institutional and everyday practices that produce them in fundamentally 
political ways, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
The notion of ‘untamed urbanisms’ is a subtle theme that pervades many recent 
contributions to urban theory. It resonates with Harvey’s (2012) reading of the 
untameability of capitalist urbanization; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer’s (2011) 
call to recentre critical urban theory on the production of cities for people, not 
for profit; Brenner’s most recent Lefebvrian reading of the uneven implosions 
and explosions of planetary urbanization (2013); Edensor and Jayne’s invitation 
to challenge the universal application of theories of Western cities to a world of 
cities (2012); Robinson’s call to examine the heterogeneity of practices that make 
cities and urban life (2006); McFarlane’s exploration of urban learning as a politi-
cal and practical, yet neglected, domain and how different environments facilitate 
or inhibit learning (2011); and Tonkiss, who argues that the social life of cities is 
shaped by ‘actors [who] engage creatively in the logistics and politics of urban 
life in ways that go beyond the masterplan, the design commission and the com-
petition entry, and which confuse any easy distinction between the expert and the 
ordinary, the technical and the amateur, the formal and the informal’ (2013: 10).
Building upon the aforementioned work and other recent trends in the urban 
studies literature (Bayat 2000; Inam 2014; McFarlane 2011; Myers 2011; Pieterse 
and Simone 2013; Pieterse 2008; Roy 2009; Watson 2009; Whittaker-Ferreira 
2007) and some contributions to the Routledge Handbook on Cities in the Global 
South (Parnell and Oldfield 2014), this book invites readers to explore how ordi-
nary citizens and planners seek to change the city, or perhaps more precisely the 
urban spaces in which they exist, live and work. 
Following the acknowledgement that we now live in a fast-urbanizing world, 
cities and urban life have also become the central locus of developmental planning 
narratives and interventions, where undesirable trajectories of socio-economic 
and environmental change are to be addressed, though often under new guises that 
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perpetuate and reproduce what is deemed as ‘undesirable’ in the first place. Yet, 
against all odds, cities continue to be untamed. That is, they are produced in ways 
that challenge the ‘taming practices’ associated most clearly with the dynamics of 
capitalist consumption and the domesticating practices of mainstream urban plan-
ning and governance, which so often prioritize the ongoing viability of capitalist 
property markets. Our intention throughout this book is not limited to an exami-
nation of what makes that possible, but rather to explore the untamed and the act 
of untaming as forms of producing the urban that are rarely acknowledged or 
recognized as productive pathways to rethink what makes and could make cities 
conduits of social and environmental justice. 
Born out of the encounter of a group of urban researchers from many different 
parts of the world in Quito, Ecuador, in 2013, this book offers a heuristic platform 
to interrogate how ordinary citizens and planners make sense of the city, by either 
confronting or engaging critically with hegemonic narratives of what a city or 
being an urbanite should be. Our central contention is that, all too often, such 
hegemonic narratives and practices embody taming processes that reduce com-
plexity, homogenize and exclude in the name of progress and over-riding impera-
tives, while quietening other ways of producing and learning the city. Our focus is 
therefore on a diversity of urban practices, experiences and imaginaries that either 
thrive within the interstices of domesticated and controlled urban development 
processes or are hardly tractable, and difficult to manage, assimilate and mould.
In this enterprise, the contributors to this book are not bounded geographi-
cally, thematically, theoretically or by discipline, but rather by a shared intellec-
tual discomfort with contemporary grand narratives and normative prescriptions 
that often obscure, marginalize or foreclose other possibilities to experience and 
imagine ways of being in the city and of producing it. The authors are also united 
by a common approach to their interrogation of the city, from a perspective that 
is conversational and also explicit about our personal positionality. Together, 
the different chapters take the reader through an exploratory journey to discover, 
explain and evaluate critically the potential of taming and untaming accounts of 
contemporary urbanisms, what and who drives them, and why and with what 
consequences. Our ultimate hope is that this book contributes to the generation 
of productive disruptions in the way we approach and interrogate urban change, 
away from a concern to control and subordinate the ‘other’, whether such other 
is nature, certain kinds of spaces, women, the urban poor, or those who cultur-
ally and behaviourally are deemed not to fit into tamed or disciplined ways of 
being urban. 
Throughout the following two sections, we offer a number of further reflec-
tions on what this enterprise involves and why it is needed. Adopting a systems 
theory perspective, we start by examining the long-term trajectories that help us 
to contextualize the advent of the ‘Urban Antropocene’ – literally the urbanized 
‘age of human-induced evolutionary change’ – as the context in which different 
and often competing contentions coexist about the role of cities in shaping wider 
socio-technical transitions and supporting different speculations on what type of 
urban change is required. We then return to the notion of ‘untamed urbanisms’ 
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to discuss what the act of untaming might tender as a heuristic device to provoke 
new reflections on the way we read and seek to change current and future urban 
trajectories, and finally offer an overview of the structure and content of the book. 
Re-ordering the urban Anthropocene?
There is growing acceptance across a wide range of publics that ‘modern society’ 
is currently facing historically unprecedented challenges at precisely the moment 
when the majority of the world’s population is living in cities. The advent of an 
urbanized ‘Anthropocene’ comes with an all-pervasive sense that global change 
pressures such as climate change, resource depletion, ecosystem breakdown and 
persistent poverty threaten the conditions of existence of human life as we know 
it (Crutzen 2002). The onset of the global economic crisis in 2007/08 has resulted 
in a realization that we may have come to the end of the post-Second World War 
long-term development cycle (Gore 2010), and there is little understanding of 
what will come next. The result is an interregnum that Edgar Morin has called the 
‘polycrisis’ (Morin 1999: 73), in which the task of ‘re-ordering’ a world full of 
things such as trees, pipes, water, and of course cities and urban lifestyles, appears 
to be the central subject of new unfolding narratives. It then becomes useful to 
borrow from systems theory to understand the historical cycles of order and cri-
sis produced through contemporary contentions of how such things should hang 
together (Pieterse, 2008; Hodson and Marvin 2010a).
Following Gore and Perez (Gore 2010; Perez 2013; Perez 2002; Perez 2007), 
the economic history of the industrial era can be understood as a succession of 
five overlapping socio-technical revolutions, with each lasting around 40 to 60 
years (Swilling 2013). Each wave has followed a recognizable trajectory of incep-
tion, innovation, crisis and then mature deployment of specific transformative 
clusters of coupled socio-technical innovations in the major infrastructure sec-
tors, in particular energy, mobility and communications. Given that cities are the 
spatial manifestation of the constellations of power expressed in particular socio-
technical systems in specific geographical contexts, it follows that these waves of 
socio-economic transformation have corresponded to the radical restructuring of 
the space-economy of each nation’s hierarchy of cities and towns (Swilling and 
Annecke 2012; see also Chapter 5 in this volume). This certainly applies to the 
current urban polycrisis (Hodson and Marvin 2010b). 
The above account of contemporary overlapping socio-technical revolutions 
shows that each successive age was characterized by a major economic crisis at 
its mid-point. Each subsequent long wave has been driven by innovation incentiv-
ized by finance capital (seeking capital gains) that has tended to over-invest in 
promising spatially configured fashionable energy, mobility and communication 
technologies, thus creating speculative financial bubbles (Harvey 2012). As econ-
omies and cities crashed when these bubbles burst, the governance of ordering/
taming projects became renewed – specifically, by states’ interventions to reor-
ganize society around a new set of institutions appropriate to the emerging over-
invested technologies (such as oil, electrification, highways and suburban sprawl 
4 Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis and Mark Swilling
after the 1929 crash). In the process, every ordering project attempted to impose 
new cultural norms on urban society, discipline the more pernicious excesses of 
finance capital, and prepare the way for productive (dividend-seeking) capital 
to take over as the primary investor in the ‘proven’ socio-technical innovations 
and the myriad goods and services that these new infrastructures made possible. 
As Harvey (2012) argued, cities were always the contested terrains of creative 
destruction that lay at the centre of these dramatic historical transformations, 
though their role in taming the global crises of capitalism is perhaps more pro-
nounced today than ever before in modern history. 
There are strong ecological, social and economic arguments to support a transi-
tion away from business as usual towards a more sustainable inclusive economy, 
but the force and speed of current trajectories tend to overload the strategic capac-
ities for action at global and national levels, and vested interests remain in con-
trol of powerful information flows. These mask the looming threats of polluting, 
greenhouse gas-emitting, resource-intensive technologies and the systems of eco-
nomic accumulation and socio-environmental subordination that reproduce them. 
As homes for the majority of the world’s population and in light of the enormous 
complexities that paralyse the governance of global challenges, cities are cur-
rently being re-interpreted as potentially crucial spaces for sustainability-oriented 
innovations that could coalesce into alternative socio-technical regimes in future. 
As in previous socio-technical revolutions when global geographical and intra-
urban spaces were restructured by the dynamics of particular patterns of accumu-
lation (Harvey 2012; Swilling 2011), the focus now shifts to the forces shaping 
the urban Anthropocene and how they may be shaping the next long-term devel-
opment cycle. On a parallel basis and outside the spotlight of international devel-
opment conferences and summits, cities are also increasingly the crucial nodes 
where, backed by local institutions and actors, complex systems of global wealth 
accumulation and concentration produce brutal expulsions (Sassen 2014). Cities 
obviously do not exist in a vacuum or outside wider social, economic and envi-
ronmental projects, but acknowledging this is different from approaching them 
as mere sites or instruments of wider transitions and transformations. The driv-
ers and sources of urban change require in our view a more dialectical examina-
tion that consciously resists the construction of new essentialisms, whether these 
endorse the notion that cities are the new re-ordering sites of global problems and 
therefore of global solutions or of unconstrained agency. This book seeks to offer 
a simultaneous interrogation of the structuring discursive and material effects of 
the urban polycrisis described above and to track the pathways that materialize 
and challenge the consolidation of old and new ordering projects across grounded 
material practices and discourses on the past, present and future of cities. 
On taming and untaming the city
As argued at the beginning, taming is a process that can take many forms across a 
rich diversity of urban contexts. It is, however, recognizable as a set of attempts by 
urban intermediaries to use visioning, planning, discourse-building, coalitioning 
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and funding strategies to impose a certain order, logic and coherence on complex 
dynamics which are deemed to be too opaque, too seemingly directionless and 
therefore too uncontrollable to provide the basis for purposive outcomes aligned 
with the requirements of accumulation, rational urban planning, urban consump-
tion and appropriate modes of cultural behaviour. Siemens, for example, recently 
published a report entitled Investor Ready Cities: How Cities can Create and 
Deliver Infrastructure Value, which explicitly argues that those cities that suc-
cessfully tame these complex dynamics using the new ICTs will become the most 
attractive to investors (Siemens et al 2014).
Transforming cities into tamed domains of information-based accumulation 
will depend to a large extent on whether it will, in practice, be possible to simplify 
or reduce complexity in the name of ‘progress’. In this book we seek to resist the 
‘taming’ of urbanism by emphasizing the ‘untameability’ of the city in its various 
manifestations in the global North and South. The most lively and rich examples 
of urbanism tend in reality to be too complex, too diverse, too incompressible, 
too ever-changing to be so easily tamed. However, what really matters above all 
is what could (possibly unintentionally) be suppressed or even annihilated by the 
process of taming. Critically, it could be argued that attempts to tame the city 
could overthrow what drives the energy, entrepreneurialism, innovations, assem-
blages, networking, heterotopias, passions and dreams that ensure the survival of 
rich, creative, alive and open-ended urbanisms. In our view, the cognitive fusions 
and reformations that emerge from the frictions, struggles and contestations made 
possible by the messy unpredictable agglomerations and assimilations of the city 
need to be recognized and protected from the sanitized urban utopias currently 
punted by some powerful actors – in particular the global technology companies – 
who recognize the strategic significance of the city.
However, for us this is not a ‘dualism’; it is not about a simplistic counterposi-
tion of the ‘tamed’ and the ‘untamed’. These are interlocked processes that feed 
off and can potentially co-produce each other, with threats that lie at the extremes: 
from the sanitized lines of the overly ‘tamed’ technotopias being marketed today 
by some technology corporations, through to the endlessly messy assemblages of 
the seemingly directionless ‘untamed’ (which some like to romanticize). Instead, 
our central argument is that by examining the dialectical dynamics of taming and 
untaming we can recognize how the ‘urban Anthropocene’ is being made and 
unmade at multiple levels as diverse actors co-opt, reformulate and fuse together 
one or another rendition of their understanding of urbanism, the information age, 
economic crisis and environmental breakdown.
The bids to tame the city can take many forms, each expressed as a ‘project’ 
at the popular level and often underpinned by a particular body of scholarship 
and theory. A non-exhaustive list of globally constituted ‘projects’ of the city 
that reflect a wide range of perspectives include the re-emergence of a faith in 
‘big planning’ underpinned by the science of modelling, as championed by the 
former Arup chief executive Peter Head’s initiative ‘The Urban Sequestration 
Trust’, among others; the increasingly influential ‘Resilience Perspective’ – now 
adopted by the Rockefeller Foundation, with links to the Stockholm Resilience 
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Centre (SRC) and the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 
(ICLEI); UN-HABITAT’s ‘Urban patterns for a green economy’ initiative (UN 
Habitat 2013); the UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP’s) Global Initiative for 
Resource Efficient Cities; the World Bank’s Sustainable Infrastructure group focus 
on material flow analysis, socio-technical systems change, and the Eco2Cities ini-
tiative (Hoornweg and Freire 2013); the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group’s 
emphasis on the opportunities offered by the world’s megacities to create resil-
ient places for the business world to tackle climate risks and greenhouse emis-
sions (CPD 2014); the Green Building movement and the rapidly growing ‘Smart 
Cities’ agenda (Komninos 2009; Townsend 2013) and associated calls for mas-
sive investments required to make cities smarter, among others. 
The examples above are part of a rapidly solidifying global urbanism that 
approaches the urban Anthropocene as one world, while actively normalizing the 
production and reproduction of ‘differential sustainability’; that is, the possibility 
‘of adjusting thresholds to meet the needs and wants of certain privileged social 
groups and territories at the expense of others’ (Allen 2014: 523). At the same 
time, the ‘polycrisis’ is expressed most clearly in the widening of the range of a 
large number of globally produced but locally experienced risks. The legalization 
of the security state to provide a safe space for economic activity in the face of risk 
(Greenhouse, 2010) has implied at the local level the securitization of space and 
a peculiar type of bio-control over people and places. This entails detailed strate-
gies to plan, monitor, securitize, protect and push – when needed – those actors, 
communities and processes that cannot be easily tamed or domesticated in zones 
of both social and physical exclusion. 
By contrast, those that share a perspective that values the untameability of the 
city are on quite a wide continuum that encompasses multiple sites of social insur-
gency, everyday urbanism and engagement with urban governance. On one end 
you might find Shack Dwellers International (supported by organizations such as 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London; the 
Bartlett Development Planning Unit (DPU), London; the African Centre for Cities 
(AAC), Cape Town; and the Sustainability Institute (SI) Stellenbosch, among 
others), who valorize the untamed collective agency of the poor in building the 
urban, while seeking to bridge their efforts with the transformations required to 
co- produce more just and sustainable urban trajectories with other urban actors 
(Allen 2012; Maricato 2009; Mitlin 2008; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2013; Swilling 
et al. 2013). These perspectives run right through to, at the other end, the work of 
Mike Davis (2005), Malik Simone (2010) and Asef Bayat (2000), who read the 
production of cities as a permanent struggle against tameability. In an attempt to 
bridge the gap between everyday urbanism, resistance and engagement, a number 
of writers have explored the interactive and relational dynamics that transform 
urban systems. These thinkers include Marcuse et al. (2009), Guy et al. (2011), 
McFarlane (2011), (the new) Castells (2012), Parnell and Oldfield (2014), Allen 
et al. (forthcoming) and Swilling (forthcoming), among others. By recognizing 
that urban change cannot simply be derived from structural economic changes at 
the national and global levels or from grand planning frameworks, these writers 
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insist on the importance of tracing the profound role played by specific configura-
tions of urban actors who actively engage prevailing power relations to realize a 
wide range of future urban visions.
The contributions to this book engage these various traditions as articulated 
across both global North and global South contexts. Our message is clear: because 
cities do not provide a clean slate, we must all be careful about what we assume 
is actually going on or what is possible. What matters is how we comprehend and 
work with both taming and untaming dynamics. Undoubtedly, actions are neces-
sary, but they must be informed by a nuanced understanding of these complex 
dynamics that may be conceptually distinct but in practice always manifest in 
relation to one another. Seeking action without critical reflection on the dialectics 
at play between taming and untaming runs the risk of producing and re-producing 
old and new unjust urban utopias. But equally, theorizing urban change without 
an axiological discussion of what type of action might be possible or desirable 
can be purposeless, confining our understanding to multiple readings of complex-
ity while overwhelming any sense of what transformative change might mean or 
entail. This is, for example, the danger of the conceptually cluttered urban resil-
ience framework. 
Departing from the notion of a polycrisis unfolding under the urban 
Anthropocene could be read by many as yet another attempt at creating a single 
grand narrative. Throughout this book, however, we approach this diagnosis rather 
differently: navigating through this polycrisis opens in our view multiple sites of 
untamed speculation and action, as well as new opportunities to discuss strategic 
visions of transformative urban futures. In other words, departing from a critical 
and grounded reading of the urban polycrisis opens up the poly-reframing of con-
temporary urban trajectories, which in turn rejects the formulation of single-issue 
or single geography grand theories of change. As such, the concept of ‘untamed 
urbanisms’ is posed here to provoke new epistemological engagements not just 
with a diagnosis of the urban polycrisis but rather with the way in which actions 
to readdress such manifestations suggests the need for new framings of what is 
wrong in the first place. Such ‘actions’ range from those effected at the individual 
and household level to those institutionalized through planning framings.
Indeed, this might imply something deeply disturbing and problematic about 
the notion of the urban Anthropocene itself. If the notion of the Anthropocene is 
intended to suggest that humans have become the dominant geo-physical driv-
ers of evolution, then the notion of the ‘urban Anthropocene’ implies that it is 
‘urban-based humans’ in particular that have become this driver – a leitmotif that 
is now reflected in the frequently used notion of ‘planetary urbanism’ and in the 
notion that we therefore need ‘Smart Cities’ that are low carbon and resource 
efficient. The proliferation of modelling as a dominant research practice in sus-
tainability science tends to reinforce this way of thinking. In effect, this sug-
gests that cities have tamed global evolutionary dynamics in ways that endow 
these formations with a moral responsibility for ensuring the future survival of 
the entire web of life. At precisely the moment when the extra-ordinary powers 
of science and technology make possible the taming of natural evolution, these 
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powers also effectively fail to provide the much longed-for panacea because of 
a tendency to rely on complex modelling tools that virtually without exception 
assume the rational – and therefore tameable – individual as the primary building 
block of the analysis. These models cannot come to terms with what is effectively 
‘unmodellable’ – the dull compulsion of the untamed dynamics of the every-
day urbanism of the world’s most dynamic cities and the unfolding logics of 
long-term structural transitions beyond the direct control of human agency or 
‘management’. 
In other words, by invoking the notion of a dialectic between taming and 
untaming dynamics, we are also raising questions about the kind of knowledge 
needed to address not only the internal nature of our cities, but also the relations 
between our cities and the ecosystem services produced by the non-urban hin-
terlands and waterbodies that are consumed within cities (with urban elites con-
suming the lion’s share). Undoubtedly models have their uses, but the qualitative 
analyses that pervade many of the chapters in this book help surface realities that 
escape the modes of analysis that have hitherto informed recent narratives about 
anthropogenically determined outcomes. As a result we face the prospect that 
models will emerge that inform policy choices for ‘managing’ urban transitions 
that neglect a broad swathe of urban realities that cannot be tamed by increasingly 
sophisticated quantitative modelling tools aimed at validating huge expenditures 
on a wide range of technofixes. 
This book engages with the politics of urban transitions, exploring the ten-
sions and dialogues between hegemonic and non-hegemonic framings, and seeks 
productive disruptions in our understanding and capacity for radical pragmatism. 
As argued by Inam, ‘[t]he most fundamental shifts in transforming cities do not 
happen by tinkering around the edges, but by fundamentally rethinking processes, 
methods, and outcomes of urbanism’ (2014: 18). At the same time we are mind-
ful to avoid the dualism often found in urban studies between a normative, pre-
scriptive or standardized pathway for urban development, and the much preferred 
desire to enjoy the city ironically through deconstruction and relativism. Thus, we 
are more interested in the interactive actions of taming and untaming as a way of 
knowing and acting upon the city, rather than the creation of another taxonomic 
system (the tamed and the untamed) to apprehend urban change.
Overview of the book
The rest of the book is structured in four parts, which are outlined below. Part 
I explores the wider socio-environmental transitions within which taming and 
untaming urbanisms operate, simultaneously examining how such transitions are 
either neglected or used to legitimize different courses of action and non-action. 
Part II digs critically into the plurality of experiences and everyday urbanisms 
that are often misrecognized forms of production of the city. Part III examines 
the capture of planning by mainstream narratives, and explores planning as a pos-
sible act of untaming, in an attempt to reframe its practice in a time of disciplinary 
crisis. Finally, Part IV works through the transformative potential and limits of 
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different practices that consciously and unconsciously open new alternatives and 
bring to life suppressed imaginaries of cities – and what being in cities means – for 
a diverse range of actors that rarely become the focus of analysis. We conclude 
with a set of provocations that have implications for future research trajectories 
and transformative urban practices. 
Part I: Trajectories of change in the urban Anthropocene
Cities are the emergent outcome of long historical cycles of seemingly interre-
lated socio-economic, spatial, institutional and ecological dynamics. How pre-
cisely these dynamics are connected depends on the conceptual lens used to 
comprehend them, with each lens phasing out of sight some of these key dynamics 
in favour of a particular dominant concern or interest. Long cycles of economic 
development transform the ecological systems within which they are embedded 
at local, regional and global scales. These long cycles and multiple scales interact 
in context-specific ways. Over the past century and a half, paradigms for reducing 
the complexity of the urban phenomenon have come and gone, but what remains 
is the irrepressibility and irreducibility of context. It is now time to find ways of 
grasping from different angles what it means to think about the trajectories of 
urban-ecological change in the era of the urban Anthropocene.
A world of cities disconnected from (real) natural systems was imagined in 
the nineteenth century and built in the twentieth century. Now that we know the 
negative consequences of this for all humanity and the wider web of life, we are 
confronted with the far from small task of fundamentally rethinking what urban-
ism would mean if the twenty-first century is to culminate in 6 billion living in 
cities by 2050 in a world of 9.5 billion without destroying the planet we inhabit. 
The chapters in Part I explore this challenge, while offering thought-provoking 
ways of reframing the way in which sustainable and just urban trajectories might 
be imagined and pursued.
Part II: The untamed everyday
The ‘untamed everyday’ section is framed by three major debates, all tradition-
ally cast in the metaphorical scene of urban development polarities. The first one 
concerns the opposition between agency and structure (Giddens 1984). Albeit in 
different ways, all chapters place themselves within a tradition that focuses on the 
reflexive character of human conduct. To take this stand implies challenging the 
idea that human conduct is purely shaped by forces and actors that people neither 
govern nor comprehend. Thus the first key argument running through this section 
is that human agency interacts with the broader forces and pressures discussed in 
Part I, both playing a fundamental role in shaping them and providing a reason to 
think about their transformation. 
Discourse is part of the dynamics of everyday life, as much as it is constitutive 
of development at large, and specific urban processes of a different kind and span. 
Thus, a second key theme is that through the political and cultural construction of 
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discourses, language is not only spoken but also makes possible in different ways 
the exercise of power (Foucault 2002). This results in dominant discourses that 
are capable of excluding or including with terrible strength, at times supported by 
appalling violence, such as those on rational planning, urban growth and competi-
tiveness, the smart city, the informal city, the slum city and so forth. This is also 
true of binary discourses such as formal/informal and poor/non-poor which often 
provide political, legal and policy justification for those who have the authority 
and capacity to rule over others. These discursive devices are needed not only by 
urban administrations but also, paradoxically, by those who claim ownership of 
the direction that urban transformation should be taking in order to save the urban 
from ecological collapse.
The third key argument running through the chapters challenges the fashion-
able idea that cities and people will inevitably adapt in fairly predictable ways to 
conditions of increasing socio-environmental uncertainty. Spanning a high degree 
of diversity – in terms of geographies, cultures and processes – all the chapters use 
case studies to challenge evolutionist readings of social change. Thus, to think of 
socio-environmental change, development and justice as an irreversible sequence 
of stages – while uncritically adopting concepts that originated in the natural sci-
ences, such as adaptation and resilience – produces short-sighted and most often 
tautological explanations. The everyday is untamed inasmuch as the diverse path-
ways to greater social justice in the city reflect the range of interests and actors at 
play, regardless of different ways of thinking and building forms of urban living 
across geographies. However, it would also be incorrect to think that there is 
no connection at all among the dynamics of everyday life. In fact, as a repeat-
ing fractal across geographies, hegemonic models of market-driven cities have 
brought about a common pattern that apparently differs from place to place but, at 
the same time, preserves an unchanging pattern that repeats itself: this is the new 
role carved for the agency of individuals as self-protecting actors within the logic 
of commodification and securitization of private life often reinforced by a wider 
human rights discourse. Part II of the book argues that these emerging patterns 
raise questions about the discourses on the future city that claim that urban politics 
needs to look not only at macro-structures, but also at the processes that crystallise 
daily into social practices and inequalities that reinforce and ultimately shape the 
unfolding and ever-changing nature of these structures.
Part III: Disrupting hegemonic planning
Urban planning encompasses a set of processes that are often seen as engaging all 
elements of urban life while at the same time being treated as something that can 
be separated from the everyday activities taking place in the city. While this may 
seem a contradictory endeavour, it highlights the key issues regarding the urban 
question for the coming years: how can urban planning serve to influence the wide 
array of factors deemed necessary for a sustainable urban future? This part of the 
book invites an examination of what planning is, and what planning does and 
could do to become a truly democratic and inclusive process. 
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In the context of historical development, urban planning can to a large extent 
be seen as an ‘ultimate taming’ project and set of mechanisms. Discourses of 
planning are so bound up with hegemonic power structures that the power at work 
often becomes hidden or naturalized. In this regard, planning, with its mantra of 
‘common sense’, is particularly suited to the neoliberal age. At its most extreme, 
this is evidenced in the ease with which large corporate entities have become 
embedded in public policy through the ‘smart city’ agenda or in the emergence 
of risk as an overarching organizing concept, for both private and public sector 
management of neuralgic spaces and resources often found within or administered 
from actors strategically positioned inside the city itself. At the other end, it can 
be witnessed through ‘creative’ projects, such as pop-up shops, meanwhile spaces 
and temporary parks, which have emerged with particular resonance since the 
economic crisis of 2008. When taken at face value, these give an indication that 
urban planning is a loose and open-ended process that manifests in context-spe-
cific ways. Yet these projects themselves are often at the mercy of wider structural 
factors, such as cycles of investment and disinvestment, thus limiting the possibil-
ity of significant shifts in urban planning practice.
In attempting to analyse the various processes at work, each of the chapters in 
Part III connects planning to the wider political and economic contexts in which 
they are embedded. The authors seek to get beyond the notion that planning is 
inherently ‘tamed’ and by definition always at the mercy of wider power struc-
tures. In a critical manner, they point towards the potential for alternative forms of 
planning practice. Each of the chapters is guided by a desire to re-infuse everyday 
practice with theoretical insights drawn from a range of sources, including the 
re-emphasis on engagement from the community and neighbourhood level to the 
level of supranational organizations such as UN-HABITAT.
The argument is reinforced by a plea for greater levels of control over public 
resources that have a direct impact on the ability of planning to become a more 
open and democratic process with respect, in particular, to the allocation of hous-
ing and land resources. When taken together, these chapters search with great 
urgency for urban planning to become less about technical fixes and more about 
promoting cities as more ‘just’ spaces where spatially embedded citizen interac-
tion becomes a core element of urban planning practices that recognize the wider 
ecological and economic context of urban development processes.
Part IV: Liberating alternatives
This part on ‘liberating alternatives’ explores people’s narratives of living and 
thus creating cities within and beyond the limits of the contemporary disciplining 
practices that produce the urban. Recognizing that alternatives exist in a variety 
of forms on many levels, the chapters in Part IV step away from social movement 
theory to investigate socio-environmental change in the urban everyday, depicting 
emerging narratives that challenge marginalization and re-invoke citizens’ rights 
to the city while creating new spaces and tensions to bring about transformative 
change.
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The central questions explored within this section are: How can we understand 
urban life and everyday practices beyond needs? What factors or qualities make 
practices ‘alternatives’ or ‘untamed’ from the perspective of the mainstream? 
What is the destabilizing capacity of such practices? What fractures emerge in 
the friction between everyday practices and social regulation? To what extent 
are ‘alternatives’ transformative? In exploring the answer to these questions, the 
concept of freedom is problematized to unveil the limits of both formal distribu-
tive norms and obligations, and people’s individual choices and preferences. The 
authors examine instead how freedom is dialectically constructed in the city, by 
whom, under what circumstances and with what consequences. Here a thread con-
necting parts II and IV is the search for a narrative other than the hopeless one 
so poignantly described by Greenhouse (2010) and others in Ethnographies of 
Neoliberalism (Makhulu, 2010; Miyazakim, 2010). In this sense, to talk about 
untamed urbanisms means referring to the tensions produced by the encounter 
between the new grand narratives and the alternatives emanating from those being 
pushed towards the social and/or physical margins of the city. The latter is an 
untaming process that reveals those acts of exclusion as not just resistances but 
powerful lenses to disrupt the narrowing logic of the marketization and commodi-
fication of urban life.
Untaming here takes place through subtle readings of undisciplined every-
day practices that are often subversive at an ontological and axiological level. 
However, the authors in this part refrain from offering a romanticized view of 
quotidian practices, and instead invite the reader to explore critically the freeing 
potential of alternative ways of learning and making the urban. Based on primary 
research conducted into lived, everyday experiences of ‘the city’ from around 
the world, the six chapters included in Part IV explore the richness, diversity and 
plethora of understandings and practices that challenge conventional, regulated 
governance approaches. They revisit the notion of freedom through themes such 
as food, work, money, bodies and public space.
Note to the Reader
Untamed Urbanisms offers a critical exploration of different strands in the pro-
duction of the city, focusing in particular on those that celebrate diversity and pro-
gressive processes, fostering critical dreaming and strategic action. By drawing 
largely on original research by a new generation of urban researchers located in 
institutions and debating and planning circles across the global South and North, 
this book sheds new light on old debates and aims to stimulate and provoke fresh 
interrogations about sustainable urban development. The book has been entitled 
Untamed Urbanisms precisely because the chapters are linked by a shared con-
cern to repoliticize the relationship between urban development, sustainability 
and justice, and to explore the tensions emerging under real circumstances, as well 
as their potential for transformative change. Furthermore, the contributors have 
the kinds of interdisciplinary backgrounds and working contexts that enable them 
to drift away from traditional disciplinary constraints and trajectories.
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A distinctive appeal of the book, together with the cultural, disciplinary and 
geographical diversity of the contributors, is the variation of discursive rhythms. 
Not unlike the fusion style in jazz, the move from one chapter or major part to 
what follows is never flat, but provides continuously shifting planes and perspec-
tives. From the global (Parts I and III) to more locally specific cases and reflec-
tions (Parts II and IV), and at the same time from the global South to the global 
North, the book itself cannot be constrained into a single style, line of argument 
or disciplinary logic.
As editors of this volume, we have passionately wrestled for decades with the 
challenging task of engaging with cities and urban change through our research, 
pedagogical approaches and engagement with action planning and political activ-
ism. As such, we are, like this book, equally troubled and inspired by the need for 
both more aspirational planning practice and actionable theory. 
Like a triad of musical conductors, we have sought to produce music but not 
without dissonance. Dissonance might be perceived as unstable sound or noise 
interrupting the flow of melody and harmony. But dissonance is in fact the com-
plement of consonance, the building up and releasing of tensions that contributes 
to what listeners perceive as beauty, emotion and expressiveness in music. In 
the same way, Untamed Urbanisms pulls the reader in various directions, but 
without dissonance, and recreated consonance there would not be music, just 
monotony. 
In the concluding chapter we offer a cross-reading of the different contribu-
tions included in this volume and an evaluation of the epistemological, methodo-
logical and axiological consequences of such an enterprise. Meanwhile, we invite 
the reader to listen and enjoy the sound of the different chapters while embracing 
every dissonance encountered in the journey as a potential productive disruption 
to hegemonic thinking and action that aims to tame the untameable. 
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Part I
Trajectories of change in the 
urban Anthropocene
Written by researchers located in both the global North and South, the chapters 
in Part I discuss the general trajectories of urban change that have emerged in the 
urban Anthropocene.   
Chapter 1 by Mark Swilling (South Africa) – entitled ‘Towards sustainable 
urban infrastructures for the urban Anthropocene’ – challenges the ecologically 
disembodied conception of urban modernity by introducing into urban analysis 
an understanding of metabolic flows of resources through urban systems. Urban 
modernity tamed nature by reducing it to flows conducted by urban infrastructures 
whose designs and governance have not changed much since the nineteenth cen-
tury. In order to establish a way of reconfiguring urban infrastructures, Swilling 
argues for the need to re-embed urban systems within a wider conception of biore-
gional resource flows which contrasts with how these flows are taken for granted 
within the traditional conceptions of urban modernity. In a resource-limited world 
where the distribution of resources needs to be more equitable, this is no longer 
feasible.
It is argued that the dominant mode of urban infrastructure governance is 
already being challenged in a number of ways, three of which are discussed spe-
cifically. The first two aim to tame the potential threats of resource limitations: 
either reinvigorate public sector infrastructure governance with a systems theory 
approach that recognizes the limits to centralized management, or privatize infra-
structure governance using the smart city solutions. The co-production of urban 
services by organized social movements and state agencies is presented as another 
response, but this time as a response to the limits of state capacity to meet the 
needs of rapidly expanding urban settlements in poor and middle-class areas.
Despite the paradigms of urban planning that have implicitly denied the ecolo-
gical contextualization of cities, Chapter 2 by Jenia Mukherjee (India) – entitled 
‘Sustainable flows between Kolkata and its peri-urban interface: challenges and 
opportunities’ – argues that cities have always been embedded within local eco-
systems which have been shaped and reshaped to suit urban requirements in very 
specific ways. The case study of Kolkata reveals how key actors have consciously 
planned and acted over many decades to tame the ecosystems that the city depends 
on for crucial services, from sewage treatment to food production. However, in 
recent years the emphasis has shifted from taming to outright destruction to make 
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way for property developments. This, in turn, has resulted in attacks on the live-
lihoods of many who depend on Kolkata’s peri-urban ecosystems, and also new 
developmental challenges, as ecosystem services such as sewage treatment are 
eroded.
Adopting a Western perspective on urbanization and the history of urban plan-
ning, Chapter 3 by Maarten A. Hajer (The Netherlands) – entitled ‘On being smart 
about cities: seven considerations for a new urban planning and design’ – contends 
that the taming of the city to prepare for fundamental changes is a recurring theme 
in the history of urban development. He refers to the sanitation syndrome in the 
late 1800s and the highway boom in the mid-twentieth century as two of the most 
significant precedents. Today’s smart city agenda is the contemporary expression 
of this approach to city-wide restructuring. The smart city agenda is the most 
dominant contemporary discourse for taming the urban by invoking an algorith-
mic urbanism that promises to finally deliver on the nineteenth-century dream of 
the city as a seamless paradise of ‘lights, water, motion’ for all. However, Hajer’s 
conclusion is that this is a false promise delivered by some corporates at a time 
when governments have declared defeat when it comes to taming the city.
Titled ‘Is big sustainable? Global comparison of city emissions’, Chapter 4 by 
Dominik Reusser, Anna-Lena Winz and Diego Rybski (Germany) points out that 
while it is important to think of cities from a carbon perspective, this must be done 
by differentiating between different kinds of cities in the developed and develo-
ping world, since efficiencies and income growth have differential impacts in the 
two regions. Their evidence suggests that in the developed world larger cities are 
less carbon intensive per capita than smaller cities, but the opposite is the case in 
the developing world where larger cities tend to concentrate expanding numbers 
of people whose incomes are rising rapidly.
Chapter 5 by Gareth Haysom (South Africa) – entitled ‘Urban-scale food 
system governance: an alternative response to the dominant paradigm?’ – addres-
ses the contested linkages between cities and globalized food systems in a chan-
ging global context of rising food prices and increasing concerns about the security 
of urban food supplies. These global food systems are crisis-ridden because they 
must find ever more efficient ways of taming ecologically and socially exploited 
food-producing regions around the world in order to deliver nutritionally poor 
foods to a rapidly expanding urban population. The emerging role of cities as 
actors in this space raises the potential for key city-based actors to contest this 
globalized taming of food-producing regions by securing and ensuring adequate 
and even higher-quality food supplies from local sustainably managed food 
bioregions.
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In recent years there have been numerous institutional reports, academic analyses 
and networks that have articulated the idea that cities are well positioned to lead 
the way when it comes to transitioning to more sustainable modes of production 
and consumption (Hoornweg and Freire 2013; Kamal-Chaoui and Roberts 2009; 
LSE Cities, ICLEI and Global Green Growth Institute 2013; Suzuki et al. 2009; 
Swilling et al. 2013; UN-HABITAT 2009, 2012; UNEP 2010; WWF 2010). The 
most recent reports by the World Bank (Hoornweg and Freire 2013) and UNEP 
(Swilling et al. 2013) have taken this further by emphasizing the significant 
opportunities for innovation and transformation provided, in particular, by the 
rising level of investment in urban infrastructures.
In this chapter I hope to reconcile what have hitherto been between separate 
trajectories of my research over the past five years: on the one hand an interest 
in the dynamics of the global polycrisis using long-wave theory (Swilling 2013), 
and on the other an interest in urban infrastructure transitions using a synthe-
sis of material flow analysis and transition theory (Swilling 2013; Swilling and 
Annecke 2012). Given that previous industrial cycles have required particular 
spatial configurations (Swilling and Annecke 2012, ch. 5), I am fascinated by 
what the contemporary reimagining of the future of our cities (primarily in the 
global South) can tell us about what may be unfolding on a global scale.
The point of departure for this chapter is the long-wave perspective expressed in 
the Introduction that the global polycrisis marks a key turning point that brings into 
focus the global significance of the current rising level of investment in urban infra-
structure. However, because this time round there are resource limits to what is 
possible, it needs to be accepted that in order to secure more sustainable metabolic 
flows through decoupling, it will be necessary to reconfigure urban infrastructures. 
This is unlikely if prevailing approaches to infrastructure planning and govern-
ance persist. Hence, a new discussion has started within the engineering profession 
about alternatives to the nineteenth-century infrastructure governance paradigm 
that remains dominant today. Two direct threats to the nineteenth-century para-
digm are then discussed: the smart city agenda propagated by global technology 
companies, and the ‘co-production platforms’ emerging from the social move-
ments active in the informal settlements of cities in the global South.
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Urban metabolism and transition
Projections for urban growth over the next 30 years are staggering, but they 
assume that the available supply of energy and materials will be sufficient to 
meet growing demand. Given that many of the energy and resource flows that 
cities currently depend on are finite and in some cases are already reaching their 
limits, it follows that achieving ever more prosperous urban lifestyles for more 
people will depend on whether it will be possible to do much more with lim-
ited resources than is currently the norm. A new literature on the metabolism of 
industrialized societies has emerged that establishes the linkages between socio-
technical and socio-ecological systems (Baccini and Brunner 2012; Farrao and 
Fernandez 2013; Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl 2007; Giampietro, Mayumi and 
Sorman 2012).1
Although contested (Jackson 2009), the term ‘decoupling’ has come to be 
associated with efforts to break the causal link between economic prosperity and 
the depletion of finite resources or degradation of environments, and can be used 
as a lens through which to envision the reconciliation of human and environ-
mental interests in rapidly growing cities (Fischer-Kowalski and Swilling 2011; 
Swilling et al. 2012).
Conventional approaches to delivering services to urban dwellers use gigantic 
networks of centrally controlled interlocked wires, pipes, roads and other infrastruc-
tures to manipulate the vast and varied flows of resources that enter into, circulate 
within and exit from cities in support of particular conceptions of city living (see 
Swilling and Annecke 2012, ch. 5). Industrial ecologists refer to the build-up of 
what they call ‘socio-economic stocks’ within the city, consisting of material stocks 
(such as buildings and infrastructural systems) and the flows of resources that go 
into maintaining and using these stocks (such as energy and water). Studying the 
patterns of matter and energy moving through and within cities is critical in finding 
solutions to optimize them in the pursuit of better resource management (Costa et al. 
2004; Farrao and Fernandez 2013; Swilling et al. 2012) and decoupling.
Urbanists outside industrial ecology who are interested in sustainability have 
in recent years integrated the general concept of resource flows into their analyses 
of urban economies (Crane and Swilling 2008; Guy et al. 2001; Heynen et al. 
2006; Hodson and Marvin 2009, 2010; Robinson et al. 2013; Swilling 2010a, 
2010b).The application of material flow analysis (MFA) to the city scale provides 
a useful framework for understanding the complex empirical dynamics of these 
flows (for recent examples see Barles 2009, 2010; Costa et al. 2004; Farrao and 
Fernandez 2013; Fernandez 2007; Kennedy et al. 2007; Robinson et al. 2013; 
Weisz and Steinberger 2010). Policy-makers wishing to promote a more sustain-
able city can use this kind of research to enable them to make decisions about the 
building of new – or retrofitting of existing – urban infrastructures that take into 
account the long-term flows of strategic resources into and out of the city. (For 
three major recent reports on this see Hoornweg and Freire 2013; Suzuki et al. 
2009; Swilling et al. 2013.)
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Rethinking urban infrastructure planning and governance
Urban infrastructures hold the key because they are potentially the focus of fis-
cal expenditures and private investments to stimulate economic growth; key 
fiscal investments in poverty reduction/eradication; and as social-ecological- 
infrastructural systems, determinants of the future ecological sustainability of 
the city and, by extension, the global economy. A number of leading global con-
sulting companies are already encouraging investors to focus on the long-term 
returns on investments in urban infrastructure, which they estimate could rise 
to over $40 trillion in the next 20 years (Airoldi et al. 2010; Doshi et al. 2007). 
The World Bank estimates that annual investments in basic urban infrastructures 
in the global South need to be doubled to achieve the $1–1.5 trillion annual 
investment levels that are needed to meet basic needs (Hoornweg and Freire 
2013: 8). Following two major global reports that focused attention on the key 
role that urban infrastructures will have to play in the building of green econo-
mies (Hoornweg and Freire 2013; Swilling et al. 2013), the question is whether 
these investments in a new generation of (new and retrofitted) urban infrastruc-
tures – often with life spans of up to 100 years – will in reality equip cities 
to handle the linked challenges of increasingly complex and therefore largely 
unpredictable dynamics of resource depletion,  climate change, eco-system res-
toration, economic development and social equity. In short, can long-term infra-
structure planning and investment be reconciled with uncertainty?
There are obviously problematic implications for cities in the fact that the 
power to make these capital investment decisions lies with a small group of 
major investors. Besides this, much will depend on whether it will be possible 
to reconceptualize the governance of urban infrastructure transitions in ways that 
help overcome the obduracy of ‘locked-in’ socio-technical systems. Transition 
researchers have been paying attention to this issue for some years now (Guy et al. 
2001; Maasen 2012). According to a group of professors from MIT’s Engineering 
Systems Division, the core problem is that the institutions and socio-technical 
systems for managing infrastructures today were first developed in the nineteenth 
century, when there was little need to consider the complexities of resource lim-
its, financial constraints, the roles of non-state actors and the demands of scale 
brought on by the second urbanization wave. Although they call for a ‘dramatic 
transformation of the scope, scale, and institutional architecture of these infra-
structures’ (Hansman et al. 2006: 148), they admit that ‘[d]espite the importance 
of infrastructure’, the engineering profession has
no comprehensive theory for it, no best practice approaches for its design, 
management, and transformation. We lack rigorous methods for developing, 
evaluating, and evolving future infrastructure architectures that must incor-
porate legacy elements while also responding to new technologies, knowl-
edge, and demands.
(Hansman et al. 2006)
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While the mainstream engineering professions continue, it is hoped, to deliber-
ate on these profound challenges, two alternatives have emerged that explicitly 
critique the rigidities of the nineteenth-century model. The first is the smart city 
agenda propagated mainly by the global technology companies (GTCs) and real-
ized largely via the neo-privatization of urban infrastructure governance, while 
the second can be referred to as the incremental urbanism that has emerged in the 
sprawling semi-serviced or unserviced sectors of the cities of the global South. 
Whereas the former is positioned as an accumulation strategy to resolve the global 
polycrisis on terms that suit the shareholders of the GTCs, the latter reflects incre-
mentalist strategies articulated by movements of the urban poor with very differ-
ent outcomes in mind.
Before considering these alternatives further, it is necessary to explore the 
arguments by two groups of engineering researchers – the MIT group referred 
to above, and the Zofnass Programme for Sustainable Infrastructure at Harvard 
University’s Graduate School of Design.
The MIT group suggests that to rise to this challenge, infrastructure govern-
ance will need to be thoroughly transformed in three ways (Hansman et al. 2006):
 • a broader ‘systems approach with deep technical and social science perspec-
tives’ will be needed that can cope with ‘dispersed decision making and myr-
iad stakeholders’
 • strengthened relationships between practice and research will be needed to 
stimulate innovations for ‘effective transition’
 • a common approach across ‘different infrastructure domains’ will need to 
replace the existing disciplinary fragmentation and specialization that charac-
terizes, in particular, city-level governance of urban infrastructures.
For the MIT group, rapid shifts in technology, deregulation, demand fluctuations, 
natural and social ‘threats to operations’, unanticipated competition, the impact of 
information and communication technology (ICT), and changing societal needs 
raise the following key question: ‘Can we continue to rely on incremental changes 
to our systems?’ (Hansman et al. 2006: 148). To provide a theoretical foundation 
for a more transformational approach that addresses this question, the MIT group 
suggests ‘it may be useful to develop a network-based theory of infrastructure’ 
(Hansman et al. 2006: 154). In practice, they argue, this would entail the radical 
step of defining infrastructures as complex adaptive systems, including the notion 
that system change entails mastering new methods and capabilities for integrated 
infrastructure planning across domains, working with external and internal stake-
holders, developing shared visions and plans, and negotiating the nature of change.
For Norton, this will entail a conception of integration that is not about more 
technological advances. Instead:
integration will require extensive and detailed cross-disciplinary understand-
ing of multiple issues, across multiple domains. This represents a paradigm 
shift in understanding, in that future planners and designers will be less 
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‘subject matter experts’ of each relevant domain and more ‘multiple domain 
experts’ across wide disciplines.
 (Norton 2013: Kindle loc. 2958)
This is certainly radical stuff for a profession trained to manage ‘large techni-
cal systems’ by building organizational cultures that value above all the logics 
of technocratic rationality, quantification and specialization (Summerton 1994). 
It remains limited, however, because it assumes all this can happen outside the 
global logics of power and accumulation, which often depend on technocratic 
fragmentation and reductionism.
Responding to the fact that nearly all the sustainability rating systems in the 
built environment sector have focused on buildings rather than infrastructure, 
Harvard’s Zofnass Programme for Sustainable Infrastructure (ZPSI) has devel-
oped a rating system called Envision which is explicitly designed to rate large-
scale infrastructure projects.2 It is claimed that this approach is supported by 25 
of the largest engineering firms in the world, which, it is claimed, collectively 
generate ‘60–70% of all engineering revenues worldwide’ (Hoornweg and Freire 
2013: Kindle loc. 159).
The Envision tool is explicitly designed to fundamentally change the way 
infrastructure is designed, constructed, operated and decommissioned from a 
sustainability perspective. This is achieved by rating each of these phases of the 
lifecycle using criteria explicitly derived from systems theory and ecological 
urbanism (Mostafavi 2012). The four primary categories are ‘Resource alloca-
tion’, ‘Natural world’, ‘Climate change’ and ‘Quality of life’, with specific cri-
teria for each category weighted according to the phase of the lifecycle being 
analysed. Most significantly, the overriding aim to integrate infrastructure plan-
ning across traditional sector domains (energy, water, waste and so on) is reflected 
in the explicit realization that
synergies and overlays of infrastructure systems had a significant potential 
contribution to sustainability. It was not enough to study and optimize a given 
infrastructure within its typological confines; the analysis had to expand in 
a multi-layered approach in which infrastructure systems would be grouped 
based on their synergistic potentials.
(Georgoulias and Allen 2012: Kindle loc. 5971–7)
Table 1.1 summarizes the main categories, subcategories and key questions 
assessed by the detailed Envision criteria.
Significantly, this framework of analysis goes beyond energy/climate issues 
to include resource flows and eco-system services; and it includes social criteria 
under the ‘Quality of life’ category. Equally significantly, despite pressure to the 
contrary from the engineering profession, the group has resisted incorporating 
into the Envision tool cost–benefit, cost-effectiveness and economic assessment 
tools, on the grounds that if they were incorporated the results would be skewed 
in favour of these financial/economic factors.
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Table 1.1 Categories, subcategories and key questions





 • Materials: reduce/reuse/
recycle
 • Energy: use less/use 
renewable
 • Water: use less/reuse 
onsite
 • Emissions: reduce CO
2
 • Adaptability: prepare for  
the future
 • Health: safety and 
precautions
 • Education: promote 
sustainability
 • Community values: 
respect community input
 • Site selection: choose the 
best site
 • Habitat: preserve the 
environment
What is the source? – choose local 
and renewable
How is it used? – be efficient
How is it disposed of? – recycle 
and reuse
Are you reducing climate 
impact? – emit less CO
2
Are you prepared for climate 
change? – build with an eye on 
the future
Are you protecting the 
community? – ensure safety and 
security
Are you involving the community? – 
respect the culture and listen
Are you promoting 
sustainability? – educate and 
inform
Where is it located? – choose sites 
with least impact
Are you preserving the 
environment? – limit pollution  
to site
Are you preserving the ecology? – 
don’t disrupt natural processes
Although the ZPSI approach will undoubtedly influence the future design and 
implementation of infrastructures via projects developed by some of the world’s 
largest consulting firms, it suffers from two drawbacks for the purposes of this 
discussion. First, it is focused on infrastructure projects and not on the ongoing 
planning and management of city-wide urban infrastructure systems. The MIT 
approach articulated by Hansman and colleagues (2006) is, in this respect, more 
useful. Second, both the ZPSI and the MIT approaches lack a sense of urbanism. 
This is, of course, unsurprising given that the remit of both is infrastructure in 
general. Nevertheless, by establishing an assessment framework rooted in sustain-
ability and systems thinking, both provide potentially useful points of departure 
for reimagining publicly accountable city-level urban infrastructure governance 
regimes and practices. However, what both approaches lack (despite the emphasis 
on complexity) is an appreciation of the limitations of all design and planning 
tools when it comes to transforming cities. The untameability of the complex 
dynamics of urbanism across all contexts is a reality that lies way beyond what 
most engineers seem able to grasp.
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Smart cities and co-production platforms:  
alternatives or building blocks of a synthesis?
As I have argued elsewhere, it is unsurprising that the GTCs have emerged from 
the global economic crisis as the key agents of productive capital, with utopian 
ambitions to drive the next accumulation wave (Swilling 2013). They have all 
projected their respective hegemonic projects by synthesizing selected elements 
of the three dominant narratives of the current conjuncture: the information age, 
the urban age and the environmental crisis. This discursive synthesis has gener-
ated promethean images of a more sustainable world that can be achieved via 
the algorithmic transformation of urban infrastructures (Townsend 2013). The 
GTCs promise what most city governments cannot deliver: new ‘green-tech’ solu-
tions, large-scale long-term investments in urban infrastructures and new govern-
ance capabilities. What they want in return is the right to invest capital on scale 
into the infrastructures of the world’s urban space-economies to shape on their 
own terms the conditions for the next long-term development cycle. As Hajer 
argues in Chapter 3, like the Light Water Motion revolution which fundamen-
tally transformed cities from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, 
if implemented over the coming decades these investments could transform what 
urbanism means in equally fundamental ways.
Various labels are used to refer to quite a wide range of initiatives which I pre-
fer to think of as algorithmic urbanism, with the smart city agenda being just one 
version of this broad trend (Hollands 2008). These include the ‘knowledge city’ 
(which focuses narrowly on business–academia relations); ‘creative city’ (which 
enlarges the knowledge city to include the creative professions, as discussed by 
Lawton in Chapter 14); ‘smart city’ (mainly about ICT in networked infrastruc-
tures); and the ‘informational city’ (following Castells 2009, combining elements 
of the knowledge and creative city with cognitive transformations – both progres-
sive and elitist – wrought by the phenomenon of ‘self-managed mass communica-
tions’). More recently, the ‘green city’ discourse has emerged in certain narratives 
as synonymous with the smart city (European Commission 2010), while some 
grassroots open-source ‘low-tech’ initiatives have attempted to appropriate the 
‘smart city’ narrative for counter-hegemonic purposes (Townsend 2013).
But what specifically is the smart city agenda? In my view, this label should be 
used to refer quite specifically to initiatives mounted by the GTCs to strategically 
position themselves (after all, IBM does own the copyright for the term). These 
include the C40 League’s Siemens-funded Smart City initiative, and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development’s Urban Infrastructure Initiative. 
The latter brings together experts from numerous GTCs (including Acciona, 
Aecom, AGC, CEMEX, EDF, GDF, Suez, Honda, Nissan, Philips, Schneider 
Electric, Siemens, TNT, Toyota and UTC), and case study work is taking place in 
Philadelphia, Pa.; Rio, Brazil; Surabaya, Indonesia; Tilburg, Netherlands; Turku, 
Finland; and four cities in Gujarat, India (Hoornweg and Freire 2013: 118).
Individual companies have also mounted their own global programmes, includ-
ing IBM, which is regarded as the biggest player in the European context (Smarter 
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Cities Programme); CISCO Systems (Internet Business Solutions Group); Veolia 
(Veolia Environment, focused on urban systems management in the water, energy, 
waste and transportation sectors); Philips (Livable Cities Programme); Alstrom 
(EMBIX initiative for carbon-neutral eco-cities); and Siemens (Infrastructure and 
Cities programme). Siemens could well emerge as the biggest player in develop-
ing country contexts because it does not only do information systems; it can also 
finance and build bespoke heavy infrastructures (railways, wind farms, telecom-
munications and so on).
Furthermore, a number of major city-wide (including ‘new city’) develop-
ments are under way with at least one GTC as a major partner. Songdo in South 
Korea, where CISCO is the primary technology partner, is now the poster-child of 
this generation of high-tech smart algorithmic urbanism. Others include Dongtan 
City (on Chongming Island near Shanghai), Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City, 
Sino-Singapore Nanjing Eco-Tech Island, Meixu Lake District (Hunan Province), 
Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, Sitra Low2No in Finland and PlanIT Valley in 
Portugal. (For an overview of these initiatives see Alusi et al. 2012.)
From this brief overview of the actors and initiatives, it should be clear that 
collectively the smart city agenda does amount to a hegemonic project in the 
making. More than likely, it will reinforce what Graham and Marvin (2001) called 
‘splintered urbanism’ – private sector investments in ‘premium infrastructures’ 
that favour highly mobile web-connected urban elites within urban enclaves that 
are increasingly disconnected from the urban dynamics of the city as a whole 
(Luque et al. 2013). They could also fail on their own terms for being expensive 
property developments that lack viable economic foundations (Alusi et al. 2012: 
Kindle loc. 7614); or, as Richard Sennett argues, this ‘closed system urbanism’ 
could engender ‘stupefication’ by reducing the complexities that give rise to the 
‘cognitive stimulation through trial and error’ that drives innovation – in short, the 
very opposite of ‘smart’ (Sennett 2012).
However, for the Harvard group a new mode of infrastructure governance will 
depend on the effective deployment (and related institutional reorganization) of the 
smart city technologies (Alusi et al. 2012; Papanikolaou 2012). It is clear that no 
matter which infrastructure governance model is adopted by a given city govern-
ment, it is hard to imagine this being done in a way that does not take advantage of 
available ICT. Besides the cost-driven choices about what systems are affordable, 
the most serious choice is not whether to digitize or not, but whether it is neces-
sary to digitize by effectively surrendering public control over one or more urban 
infrastructures to one or more GTCs. Some cash-strapped rapidly expanding cit-
ies in the global South, however, may have very little choice. There is evidence, 
for example, that Siemens is giving undertakings to some of these cities that it 
can raise the funds for new smart-grid-controlled urban infrastructures (such as 
public transport) if it is granted long-term (25–50-year) concessions to control 
these infrastructures. Taken to its logical conclusion, the worst scenario here is 
premium infrastructures for the rising middle class managed by a GTC (such as 
the new heavily subsidized intra-city rail systems in Johannesburg/Pretoria and 
Bangkok) while the rest of the population are left dependent on services provided 
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by increasingly unaccountable cash-strapped city governments. This new form of 
techno-apartheid should be avoided.
Top-down algorithmic urbanism delivered by public agencies, GTCs or pub-
lic–private partnerships is not, however, the only alternative to the nineteenth-
century infrastructure governance model. In the sprawling under-serviced and 
unserviced sectors of the urban global South, households and communities have 
started to develop their own institutional forms for managing access to ongoing 
supplies of basic urban services (in particular water). The underlying social pro-
cesses can best be referred to as incremental urbanism because access to services 
is not determined via connections to formal networked infrastructures, although 
this can be the eventual outcome. Incremental urbanism is the (often precarious) 
emergent outcome of myriad socio-technical assemblages created by households 
and communities engaged in the quiet encroachments of everyday life that make 
survival possible. (For examples of this perspective see Bayat 2000; McFarlane 
2011; Pieterse 2008; Simone 2004.)
The more mature community-based institutional forms that have emerged from 
incremental urbanism for managing access to services have begun to be referred 
to as ‘co-production platforms’ (CPs) (Allen 2013; Allen et al. forthcoming 2015; 
Mitlin 2008; Swilling et al. 2013). It is these CPs that are significant for this 
discussion, especially in light of the argument by Allen and colleagues that they 
may well be precursors for a new mode of ‘polycentric governance’ of urban 
infrastructures. This could be more appropriate for the governance of incremental 
urbanism than conventional approaches (Allen et al. forthcoming 2015).
One of the more significant examples of CPs is the community water boards 
(CWBs) that have emerged in Latin America.3 Known collectively as the Justicia 
Hídrica (Water Justice) movement, it is estimated that there are around 80,000 
CWBs in Latin America supplying 40 million people in both poor informal set-
tlements and middle-class neighbourhoods. In both Cochabamba (Bolivia) and 
Caracas (Venezuela), official state recognition and sanction of these CWBs con-
firmed the argument that they could become viable platforms for co- producing 
water services. After the election of Evo Morales in 2006 the Ministry of Water 
and the Environment was established with an explicit mandate to force ‘co-
production partnerships’ with the 28,000 community-based water provision 
institutions (only 27 of which were formally recognized). Only 48 per cent of 
Cochabamba was serviced by SEMAPA, the municipal provider. Between 500 
and 600 Comités de Agua (CAs) met the needs of the rest mainly by accessing 
groundwater or, as the groundwater was depleted, by buying water in bulk from 
vendors. The first CAs emerged in informal settlements in the 1980s, spreading 
into other poor and middle-class areas later on. In 2006, 49 CAs federated into 
an association (ASICASUDD-EPSAS) for the purposes of co-managing water 
services with the state (‘co-gestión’). The Morales government has since actively 
supported the CAs ‘as part of a wider overhaul of the water sector’.
In Caracas the CPs were associated with the Mesas Técnicas de Agua (MTAs – 
technical water committees). With origins going back to temporary experiments 
in the early 1990s when the Caracas municipal government responded to water 
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protests by establishing the MTAs, the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 created the 
space for permanent institutionalized CPs in the water sector. The local MTAs were 
revitalized and then federated into district-level Consejos Communitarios de Agua 
(CCAs) for co-managing neighbourhood-wide and city-wide plans. The model 
became national policy in 2001 when the Organic Drinking Water and Sanitation 
Service Act (LOPSAS) was adopted. Since 2001 the national agency that coordi-
nates water provision for 80 per cent of the population, Hidroven, has actively sup-
ported the MTA-CCA model. There are now 7,500 MTAs in Venezuela.
Although formal state recognition in Bolivia and Venezuela allowed CPs in the 
water sector to proliferate, there are also many examples from other parts of the 
world. These include the well-known Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi, Pakistan, 
and the Baan Mankong in Thailand (Boonyabancha 2009; Hasan 2006), plus 
numerous projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America initiated by slum-dweller 
federations associated with Shack Dwellers International (see www.sdinet.org). In 
South Africa, my own recent experience in establishing CPs in the energy sector 
(using solar power) in informal settlements has confirmed that it is necessary to 
pay attention to revenue streams to cover the ongoing cost of operations and main-
tenance. This was achieved by combining subsidies from government and fees 
paid by the ‘customers’ of the social enterprises that were set up as energy vendors 
(Swilling et al. 2013). This approach has now been applied to local sanitation 
systems, which include biogas production as a complementary revenue source.
Is a synthesis possible?
Although the socio-economic interests driving the smart city agenda and incre-
mental urbanism could not be more different, it is not difficult to imagine how 
they could be complementary. Undoubtedly, at the moment they are far apart: it is 
impossible to imagine how top-down private or public delivery of expensive smart 
city solutions can be reconciled with the grassroots polycentric governance repre-
sented by the CPs. Nevertheless, from the South African experience it is clear that 
a reliable incorruptible flow of revenues from slum dwellers into social enterprises 
can be achieved by using the cellphone network for making and recording pay-
ments. Similarly, the providers of subsidies can be reassured with real-time infor-
mation that the funds are going to the targeted ‘beneficiaries’. This is an example 
not of a smart technology that surrenders control to a GTC, but rather of how a 
community-based approach can be reconciled with public resources (subsidies) by 
using cutting-edge ICT that reduces transaction costs and secures transparency. In 
this way a thoroughly new mode of infrastructure governance can be created that 
works with affordable digital systems, and could make possible a more inclusive 
urbanism than a smart city alternative delivered by a GTC.
Conclusion
To conclude, it has been argued that mounting investments in urban infrastruc-
tures will, more than likely, shape the dynamics of the second urbanization wave, 
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and determine how a transition to more sustainable urban metabolic cycles is con-
ceived and executed by key actors. By embedding the challenge of urban infra-
structures within an understanding of urban metabolic flows, it becomes very 
clear that the prevailing nineteenth-century infrastructure governance paradigm 
needs to be replaced. However, the discussion about this problem and possible 
solutions influenced by network approaches is still very much at an early stage 
within the mainstream engineering professions. At the same time, the GTCs are 
marketing their smart city solutions, and in the cities of the global South ‘co-
production’ platforms have started to emerge that could potentially herald new 
forms of polycentric urban governance.
Future research will need to explore the institutional hybrids that may emerge, 
as algorithmic and polycentric governance fuse together into what could become 
a new networked mode of infrastructure planning and governance. To this end, it 
will be necessary to incorporate urban metabolic flow analysis into the analytics 
of these new modes of networked governance in order to ensure that they express 
rather than ignore the challenge of sustainable resource use.
Notes
1 For a thorough contemporary review of the application of this approach to cities, see 
Robinson et al. (2013).
2 See www.sustainableinfrastructure.org/rating/ 
3 This and the next paragraph on Bolivia’s and Venezuela’s CPs are drawn from Allen 
et al. (2013).
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2 Sustainable flows between Kolkata 




That over half of humanity now lives in towns and cities is the most complex 
socio-economic phenomenon of the twenty-first century. In slightly over two dec-
ades, from 2010 to 2030, another 1.5 billion people will be added to the popula-
tion of cities; by 2030 that fraction will be increased to 60 per cent.1 Although 
urbanization has occurred since ancient times in human history, the most impor-
tant ways in which the urbanization processes today are different from urban 
transformations of the past include the scale, the rate, and the shifting geography 
of urbanization (Seto et al. 2013: 4). Urban growth in the coming decades will 
take place primarily in Asia (China and India in particular) and Africa (especially 
Nigeria). The developing world has already entered into the high-growth, rapid-
transition phase of the urbanization process, marked by numerous problems and 
challenges including the swelling of slums and squatter settlements; lack of city-
wide infrastructures for services such as housing, health and sanitation; privatiza-
tion and commercialization of infrastructures; city development plans based on 
the logic of foreign capital; the widening gap between the rich and the poor; and 
the changing nature of the rural–urban divide.
Scholars argue that one of the crucial aspects of the contemporary urbanization 
process in the developing world is the emergence of what is defined as the ‘peri-
urban’ or semi-urban interface, where rural and urban features tend to coexist 
increasingly within cities and beyond their limits (Allen et al. 1999; Allen 2003, 
2009; Shaw 2005). Various recommendations are being made to incorporate this 
new concept into both theory and practice (planning). These include the appli-
cation of the urban–rural gradient paradigm as a powerful organizing tool for 
studying urban ecology and initiatives to come up with a specific approach to be 
applied in environmental planning and management (EPM) of these areas (Allen 
2003: 147).
The peri-urban constitutes an ‘uneasy’ phenomenon, usually characterized by 
either the loss of ‘rural’ aspects (loss of fertile soil, agricultural land, natural land-
scape and so on) or the lack of ‘urban’ attributes (low density, lack of accessibil-
ity, lack of services and infrastructure, and so on) (Allen 2003: 136) and recent 
urban expansion or sprawl in the developing countries. Interestingly enough, if we 
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look into the pages of history, we find that the sharp disconnect between the urban 
and the rural is only a recent occurrence, first appearing as late as the early twen-
tieth century. Densely packed housing and central institutions within the defen-
sive walls of the city, and residential settlement spreading far beyond that limit 
(a phenomenon that we might today call sprawl), was a pattern found frequently 
in the Near East, Asia and medieval Europe (Boone and Modarres 2006; Elmqvist 
et al. 2013). The layout of other ancient cities (like those of the Khmer of early 
medieval Cambodia, the classic Maya of Central America, and some pre-colonial 
African societies) was marked by a different type of sprawl or area spread, where 
residences were interspersed among agricultural plots in an extensive low-density 
continuum surrounding central institutional buildings and monuments (Evans 
et al. 2007; Scarborough et al. 2012; Simon 2008; Elmqvist et al. 2013). Ecosystem 
services, mainly in the form of agriculture, within these greater cities or broadly 
defined urban boundaries provided a major share of the city’s subsistence. 
The disconnect between the urban and the rural, or the urban infrastructures 
and the wider ecosystem of the city, was imagined in the nineteenth century and 
built in the twentieth century (see introduction), the Chicago School of urban soci-
ology being one of the chief proponents. Cities came to be considered as separate 
entities detached from their peripheral areas; the interactions, flows, links and 
linkages between the two, which formed a vital component for the sustenance of 
both, were neglected and ignored.
To know, understand and consider the great variation of urban histories, rather 
than depend on and draw from mere generalizations and universal theories, it is 
relevant and beneficial to use a historical perspective across a large space–time 
scale. This approach prompts a researcher to take a case-study-based approach 
to exploring specific trajectories of urban development, the evolution of a par-
ticular urban space, the interaction between the city and its periphery, and the 
changing realities as history proceeds. I am a student of history and an inhabitant 
of Kolkata, one of the three megacities of India with a population of 10 million 
plus.2 In this chapter, I explore the complex interactions between Kolkata and its 
peri-urban interface (PUI) since the days of their inception during colonial times. 
Considering primary historical sources, including official documents, reports, let-
ters, extracts, maps and plans, I argue that the city and its PUI co-evolved as 
consciously constructed spaces following a hegemonic discourse of domination/
subordination, the latter functioning as an output and input, produced and required 
by the city. 
The British tamed its natural ecology (in the forms of creeks, swamps and 
marshes) into waterscapes (i.e. extensive canals connecting the city with its 
hinterland) to accomplish colonial capitalist motives of revenue generation, 
unintentionally giving birth to the eastern sewage-fed wetlands that in turn 
emerged as the space for the informal, ‘untamed’ practices of marginal peri-
urban communities. Post-colonial urban planning narratives in the immediate 
post-independence period were strategically constructed to tame the untamed, 
legitimizing rapid urban sprawl at the cost of the peri-urban wetlands, for seek-
ing capital/financial gains. With the popularization of ‘sustainable development’ 
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followed by ‘sustainable urbanization’, like many other developing cities, its 
‘environment’ had to be incorporated within the ambit of urban planning of 
Kolkata, paving the way for state/municipality-led ‘urban environmentalism’ 
that increasingly built upon capital-intensive beautification schemes and pro-
jects securing resources for capitalist restructuring within the neoliberal regime 
(Bose 2013), the untamed scapes and practices being rapidly tamed. However, 
state-led environmentalism received both acceptance and rejection from the 
middle class, whose vision sometimes collaborated with the authoritarian 
vision of the beautification and development of the city but also sharply col-
lided against it, the Kolkata wetlands case being the strongest manifestation 
of this aspect. Though the city is being increasingly untamed by ‘authoritar-
ian environmentalism’ validating mega-urbanization at the cost of wetlands and 
supporting ecosystem resources and affecting urban–peri-urban linkages, it is 
yet extremely important to understand the production of the city through these 
complex dynamics and dialectics of taming and untaming theories and practices 
embedded in the pluralities of Kolkata’s environmentalisms. 
Overview and objectives
The sustenance of Kolkata heavily depends upon its interaction with its PUI, 
mostly in the form of wetlands in the eastern part of the city3 that act as a transi-
tional zone, an urban–rural continuum for a rapidly urbanizing space. The prox-
imity of the wetlands to the city and their interdependence is what sustains them. 
The East Kolkata Wetlands (EKW) are the world’s largest resource recycling 
ecosystem, fully managed by local inhabitants using inter-generational knowl-
edge. They recycle around 600 million litres of sewage and wastewater generated 
by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) every day. The canals, artificially 
excavated during the colonial regime with the triple purpose of facilitating trade, 
transportation and drainage, carry and dump sewage water into the wetlands. The 
wetlands in turn provide ecosystem services and livelihood opportunities to the 
peri-urban poor, who sell their surplus produce in city markets. Most importantly, 
unlike most other populous cities Kolkata does not have a separate sewage treat-
ment plant; the wetlands as a natural sink (often regarded as the ‘natural kidney’ 
of Kolkata) provide free services which would have otherwise cost the city around 
US$ 80 million per annum.
In spite of this, the PUI is significantly dwindling in size, heavily interrupt-
ing the ecological balance and threatening the socio-economic benefits for both 
wetlands and city. Kolkata has urbanized rapidly with an east-centric bias during 
the post-independent period,4 at the cost of her wetlands. Initiatives from environ-
mental scientists and civil society advocacy groups played a crucial role in hav-
ing EKW put on the Ramsar list of Wetlands of International Importance (www.
ramsar.org) in 2002, which has helped to protect the remaining 12,500 hectares 
of wetlands from further encroachment. Although the EKW enjoy legal protec-
tion through court orders, legislation and international conventions, conversions 
from wetlands to estates is still taking place. Over the last ten years there has been 
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a sharp escalation of conversions, and a quarter of the surviving wetland area 
remains under severe threat. This spatial transformation through urban sprawl, 
disrupting the age-old urban/peri-urban interaction, implies catastrophic out-
comes for the EKW and the urban systems that depend on it. 
By going through expert and technical documents and from my own non-
expert and non-technical repeated visits to the outskirts of the city (which made 
me nostalgic, since each time I went there I would notice and regret that a particu-
lar patch of green field or a water body had been replaced by concrete high-rise 
buildings), I identify the present challenges in the urban–peri-urban interrelation-
ship, investigating factors behind their diminishing interdependence. The aim is 
to understand the whole issue within the politico-economic framework of urban 
planning in a developing city with a colonial heritage.
Urban and peri-urban: a colonial history of  
evolution and interdependence
Kolkata’s natural ecology, with the Hooghly River on the west, the saltwater 
marshes on the east, and the Ganges and her numerous tributaries and distributar-
ies intersecting the whole area, played a key role in the selection of the city as the 
seat of the imperial capital (Mukherjee 2009–10). The natural environment was 
gradually tamed, controlled and interfered with, keeping pace with the develop-
ment of the universal laws of colonial hydraulics, to create an artificial system that 
facilitated both trade and transportation, and drainage and sanitation. The British 
project of urbanization implied the evolution and successful management of this 
complex hydraulic scheme.
Figure 2.1 Sustainable flows between Kolkata and its PUI. 
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The East India Company obtained a Firman (order) from the Mughal Emperor 
in 1677/78, which granted it rights and privileges to conduct trade freely in Bengal 
(the area of India in which Kolkata is located). There developed a brisk trade from 
1680 onwards between the British, Dutch, Portuguese and French in the Hooghly 
region. The British wanted to establish an independent settlement in Bengal for 
appropriate exploitation of new trading opportunities (Roy 1982: 3). The three 
villages of Sutanuti, Kolkata (Kalikata) and Gobindapur, where Job Charnock had 
landed with a contingent of 30 troops on 24 August 1690, consisted of a narrow 
strip of land on the banks of the Hooghly, surrounded by swampy jungles and 
brackish lagoons on all sides. It was a place of mists, alligators and wild boars. 
Colonial reports and letters shed light on the unhealthy and deleterious environ-
ment of the area when the British first settled there (Chattopadhyay 1990: 6–8).
However, in spite of such disadvantages, the selection of the area was the 
result of a deliberate judgement on the part of the British, who realized the mani-
fold ecological advantages that the place actually offered. The Hooghly River 
tapped the trade of the Ganges valley, and the settlement site was located at the 
highest point at which the river was navigable for seagoing vessels. The Ganges 
and its tributaries provided the foreign merchants with an opportunity to extend 
their trading operations inland over a wide area between Kolkata and other parts 
of Bengal, including Khulna, Faridpur, Backhergunj and Barishal. On the east-
ern side the site was protected from invasion by the presence of an extensive 
salt lake, the swamps and marshes of which made it invulnerable to the enemy. 
Moreover, the cost of land acquisition was less because of the marshy environ-
ment. Hence, the economic logic for the commercial development of the Ganges 
valley gathered momentum (Ghosh et al. 1972: 8), making way for Kolkata’s 
urbanization.
Kolkata’s urbanization occurred in parallel with canal construction and 
marsh reclamation. The colonial history of excavation of canals (which finally 
evolved into the city’s Eastern Canal System: Inglis 1909: 1) and reclamation 
of marshes offers a unique insight into the growth of an expanding city. While 
the system emerged to make space for the colonial motive of interconnecting 
Kolkata with her hinterland, ensuring an unobstructed flow of raw materials 
and commodities to the city and the port, exploitation of economic opportuni-
ties was the most important factor behind Kolkata’s expansion as one of India’s 
largest urban centres. Inevitably, how to deal with the drainage and sewer-
age problem for the gradually expanding city became a major challenge. The 
Eastern Canal System, along with some additional cuts and excavations (which 
were then integrated into it), was built to drain the sewage into the saltwater 
marshes.
The first city drainage scheme directed waste water artificially into the River 
Hooghly (against the natural slope), and the river in turn provided drinking water 
to the city. This system failed in 1803, prompting the implementation of a new 
scheme. This involved an underground drainage system for disposing of sewage 
and stormwater through the same conduit into the saltwater swamps, which were 
then finally connected to the Bay of Bengal through the Bidyadhari River. The 
38 Jenia Mukherjee
stormwater flow (SWF) and dry weather flow (DWF) canals were constructed fol-
lowing a combined drainage system designed by William Clark, a sanitary engi-
neer and justice of the peace. The drainage scheme, comprising canals, sluices 
and bridges, and following the natural slope of the land,5 was completed by 1884 
(Ghosh and Sen 1987: 221; EKWMA 2010: 2).
It is important to note here that the Bidyadhari River acted as the outfall chan-
nel for the disposal of stormwater and sewage. The river rapidly showed signs 
of deterioration because the excavation and re-excavation of canals speeded 
up the process of silt deposition on the river bed. When it became absolutely 
defunct and was officially declared dead for both drainage and navigation in July 
1928, a serious deadlock occurred in the city’s drainage system. The immediate 
need was the implementation of an alternative outfall. The Kulti River seemed 
to be the only possible solution, and the Kulti Outfall Scheme was executed 
and commissioned in 1943. This led to a gradual transformation in the aquatic 
environment of the area from saline to non-saline; from saltwater marshes to 
sewage-fed freshwater wetlands. The Eastern Marshes were saline in nature, as 
the Bidyadhari River carried saline water from the Bay of Bengal and spilled 
over the low-lying area. The silting-up of the Bidyadhari River caused a decrease 
in the inflow of saline water. Moreover, with the decay of the river, sewage and 
stormwater came to be diverted into the saltwater lakes through canals, turning 
them into freshwater lakes. About 75 per cent of the total waste flows through the 
DWF and SWF channels from Bantala to Kulti (which is 22 km from Bantala); 
15 per cent of the waste is carried from the northern part by the Bagjola Canal 
and Krishnapur Canal; and in the south, the Tolly’s Canal carries 10 per cent of 
the additional discharge.
With this diversion in the discharge of the city, the salinity of the salt lakes 
dwindled from 800–1,200 to 500–600 parts per million. This turned the once 
profitable nona bheris (saltwater fisheries) into sewage-fed fisheries. The salt-
water marshes that existed 200 years back between the Hooghly and Bidyadhari 
rivers gave rise to the present EKW (Gupta 2005: 24). When the Kulti Outfall 
Scheme was implemented, an adequate water-head was raised for supplying sew-
age to most of these fishponds by gravity, which resulted in the extension of 
wastewater fishponds further east and south-east for about 8,000 hectares (Ghosh 
2005: 48).
Table 2.1 The Eastern Canal System: Excavated canals and the year of execution
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The EKW lies between the levee of the Hooghly River on the west and the 
Kulti River on the east, and is distributed nearly equally between the two sides 
of the DWF channel that reaches the river. This serves as the PUI of the city and 
is, in turn, used as an output and an input, for material produced and required by 
Kolkata (Ghosh 2005: 43). In short, both the urban area and its PUI, and the inter-
relationship and interdependence between the two, evolved as part of the colonial 
project of urbanization.
Free services versus colossal infrastructure: the recycling 
mechanism and present output from EKW
The EKW stretches over two districts, North and South 24 Parganas, and com-
prises 264 sewage-fed fisheries, agricultural land, garbage farms and some built-
up area (Kundu et al. 2008: 868).
Following the pattern of land use, the EKW has been classified into two cat-
egories, the core and non-core wetlands areas. The core wetlands area includes 
water bodies and the garbage recycling area, and the non-core wetlands area 
includes agricultural land and settlement, spanning both rural and urban areas 
(EKWMA 2010: 7).
EKW generates various forms of ecosystem services including provisioning, 
regulating and cultural services. It has a long history of sewage-fed piscicultural 
and agricultural practices using local traditional knowledge. Informal aqua farm-
ing started in the late eighteenth century. After the decline of the Bidyadhari River, 
wastewater fishing, horticulture and agriculture were established as opportunities 
by private entrepreneurs. When the wetlands were transformed from brackish 
water lakes to sewage-fed fish farms with greater economic potential, large areas 
were also converted for settlements and agricultural development. 
The most unique feature of EKW is the mechanism by which city sewage is 
treated and recycled into productive activities. The wetlands function as waste 
stabilization ponds (WSPs); sewage from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation 
(KMC) is treated in a series of contained pools in carefully managed conditions 
(Edwards 1992: 300). The canals function as anaerobic and facultative ponds 
and the fisheries act as maturation ponds. When the nutrient-rich effluent moves 
through the system, it is progressively cleaned and nutrients are redirected to the 
growth of algae or agricultural products grown along the pond edges. Solids are 
removed, composted and used to fertilize the surrounding fields. Algae and other 
aquatic plant materials are used to feed several fish species, which in turn create 
nitrogen and phosphorus-rich water to irrigate the adjacent rice fields (Jana 1998). 
Solar radiation is adequate for photosynthesis to occur. Solar energy is trapped by 
a dense population of plankton which is consumed by the fish. The fish not only 
maintain a proper balance of plankton population in the ponds but also convert 
the available nutrients in the wastewater into a readily consumable form (Kundu 
et al. 2008: 877). Here, nature and traditional knowledge mingle to create some-
thing unique and sustainable that could be applicable in other contexts. While 
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Figure 2.2 Waste recycling mechanism.
aquaculture can be described as a biological system, the wetlands function with 
additional inputs of fish seed, electricity, labour and a constant stream of waste-
water and stormwater (Carlisle 2013).
The resource recovery mechanism has been developed and nurtured by indig-
enous peri-urban communities over many decades using low-cost technologies 
that run contrary to ‘big technology’ engineering and scientific waste manage-
ment practices. Furthermore, the wetlands provide livelihood opportunities for 
these indigenous peri-urban communities. EKW is inhabited by 109 villages 
with a population of 150,000 (according to the household census of 2003). The 
fishers and farmers live on wetland produce and sell the surplus to city markets; 
74 per cent of the working population draw their sustenance from fish farming, 
agriculture and horticulture (EKWMA 2010: 24). The city receives nearly one 
third of its daily fish requirement from EKW, which is about 11,000 metric 
tonnes per annum, and the area also produces 150 metric tonnes of vegetables 
each day.
The EKW provides not only free provisioning services (fish, crops and vegeta-
bles), but also regulatory and cultural services in the form of control of water and 
air pollution, groundwater recharge and flood control, preservation of biodiversity 
and habitat, and recreational spaces for the urban and peri-urban population.
Dwindling wetlands, diminishing flows:  
post-colonial urbanization and development
The interaction between Kolkata and her PUI is at stake as the wetlands face 
major challenges from innumerable factors. These include:
 • Non-maintenance of water-bodies (bheris) and pollution: silting up of water 
bodies and canals, lack of infrastructure for aquaculture, lack of funds for 
maintenance of fisheries, irregular and insufficient water supply, lack of inte-
grated aquatic resource utilization, insufficient sewerage supply (seasonal), 
and discharge of domestic and tannery effluent in the fish ponds.
 • Non-availability of proper policies and legislation: unclear delineation of 
the wetland boundary, unclear land ownership, lack of development project 
assessment (environmental impact (EIA) and socio-economic), law and order 
problems, encroachment of water bodies leading to reduced employment, 
unscientific farming and harvesting because of union intervention, and lack 
of health and hygiene practices and education.
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 • Lack of awareness, abilities, rights and duties: absence of fishers’ rights, lack 
of awareness among non-users and planners of the benefits, lack of coor-
dination between the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and locals, lack of work culture, limited ability of poor communities to fight 
encroachment, weakness of fishers’ co-operatives, lack of recognition of 
fisheries as an industry.
However, a detailed investigation into these factors would show that mega- 
urbanization on the eastern part of the city since the post-independence period is 
the most severe threat to the wetlands, leading to shrinkage which in turn affects 
the urban/peri-urban interaction. This is the primary cause of the problem – all 
other problems flow from this.
West Bengal was flooded with a huge influx of people following Indian inde-
pendence in 1947, which was accompanied by the partition of the country into 
two separate states, India and Pakistan. Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal, 
experienced the most population pressure, and this led the then chief minister, 
Bidhan Ray, to speak in favour of Kolkata’s expansion through the rise of new 
townships. In 1956, it was proposed to establish the Salt Lake Township, at the 
cost of reclaiming the wetlands. In 1960, when 3.75 square miles of North Salt 
Lake was acquired, of the 58 fisheries of that area, 44 came to be sacrificed 
to meet the needs of the expanding city (Master Plan 1975). In the North Salt 
Lake area, 26 fisheries were taken over by the Salt Lake City housing complex 
alone, according to a report by the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority 
(KMDA) (KMDA 1976b). Between 1962 and 1967, 3,000 acres (approx.) of 
wetlands were filled up with silt from the Hooghly River to make way for major 
residential projects in Salt Lake City, and between 1967 and 1972 another 800 
acres were converted for the expansion of the city (Kundu et al. 2008: 878). In 
the 1970s, 1,650 acres and 600 acres were reclaimed for the development of 
new projects and townships such as East Kolkata Township and Patuli respec-
tively. In the 1980s, a part of the wetlands was encroached upon to make way 
for the construction of Eastern Metropolitan Bypass and Municipal Solid Waste 
Disposal Ground. 
There were protests and petitions against this changing pattern of land use, 
typically displaying the nature of middle-class urban environmentalism in 
Kolkata. In 1991, city-based NGOs took up the cause of wetlands protection 
and conservation along with other environmentally minded bureaucrats. This 
was the first incidence of a movement that had an explicitly environmental goal 
in the metropolitan area. It forced the state government to take public opinion 
into account in its urban planning for the very first time. Several cases were 
fought in both the High Court and the Supreme Court to conserve the EKW 
(Dembowski 2001: 84–142). In 1992, a writ petition was filed by People United 
for Better Living in Calcutta (PUBLIC), as a lead NGO (joined by four other 
city-based NGOs) in the Calcutta High Court. The petition demanded that the 
State of West Bengal and its officers be legally bound to protect the wetlands in 
accordance with the West Bengal Town and Country Planning Act, 1979, section 
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46(1), Article 51A of the Indian constitution, which says that protection of the 
environment is one of the vital duties of the citizens of the country, and Article 
21 of the constitution which implies the right to live in environmentally safe and 
pollution-free conditions.
The High Court delivered the verdict that ‘[t]here can’t be any matter of 
doubt that the Calcutta Wetlands present a unique ecosystem apart from the 
materialistic benefit to the society at large’ (Kundu et al. 2008: 879) and that 
no government or non-government body could reclaim any more wetlands. The 
Land Reforms Department and the Department of Environment, Government 
of West Bengal, identified 32 mouzas (local unit of land measurement) to be 
completely preserved as the waste recycling region of Kolkata. Following this, 
the land schedule and the report were sent to the Ramsar Convention, which 
then declared the EKW a Ramsar site (no. 1208) on 19 August 2002. A statutory 
authority called the East Kolkata Wetlands Management Authority (EKWMA), 
responsible for systematic implementation of wise use principles for the man-
agement of EKW, was set up under the East Kolkata Wetlands (Conservation 
and Management) Act in 2006.
But unfortunately, the Ramsar-designated 12,500 hectares, including 37 mou-
zas (five mouzas were later added), are also facing severe threats of rampant, 
unplanned urbanization. The EKW still suffers from ambiguous boundary defi-
nition and ownership. There is an immediate need to redraw the map of EKW, 
since no such effort has been made since 1985, and it is important to remove areas 
that have been urbanized, as this land-use change is irreversible (Niyogi and Ray 
2013). 
A Times of India (TOI) report said:
Though the wetlands enjoy the protection of court orders, legislations and 
international conventions, there is no real shield on the ground. In the past 10 
years, nearly 10 per cent of EKW has been converted into concrete. Another 
quarter of the wetlands are under threat. Land sharks use an old but ruthlessly 
effective method of walling up a part of the wetland and dumping tonnes of 
fly ash, concrete and garbage in the dead of night. Within weeks what was 
once a thriving bheri (fish pond) turns into dry land and the site for the next 
multi-storey.
(Niyogi and Ray 2013)
The most threatened mouzas are Paschim Chowbaga, Chowbagha, Chak Kolar 
Khal, Kharki, Bhagabanpur, Karimpur, Jagatipota, Ranabhutia, Atghara, 
Mukundapur and Thakdari. Moreover, numerous water bodies have also been 
converted into paddy cultivation. The availability of sewage is not governed by 
the demands of fishers who are the primary users of it, but largely skewed in 
favour of the needs of the metropolis. During the monsoons, when there is signifi-
cant waterlogging within the urban reaches of the city, the entire storm flows are 
flushed through the SWF to the Kulti River, leading to drastic declines in sewage 
flows by 60–80 per cent (EKWMA 2010: 21).
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Table 2.2 List of mouzas in the Ramsar-designated EKW area
District Police Station Sl no. Mouza Status
South 24 Parganas
























































































































*Indicates the most threatened mouzas.
Beyond the consumption city? The polemics of  
urban planning and development
In the developing world, a serious loss of agricultural land, forest land and wet-
lands has taken place on urban fringes over the past few decades, occasioned 
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by the tremendous growth of cities. Maintaining food production around urban 
areas is essential to the long-term survival of cities. Protecting these lands (and 
wetlands) from housing and industrial development and guaranteeing livelihood 
opportunities to the ecosystem-dependent communities are essential components 
in the development of successful strategies for urban food production (Furedy and 
Ghosh 1984). EKW is ‘one of the rare examples of environmental protection and 
development management where a complex ecological process has been adopted 
by the local farmers for mastering the resource recovery activities’ (Kundu 
et al. 2008: 869). But why did it face (and why is it still encountering) massive 
encroachment as a result of unplanned and uncontrolled urbanization on the east-
ern fringes of the city in spite of its tremendous importance? To understand this, 
it is imperative to look into the politico-economic forces that actually dictated 
the very pattern of Kolkata’s urbanization and development in the post-colonial 
period, strongly influenced by local and global events.
To reiterate the point: 
The patterns and processes of urbanization in the developing world have been 
so strongly stamped by their colonial history that the contemporary reality 
cannot be properly understood without an analysis of the factors that were 
induced in the system during the colonial period to meet the requirements of 
imperialist exploitation.
(Raza and Habeeb 1991: 49)
A three-stage model has been suggested for the economic and urban development 
of Kolkata (and also some other cities of India), characterized by distinct modes 
and relations of production and investment, policy and goals, and also distinct 
spatial forms. The stages are of a colonial economy during the first global period, 
a postcolonial (or command) economy during the nationalist period, and a post-
command/reform economy during the second global period (Chakravorty 2000: 
56–77).
Like many other port cities, Kolkata was created and colonized for colonial 
extraction and profit, to act as a point of trans-shipment of commodities and market 
for processed goods, and as a seat of administration. The urban layout and structure 
absolutely suited colonial needs and interests. As the main basis of the city was 
export trade, it was elaborately and inextricably connected and linked with Bengal 
and other parts of eastern India by canals, roads and railways. Urbanization was 
externally imposed to meet the needs of the colonial economy, ‘delinked from the 
developments in the rural areas’; a ‘colonially-induced urbanization . . . without 
roots’ (Dasgupta 1987: 278). While Kolkata grew as a port city and administrative 
centre, the rest of Bengal remained backward, agrarian-based, and neglected. The 
population remained highly concentrated in Kolkata and its periphery (Dasgupta 
1987: 279). In the immediate post-colonial nationalist phase ‘development’ as 
opposed to exploitation and extraction became predominant, with key ideas like 
import substitution, infant industry protection, balanced growth, self-sufficiency 
dominating the scene. In the present stage, like most of its ‘developing’ counterparts, 
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Kolkata has been reconnected to the global market following the failure of imports 
to substitute for industrialization in the south and the demand for new markets and 
production centres in the north (Chakravorty, 2000: 56–77).
Since the early 1990s India has followed the economic policies of the multilateral 
funding agencies, specifically structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and asso-
ciated privatization and commercialization of urban infrastructures (Mahadevia 
2001: 242–59). Environmental programmes for making Indian cities, including 
Kolkata (along with Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Delhi), more sustain-
able have been undertaken. With the support of the UK Overseas Development 
Agency (ODA) (now known as the Department for International Development, 
DfID), the first Calcutta Environment Management Planning Strategy and Action 
Plan (CEMSAP) was initiated in 1995–6; the documents produced by CEMSAP 
were later used, at least partially, for improvement of the environment in the city. 
The Kolkata Environment Improvement Project (KEIP) was initiated in 2002 
under the Sustainable City Programme (SCP), with the improvement of canals 
(including those carrying the sewage into the EKW) and solid waste management 
being important components of the project.6 KEIP also stressed the treatment of 
sewage discharged into the DWF to increase the productivity of EKW fisheries. 
But in spite of the constant claims that it was a success story, most of its provisions 
have not been implemented, and of what has so far been implemented, the qual-
ity of implementation has been poor. This is an Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
funded project with an estimated cost of US$ 220 million. The external agencies 
have exerted a strong influence on official programmes and the city has fallen into 
a debt trap without any actual improvement of its urban infrastructure.
The duality and ambiguity in urban planning can be traced back to the forma-
tion of the KMDA in 1970 and the publication of the Development Perspective 
Plan in 1976, which emphasized a polycentric model of development along the 
east–west spatial growth axis of the city. This itself violated the earlier Basic 
Development Plan (BDP) of 1966, which focused on a bi-nodal strategy along 
a north–south urban development axis (KMPO 1966; KMDA 1976a). Since the 
implementation of DPP, the eastern periphery of Kolkata – the PUI – has become 
a space for real-estate speculation. The KMDA tried to attract private invest-
ment for projects aimed at the development of commercial complexes and market 
areas.7 Although the next major plan of 1990, Plan for Metropolitan Development 
1990–2015, generated warnings about the negative implications of the east-centric 
urban sprawl, development projects and urban expansion continued in the same 
manner at the cost of the city’s wetlands (KMDA 1990). It is clear from the plan-
ning reports that the actual purpose of this pattern of urban expansion is to capital-
ize on the enormous development potential in the vast stretch of undeveloped land 
on the city’s eastern fringes.
Conclusion
The dominant literature on urbanization and its present challenges focuses on 
the hardware of cities (built city infrastructure: transportation systems, housing, 
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water works, sanitation, slums and so on). Scholars (especially urban sociolo-
gists) also seem to be concerned about the software of cities (as centres of creativ-
ity and lifestyle, involving culture and learning institutions and so on). But very 
little is written about the ecological infrastructure of cities which involves their 
wider ecosystems (Sukhdev 2013: v). A focus on the third aspect, reflecting more 
on the ecology ‘of’ cities rather than ecology ‘in’ cities (McDonnell 2011) can 
be an important approach to address the global discourse on urbanization and 
sustainability.
Urban places have to be studied as integrated components of long-term resil-
ience. The urban includes much more than a particular density of people or area 
covered by built structures; it has to be considered as a complex socio-ecological 
system. Without such approach, important feedback mechanisms would remain 
invisible, misinforming policy and action. A redefinition of urban sustainability 
through the reintroduction of the social-ecological perspective would make invis-
ible feedbacks and connections visible (Elmqvist et al. 2013: 14). The historical 
methodology (including historical analogy, forecasting, backcasting and so on) 
is extremely useful not only to identify the present challenges of urbanization 
(within the larger global context) but also to explore the potentials and opportuni-
ties for a particular city. Critical exploration and examination of the complexities 
of taming and untaming becomes essential to recognize and understand the com-
plex making and remaking of the urban Anthropocene at multiple levels, includ-
ing the different visions of the different actors in the social hierarchy regarding 
‘preservation’, ‘restoration’ and most importantly ‘improvement’ of city and its 
natural environment. 
When I look into the canals of Kolkata, which seem to be taking their last 
gasps, and visit the still remaining watery world of EKW in the midst of lush 
greenery, I deeply feel the need for sustenance for these lifelines of the city; the 
need for re-embedding the infrastructure of Kolkata within its wider ecosystems. 
As far as this particular case study is concerned, the survival of both the urban 
and the peri-urban completely depends on the continuation of their mutual inter-
dependence through the proper functioning of sustainable flows between the city 
and its periphery.
Notes
1  Population Reference Bureau www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2007/UrbanPopTo 
BecomeMajority.aspx (accessed 25 May 2014).
2  According to the latest census of India (2011), Greater Mumbai with a population 
of 18,414,288 continues to be India’s biggest city, followed by Delhi (16,314,838) 
and Kolkata (14,112,536).
3  The wetlands are known as the East Kolkata Wetlands, and the nomenclature is owing 
to Dhrubajyoti Ghosh, an environmental engineer, who first discovered and documented 
the resource recovery features of the landscape. 
4  India achieved independence on 15 August 1947.
5  The city had a natural eastwards elevation. The wetlands were nearly 8.5 ft (2.6 metres) 
below the highest point of the city.
Sustainable flows between Kolkata and its PUI 47
6 www.keip.in/bl3/
7  It is important to mention here that in 1973 the International Development Association 
(IDA), a soft-loan associate of the World Bank, agreed to provide financial assistance for 
44 out of 100 ongoing schemes under KMDA. The credit package amounted to US$ 35 
million. IDA–I marked the beginning of a series of such credits for the development of 
Kolkata. The 278 crores rupees allocated for the Five-Year investment plan (1979–83) 
included World Bank assistance of US$ 87 million for a package of projects under IDA–
II (Roy and Roy 1990).
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3 On being smart about cities
Seven considerations for a new  
urban planning and design
Maarten A. Hajer
Smart cities or smart urbanism
Cities periodically experience transitions. There have been at least two in the past 
200 years. In the nineteenth century, Western cities transitioned from medieval to 
industrial city structures. In Europe, motivated by taming discourses derived from 
the logic of industrialism, city planners tore down the city walls to make way for 
a new infrastructure of factories, railways and housing. They installed elaborate 
sanitary infrastructures to combat diseases. In the twentieth century, the invention 
of the car initiated a second transition. This time motivated by the taming potential 
of urban modernity, the resultant large-scale readjustments resulted in ring roads, 
high-rise tower blocks, central business districts and the ‘suburb’. Today, there is 
a need, some argue, to re-tame the city by making a transition to eco-efficient city 
structures, or what some technology companies refer to as ‘smart cities’.
The taming discourse of the ‘smart city’ promises an era of innovative urban 
planning. Information and communication technology (ICT) drives the discourse, 
aiming to make cities safer, cleaner and more efficient. Smart cities will then be 
able to ‘sense’ behaviour via ‘big data’ and use this feedback to manage urban 
dynamics. City planning will then become a continuous experiment, with cities 
serving as ‘living labs’ for new products and services. The optimism of this new 
taming discourse is captivating, but requires critical interrogation.
This chapter aims to assess whether this idea of smart cities possibly contrib-
utes to the quest for the sustainable and resilient urban system we need. It reflects 
on the motivations for and challenges of past transitions to appreciate the untame-
able complexity and multifaceted nature of urban transitions that the smart city 
discourse may be ignoring.
Urbanization is always the outcome of a process of discourse formation in 
which coalitions shape up and solidify around particular agendas, approaches and 
technologies. In that sense, studying smart cities is of paramount importance. It is 
a taming discourse that may well influence city development in the years to come.
What is new is that we now need to think about urbanization as a global 
phenomenon. Demographic calculations suggest that up to 70 per cent of peo-
ple will live in cities by 2050, with most new urbanization taking place in Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa. The reports of global consultancies such as the Boston 
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Consultancy Group agree with the World Bank’s mind-boggling estimates of the 
US$30 to $50 trillion required in urban infrastructure investment over the next 20 
years. This investment would extend infrastructure in the developing world and 
retrofit existing infrastructure in the developed world, some of which dates back 
to the nineteenth century.
While the consulting companies generate seemingly ‘scientific’ estimates of 
investment potential to activate the major financial institutions to participate in 
the new taming discourses aimed at modernizing rapid urbanisation, the smart 
city agenda suggests a way to spend this money. It proposes a digital upgrade 
to increase city efficiency without much reference to equity and social justice. It 
gives us a sense of déjà vu. The discourse of the modern, functional city that dom-
inated twentieth-century planning promised a healthy urban life for all, with free-
flowing traffic and electricity ‘too cheap to meter’, yet was not able to deliver. 
When it comes to smart cities, future possibilities look enticing but past failures 
are ignored because of the durability of suspect assumptions about how easily the 
city can be tamed.
The important debate on the future of cities deserves to be grounded in an 
understanding of the history of urbanism and the complexity of taming and 
untaming dynamics. This understanding can help frame a resilient and shared 
vision, without which investment is likely to flow into short-term agendas based 
on outdated twentieth-century urban planning practices.
Alternatively, if ‘urban metabolism’ is placed at the centre of the analysis, the 
potential for a harmonious transition becomes questionable. This chapter examines 
how we can infuse the smart city discourse with an understanding of the natural 
flows and particular histories of cities, their potential governance and institutional 
models, and the possibilities of organizing learning, both in and between cities. 
It argues that we need a ‘smart urbanism’ – a body of thought on urbanism that 
is powerful, integrative, action-oriented and sufficiently cognizant of the fact that 
there are severe limits to what can in fact be tamed in the rapidly expanding and 
transforming cities of the world.
The smart city as discourse
Urbanization is a crucial challenge for the twenty-first century. More people will 
urbanize in the next 40 to 50 years than in the last 200, according to the World 
Bank (Hoornweg and Freire 2013). This implies that in ‘just 40 years cities will 
need to build the infrastructure for an additional 2.7 billion people’ (2013: 125). 
China wants to rehouse 250 million people from rural areas to cities by 2030 
(OECD 2013). The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 
estimates that African cities will house an additional 800 million people by 2050 
(OECD 2013: 33). This raises serious infrastructural challenges in terms of trans-
portation, water and wastewater, solid waste and energy.
The notion of smart cities has emerged in this context from the major global 
technology companies as a logical way forward. According to the World Bank 
publication, applying smart city technologies could reduce carbon dioxide 
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emissions by 7.8 gigatonnes by 2020 (Hoornweg and Freire 2013: 9). To put 
this figure in context, in 2012 US national emissions were 5,194 megatonnes and 
China’s were 9,864 megatonnes (Olivier et al. 2013). However, while combining 
the full effects of applying smart technology looks impressive on paper, imple-
mentation faces political and physical challenges that the smart city discourse 
hardly ever recognizes.
In policy and politics, often smart cities are understood as a set of devices, pro-
posals and instruments to be adopted, installed and operated. Policy-makers see 
this as a programme that opens up space for corporate entities to sell technological 
solutions. These solutions would address problems such as health, traffic conges-
tion, energy supply, water supply, waste management and environmental qual-
ity. This top-down and centralized perspective is then typically criticized from 
a bottom-up perspective, which focuses on ‘smart citizens’ and open platforms 
(Townsend 2013; Greenfield and Kim 2013). The debate risks getting caught in a 
dichotomy where a priori value preferences (‘small is beautiful’ or ‘big problems 
require integrated solutions’) determine the stance of various actors.
Real change comes about through the emergence of a coalition of forces that 
creates the necessary persuasive power. Actors in the coalition agree on a strategic 
orientation and share a language for discussing cities. They do not necessarily 
agree on all the details. ‘Smart cities’ can be represented as such a discourse, as a 
way of seeing and talking that highlights some aspects of the urban reality while 
phasing out those realities that are inconvenient, in particular the affordability of 
the envisaged urban systems for those who are not formally employed.
Discourse is defined as ‘an ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts and catego-
rizations through which meaning is allocated to social and physical phenomena, 
and which is produced and reproduced in an identifiable set of practices’ (Hajer 
2009: 59–60). In this sense, Keynesianism or neoliberalism is a discourse, as both 
offer ways of seeing that became institutionalized into rules and routines. This is 
why discourse analysis postulates that language matters. Through language ‘some 
issues are organized into politics while others are organized out’ (Schattschneider 
1960). In this way discourses become the tools for how the taming of the city 
is organised. Counter-hegemonic discourses, however, give expression to that 
which cannot be tamed by the process of ‘organizing out’ inconvenient truths. 
When it comes to smart cities as a taming discourse, concepts such as ‘smart 
grids’, ‘big data’, ‘efficiency’, ‘infrastructure’, ‘system’ and ‘information’ domi-
nate. This highlights the first key aspect of the smart cities discourse – it is a 
managerial project with a focus on using ICT to solve urban problems. This domi-
nance of ICT leads urbanist Mark Swilling to view the ‘smart city’ discourse as a 
form of ‘algorithmic urbanism’ (see Chapter 2).
Second, smart cities are typically discussed in new, cross-over fora in which 
business, government and knowledge institutes find each other. These meetings 
are important, as this is where the imagination of the possible futures shapes up.
Third, smart cities are oriented to a particular organizational idea featuring 
public–private partnerships. This has implications for how consumers pay for 
their urban services. A ‘pay per use’ approach will replace ‘public works’ financed 
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via taxation (Graham and Marvin 2001). While this provides an excellent private 
business proposition, the process neglects to examine how particular understand-
ings of the ‘smart city’ relate to existing governance systems or civil society.
Fourth, smart city discourse approaches innovation primarily as a technologi-
cal matter. It does not discuss the very conditions under which transition has to 
occur. The importance of looking at conditionalities has emerged strongly in one 
of the first comprehensive studies of a ‘smart cities’ partnership, the T-City in the 
German city of Friedrichshafen (Hatzelhoffer et al. 2012).
Fifth, smart city discourse is notably weak on the history of urbanism. Pointing 
at ‘efficient’ solutions is not new; the question is why technical solutions were 
often not seen as preferable and most had undesirable unintended consequences 
when implemented.
When it comes to cities, there can be no fixed solutions. The notion that the city 
is untameable suggests that urban politics is about making difficult choices, often 
after lengthy (often unpredictable) public consultation processes (Barber 1984; 
Hajer 2009). For the advocates of smart cities the challenge may lie in avoiding 
the dichotomy between the taming intent of ‘big’ tech solutions and the untaming 
dynamics of bottom-up participatory planning. What is undeniable is that we can-
not continue to build cities on the default twentieth-century model that assumed 
centralized control via large public and private bureaucracies. Today, govern-
ments are also more vulnerable, and lack the authority, legitimacy and funding to 
‘bend the trend’. We may need to invent and define a mode of collaborative smart 
urbanism through debate that recognises that the city can only be tamed to a point, 
beyond which a much more complex world exists – this more so than ever before.
Previous city transitions
The sanitary reform movement
The problems faced by contemporary cities, while daunting, are not without 
precedent. The period from the mid-nineteenth century onwards is particularly 
instructive, as in this era cities began to install public infrastructure. The first 
sanitary survey of New York City took place in 1864:
The inspectors wrote about overflowing privies, slime-covered streets filled 
with horse manure, and slaughterhouses and fat-boiling establishments dis-
persed among overcrowded tenements. One inspector reported that blood and 
liquid animal remains flowed for two blocks down 39th Street from a slaugh-
terhouse to the river.
(Pizzi 2002)
Cities such as London, Paris and Berlin faced similar consequences of slum life. 
To tame these cities, city governments cleared the slums, installed sewage sys-
tems and provided good drinking water. This eventually put an end to frequent 
epidemics of typically urban diseases in Western cities.
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With hindsight, the installation of this infrastructure seems a coherent exercise. 
However, the process involved political conflict, resistance from vested interests 
and coalition-building. Social reformers such as Edwin Chadwick and Charles 
Booth put the issue on the agenda, and journalists spread the message to a wider 
audience. Governments began to investigate the challenge. Those with vested 
interests were only persuaded once comprehensive statistical work showed the 
need for sanitation infrastructure. In effect, infrastructural works on both sides 
of the Atlantic resulted from a ‘sanitary movement’ discourse coalition that com-
bined the social issue of urban blight (ethical values) with installation of new 
infrastructure (technical considerations).
This new sanitation discourse inspired planners and designers to envision alter-
native city futures. People such as Frederick Law Olmsted, Ebenhezer Howard and 
Patrick Geddes responded to the call for more liveable cities, and each invented 
forms of city planning designed to reconnect the city to its natural environment 
in ways that effectively allowed cities to tame the ecosystems upon which they 
depended (see Chapter 2 for how this worked in Kolkata). The possibility of a 
more harmonious world inspired their designs. While their influence was never 
direct, their ideas became elements in the discourse. These elements were shaped 
further by political ideology, new technological inventions and choices of organi-
zational form. For example, Howard’s garden city idea paved the way for the 
suburb, but stripped it of his societal idealism.
The history of the sanitary movement of the nineteenth century illustrates 
that technological solutions cannot be isolated from the broader socio-political 
dynamics that shaped responses to the public problems of the day.
The modern city
The ‘modern’ movement dominated urban planning in the 1920s, epitomized in the 
work of the Swiss/French architect Le Corbusier and influenced by thinkers such 
as Siegfried Giedion, Walter Gropius, Bruno Taut and J. J. P. Oud. Planners and 
designers used new materials and methods of construction, such as steel, concrete 
and prefabricated materials, as well as modern styles, to create higher buildings. 
The modern movement continued to aspire to the ‘garden city’ notion and socially 
utopian ideals. By linking architecture to urban planning, the movement could use 
new materials to overcome public health problems and show ways to improve liv-
ing conditions. There was an emphasis on differentiating spaces for working, living 
and leisure – each according to tightly defined codes aimed at effectively tam-
ing the unruly and (in certain parts of the world) potentially revolutionary popular 
classes. In modernist planning, nature was rigidly conceptualized so it could be 
ruthlessly tamed. Planning focused primarily on air quality and adequate lighting.
The possibilities of science provided the foundation for the modern movement, 
which proclaimed the ‘functional city’ as a solution to the urban problems of the 
day. The movement used survey and statistical analysis to find efficient solutions, 
with an emphasis on zoning, rather than detailed design. Cities, with some excep-
tions, have never taken up these solutions in their entirety.
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Technological development and social critique outpaced modernist design. 
Prospects for the urban world also changed after the Second World War. The mass 
availability of the car created new transport issues in cities (see Berman 1983). 
Urban planners such as Robert Moses were active in a complicated discourse 
coalition that included real estate interests, mobility management concerns and 
bureaucratic strife between different agencies.
The modern movement relied on its strong ties to city governments, and 
employed a persuasive narrative linking the application of the latest technolo-
gies and the realization of political interests. Just as the dystopia of urban blight 
propelled the nineteenth-century sanitation movement, the utopian vision of a 
clean and dispersed car-based city captured the imagination of political elites. The 
imposition of this modernist format tamed cities in their very essence, diminishing 
them as untamed places of exchange, of inspiration and openness.
Following the Second World War, city planners restructured cities to accom-
modate the car. The emergence of the car as a means of mass transport extended 
the socio-spatial scope of modern planning projects. It was also at this time that 
planners conceived of highway systems. The mobility provided by the car allowed 
people to live further away from work. The car enabled the materialization of the 
‘suburb’, which became a cornerstone of the ‘American dream’ promising a new 
way of life for the middle class that became an aspiration for people all over the 
world. 
Europeans saw ‘suburbanization’ as urban sprawl, and attempted to guide 
the overflow into newly constructed cities, such as Milton Keynes in the United 
Kingdom. These new cities connected to the main urban centres through pri-
oritized public transport systems. The regional scope of the city found its new 
expression.
The story of the modern city is told mostly through descriptions of organized 
housing and transport systems. However, most modern post-war cities were sup-
plied by centralized, fossil fuel-based energy systems that generated electricity 
and delivered it to homes via a grid.
The transition to the modern city illustrates how twentieth-century urban 
development was the product of a discourse coalition in which planners and 
designers only played one part in the taming of the city. The idealism of the 
modernist planner must be seen in the context of continued economic growth, 
the motor industry’s push to make cars consumer goods, and the emergence of 
a broadly shared sense of a good life related to suburban living. Resource use 
and waste were not taken into account, as much of this happened outside of city 
perimeters. 
Cities in the Anthropocene
Until recently, nature has functioned as a useful hinterland for cities, providing the 
necessary building materials, fuels, water and food. Simultaneously, nature also 
functioned as a sink to clear away our waste and emissions. The nature–society 
nexus has now become dysfunctional.
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Cities run on fossil energy, which causes global warming; they extract too 
much drinking water and do not recoup wastewater and nutrients; and they pile 
up waste in landfills. The modern system allows non-renewable resources, such 
as phosphorus and nitrogen, to flow into rivers and seas, causing environmental 
havoc, and throws away precious metals into landfills.
In the early 1990s, Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen suggested that our industrial 
way of living had geological consequences. He coined the term ‘the Anthropocene’ 
to express this (Crutzen 2002). Subsequent work by Rockström, Steffen and oth-
ers reinforced this claim. The human species is crossing planetary boundaries 
(Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2004) in terms of climate change, biodiver-
sity loss and the nitrogen cycle, and is at risk of crossing others. It is now impor-
tant to rethink how cities function based on the acceptance of natural limits to the 
way they use resources.
The failure to conceptualize the relation between the city and the natural 
environment in metabolic terms was one of the tragedies of twentieth-century 
planning. While the early 1920s planner Patrick Geddes followed an integrated 
approach to the city and its hinterland, the subsequent modernist influence was 
oriented to growth and driven by a belief in the superiority of engineering and 
science. Most twentieth-century cities are locked into fossil fuel-based infrastruc-
tures, and this lock-in is institutionally embedded, making it difficult to transition 
to an ecologically benign metabolism. Scientists speak of ‘nexus’ problems in 
which issues around climate change, energy consumption, land use and biodiver-
sity loss are fundamentally intertwined. A metabolic approach brings out those 
connections.
The tragedy is that urbanization patterns in the new cities of the global South 
are mostly following the default trajectory of the West. This is most apparent in 
the cities of China. The ‘airpocalypse’ in Beijing and other cities creates serious 
health hazards, affects agricultural production and negatively affects the economy 
(Guardian 2014). The decontextual high-rise developments in African and Asian 
cities follow this model more broadly.
Somehow the cities of the global South must find ways to leapfrog using avail-
able knowledge and technology and ways to reconfigure the urban metabolism 
of cities. Countries in the West introduced environmental protection and mitiga-
tion measures in the 1970s; however, the cities of the global South have not been 
allowed to leapfrog and they are now experiencing the same problems, but on a 
grander scale. For example, 3 billion people in the world still drink poor-quality 
water, and in India, only 160 out of 8,000 towns have both a sewerage system and 
a sewage treatment plant (Biswas and Brabeck 2014).
Smart urbanism: an agenda for planning and design
We are currently experiencing a discursive shift to create the new practices of 
twenty-first-century planning and design. In discourse analysis, we differenti-
ate between ‘discourse structuration’ and ‘discourse institutionalization’ (Hajer 
1995: 60–1).
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Discourse structuration describes the process in which a particular way of 
understanding reality settles and becomes generally accepted. At this point, a 
particular sense of problems and solutions emerges. This discourse may become 
the new ‘normal’, and become institutionalized in new rules and routines, in 
laws, in new business models, in new roles for actors, and even in newly shared 
values.
Moments of discursive shift are moments of opportunity. The old institutional-
ized power relationships give way to debate. New actors often appear to discuss 
new issues in crossover fora. This is what is happening around the notion of a 
‘smart city’. 
Let me share seven considerations that help smart city planning and design to 
break free from the assumption that it will be relatively easy and painless to tame 
the city.
‘Decoupling’ as the strategic orientation
In the next decades, we will need to decouple the rising prosperity of the city 
from ever-increasing resource use. For instance, we need to create our wealth 
using about a tenth of current greenhouse gas emissions. The UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) International Resource Panel (IRP) Decoupling Report 
(UNEP 2013a) has brought this perspective into a wider urban agenda. 
Decoupling is a major break from the current ‘urbanization by default’ pattern, 
but if it is not achieved, cities will face increasing pollution, rising emissions, 
congestion and rising input costs, as prices absorb the downstream effects of 
resource depletion.
A persuasive story line about the future
Planning theorist James Throgmorton described planning as ‘persuasive story 
telling about the future’. He argued that the essence of planning was not about 
ends and means, ordering and organization; rather, it was about a vision, a persua-
sive story with generative capacity. This persuasive story informs plan-making, 
restructuring, organizing and logistics (Throgmorton 1996) and confirms the cen-
tral thesis of this book, namely that success today depends on ensuring that eve-
ryone is involved at all times. 
We need new, persuasive ideas for the city that mobilize actors and resources, 
and that give city governors the confidence to make changes. The ‘smart city’ 
discourse mobilizes positive energy among elites, but it lacks a connection to the 
broader social reform agenda. Reconceptualizing the city must take into account 
the need for environmental sustainability, social justice and resilience to future 
shock. Smart technologies must enable cities to stay within a ‘safe operating 
space’ in terms of planetary boundaries; in addition, this space must be socially 
just (Raworth 2012). How to fuse these two ‘spaces’ is the heart of current debate 
on sustainable development goals. Creating separate goals for cities offers a way 
of linking urban development to the broader normative debate.
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Smart cities are related to the concrete aspects of urban planning and policy-
making, allowing for enhanced efficiency. This translates into the city being 
cheaper and easier to navigate, explore and exploit, as well as cheaper and easier 
to manage. Smart urbanism calls for a language that expresses more than effi-
ciency and technology.
Urban metabolisms as a framework for strategic decision-making
Some aspects of good city life are very visible, while the metabolism of a city – the 
constant flow of inputs and outputs – is almost invisible. These metabolic flows 
comprise water, energy and food (UNEP 2013a; Ferrao and Fernandez 2013), 
building materials and wastes, among others. Inefficient metabolic systems will 
be vulnerable to the inevitable price effects of predicted resource scarcity, and 
they are likely to lead to negative feedback loops, such as smog.
Even the global North lacks statistics on its cities’ inputs and outputs. Initiatives 
such as the Large Urban Areas Compendium by the World Bank and the Global 
City Indicators Facility are therefore timely (Hoornweg and Freire 2013; GCIF 
2014).
Understanding urban metabolism calls for a focus on potential, on trans-
formation and on transition, as well as on monitoring and evaluation. It is a 
multi- and trans-disciplinary effort involving designers, planners, scientists and 
policy-makers.
Focus on the default in infrastructure
Connecting smart city discourse to a sustainable urban metabolism provides the 
discourse with a purpose. The IRP identified the crucial role of urban infrastruc-
ture as ‘to promote resource efficiency and decoupling at the city level, as well as 
well-being and access to services of their citizens’ (UNEP 2013b: 7).
Infrastructure is a deeply problematic field from a governance point of view, 
as it is mostly sunk, covered and static. It is the result of decades, sometimes 
centuries, of cumulative investment. Maintaining and changing infrastructure 
is complex because it is used daily. However, existing infrastructure sets the 
default via the existing hardware of urban networks and via the software that 
determines how we use them. Smart technology can contribute to change via the 
latter, as it is easier to change the way we use, for example, the roads than the 
roads themselves.
Rules and ownership of infrastructure present challenges. Policy-makers need 
to reflect on the social consequences of the rules they adopt. For example, smart 
meters and smart grids might serve citizens, but privilege companies.
The days of blueprint urban planning and development are over. A large part 
of the predicted urbanization will take place in weak states with low regulatory 
capacity. Peer-to-peer learning could compensate for this lower capacity for stra-
tegic forward planning. Decoupling might be more about learning and copying 
than about elaborate bureaucratic planning.
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Beyond the notion of a ‘smart city from a box’
The idea of ‘smart cities from a box’ – generic concepts that are imposed on 
cities – will not work because cities are inherently untameable. Experimental cit-
ies such as Songdo in South Korea, Masdar in the United Arab Emirates and 
Dongtan in China have not lived up to their sustainability promises. They are the 
twenty-first-century equivalents to Brasilia, Abuja, Melbourne and Chandigarh, 
and clearly demonstrate what happens when governments plan for sustainabil-
ity, but use outdated twentieth-century concepts (Kuecker 2013; Townsend 2013; 
Ferrao and Fernandez 2013: 131 ff.; Premalatha et al. 2013).
Engineers cannot decouple resource use and rates of economic growth in 
cities on their own, as technology and society are linked in complicated ways. 
For example, a car cannot be analysed as technology in isolation; it feeds into a 
broader system encompassing motorways, parking garages and out-of-town shop-
ping malls to create the very idea of the commuter lifestyle. It is also central to 
a powerful industrial complex that creates jobs, generates knowledge and drives 
innovation. The importance of placing technologies in context cannot be overes-
timated. Social innovations can often bring about change. Examples of untamed 
technological innovations in the social sphere include community websites that 
organize sharing of tools in services.
It is most likely that a new blend of social innovations, new technologies and 
new business models will provide the disruptive force required to shift the domi-
nant modern system.
A new open and collaborative politics
The notion that the twenty-first century will be shaped by ‘decisive acts’ by an 
elected city council is misguided. Innovation in the spheres of technology and 
social forms of organization outpaces the capacities of classical-modernist forms 
of government to implement taming strategies (cf. Hajer 2009, ch.1).
In Seeing like a State (1998), anthropologist James Scott studied the failure of 
schemes aimed at improving the human condition. He noted that when a state is 
overconfident in its reliance on science and technology and a civil society is too 
weak to raise questions or provide resistance, the state implements disconnected 
plans. These plans then place an undue burden on the state to execute the scheme, 
which often results in the adoption of authoritarian methods. This weakens the 
possibilities of joint implementation and learning.
Smart urbanism is about constant learning, inspiration,  
measuring, analysing and readjusting
It is necessary to rethink how public administrations operate within increasingly 
complex untameable environments. A well-educated civil society raises astute 
questions and demands, and the classical ‘decide, announce, defend’ model is 
vulnerable in a world of constant learning. ICT brings ‘protoprofessionalization’ 
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within reach of many, and governments now face an ‘energetic society’ (Hajer 
2011) that they can either embrace or antagonize. The art of urban planning must 
become the process of facilitating the untamed intelligence of a given city’s 
citizens.
The ideas of John Dewey and the subsequent writings of Don Schon on learning, 
and the rethinking of public policy by authors like Majone and Wildavsky, who 
saw implementation as a phase of continuous learning (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984), align with the notion of an untamed ‘energetic society’ enhanced by access 
to and use of technology.
It is by no means obvious that cities will follow this track. The alternative 
option is that governments follow the established classical modernist model and 
aim for big contracts with a single party or a consortium of parties. It would then 
be easier to control upgrades of city infrastructure in terms of contract and per-
formance measurement, but most likely far more difficult to learn and readjust.
Elsewhere I have argued for radical incrementalism in using the enhanced col-
lective intelligence of cities to move towards a sustainable future without resort-
ing to traditional tools to tame the city (Hajer 2011). This requires an open format 
to stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit. It assumes that infrastructure is conceived 
as a backbone to ‘new’ city life and that there are possibilities for continuous 
learning on that backbone. For example, open fibre-optic cable networks could 
facilitate entrepreneurs in providing new services.
It is important to consider the governance of infrastructure transitions. We 
need a strong coalition to make the transition; however, the organizations cur-
rently promoting smart cities are so powerful that they often exclude citizens from 
the process. Amsterdam’s ‘smart city’ agenda provides an interesting blend of 
high-end, high-tech interventions and a scattered set of experiments that involve 
citizens, along with collaborative projects that implement decoupling at street 
level (ASC 2014).
Collaborative governance implies openness to different outcomes. It is not 
effective if viewed solely as a tool to facilitate the implementation of a fixed 
set of predetermined goals. True coalition-building allows participants a voice, 
which then leads to creative conceptualization and implementation. It may seem 
counterintuitive as the process adds complexity, but this allows collaborative gov-
ernance to find the best solutions. This, in turn, reinvigorates the idea of local 
democracy and demonstrates how to work with rather than against the untamed 
dynamics of the city.
Create a globally networked urbanism
The task of the twenty-first century might be to recognize the inherent untame-
ability of the city by bringing back the ideal of cities as places of exchange, inspi-
ration, social mobility, enhanced quality of life, inclusion and connectedness to 
nature.
As stated previously, the twenty-first-century city cannot work from a lin-
ear blueprint model. We can now use complex learning networks to speed up 
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the sharing of information. Examples of emerging horizontal networks include 
C40 Cities, ICLEI, UN Global Compact, Global Initiative for Resource Efficient 
Cities, and the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP) Sustainable 
Urbanization Initiative. But these fora need to spend more time on actual policy 
analysis showing why certain interventions worked and under what preconditions.
Given current challenges, cities need to be able to adapt, readjust, copy and add 
on to existing practices and knowledge. Modernist thinking relied on coordination, 
with a linear division between thinking (science), deciding (politics) and execu-
tion (implementation). In contrast, it is more likely that city-level decoupling will 
be achieved if key actors stage (creative) ‘co-opetition’, which would encourage 
cities to excel, but also encourage them to share experiences and knowledge.
A global networked urbanism requires the development of a science of ‘trans-
plantation’. This would help identify the conditions under which schemes such as 
smart grids, rapid bus transit systems and solid waste management systems are 
successful, and their potential for replication.
The exciting possibilities presented by big data can obscure the importance 
of political debate, urban conflict and the expression of interests. Deliberative 
policy-making (see Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) aims to connect these issues.
It is most likely that twenty-first-century planning will not be about figurehead 
personalities, but rather about networks. Smart city urbanism is most likely to 
succeed if, as a configuration, it can constantly change and adjust. In a sense, it 
should not be a top-down techno-fix but rather a project of projects, creating the 
conditions for ongoing learning, reflection and adjustment through analysis and 
knowledge-sharing.
Conclusion
City-level decoupling is arguably the task of the century. The sanitary reform 
movement of the nineteenth century provides a sense of what is required to 
bring about the required shift, as does twentieth-century urban modernism. Both 
involved coalition-building to achieve specific goals. The current transition will 
need a broad engagement, ‘a social movement that enlists science, the humanities, 
and us all to address the challenges we face building a planet of cities that can 
survive’ (Townsend 2013: 320). To achieve this, the smart city discourse needs 
to connect to a societal context and correct its current technocratic orientation by 
recognizing that there are severe limits to what can be tamed. While cities contrib-
ute the most to carbon dioxide emissions and resource use, they are also the most 
capable of innovation and change. 
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4 Is big sustainable? 
Global comparison of city emissions
Dominik Reusser, Anna-Lena Winz  
and Diego Rybski
Introduction
Human activities have become an important driver of changes in the geochemical 
cycles of the earth, altering flows of water, nutrients and greenhouse gases (GHG). 
As discussed in the Introduction, the term Anthropocene has been proposed for 
this new geological age (Crutzen 2006). There is no doubt that these changes are 
unsustainable and are causing or will cause damage to the ecosystem and society. 
In fact, there have been calls for a reconfiguration because we are transgressing 
or have transgressed important boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009) and are uti-
lizing more than one Earth for our current way of living (e.g. Wackernagel and 
Rees 2013). Furthermore, not only do the environmental limits indicate a need for 
change; the steadily increasing costs of most resources (Dobbs et al. 2011) also 
demonstrate the need for a transition to sustainability.
Urban living is well suited to address the necessary change for three main 
reasons. First, it can host sociocultural experiments that can act as a catalyst for 
innovation. Second, ever more people are living in cities. Third, in cities mate-
rial flows are concentrated and energy intensity is high, so change is particularly 
important in this type of environment.
In view of the sustainability challenge,1 we can ask whether larger cities are 
more efficient because of better utilization of infrastructure, shorter distances or 
created co-benefits (Dodman 2009). An alternative view is less commonly dis-
cussed: smaller cities could be considered more sustainable because of reduced 
pressure on local ecosystem services and less need to import products from dis-
tant places, leading to the conclusion that we should counteract city growth. For 
example, Marcotullio and colleagues (2013) find that urban emission levels can 
be higher than those in non-urban areas in developing countries.
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between city size and environ-
mental impact using the example of GHG emissions. Our motivation is rooted in 
a deep concern about our future and the conditions we leave to next generations. 
It is our belief that better understanding the mechanisms and basic relations of the 
global challenges constitutes an important first step to initiate a change to more 
sustainability. Thus, we look at the following questions by analysing data from a 
wide range of cities:
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 • Are large cities, in relative terms, responsible for greater or lesser emissions?
 • What are the possible explanations? 
 • How consistent are the explanations with the observed data? 
To address the topic, we give a very short introduction to GHG emissions and 
climate change, then go on to relate this to infrastructure and societal change. We 
find that for reduction potential, it is important to better understand how emis-
sions are connected to lifestyles, to assess inventories and possible drivers. We 
are aware that this kind of analysis can substantiate the taming discourse of the 
SMART City agenda, but we also hope that this analysis reinforces those social 
movements calling for radical lifestyle changes for the billion or so overconsum-
ers that predominate in the cities of the developed world and that constitute rap-
idly expanding enclaves in the growing cities of the developing world. Thus, we 
next briefly look at potential drivers at different scales, from the national to the 
individual.
We then present the core argument that in countries with high gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, an increase in city size results in declining GHG emis-
sions per capita; while in countries with lower GDP per capita, an increasing size 
of cities tends to correlate with rising GHG per capita. We test different drivers 
identified earlier in the chapter as potential explanations. A final section summa-
rizes and wraps up the discussion in a way that critically addresses these findings 
from the perspective of the main themes of this book.
Climate change
Among the processes of global change, global warming is often regarded as the 
most pressing question (see e.g. Randers 2012). It is challenging because of the 
high energy requirements of large parts of society and the economy. It has been 
agreed that anthropogenic GHG emissions are the major cause of climate change 
(IPCC 2013). Because of the complex causes and effects, it is difficult to coordi-
nate action to counter climate change, especially in tightly structured and regu-
lated cities geared to maintain high-consumption lifestyles. Nonetheless, global 
coordination is needed, but international negotiations have proved difficult at best 
(Kartha et al. 2012). Equity questions related to GHG budgets are difficult to 
solve because while mainly urban consumers in the global North have used the 
majority of the historic GHG budget, the impacts of climate change are often felt 
most strongly in the global South where livelihood-supporting ecosystems are 
under threat.
It was agreed by the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that global warming has 
to be limited to 2 °C. Various budget approaches have been proposed to share 
permission to produce GHG emissions at a level compatible with the 2 °C limit 
between different nations (Schellnhuber et al. 2009; Costa et al. 2011). So far, 
no agreement has been reached on how to achieve this goal (Kartha et al. 2012). 
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Even if there is a warming of ‘only’ 2 °C, various impacts are expected (Parry 
et al. 2008). One effect is that climate change causes modifications to or the loss 
of various ecosystem services. For example, a lack of climate stabilization can 
result in the urban heat islands effect (Zhou et al. 2013). Adaptation to climate 
change is becoming an ever more pressing issue. While mitigation must be coor-
dinated globally, adaptation measures are often local or regional (Adger et al. 
2007). This multi-scale nature of the measures required makes climate change 
even more difficult to coordinate.
An energy-hungry society
Societal form (such as hunters and gatherers, agrarian and industrial societies) 
appears closely interrelated with the type and quantity of energy use. For exam-
ple Haberl and colleagues (2011) investigated the interrelation of societal forms 
and social metabolism. In order to manage material flows, a society needs the 
appropriate resources, knowledge and infrastructure. Often, a dominating socio- 
technical configuration exists in a society, what some refer to as the socio-technical 
regime (Geels 2011). It might be possible to imagine alternative configurations, 
but these would typically need different resources, and different knowledge and 
rules within particular niches (Geels 2011). 
Because of the considerable investment in the current socio-technical regime, 
we often observe a technological lock-in that is reinforced by the prevailing plan-
ning and governance systems. For example, the current energy system in most 
parts of the global North is designed for a fossil fuel-based, centralized energy 
supply with large power plants and corresponding power grids, inefficient energy 
use and supply-side management of variations. There could be an alternative con-
figuration with more decentralized interconnected local networks and increased 
efficiency, but that would be difficult to realize because it would disrupt pre-
vailing socio-technical regimes that provide the infrastructural foundation for the 
global economic system as it is currently constituted.
Current configurations often assume that increasing (economic) activity is 
coupled with increasing throughput of energy and material. What is needed is a 
decoupling in order to satisfy a growing population with decreasing throughput 
(UNEP 2013). For this, it will be necessary to reconfigure urban infrastructures 
(UNEP 2013). However, there is no consensus on how to achieve this. Large 
technological companies have a taming agenda expressed via the SMART City 
agenda, while a large number of environmental and social justice movements 
insist on disruptions to existing modes of consumption and production. Looking 
at the example of GHG emissions, factors other than infrastructure are also impor-
tant for a potential decoupling. For example, socio-economic and cultural factors 
have a strong influence on the size of emissions from our nutrition, travelling, 
water use and housing requirements, to name just a selection of our daily needs 
(Reusser et al. 2013). To replace the current regime, we need first to experiment 
with niche innovations, many of which have historically emerged from marginal 
societal actors inspired by a more ecologically sustainable vision of the future. 
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But which alternatives are most efficient in reducing GHG emissions? If we 
focus on the energy supply sector and more economic and technological solu-
tions, computer simulations (which admittedly assume rational behaviour) help 
to assess the costs of the various solutions. According to these calculations, it 
seems feasible to convert the energy supply infrastructure in a way compatible 
with the 2° target at moderate cost if policy and implementation constraints are 
ignored (Edenhofer et al. 2012). However, the approach taken in such studies 
does not include decentralized solutions less consistent with taming technocratic 
approaches to a low-carbon transition. It considers the interactions with other 
aspects in the lives of citizens in a limited way. By considering these other factors 
affecting emissions, we can gain ideas on how to use energy and infrastructure 
more efficiently for more socially progressive purposes.
Identifying emission drivers
Gaining a good understanding of GHG emissions through consistent reporting is 
demanding. For example, the guidelines for reporting inventories to the UNFCCC 
are a thick manual filled with detailed technical descriptions (IPCC 2006). The 
basic idea of this accounting framework is to count GHG emissions at the loca-
tion where they are produced (so-called production-based emissions). However, 
emissions may occur during the production of a certain good, while it is consumed 
in different places. Thus, through trade, virtual emissions are transferred around 
the globe. 
To correct for such traded emissions, the concept of consumption-based emis-
sions has been introduced (Peters 2008; Davis and Caldeira 2010). For consump-
tion-based emissions, all the emissions generated during the production of a 
good or service are accounted for in the country where this good is consumed. 
However, the data required to estimate consumption-based emissions are still 
quite uncertain. For example data are missing for certain countries (Ahmad and 
Wyckoff 2003). Also, the data required to assess changes over time in a consist-
ent way are not available in sufficient quality for cities globally (Walmsley et al. 
2012; Minx et al. 2013). Because of limited data availability on consumption-
based emissions, we focus on production-based emissions in the remaining part 
of the chapter. Keeping the problem of production- versus consumption-based 
emissions in mind, we can try to understand the main drivers at different levels 
of accounting.
Using the IPCC reporting schema, we find emissions inventories that are pol-
lutant specific and sector specific. While, in general we find increasing emissions 
with increasing income (GDP) at the country level, the question of reconfigura-
tion and decoupling mentioned earlier also arises on the country scale. For many 
pollutants, as development progresses, the concentration first increases as a result 
of increased economic activity, then reaches a maximum and starts to decrease 
because of more efficient technology and more restrictive regulations. This 
inverted U-shaped curve for pollutants is called the environmental Kuznets curve 
(Kornhuber et al. 2014; Stern 2004). Whether such an environmental Kuznets 
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curve for GHG is observable for GHG emissions depends on how development is 
measured (Kornhuber et al. 2014; Galeotti et al. 2006). Growth of emissions has 
been reported to be largest for the energy supply sector, for direct emissions from 
transport, for industry, for change in land use and forestry (IPCC 2007).
While current policies for climate mitigation often are set at the country level 
and global negotiations are of the highest importance, it is often at the city level 
that concrete infrastructure measures are taken and change occurs. The analysis 
and understanding of emissions at the city level is a very active field of research. 
Emissions are analysed based on atmospheric measurements (e.g. Tollefson 
2012), trade data (e.g. Minx et al. 2013) or inventories (e.g. Dodman 2009). 
These studies identify high-consumption lifestyles associated with high incomes 
(Dodman 2009; Minx et al. 2013), as well as the occurrence of industry, educa-
tion, car ownership and decreasing household size (Minx et al. 2013) as important 
explanations for high emission levels. Agreements exist at the country level with 
drivers regarding industry, income and mobility.
Looking at a household level, a study conducted in the United Kingdom inte-
grated results from different surveys to relate household characteristics to emis-
sions (Hargreaves et al. 2013). The study used representative surveys making the 
results valid for the entire United Kingdom. Hargreaves and colleagues (2013) 
found that, in general, emissions are higher for larger households (in terms of 
space and inhabitants), in a rural environment, with a household representative 
person of age 45–55, and from a higher occupational and socio-economic class. 
A statistical method to determine the factors with most power to explain emis-
sions (analysis of variance – ANOVA) used by Hargreaves and colleagues (2013) 
shows, unsurprisingly, that income and number of cars have the most explanatory 
power, followed by household size and composition, and then other socio-demo-
graphic and economic factors. Again, we find agreement for the drivers including 
income and mobility, while industry does not directly apply at this level.
When is big sustainable?
In Rybski and colleagues (2015) we investigate how per capita emissions change 
with city size (the scaling behaviour of city emissions). In Figure 4.1 we show 
normalized per capita emissions of the city against population.
Emissions are influenced by country-specific factors, such as for example den-
sity of cities, because the denser European and Japanese cities require less trans-
portation than North American and Australian cities. In order to control for such 
factors that are fairly constant throughout a country and make data comparable 
between multiple countries, we divide the city per capita emissions by the average 
per capita emission for the relevant country. Thus, we only look at the effect of 
city size (and potentially other city-specific circumstances).
Assuming that city emissions have been reported correctly and consistently, 
we find some evidence for a dependence on the GDP per capita. In countries with 
higher GDP (mostly from the global North – Figure 4.1 last panels), larger cities 
are more efficient, because they have lower per capita emissions than smaller 
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cities. In countries with low GDP (mostly from the global South – Figure 4.1 first 
panels), larger cities have higher per capita emissions than smaller cities. From 
the results, it appears that differences exist in how emissions increase depending 
on GDP.
In the previous section, we reported a number of possible explanations for the 
difference in emission intensity. For example, we found that income, the number 
Figure 4.1  City efficiency in terms of carbon dioxide emissions. Per capita (annual) 
carbon dioxide emissions versus population. The emission values have 
been normalized by dividing by the country emissions per capita. The line 
indicates the regression line. City emission figures have been sorted and 
separated into groups according to the GDP per capita of the countries. (a) 
Group 1: Philippines (1), Bangladesh (4), Nepal (3). (b) Group 2: China (5), 
South Africa (1), Thailand (2), Greece (1), Sri Lanka (4), Slovenia (1), Czech 
Republic (1), Portugal (1), Spain (2), Mexico (1), Republic of Korea (2), 
Indonesia (1), Brazil (3), India (42), Bhutan (2) and India (42, brown open 
triangles). (c) Group 3: Germany (4), Italy (4), Singapore (1), Belgium (1), 
Finland (1), Japan (1), France (1), Sweden (1). (d) Group 4: United Kingdom 
(35), Netherlands (1), Canada (4), Australia (1), Switzerland (1), Norway (1) 
and United Kingdom (35, grey open squares). (e) Group 5: USA (122).
  The United Kingdom and India appear twice, as part of a group and as individual 
countries. 
Source of GDP data: World Bank: GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollar); World Bank, 
International Comparison Program database. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.
PP.CD (accessed December 2013).
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of cars and transport emissions, household size, energy supply infrastructure, 
industry and land-use patterns can be used to estimate differences in GHG emis-
sions. In this section, we want to test some of these factors for their potential to 
explain the dependency of per capita emissions on city size.
Income was identified as the most important predictor on a household scale 
in the United Kingdom, and was tested as the first potential explanation. Related 
to travel behaviour and land use patterns, we will look at how the distribution of 
facilities (such as for example hospitals, shops and restaurants) could relate to 
emissions. Finally, we also look at the importance of the industry sector as a third 
potential explanation.
Income in different cities was a factor in the investigations by Bettencourt 
and colleagues (2007). The authors found that the average per capita income in 
big cities was larger than in small cities. This finding can be combined with the 
finding that a person’s emissions vary depending on their income. Hargreaves 
and colleagues (2013) reported that emissions increase with increasing income. 
Emissions increase fast with changes in low incomes and slowly with changes 
in high incomes (Chakravarty et al. 2009). We combined the observations by 
the Bettencourt 2007 and Chakravarty 2009 teams using simplifying assumptions 
about the distribution of the income in a particular city. This potential explana-
tion leads to results consistent with larger per capita emissions in large cities, as 
observed for cities with low GDP. However, it is incompatible with the lower 
per capita emissions in large cities as observed for high GDP. If income is the 
basic mechanism affecting the scaling of emissions with city size, policies will 
have to limit the increase of emissions with increasing income for a decoupling 
to occur. However, in practice this will entail the implementation of quite funda-
mental socio-technical changes within highly complex urban environments where 
success depends on effective discourse coalitions rather than on technocratic solu-
tions conceived by state planners. 
Looking at travel behaviour and land use patterns as a potential explanation, 
we can make use of the findings of Um and colleagues (2009), who report that 
facilities are present in a denser form in areas with a denser population. However, 
population density increases faster than facility density. We checked different sets 
of assumptions to assess how per capita emissions change with city size. For every 
assumption we found that per capita emissions are smaller for big cities. Thus, 
using travel behaviour and land use patterns as an explanation is consistent with 
what we observe for cities with high GDP. If facilities and related travel behav-
iour create the basic mechanism affecting the scaling of emissions with city size, 
policies will have to ensure that there are short routes to facilities and that exist-
ing facilities are well utilized to make cities more sustainable. This could disrupt 
prevailing land-use and ownership patterns. 
Finally, industry as a potential explanation can be assessed with data about the 
fraction of GDP produced from the industry sector, which is available from the 
World Bank database at a country level. It has been analysed and its dependence 
on the GDP per capita described by Lutz and colleagues (2013) at a country level. 
Based on a few assumptions, we find country-specific results on how per capita 
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emissions change with city size. We find that per capita emissions increase more 
slowly with city size in countries with high GDP per capita than in countries 
with low GDP per capita, which partly reflects these observations. For some very 
dynamic economies where the share of the GDP from industries is quickly substi-
tuted by GDP from services, we find decreasing per capita emissions with increas-
ing city size. However, such dynamic cases are rare (12 countries globally), and 
while Rybski and colleagues (2013) report such a behaviour for the United States, 
this is not the case based on our analysis.
If the importance of industry is the basic mechanism affecting the scaling of 
emissions with city size, policies will need to ensure emission-efficient industry 
and a tendency for more consumption of services rather than goods, to make cities 
more sustainable. Note that replacing local industry by imports to save emissions 
will not solve the problem on a global scale.
Overall, none of the explanations appears to be correct. Industry as a possible 
explanation seems most promising. However, in every case, we find that we can 
explain some of the observations, but not all. Most likely, all factors are important 
to a varying extent and each explanation has its limitations. Sufficient data for 
rigorous testing are currently lacking.
Discussion and conclusions
We started with the following question: ‘Are large cities in relative terms respon-
sible for greater or lesser emissions?’, taking emissions as one example of interac-
tions between nature and society. We reported on findings from a previous study 
by Rybski and colleagues (2013), where larger cities in countries with higher GDP 
(generally from the global North) have lower per capita emissions than smaller 
cities, and the reverse was observed for cities in countries with lower GDP. This 
puts into perspective the general rule that cities make it possible to deliver a good 
standard of living with reduced environmental impact. However, the rule may not 
be valid for all regions of the world.
We continued by looking for possible explanations and testing their consist-
ency with the general tendencies observed in the data. We find, on the one hand, 
that the increasing per capita emissions with increasing city size that are charac-
teristic of countries/cities with lower GDP per capita can be explained by both 
income distribution and the contribution of industry to the overall economy. On 
the other hand, the decreasing per capita emissions with increasing city size char-
acteristic of countries/cities with higher GDP per capita are explained by the dis-
tribution of facilities and related travel behaviour. The contribution of industry to 
the overall economy also helps to explain a lower increase in per capita emissions 
in the case of higher GDP per capita, but normally not a decrease.
While none of the explanatory approaches is consistent with all the data, the 
findings are fairly plausible and not very surprising. In developed economies, 
average incomes increase slowly with city size (Bettencourt et al. 2007), but at 
the same time the efficiencies are greater in big cities due to agglomeration. In 
developing economies, moving to the city is often – for those with education 
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and skills – about moving into the middle class. It will have to be tested whether 
income increases faster with city size for low-income countries. However, invest-
ments in the efficiencies of agglomeration in developing country cities are at an 
early stage. It therefore follows that size in developing country cities will correlate 
with rising carbon dioxide emissions per capita up to a certain point in the devel-
opmental trajectory.
Thus, we have not provided a general answer to the question whether larger cit-
ies are more efficient. Answers will have to be based on local experience. Policies 
to help move towards decoupling will need to include a mix of measures that are 
appropriate to the context.
Conclusion
Abstracting from the results presented in this study, the message to city managers 
is not to wait for a global agreement, but to begin now with a mixture of policies 
that are not derived from a global toolbox. Each city is different, and their con-
textual knowledge and learning should inform the way policies are formulated 
and implemented. This will allow the creative diversities of urban dynamics to 
shape policy options rather than be suppressed to accommodate taming discourses 
derived from the global policy elite that dominates major consulting firms and 
international financial institutions. In general, measures to increase the emission 
and energy efficiency of the energy supply are well suited to and may strengthen 
the local economy. All measures need to consider access and equity-related ques-
tions to also ensure social sustainability. In order to reduce travel-related emis-
sions, strong policy measures are required to overcome lock-in effects, especially 
when these are vigorously defended by car-based middle-class elites whose inter-
ests are often represented in powerful political parties. A shift in mindset may 
help people to see urban life from a new perspective. For example, thinking of 
emissions along the entire product lifecycle is likely to shift priorities. Moreover, 
overcoming the scaling effects related to income probably requires specific 
approaches for different income levels: we need to start telling different stories of 
success and quality of life.
The basic underlying assumption in this chapter is that it is useful to identify 
general tendencies of how society functions and that this is possible using obser-
vations of the change in per capita emissions with city size. Some of the main 
limitations of the material presented include a systematic bias in the emission 
data reported which can not be excluded. For example, in a recent study Oliveira 
and colleagues (2014) report large US cities to be less carbon-efficient than small 
cities based on gridded emission data. Results from gridded emission data depend 
heavily on the algorithm used to distribute emission to grid cells. Furthermore, the 
data and analysis were based on production-based emissions, while consumption-
based emissions compensate for virtual emission trade. The results would prob-
ably look different using consumption-based emissions.
An analysis of carbon footprints of municipalities in the United Kingdom 
found the footprints from a consumption-based approach to be normally higher 
Is big sustainable? 73
and much more homogeneous than those using a production-based approach 
(Minx et al. 2013).
It was not possible to cover all explanatory approaches in our analysis, and the 
analysis could be extended. Moreover, questions related to distribution and equity 
have only been touched upon and deserve more attention. Despite the limitations, 
this chapter and the entire book are another step towards the urgently needed 
integrated analysis of nature–society interactions. Investigating how GHG emis-
sions are scaled with city size is especially relevant because very fast urbanization 
is expected for the global South and it is essential to assess the consequences for 
future climate change. This analysis does not in and of itself reinforce a particular 
approach to the planning and governance of urban transitions to more sustainable 
modes of consumption and production. This data can be used to reinforce a tam-
ing SMART City agenda that tends to emphasize algorithmic technofixes focused 
exclusively on carbon reduction without affecting consumption levels. It can also 
be used to justify a more holistic approach to lifestyle change more consistent 
with untamed visions of future urban changes that tend to emanate from the envi-
ronmental justice movements. 
Note
1  At the same time as addressing environmental concerns, it is equally important not to for-
get about the equity question. How are environmental stresses and consequences distrib-
uted between the genders? This question must be posed, at both a local and a global scale.
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5 Urban-scale food system  
governance
An alternative response to  
the dominant paradigm?
Gareth Haysom
Food had a symbiotic relationship with cities for centuries. Food shaped cities. 
Food influenced the location, design, economies and politics of cities. For many 
cities their ability to ensure food availability determined their stature.1 Recently, 
however, the relationship between food and the city has become increasingly 
opaque. Colonialism, industrialization and globalization have resulted in changes 
in food system functions. All of these changes have distanced cities from food 
production and changed the relationship between the city and food. 
Defined in terms of the distribution of dietary energy supply, 868 million 
people around the world were considered chronically undernourished in 2013 
(FAO 2013: ix). Crush and Frayne (2010) correctly argue that food insecurity 
is misleadingly regarded as an issue that only affects rural populations. African 
cities are expanding rapidly and are key centres of growth and development 
(UN-DESA 2012). For many urban residents, this growth and development 
is not translating into better livelihoods. Access to food is particularly prob-
lematic for poor people in African cities (Crush and Frayne 2010). In South 
African cities, where first apartheid and then prevailing policies have had a 
direct impact, urban food insecurity is high (Battersby 2011; SANHANES-1 
2013). Current food system governance and policies perhaps even perpetuate 
urban food insecurity.
Urban food security and related consequences raise questions about the role of 
cities in the food system, and the processes that enable active city resident partici-
pation in the urban food system. It was these questions that precipitated my own 
enquiry into the nascent urban food system governance approaches and actions 
that I observed, both in my engagement with policy-makers and in practice. 
The urban food system challenge forms part of a wider set of converging, 
mutually reinforcing transitions (Swilling and Annecke 2012). Four intercon-
nected global, yet locally experienced, transitions are considered in this chap-
ter. These include the second urban transition, the food system transition and the 
nutrition transition. Fourth, driven by the preceding transitions, is the emergence 
of alternative urban food governance innovations. These governance strategies 
are diverse. A collection of these emerging alternative food governance innova-
tions are investigated, and provide a framework against which the South African 
urban food governance interventions are compared.
Urban-scale food system governance 77
This chapter suggests that food insecurity in South African cities remains a 
pervasive and increasingly complex challenge. Addressing these complexities 
requires innovative governance approaches extending beyond the traditional 
remit of the city.
Mutually converging transitions
This book engages with the consequences of the polycrisis. The second urban 
transition is dealt with in Chapters 1 and 2. Linked to the untamed theme of the 
book, Pieterse (2013a: 21) highlights how descriptions of the developing world 
cities as ‘endless vistas of shantytowns as the visible face of crisis’ do not effec-
tively capture the processes, networks and dynamics embedded within developing 
world cities. What the African city does reflect is an endless struggle for ‘liveabil-
ity’, in which different forms of cityness emerge. The ability to participate in pro-
cesses that enable the realization of the interests of urban residents is central to the 
notions of liveable urbanism (Swilling 2011: 90). This ‘liveability’ is observed in 
the changes that grassroots organizations have enacted through bottom-up agency 
(see Appadurai 2002). 
A theme in the writings of Pieterse (2006, 2013b) is the question of participa-
tion, voice and, by implication, agency. Pieterse suggests that the role of com-
munities in rebuilding the city is facilitated through the creation of ‘homebru 
strategies that emerge and flourish in a context of radical democratic politics that 
stretch across formal–informal, concrete–symbolic and consensual–conflictual 
binaries’ (2006: 300).2 Cities are in transition, particularly developing world cit-
ies. These transitions see different forms of agency and governance emerging. 
One area where this agency and governance is reflected is in how certain cities 
engage with food. 
The food system transition process constitutes a broader set of interconnected 
transitions that reflect a number of attendant subtransitions. Friedmann and 
McMichael’s (1989) food regime thesis focuses on the ‘contradictory relations 
underlying the institutional and power structures across capitalist time, and at a 
particular conjuncture’ (McMichael 2009: 292). Of interest here are the work-
ings of the current food regime, the third or ‘corporate’ food regime, where the 
organizing principle is the market, not the empire (as it was in the first regime) or 
the state (the second regime) (McMichael 2009). I argue that one of the principal 
processes of the third food regime is a desire to tame. Taming is evident not only 
in how the retail market is structured, but also in how all points in the food sys-
tem are being tamed. This taming reduces diversity and vibrancy within the food 
system. Problematically, this taming results in significant net losses – in farmers, 
health and, specifically, in food security, nutrition and voice. As discussed in the 
introduction, ‘taming processes reduce complexity, homogenize and exclude’.
A number of food regime transitions have specific relevance to the urban food 
question. These transitions fall within the wider concept of what is termed the ‘Big 
Food’ transition (Stuckler and Nestle 2012; Monteiro and Cannon 2012). The Big 
Food phenomenon is evident in South Africa (Igumbor et al. 2012). Within the 
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Big Food transition, two sub-transitions are evident. One is the supermarket tran-
sition documented and theorized by Reardon and colleagues (see Weatherspoon 
and Reardon 2003; Reardon et al. 2012). The nutrition transition (Popkin 2002) 
is typified by adverse changes in diet, and is directly associated with urbanization 
(Mendez and Popkin 2004: 75). 
Different groups are responding to the changes in the food system and the 
attendant consequences of the third food regime. While these groups are diverse, 
some are referred to as alternative food networks.
Alternative food geographies
The different responses to the current food system represent a maturing body 
of socio-spatial food theories under the umbrella of alternative food networks 
(AFNs) (Renting et al. 2003; Watts et al. 2005). AFNs are described as being:
New rapidly mainstreaming spaces in the food economy defined by . . . the 
explosion of organic, Fair Trade, local, quality, and premium speciality foods. 
In these networks, it is claimed that the production and consumption of food 
are more closely tied together spatially, economically and socially. 
(Goodman and Goodman 2007: 2) 
The same authors argue (with cynicism and truth) that these AFNs reflect a sense 
of ‘upper class angst’ (Goodman and Goodman 2007). As a result, the some-
what privileged view of AFNs requires the inclusion of wider food system-related 
discourses. 
I have spent time working in different parts of the food system as a profes-
sional, and later as an academic and a researcher, trying to understand the system. 
My areas of interest include sustainable food and urban food issues. In this work, 
I have encountered proactive and valuable projects, processes and actors. 
However, these initiatives and actors often competed with one another, undermin-
ing the different approaches despite an overarching sustainability ethos. These 
experiences further support the need for the expansion of the concept of AFNs. 
Borrowing from Wiskerke’s (2009) term ‘alternative food geographies’, 
I build on the notions of an integrated and territorial agrifood paradigm to refer 
to AFNs and further expanded food system interventions as Differentiated Food 
Geographies (DFGs). This DFG approach seeks to categorize the different food 
system perspectives according to three areas of analysis: focus, scale, and ideol-
ogy or politics. While a measure of overlap and duplication exists, this categoriza-
tion highlights four different responses to food system challenges:
 • A production focus – including the organic and other such movements, and 
reflecting a politics of land-based activism (see Altieri and Nichols 2005; 
Kate 2010).
 • A green focus – still with a dominant production focus but seeking to vali-
date green actions through labelling and certification. This reflects notions of 
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doing less harm and a politics of regulation (see Bennett 1997; Collins and 
Fairchild 2007).
 • A justice focus – which considers issues such as food sovereignty and food 
justice but focuses predominantly on alternative market systems, displaying 
a politics of justice and culture (see Patel 2007).
 • A spatial focus – which questions how specific scale-based domains engage 
with the broader food system and the levers and structures required to ensure 
wider benefit. Here the politics of equality and place-specific cohesion domi-
nate (see Roberts 2001; Blay-Palmer 2009). 
This chapter focuses on the spatial-specific responses in food system governance, 
as these reflect most directly the urban food governance trends and, I argue, hold 
potential for engagement with and validation of untamed urban food system actions. 
International food governance analysis
A distinct spatial focus to food governance is emerging internationally. Belo 
Horizonte in Brazil has developed a number of city government-led pro-poor 
interventions (Barker 2007; Rocha and Lessa 2009). Other South American cit-
ies taking this type of approach include Bogotá and Medellín in Colombia. In 
North America, cities, counties and states are developing spatially bounded food 
governance initiatives. The Toronto Food Policy Council (TFPC), the designated 
custodian of the Toronto Food Charter, is aligned to, but outside, government 
(Friedmann 2007). Other examples of North American and European city food 
strategies reflect the need for local relevance, contextual knowledge and gover-
nance that generally extends beyond the current governance domain of the city. 
While caution should be exercised and it is unwise to adopt uncritically any 
international trends in local food governance, some key themes within urban food 
governance are evident. These themes include a clearly articulated scalar bound-
ary of operations, networked knowledge generation, participative governance, 
inter-ministerial engagement, a deliberate pro-poor orientation, and research-
informed interventions used in the formulation of scale-specific food strategies. 
This review has used data specific to two North American food governance 
sources. First are data from the Community Food Security Coalition (CFSC), a 
grouping of over 170 food policy councils (FPCs) (as of May 2012).3 The data 
from these groups were drawn from CFSC sources, validated through online 
reviews and tested through key informant interviews. A report investigating 
Canadian place-specific food governance structures informed the second review. 
Here 64 organizations were investigated (MacRae and Donahue 2013).
The areas of focus of the CFSC initiatives offer insight into focus, mandate and 
need. Through a process of key word/phrase attribution, 12 areas of focus were 
identified and organized according to governance scale. Figure 5.1 reflects the 
frequency of focus at specific scales and highlights the dominance of a local-level 
focus. This focus offers insights into the changing role played by local entities in 




















Figure 5.1 Area of focus by scale.
issues associated with planning highlighted at the local scale in Figure 5.1 reflects 
a local food systems trend (Dahlberg 1999; MacRae and Donahue 2013). 
A key question that needs to be asked at this point is whether the formation of 
these scale-focused food governance structures possibly reflects a form of taming, 
even if this is as a counter to the taming associated with the third food regime?
The city of Belo Horizonte in Brazil has approached urban food system gov-
ernance differently. In Brazil food is a right of citizenship (Barker 2007). A city 
government unit, the Secretariat for Food Policy and Supply (SMAAB), has 
engaged directly with urban food governance since 1993. Its actions have evolved 
into six main areas of focus: subsidized food sales, food and nutrition assistance, 
supply and regulation of food markets, support to urban agriculture, education for 
food consumption, and job and income generation (Rocha and Lessa 2009: 391). 
The case of Belo Horizonte is often described as a city-led initiative. However, 
one of the foundations of success in the Belo Horizonte case was the role and par-
ticipation of civil society through the creation of the Municipal Council for Food 
Security at the start of the process. This provided a platform for social mobiliza-
tion into policy and programmes (Rocha and Lessa 2009: 397).
It is important to stress that the local or city-scale focus does not imply self-suf-
ficiency or the concept of localization (see Hopkins 2008). Local in this instance 
involves a focus on how food flows are governed in the interests of the local 
(Morgan and Sonnino 2009), taking care to avoid the so-called ‘local trap’ (Born 
and Purcell 2006). When the reviewed scale-specific food governance approaches 
are considered collectively, key operating principles can be deduced. These are 
described in Table 5.1. 
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Governance that draws on multiple actors from within and outside  
government.
The majority of cities play an indirect management role, using their 
convening authority to facilitate processes and actions as opposed 
to top-down management.
Recognition given to the knowledge and networks of multiple food 
systems actors, facilitating the equitable use and application of this 
knowledge. Considers immediate issues but also long-term trends.
Direct focus given to contextual issues pertinent to the specific 
locality. Broader issues are still considered but form the locality’s 
perspective.
Focus on intersections between issues, breaking traditional 
governance silos. The interconnections between health, education, 
planning and environment dominate.
A general alignment with an ethos of sustainability, but generally 
considered in a more integrative manner, beyond a sustainability-
as-green focus. 
Engagement with multiple food system actors and specifically other 
cities, sharing experiences, knowledge and challenges.
Source: own analysis
Many of the international city programmes emerged in the context of an urban 
food policy vacuum. Northern cities reflect a number of different governance 
approaches and motivations. In the South American city examples, the city gov-
ernments drive processes but with embedded participatory processes. Recently 
new forms of food governance have emerged in certain South African cities.
South African urban food governance trends
South Africa has no urban-specific food policies, but general policies and legal 
frameworks that consider the challenges of food security are in place. These 
frameworks obligate all spheres of government to act. The two primary frame-
works are the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), specifically Section 
27(1)b, the so-called ‘Right to food clause’ which compels organs of the state to 
ensure the progressive realization of the right to food. Second is the Integrated 
Food Security Strategy (IFSS) of 2002. The IFSS was formulated and housed 
within the National Department of Agriculture (now DAFF). Problematically, 
this focus perpetuates a rural, productionist view of food security and as a result 
effectively disregards urban food insecurity. A dominant focus on production may 
enable the desired positive food trade balance, argued as a determinant of food 
security in the National Development Plan (NDP 2012: 230), but this does not 
translate into food security at either the household or the city scale. 
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In the context of pervasive yet poorly understood urban food insecurity, it is 
necessary to reflect on the food security challenges in selected southern African 
cities. In 2008 the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN), focusing 
specifically on poor areas, found 77 per cent of people suffered from food inse-
curity in poor areas of the 11 southern African cities it surveyed. This trend was 
evident in the three South African cities within the AFSUN review. In Cape 
Town 80 per cent of those surveyed were found to be moderately or severely 
food insecure (Battersby 2011). More recently, the South African National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (SANHANES) found 68 per cent food 
insecurity in urban informal areas (SANHANES-1 2013: 22), aligning with data 
from the 2012 General Household Survey reflecting food access constraints 
(StatsSA 2013). 
Although other South African cities have engaged in forms of food system 
interventions, these remain locked in project and production-oriented interven-
tionist paradigms. Stellenbosch and Cape Town, while in no way exemplars, 
reflect a new trend, one where more systemic approaches are emerging.
Through a partnership between the University of Stellenbosch and Stellenbosch 
Municipality, a food system study for Stellenbosch was carried out. As part of 
this process, a Draft Stellenbosch Food System Strategy (DSFSS)4 was developed 
and adopted by the municipality in 2011. The DSFSS borrowed heavily from 
international urban food governance typologies in terms of governance and food 
security interventions. However, although formally approved, the strategy has not 
been implemented. Conceptual and process-related faults limited the uptake of the 
DSFSS. Enquiries into the stalling of the DSFSS revealed multiple challenges, 
highlighting the complexity of developing such governance structures. One of the 
key challenges reported was a disregard for food system agents and the argument 
that the top-down nature effectively excluded any untamed forms of food system 
agency. 
Despite a long food history, Cape Town’s current engagement in food system 
issues originates from the development of the Urban Agriculture Policy (UAP) 
of 2007 (CoCT 2007). The UAP implementation precipitated an ever-increasing 
engagement with wider food system issues (Visser 2012), which led to the reali-
zation that there was a need for a city-wide food strategy. This realization was 
reinforced by ongoing engagement with other cities, including Belo Horizonte 
and the TFPC in Toronto. 
The nature of the emergent food system engagement precipitated a call for 
tenders to conduct a study into the food systems and food security in the City of 
Cape Town in 2013. This call sought to ‘investigate [the] multi-faceted urban 
development challenge comprising of two inter-related aspects, namely 1) the 
components and effectiveness of Cape Town’s food systems, and 2) the status 
of food insecurity in Cape Town’ (CoCT 2013: 10). In May 2014 (at the time of 
writing) the study had been completed and was awaiting formal approval. The 
city now needs to determine how it will use the study findings and recommenda-
tions, which included detailed stakeholder reviews, to inform a city-wide food 
strategy.
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Discussion
The Stellenbosch and Cape Town food strategy processes emerged in the contexts 
of an urban food policy vacuum, and of high, yet often unrecorded, levels of 
food insecurity and attendant dietary and nutritional challenges. Both urban areas 
eschewed traditional project-driven welfarist food system interventions. These 
nascent processes are argued to reflect the beginnings of a change. 
One trend evident in Cape Town and Stellenbosch is an engagement with a 
far wider stakeholder group. Both the Stellenbosch and the Cape Town processes 
have actively sought to access knowledge networks at the community scale, 
where different actors are displaying agency, responding to and engaging in food 
system activities. These agency-type actions are a resource in food governance 
processes, a resource with essential knowledge about food system dynamics and 
faults. These agents are vital, even if they disagree with or contest government 
intervention in the food system. Such untamed epistemic communities offer valu-
able food system insights, and their inclusion in food system processes enables 
greater voice and agency in food strategy design.
Globalization and the associated neoliberal policies have prompted shifts in 
urban governance, altering the relationship between cities and the nation state. 
This shift has been described as a move from developmental Fordist-oriented 
approaches to liberalized entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989: 4). Although some 
North American food governance structures (FGSs) reflect a form of urban food 
system entrepreneurialism, the general trends evident in FGSs reviewed avoid 
such liberal entrepreneurial governance. The international FGSs reflect neither a 
reversion to Fordist nor liberalized entrepreneurial governance approaches. The 
emergence of ‘pluralistic’ governance structures is driven by the absence of formal 
local food-focused governance initiatives (MacRae and Donahue 2013; Emanuel 
2013), structures originally enabled through inclusive (Keynesian) local govern-
ment. The liberalizing trend in local government has resulted in a food policy (and 
food-related remedial action) vacuum (Harper et al. 2009). Contextually focused 
FGSs are seeking greater levels of inclusivity and ways to counter inequalities in 
the food system (Harper et al. 2009). In many instances, the FGSs are created spe-
cifically because the trickle-down notion associated with liberal economic theory 
is not delivering the claimed food system benefit (Cook 2013). 
It is clear from the international and South African cases that city government 
has a critical role to play in urban food system governance. Pieterse (2013c) pos-
its that the city’s governance role entails the city using its legitimate authority to 
convene divergent urban (food system) stakeholders. City governments have a 
unique ability to bring different groups together, through funding and their legal 
mandate, to ensure participatory processes. As the accountable entity (at the local 
government scale) for the progressive realization of the right to food, cities are 
explicitly required to play an active role in such processes. Additionally, if certain 
groups require greater attention (such as the vulnerable and food insecure), the 
city must direct additional attention to these areas, ensuring that the vision of any 
food governance process is aligned to wider city needs, while at the same time 
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preventing capture by splintered ideological perspectives. Disparate views of the 
food system and food system outcomes are inevitable, as evidenced in the DFG. 
Informed by the city’s dual roles of convener and custodian, cities need to play 
the role of facilitating food system processes and actively encouraging agent-style 
homebru and untamed actions. This represents a new and emergent form of place-
specific, and in this case urban, food governance. 
Conclusion
Urban food system actions are emerging. Many actors are active in urban food 
activities in the rapidly changing South African cities. City government and other 
food system stakeholders all have essential roles to play in urban food governance 
processes. The changing role of cities means that food system governance and 
food security interventions can no longer remain the domain of national govern-
ment, focusing on rural areas where productionist responses dominate. Cities have 
a critical role to play in systemic governance interventions that seek to enable 
food availability as well as food access, appropriateness and agency. 
This is not the exclusive responsibility of city government. Processes are nec-
essary to facilitate the agency actions of a wider grouping of urban food system 
stakeholders. Such actions are emerging. There needs however to be a radical shift 
in how participation in urban governance processes is approached. Collaborative 
forms of urban food system governance offer potential pathways to improved 
food system governance. Accepting and embracing the untamed nature of many 
agency actions in the food system, and seeking out ways to include these agents or 
actors in food system processes, while retaining their untamed vibrancy, is argued 
to be an essential component of effective food system governance.
Notes
1  See Carolyn Steel’s (2008) description of the first cities and how food influenced these 
for more on this point.
2  Homebru is a colloquial South African term used to describe emergent local actions, 
activities, responses or characteristics that reflect the local dynamics. This generally has 
positive connotations.
3 The CFSC was disbanded at the end of 2013. 
4  For the full strategy see www.sustainabilityinstitute.net/assets/news_article_files/stel 
lenbosch_draft_food_strategy_july_2011.pdf
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The chapters in Part II provide a set of case studies that engage with three major 
debates in urban studies, namely the polarity between agency and structure and 
how human and non-human living beings possess active agency within wider 
socio-ecological dynamics of change; the problematic implications of discur-
sive narratives importing evolutionist assumptions about ‘adaptation’ into the 
social sciences from the eco-system sciences; and the simplifications implied 
by the state-versus-market dualism from the existing urban service delivery 
systems that proliferate in informalized cities of the global South. In doing so, 
the whole set of chapters enter into a productive dialogue with key themes of 
the book as far as its search for the ‘untamed’ and its intellectual operation of 
‘untaming’ current urbanisms is concerned. Therefore the reader will find mate-
rial for interesting reflection on at least four grounds: i) the contemporary pro-
duction of injustice throughout the social production of space in the Fraserian 
terms of maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation; ii) the presence 
of risk and vulnerability as constitutive part of every day life, especially of the 
poor but neither necessarily nor only them; iii) the ‘de-territorialization’ of the 
production of risk in contemporary urban settings of the global South in as much 
as risk is largely globally produced; and, finally, iv) the brutal forms of exclu-
sion and expulsion that echo the recent and parallel reflection put forward by 
Saskia Sassen.
In Chapter 6, entitled ‘Lost in translation: social protection and the search for 
security in Bogotá, Colombia’, Andrea Lampis (Colombia) presents a set of case 
studies that question an increasingly common global trend in social protection: the 
so-called social floor and social investment paradigms. Urban areas in the global 
South are the testing ground for new social configurations of social protection, 
which are of great relevance for people and agency in general, not only for the 
poor. Although still formally administered by public bodies, these reconfigura-
tions factually respond to the new logic of privatization and commodification of 
individual and collective security. Using the fractal metaphor, the case illustrates 
how women and men in both secure and insecure employment in Bogotá tend to 
escape the new hegemonic logic of social protection. The analysis underlines the 
contradiction between market-driven practices and the traditional welfare state-
driven principles invoked to justify the implementation of these practices.
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Entitled ‘Potentials of the urban poor in shaping a sustainable Lagos metropo-
lis’, Chapter 7 by Taibat Lawanson (Nigeria) explores the responses of the poor to 
recombining socio-economic and environmental risks in Lagos, Nigeria. Familial 
patterns of collective action defined by others as ‘informal’ emerge as a structural 
feature of how the poor build their livelihoods in Lagos. Far away from the neo-
liberal celebration of the potential value of societies driven by market forces, the 
chapter’s narrative guides the reader across a brutal landscape of complex eco-
nomic agents and collective forms of solidarity. This sets in context the paradoxi-
cal claims of local government and local actors who strive to achieve the goal of 
making Lagos ‘Africa’s model megacity’ by denying the existence of many layers 
of social exclusion and differential citizenry based on social status and economic 
purchasing power.
Chapter 8 by Mauricio Domínguez Aguilar and Jorge Pacheco Castro 
(Mexico), entitled ‘Sustainability of what? The struggles of poor Mayan house-
holds with young breadwinners towards a better life in the peri-urban area of 
Merida, Yucatan, Mexico’, presents a bottom-up reading of the social vulnerabil-
ity of poor Mayan families for a better life in the peri-urban context of Merida city 
in the Yucatan peninsula, Mexico. The chapter shows how especially ethnicity, 
but also age and gender, shapes social vulnerability outcomes and deeply influ-
ences the struggle for more sustainable livelihoods. By bringing into focus these 
key dimensions of agency in the city, the case study challenges the straightfor-
ward use of the livelihood approach as well as of programmes aimed at poverty 
reduction, making the point that social and environmental sustainability are not 
only technical but profoundly political challenges because of the way ethnicity 
and lifecycle interact with asset ownership and land use in determining different 
forms of social vulnerability and exclusion. 
Chapter 9 by Chipo Plaxedes Mubaya, Patience Mutopo and Mzime Ndebele-
Murisa (Tanzania), entitled ‘Local governance, climate risk and everyday vulner-
ability in Dar es Salaam’, analyses the opportunities available to slum dwellers to 
deal with climate risk and vulnerability. Collective agency and action are hindered 
here by multiple causes of social vulnerability, including poor health, precarious 
employment, and little political voice or power. The study concludes that bio-
physical causes of vulnerability are not necessarily the main entry point for the 
analysis of vulnerability to climate risk. Within an already established scholar-
ship on the ‘double exposure’ of the poor to critical environmental and economic 
events, the chapter provides a refreshing reminder about the need to look at the 
potential changes made possible by the collective agency of the poor, but without 
romanticizing what can be achieved given the limits imposed by structural con-
straints that originate in the recent and past history of the country.
Chapter 10 by John Harris (USA), entitled ‘Accra’s unregulated market- 
oriented sanitation strategy: problems and opportunity’, explores how unregulated 
market-oriented sanitation strategies mount both problems and opportunities for 
local actors in Accra, Ghana. The author challenges the taming narratives of pri-
vatization, showing how one-size-fits-all schemes of privatized service provision 
do not reflect the complex thread of socio-technical configurations through which 
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basic social needs and rights are expressed in Accra. Against a background where 
the plight of the urban poor regarding water and sanitation cannot be disentangled 
from widespread inequalities in terms of land and other resources, the chapter 
examines the governance of unregulated markets and political co-option, ques-
tioning how political interference affects the manner in which sanitation is pro-
vided for approximately 40 per cent of the city’s population. Instead of taking a 
definitive stance for state-driven or market-oriented solutions, Harris problema-
tizes the role of agency in the unregulated markets that characterize everyday life 
in settlements across thousands of cities in the global South.

6 Lost in translation
Social protection and the search for  
security in Bogotá, Colombia
Andrea Lampis
Introduction
The bail-out of the international financial system and international banks respon-
sible for the ruin of entire economies and the life perspectives of hundreds of 
thousands of persons meant the decoupling of capitalism from any ethical pre-
occupation with the consequences of the highly deterritorialized and financially 
driven model. The new social configurations of social protection, although still 
formally administered by public bodies, factually respond to the new logic of 
privatization and commodification of individual and collective security. In many 
cities of the world not only the urban poor but also the middle class increasingly 
face the daily task of having to reinvent again and again some fragile, often legally 
informal and nonetheless institutionalized (McFarlane 2012) form of security. 
Based on fieldwork material from 2007, this chapter examines men and 
women workers’ narratives about their ways of achieving and perceiving security 
and protection. In doing so it presents a case for a broadening of the conceptual 
approach on which rests the social protection reform led by international financial 
institutions in Colombia as in the global South at large. 
Framing the debate on social protection in the  
twenty-first century
I have always been interested in the intersection between constraining social 
dynamics and the power of agency. I grew up, studied and later became an 
academic during an epochal shift that radically transformed the life goals and 
opportunities of my generation. Under the powerful push of globalizing dynam-
ics and the power of remote agencies with the capacity to shape destinies, 
what was unthinkable only ten years before the beginning of the 1980s became 
reality. The world in which our generation believed they had grown up soon 
revealed a rather different sort of movie plot from the steady and comfortable 
picture of long-term job security and social welfare. New forms of vulnerability 
and risk emerged. 
Thirty years later, right at the end of the year 2010, a decade marked by con-
certed global efforts to achieve the eradication of extreme poverty drew to a close 
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in the midst of the most severe financial crisis since 1929. Between 2000 and 
2010 multi-dimensional poverty and inequality deepened, and a recurring negative 
trend was also recorded in access to employment (Ocampo and Franco 2000). This 
reflected the direct impact of the negative economic cycle (Navarro 2009), as well 
as that over the last 30 years industrialization policies have been capital rather than 
labour intensive, and based on limited local or regional markets (Beall 2000). 
In Latin America, De Mattos (2010) recalled how the majority of the political 
processes in the region were built on the aim of dominant local elites to achieve 
a significant leap forward in the construction of capitalist societies. An urban-
territorial configuration was seen as a key piece of the entire project reflecting the 
need to combine the most rampant forms of land exploitation with the guarantee 
of a friendly market environment, avoiding social upheaval through concessions 
and tailored social safety nets (Vite-Pérez 2011).
Mainstream answers have remained rather blind to the implications of market-
driven transformations. They have sought to figure out a way to reinvent highly 
institutionalized forms of state-led social policy to exercise a protective role espe-
cially for the most vulnerable through a combination of public and privately pro-
vided services.
In April 2014 the World Social Protection Report published by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), in the face of a bold call for a new course of rights-
based social protection strongly focused on social floors, after analysing the post-
crisis measures undertaken worldwide after 2010 had to admit:
As the crisis moved into its second phase from 2010 onwards, rising con-
cerns over sovereign debt levels and fiscal deficits led governments to aban-
don fiscal stimuli and introduce fiscal consolidation measures. According to 
the IMF’s projections of government expenditure in the World Economic 
Outlook database (October 2013), 106 of the 181 countries for which data 
were available moved to contract public spending in 2010.
(ILO 2014: 121)
But the idea according to which state-led, substantially publicly provided social 
protection can be held as the solution for the crisis (Barrientos and Hulme 2010) 
also replicates a typical mistake of Western developmental thinking (Escobar 
2008): of trying to accommodate a changing reality to its own ideals and princi-
ples, regardless of the disruptive power of economic global forces and national 
vested interests and politics.
It is on the basis of these considerations that I deem worth exploring the fol-
lowing argument, which I knowingly build from a minority position. As a result, it 
is off the map of mainstream thinking. By and large, the social policy literature – 
and most importantly the very politics that appropriated it – went through two 
major phases during the neoliberal era. 
A first ‘resistance phase’, driven by the state-centred model, tried to tackle 
the problem most of us thought was central in the face of the mounting wave of 
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neoliberal economics: ‘how to protect’. As Ferguson (2010) put it in analysing 
the different uses and forms of comprehension of neoliberalism, this perspective 
led many scholars sensible to the issues of redistribution, inequality and justice 
to opt for a stance that was basically ‘to be anti-something’: for instance, anti-
capitalism, anti-injustice or anti a growth-centred development model.
The second is the ‘incorporation phase’, driven by a market-centred model. 
This produced a conceptual framework in which even the ‘anti’ is gone and the 
simple fact of the market is the central axiom of the policy framework, which is 
based on the oxymorons of ‘inclusive growth’ or ‘social investment’. 
If this discussion is taken onto a more philosophical plane, we can see a link 
with Nagel’s reflection on global justice:
However imperfectly, the nation-state is the primary locus of political legiti-
macy and the pursuit of justice, and it is one of the advantages of domestic 
political theory that nation-states actually exist. But when we are presented 
with the need for collective action on a global scale, it is very unclear what, if 
anything, could play a comparable role.
 (Nagel 2005: 113–14)
He captures in a very lucid way an essential tension of our times: the defeat of 
the nation-state as the main agent providing a guarantee for social rights, and 
the parallel commodification of rights, and therefore of social protection too. 
I do not take this as an absolute truth, in order to prevent easy critiques from 
those who argue that the state still does play an important role in social protec-
tion. I agree, it does. However, it does so under the constraints of much more 
powerful economic and political actors, and most of all within the logic of the 
market itself. 
Wood (2009) pointed out that in many poorer countries the problem for state 
actors is that power, authority and, more problematically, legitimacy lie signifi-
cantly elsewhere. Saith noted that there must be something ‘lost in translation’ 
when we move from universal values to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). MDGs are well embedded in the neoliberal strategic agenda of having 
market goals and mechanisms. We are left to play the only game that is still in 
town, the ‘Monopoly’ of capitalism (Saith 2006). 
As the 2009 bail-out of the international financial system and international 
banks responsible for the ruin of entire economies and the life perspectives 
of hundreds of thousands of persons showed, the above is not the case any-
more. It symbolically and factually meant the decoupling of capitalism from 
any ethical preoccupation with the consequences of the highly deterritorial-
ized and financially driven model. We need a view that is alternative to the 
map built by mainstream scholarship as far as agency and social protection 
are concerned, to refresh the understanding of how people build pathways to 
social protection in cities of the global South, and increasingly of the global 
North too.
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Decoupling assistance from citizenship: the changing  
fractal in social protection
Social protection configurations tend to present different forms across time. 
However, each form preserves an inner structure, as a fractal. The repeating pat-
tern across local differences in the case of the period after the Second World War 
was based on two axioms: first, the equality of citizens in terms of their right to 
receive protection in the face of risk; and second, the duty of the state to provide 
that protection for them on the basis of a social contract.
The second fractal emerged at the end of the 1990s, and is related to elements 
that characterize the recent trends in the financing of social protection. To further 
elaborate after Jenson (2013), the recurrent element within this second fractal is 
the new role carved for the agency of individuals as self-protecting actors within 
the logic of commodification and securitization of social protection. The transac-
tion – as Jenson points out (2013) – is not a smooth one, and there is both continu-
ity and discontinuity between the ‘pro-poor growth’ discourses of the 1990s and 
the ‘social investment’ discourses of the 2010s. There is continuity because ‘pro-
poor growth’ visions consider market-driven development and sustained growth 
as central, and so does the ‘social investment’ perspective. The discontinuity lies 
in the fact that the domain within which human agency will try to achieve self-
protection now is a market-oriented competitive constellation of formal and infor-
mal services and insurances.
From the socio-anthropological perspective this is by no means a new find-
ing. Canclini (1995) had talked about ‘citizen-consumers’ almost 20 years ago. 
What deserves further research is both the lack of recognition of this shift within 
the discourse of international and national social development agencies, and 
how individual and collective agents seek, strive for and achieve security and 
protection.
As Jenson (2013) pointed out, the social investment perspective has achieved 
the status it enjoys nowadays because it encapsulates strategic elements that are 
needed to counteract the drivers of widening inequality gaps. However, the new 
element of the fractal is that the state is required to deal with the injustices gener-
ated by the market-centred development model. Jenson (2013) identifies three key 
elements in this new vision, expanding its fractal to both the global North and the 
global South:
 • Learning and knowledge are the pillars of the economies and societies of the 
future.
 • The future has to be assured before ameliorating the conditions of the present. 
(Emphasis on children and the reproduction of human capital.)
 • Successful individuals enrich the common future.
Nonetheless, as Grassi (2014) has recently illustrated, even the return of democ-
racy in Latin America, although it had the advantage of being broadly associated 
with a decline in political violence, represented a failure to redress long-standing 
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‘social and welfare debts’ or restore social justice. The recent literature on neo-
extractivism by Latin American scholars has illustrated how both urban and 
rural spaces are nowadays only partially democratic spaces (Alimonda 2009; 
Escobar 2008).
From social risk management to social floors in Colombia
After the structural adjustment decade of the 1980s, Latin American countries 
have been reforming their social protection packages, first by the introduction of 
social safety nets, and later by conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes. The 
social risk management (SRM) approach put forward at the end of the 1990s by 
the World Bank (2000) was used in Colombia after a major economic crisis in 
1999 to inspire the CCT programme Familias en Acción.
From 2006 to 2008 the World Bank pursued an initiative in Colombia to delink 
health and pensions contributions from the type of employment. Its aim was to 
solve the problem of gaps in workers’ contributions as well as the ambiguities of 
the legislation on informal employment. This was meant to create what has been 
called a ‘social floor’ (in Latin America labelled ‘basic universalism’). The idea 
was promoted by both the World Bank (Perry et al. 2007) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Filgueira et al. 2006).
With the social floor and the social investment perspectives, the World Bank 
(Perry et al., 2007) was trying to focus on what the institution has called the ‘flip-
side’ of the informality coin, meaning its less researched side, and referring to the 
fact that traditionally the issue had been looked at from a structural perspective. 
There is, however, a danger that the result will be to blame workers’ ‘choices’ 
and motivations for staying informal and not welcoming the new social protection 
packages derived from the ‘basic universalism’ paradigm. 
The neoliberal argument, encapsulated by the International Financial 
Institutions’ (IFIs’) policies, was that privatization would lead to greater enter-
prise efficiency, and this would create benefits for the majority of countries. 
Instead, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies tended to limit production and 
employment, and all too often the labour market performed below the optimisti-
cally expected level (Sarmiento Palacio 2008: 252).
One of the main issues flagged up by recent World Bank-promoted research on 
a continental scale in Latin America is that weaknesses in the design and imple-
mentation of many programmes mean that in reality they exacerbate people’s 
lack of access to protection and create further incentives for informality (Perry 
et al. 2007). In the long run, the goal behind this approach is to provide universal 
‘essential’ health cover, delinked from the labour contract and financed by general 
taxation, along with ‘poverty-prevention’ pensions aimed at the elderly and the 
poor. 
The hypothesis the World Bank and the government wanted to test to support 
a policy against social protection subsidies and in favour of a minimum but uni-
versal social floor was that subsidized workers were risk-averse and would not 
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actively participate in a system oriented by the criteria of economic competition, 
quality and efficiency. 
The case study
According to the Centre for Development Studies of the National University 
of Colombia (CID), from the 1990s onwards Colombia underwent a process of 
substitution of secure employment by precarious employment (CID 2004). The 
global participation rate increased from the beginning of the 1990s from 57 per 
cent to 62 per cent, as a reflection at the macro level of micro-social processes 
determined by critical vulnerability. Specifically, the loss of jobs by the main 
household earners prompted the entrance into the labour market of women, young 
people and the elderly. In 2009, the percentage of poor population by income in 
Colombia was 45.5 per cent and extreme poverty was 16.4 per cent, according to 
the National Planning Department (DNP 2011). 
People’s opportunities in cities so heavily marked by a greatly segmented 
labour market depend on income generation and the provision of public subsidies 
(Lampis 2010; Urrea 2010). Against this background, even the fragile economic 
recovery that the country recorded after 2002 did not resolve the crisis of the 
labour market, and the levels of inequality have remained basically unaffected 
from 1970 to 2010, showing how economic recovery did not manage to affect 
more structural inequalities in the country (Urrea 2010).
The study contacted the Secretariat for Social Integration of the city local 
administration and obtained a database of 4,000 workers classified in the System 
for the Identification of Potential Beneficiaries of Social Programmes (SISBEN). 
The SISBEN index is the result of a multi-level analysis based partly on the 
standards of living approach and partly on the capability approach. The bottom 
three levels (SISBEN I, SISBEN II and SISBEN III) are considered eligible for a 
range of social programmes and subsidies. As the most multi-dimensionally poor, 
individuals who belong to households that rate as SISBEN I have so far been the 
most subsidized according to the methodology employed. The SISBEN system 
has been employed in the ranking of the population for the calculation of the 
contributions of individuals and households towards public health care insurance. 
The Colombian Health Care System has to date been organized as a two-tier 
system. The subsidised tier (Régimen Subsidiado) provides significantly subsi-
dized health care for those in SISBEN I and II and informal employment. The 
non-subsidized tier (Régimen Contributivo) provides health care insurance for the 
rest of the population, including those in SISBEN III. Because people rated as in 
SISBEN III are on the borderline between the two systems, they were a suitable 
control group.
Demographic data
The research surveyed 53 workers from Bogotá. The gender balance of this purpo-
















































































in age from 17 to 64, with a standard deviation (SD) of 10.47 from the mean of 
36.5. General data on educational achievement reflect the fact that people’s work-
ing perspectives and gains in quality of life are likely to be low or relatively low 
if they have not obtained a degree (see Table 6.1).
Workers were distributed along the following groups:
a Informal sector workers classified as SISBEN I or II: in other words those 
eligible, at least in principle, for the Regimen Subsidiado, specifically:
 i  Male, self-employed/self-employed workers, categorized as SISBEN 
I or II
 ii  Female, self-employed/self-employed workers, categorized as SISBEN 
I or II
iii Male, informal salaried workers, categorized as SISBEN I or II
 iv Female, informal salaried workers, categorized as SISBEN I or II.
b Informal sector workers classified as SISBEN III, with males and females 
being analysed separately to act as comparator groups. Specifically:
 i Male, informal workers categorized as SISBEN III
 ii Female, informal workers categorized as SISBEN III.
Social vulnerability and its effect on work
The dynamics of vulnerability and the struggles of women and men to achieve 
more sustainable livelihoods seem to be factors that cannot be ruled out when 
analysing informality (Moser 1998). The vulnerability of people’s lives changes 
over time, mostly because of critical life events involving the loss of resources, 
assets and capabilities that lead people to lose their entitlement to certain rights.1 
The study identified three typologies of life events related to people’s tendency to 
enter either formal or informal employment.
First, there are life events that have an impact on people’s opportunities to access 
education and training, which have an impact on endowments and assets, where 
the term ‘assets’ can be considered as referring to means to transform resources 
into capabilities (de la Rocha 2006; Lampis 2009, 2010; Moser 1998, 2009).
Table 6.1 Workers by highest educational attainment
Highest Educational Level Frequency %
None
Primary school (1–5)
Basic secondary school (6–9)
Upper secondary school (10–13)
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A second typology of events contributes to answering questions about what 
workers do in order to face unexpected and critical situations, and a third one 
consists of specifically employment-related life events that can be explained by 
the situations illustrated by the first two typologies.
The loss of a job is a very frequent experience. Here are quotes from two male 
workers from the group of self-employed males in SISBEN I and II, reflecting 
how these people are extremely concerned about their job security because of 
their role as the household’s main breadwinner:
Since there are no more jobs around we work for contracts in iron smelting. I 
have a lot of skills, but there is nothing to do. There were five or six of us but 
there was no job for anyone [after the crisis] with the exception of his [our 
boss’s] cousin who had a contract. [This] contract, that was verbal and I had 
no social protection, no sir, nothing.
 (28 years old)
The study found a critical divide between informal and formal workers, both males 
and females, in terms of the relationships between critical life events having an 
impact on people’s opportunities and both life and employment trajectories. This 
sheds light on the interlocking relationship between poverty and informality. The 
poor have limited access to formal employment, limited knowledge of social protec-
tion and low willingness to pay for formal benefits such as pensions, although they 
are more willing to pay for health as it has a more immediate impact on livelihoods 
security. McGrath and Keister (2008) showed that the effect of unemployment on 
asset accumulation is of the utmost importance for understanding informality. 
Thus, when comparing the control (SISBEN III) and interest groups (SISBEN 
I and II), as well as comparing the two interest groups with each other, the study 
found gender differences in the magnitude of the impacts that critical life events 
had had on individuals. In both cases, among the most important critical life 
events were dropping out of school, and economic crises hitting the household 
and compelling young people to enter the job market at an early age. 
Formal workers presented a completely different picture. Typically, their lives 
had been marked by greater security and stability, and the analysis of this dimen-
sion questions the idea that the motivation for being formal or informal depends 
on an individual’s agency and personal preferences. 
Labour history and workers’ mobility
Only a handful of workers across the researched categories had at some point 
in their working lives had the chance to obtain health insurance and make 
pension contributions. Their mobility therefore tends to be between salaried 
informal jobs and petty self-employment, such as street selling. Self-employed 
women, particularly those female self-employed workers in SISBEN I and 
II, had had more precarious employment histories. One of the female self-
employed workers in SISBEN I and II made these comments, which are typical 
of many we heard:
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While my dad was looking for a job I spent a while supporting the household, 
working as a live-in domestic servant. Because I was earning, I was the one 
who paid rent at home. This went on for a while. Later on, I was working and 
also receiving some help for my studies, and I used to help my brothers to pay 
for their studies. But then I had to dedicate myself to paid work.
(40 years old, female)
On the whole, when we try to understand the complex effect produced by the 
intersections between self-employed work, informal work and precarious salaried 
jobs, we find that the search for security of income plays a major role. Women’s 
working trajectories are different from those of men, largely because they tend to 
spend longer periods tied up with their productive and reproductive roles. 
Self-employed male workers in SISBEN I and II are among the most inter-
esting cases explored. All of them reported having experience and technical 
training which enabled them to keep working in the same activity for relatively 
long spells. Still, the case studies show that, depending on an individual’s level 
of technical experience, age, gender and responsibility, for many individuals 
the best option was self-employed work. The following is a quote from one of 
these workers:
So now as a self-employed worker the money is good, since at times you can 
earn the same as a salaried person . . . of course, there are also disadvantages, 
such as not having a pension or being able to pay for health insurance and at 
present I do not think there is enough money. Perhaps with time you could 
start to save for a pension.
(36 years old, male)
A significantly different picture emerged from the analysis of the data gathered 
from female formal workers at SISBEN level III: that is, those just above the cut-
off level for eligibility for the subsidized tier of the Colombian healthcare system. 
Most of them had had informal jobs in the initial years of their working lives, then 
went on to the lowest ranks of formal employment. For the majority of women 
in this group, this relative improvement in their working lives tended to alternate 
with moments in which their labour security swung backwards because of unem-
ployment spells which harshly affected their households.
Male formal workers at level III of SISBEN also showed significant differences 
from male workers in the groups of interest, and also differences from women at 
the same SISBEN level. From the beginning of their working lives these men had 
had formal waged employment, although they had usually begun on the lowest 
rungs of the formal employment ladder.
Scholars such as Flórez (2002) and Portes and Haller (2004) have stressed 
the economic and institutional place of economic activities in society as a whole. 
They have questioned any purely dual vision and positioned the need to go beyond 
informal work to achieve a better grasp of the informal economy.
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Employment conditions and quality of work
Under this dimension, the main finding was that a lack of formal written con-
tracts, more than access to more complete packages of social protection, marks 
the difference between the six study groups and the two control groups of formal 
workers.
Female self-employed workers in SISBEN I and II work in conditions that tend 
to be very precarious both in terms of social protection and in other ways. This is 
shown by a quote from an informal salaried male worker:
Where I work I am not insured. I arrive for a shift and they pay me. There is 
no pension, no severance pay, there is nothing . . . . So far so good. Since I 
work in a public business, a lot of people come there and the pay is good. The 
majority of the customers are people we know and nothing uncommon ever 
happens . . . no . . . it is good, I feel good about this job.
(55 years old, male)
The differences between formal and informal employment are also stark because 
under formal arrangements workers have more voice and the state exerts more 
control than in the largely unregulated informal sector.
Motivation for being formal or informal
Women and men alike were not so much motivated to choose between formal or 
informal work per se, but which type of work they obtained was strongly influ-
enced by their social and economic position. This was the factor that tended to 
determine whether they entered the labour market as self-employed or as informal 
salaried workers. However, despite this similarity, gender differences emerged 
quite clearly, as in the analysis of labour histories. 
Both focus groups and in-depth interviews showed that women were more 
inclined than men to describe ambivalence and tensions brought about by their 
subjective life paths and identities around their working lives. For instance, they 
used the idea of flexibility versus stability to express the tension between having 
time for domestic obligations and time for income generation:
Well, as a self-employed worker you manage your own time. But at the same 
time, you tend to become a slave to the job. To get some more money you 
do more work and leave the children alone and even the household chores. 
(40 years old)
Most women who said they preferred salaried work to self-employment generally 
did so because of access to a more regular income source, even if this was often 
low. None mentioned consumption smoothing in those words, but many under-
lined the problem of meeting monthly payments for public services and food. 
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Knowledge of social protection arrangements
In discussing social protection, and particularly health coverage for the low-paid 
there are three important points to be highlighted: affordability, security of provi-
sion and indirect assets protection.
On the whole, knowledge on health becomes increasingly precise as workers 
become more educated and better off: that is, when we go from SISBEN I and II 
workers to SISBEN III. Informal salaried workers know more than others in the 
first broad group. On pensions and other benefits, in the absence of active action 
by the state and the employers, knowledge is much higher among formal workers 
and is often acquired by means of mutual trust and solidarity.
The great majority (more than 80 per cent) of formal workers contribute to 
their pensions on a regular basis. However there are some cases of people who 
said they were making contributions but subsequently fell out of the system. Some 
workers who were in self-employed or informal work said they had made pay-
ments towards pensions in the month previous to the interview.
Willingness to pay for social protection
Willingness to pay for better and improved social protection is strongly related 
to lifecycle and household structure. The influence of these factors varies among 
groups and within groups. The main tension is between effective saving capacity 
over time and declared willingness to pay. While the latter could be relatively 
high, the former is often rather low. 
Workers in SISBEN I and II are generally willing to pay for better health cov-
erage, but the feedback that comes out from the comparison between the insights 
gathered about their knowledge of social protection mechanisms and motivation 
suggests it would be relevant to adopt a more flexible approach. They do value 
additional social protection and often state that they would like to have some 
access to programmes related to housing, leisure and training, but they cannot 
afford to make additional payments.
Self-employed workers, especially women in SISBEN III, are strongly con-
ditioned by their low income levels. Women who are heads of households face 
particular pressures on their budgets. Also, their logic is to maximize security in 
the short run. 
Their comments revealed the mistrust many typologies of workers have 
towards the public sector, providing elements to explain why self-help is so dif-
fused in a country where labour stability is long gone.
Concluding reflections: The need for a renewed debate  
on agency and social protection
The findings from this case study also question the view of a straightforward 
relationship between a formal job and better social protection. The logic of pov-
erty and vulnerability maximizing resources to provide for vital material and 
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non-material needs is not driven by risk-aversion as much the fact that becoming 
‘more formal’ is not only a cultural shift but entails the modification of structural 
conditions.
The old ways of thinking based on long-standing assumptions about social 
protection and social development which persisted through the twentieth century 
have been swiped away by institutional arrangements and social configurations 
that have deeply transformed ideas about the nature and role of the state, and the 
political role of public institutions.
The school of thought represented by Sen (1999), Nussbaum (2003) and Alkire 
and Foster (2007) among others, together with the strong institutional backing 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), produced a number of 
intellectually challenging and provocative insights. These ranged from the capa-
bilities approach to the idea of human security (Ogata and Sen 2003) to the Human 
Development Index (UNDP 1990) and the Index for Multi-Dimensional Poverty 
Measurement (Alkire and Foster 2011). However, beyond the academic milieu or 
a few attempts like those by Colombia and Mexico with the Multi-Dimensional 
Poverty Index, the appropriation by local communities, by local administrators 
and – most of all – by the big transnational corporations and the private sector 
of all those elaborations is extremely low. These new approaches of the 1990s, 
which attempted to fill the post-1989 void, deserve nowadays a debate. 
The point taken from scholars who adopt a critical stand here is that we are 
made to believe that these big international strategies are somehow the continu-
ation of the original Western project of modernity centred on the universality of 
rights, and political and social citizenship.
Note
1  Examples of critical life events are loss of a job illness, and becoming a victim of vio-
lence (see Lampis 2009).
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The sustainability challenge for African cities includes how to respond to glo-
balization issues and reconcile glaring socio-spatial inequality, while contending 
with climate change. However, many African governments seem ill-equipped to 
address these issues (Al-Zubaidi et al. 2012). 
With a vision to be ‘Africa’s model megacity’, the Lagos State Government 
is currently implementing various projects to overhaul the city infrastructure and 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). These projects are often done without 
regard for the needs of the poor residents, who are constantly faced with institu-
tional hostility, either through the declaration of their daily practices for making 
a living through informal economic activities as illegal, or the frequent threat 
of eviction from their homes, which are often located in informal settlements 
(Ahonsi 2002; Kamunyori 2007; Basinkski 2009). 
In response, the urban poor in Lagos have made on-going adjustments in 
the face of social exclusion and rights denial in the city. These adjustments are 
achieved by their adopting different coping strategies within the multiple formal–
informal interactions connecting them to the local formal economy and govern-
mental projects in a way that can be compared to other urban realities of Africa 
and the global South at large (McFarlane 2012). The recurrent tensions in the 
urban space arising from a disconnect between the developmental policy thrust of 
policy-makers and the pursuit of survival of the population need to be understood, 
especially because this situation is emblematic of African urbanism (Watson 
2014). 
Recent studies, such as those of Gandy (2005), Sijuwade (2008), Adelekan 
(2010) and Aderogba (2012), have investigated the response of the poor to the 
threat of eviction, lack of access to social services and environmental hazards in 
Lagos. In line with the established tradition of urban vulnerability and livelihoods 
analysis of the nineties (Moser 1996; Beall and Kanji 1999), these studies all 
point to the fact that the urban poor seek to find alternative ways of coping with 
the challenges a megacity like Lagos poses for their livelihoods, seldom backed 
by institutional responses. They are doing so using innovative and unconventional 
methods, as had been affirmed by the works of Koolhaas in the Harvard Project on 
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the City (2001) and Fourchard (2010), even though according to de Boeck (2007) 
the notion of poverty places too much stress on the weaknesses of the poor, and 
does not acknowledge the agency they possess.
Aligning with the belief that the key to effective poverty alleviation lies in 
identifying and harnessing the strengths in the familiar patterns and processes uti-
lized by the urban poor, this chapter seeks to understand the strategies adopted by 
the urban poor in responding to the challenges of a twenty-first-century dynamic 
Lagos megacity. The chapter teases out the inherent potentials in informal sys-
tems currently being practised, and highlights the agency that can be recognized 
and adopted in Africa’s distinct urban scenario. In doing so, the chapter enters into 
a dialogue with at least two bottom-line threads of the book as whole. On the one 
hand is the debate on the difficulty embedded in any attempt to easily tame local 
forms of slum urbanism, in as much as planning solutions most often tend to trans-
form the physical space rather than the social and power dynamics of which the 
former is the real by-product. On the other hand is the debate on the co-production 
of the city, as most cities of the global South, and certainly Lagos among them, 
defy the very idea of co-production because deep forms of socio-political exclu-
sion and misrecognition persist as the main articulators of the urban fabric there. 
These are explicitly analysed through the debate on formality/informality seen 
as an opposition between those who have the power to declare what is legal and 
those who are literally ‘made’ illegal by those political decisions and regulations. 
In this sense, the chapter might be considered as an agnostic piece within the book 
as a whole, especially in terms of the belief in the redemptive power of big plan-
ning discourses and overarching transformative paradigms.
The agency of the poor: literature overview
The need to recognize the resourcefulness of the poor and understand the extent 
to which they participate in urban economic and political life to achieve social, 
economic and political goals (de Soto 1989; Bayat 2000; de Boeck 2007), was 
highlighted as early as the 1990s in the works of Roberts (1995) and Beall and 
Kanji (1999). This position has been further reiterated by a more recent strand of 
literature (Mabogunje 2005; Hermanson 2010), and more recently in the submis-
sion of Khato (2012), who stated – as the voices denying it have not faded away – 
that the poor and oppressed do have agency and make both active and rational 
choices regarding survival within their limited resources. 
A decade and a half ago, Carney and colleagues (1999) pointed out how 
livelihood-building processes comprise the capabilities, assets (including mate-
rial and social resources) and activities required for making a living. While the 
Sustainable Livelihoods concept has been heavily criticized because it presents an 
overly optimistic view of how poor people organize their lives, by emphasizing 
more their opportunities and agency, rather than the impoverishment paradigm 
of earlier studies (de Haan 2012), the call it makes for recognition of how people 
knowledge is relevant for the crafting of more sustainable policies is important. 
For example, inclusive urban policies that guarantee for all ‘the right to the city’ 
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can be produced by gleaning from alternative methods of urban living typified by 
the poor. This in itself is untaming the urban debate (see also Lawton, in Part III 
of this book). 
One of the ways the agency of the urban poor in Lagos expresses itself is 
through the complex binds they develop with informal productive processes to 
access and accumulate assets (Tipple 2005). The strife for greater economic secu-
rity within the uncertainties posed by city life results in a situation where as many 
revert to the informal sector for survival, depend on this sector strongly, and are 
usually unable to separate economic life from other aspects of social life such as 
culture, religion, kinship and lineage (Meikle 2002, Srinivas 2003; Satterthwaite 
2006; Lawanson and Olanrewaju 2012). This is dominant in Lagos because 
according to the Lagos State Government (2012), about 93.7 per cent of business 
units in the state are located within the informal sector.
However, informality is often termed illegal, and various tiers of govern-
ment continually strengthen policies that restrict the access of the poor to infor-
mal enterprises and housing (Charman et al. 2012). With informality being the 
dominant urban reality in many African countries, on the basis of my experience 
researching and working at the community level on health issues with the urban 
poor of Lagos, I therefore align with the submission of Satterthwaite and Hardoy 
(1993), that there must be something wrong with the law and attitude of govern-
ment if the urban majority are forced to contravene laws daily in their quest for 
survival. A more recent study by McGranahan and Satterthwaite (2014) reveals 
that 21 years later the situation is yet to improve, as policy measures to control 
urbanization, especially in developing countries, still amplify inequality and tend 
to reduce the urban poor to precarious living conditions in fragile environments, 
ill-suited to habitation, and lacking access to basic public amenities and services. 
Hence, in a way that is closer to the elaboration of the urban ecology school of 
thought, this chapter reflects my uneasiness with the very idea of traditional tech-
nocratic planning as the more appropriate solution for the kind of urban contexts 
such as those of Lagos, where I live. This leaves me to wonder about what kind 
of new approach might provide an answer to the urge we feel for a renewed right-
based and more inclusive planning approach for African cities (see Rosales, in 
Part III of this book). 
In many instances, government’s framing of formal–informal relationships 
contributes to the designation of informality in urban debates as a development 
problem, whereby the informal is devalued as not only legally illegitimate, but 
visually, socially and spatially illegitimate (McFarlane 2012). Many African pol-
icy-makers promote economic dualism and assume an autonomous relationship 
between the formal and informal sectors, hence rather than recognizing its poten-
tially productive capacities (Harding and Jenkins 1989) they see the informal 
sector as an economic parasite which should be stifled to engender development 
(Gerxhani 2003). For example, despite accounting for 90.2 per cent of real estate 
assets in Lagos State, the informal economy is termed ‘extra-legal’. 
Informality and formality then become tools for negotiation, interaction and 
regulation in the city (Roy 2009). MacLeod and Jones (2011) highlight a typical 
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scenario where some instances of informal land annexation or transformation such 
as squatting on vacant lots are designated as illegal and their inhabitants criminal-
ized, while others manifesting as gentrification or change of use are seemingly 
formalized to enjoy state sanction (with fines for contravention of these develop-
ments) or even endorsed as practices of the state (rezoning). Forced evictions 
remain a common means by which land occupied predominantly by low-income 
groups is cleared for redevelopment in Lagos. The case of Maroko, which made 
way for highbrow Victoria Island Extension, was emblematic in the 1990s, result-
ing in the displacement of 300,000 low-income residents without compensation 
or relocation (Agbola and Jinadu, 1997). More recent evictions in Makoko, Odo-
Iragunshi, Kuramo Village and Ijora Badiya have also resulted in loss of life and 
property for many more (Amnesty International 2013). 
Another example is street vending, which is perceived as a manifestation of 
underdevelopment, rather than a clear display of urban resilience by the lowest 
cadre of society (Sassen 1997; Bromley and Mackie 2009; Cross and Morales 
2007). As a result, there are multiple laws set up specifically to control and pos-
sibly eradicate street trading across the Lagos metropolis, with fines of up to $33 
(N5,000) and imprisonment for up to six months for first-time offenders.
The agency of the urban poor of Lagos metropolis
Economic sustainability: informal livelihoods and finance networks
The informal economy is the highest employer in Lagos, attracting close to 75 per 
cent of the working-age population in diverse activities from street vending and 
roadside cottage industries to home-based enterprises (HBEs) (LASG, 2012). 
HBEs in particular have helped many a family overcome destitution through bet-
ter access to income generation opportunities. At this stage, operators are usually 
unable to separate economic from other facets of life, and so combine the quantum 
of personal and domestic assets including living quarters, home appliances, vehi-
cles and furniture for business, further corroborating the principles outlined in the 
sustainable livelihood framework.
A recent study across low-income communities in Lagos (Lawanson 2011) 
revealed that 82.5 per cent of the working population in these communities are 
engaged in some form of HBE, especially petty trade (51 per cent) and artisan 
services (38 per cent). The study further revealed that about 45 per cent of the 
respondents rely solely on home enterprises, with most households having multi-
ple income earners (spouses 69 per cent, children 17.9 per cent and resident kin-
folk 13.4 per cent). Across the Lagos Metropolis, the dominant business structure 
is the sole proprietorship (84 per cent); many have grown into larger enterprises 
(43 per cent), employing between one and four staff, with unpaid family workers 
making up only 8 per cent of staff strength
While HBEs are a basic means of survival for poor households, many who 
began HBEs for daily survival have transited to growth enterprises, employ-
ing kin and diversifying business activities, through funds raised from local 
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financial aid networks similar to those modelled in the Grameen bank (Barua 
2006). Micro, small and medium-scale enterprises (MSME) have been identified 
as the main thrust for economic development in developing countries (Charmes 
1998; Mitullah 2004). It is interesting to note that prohibitive bank lending rates 
and collateral demands result in a situation where the majority of seed funding 
for small-scale enterprises comes from informal microfinance, the latter usu-
ally being a combination of pooled personal savings, proceeds of rotating credit 
schemes and informal lending schemes accessed through membership of coop-
eratives. Informal financial institutions have been identified as an avenue through 
which both the borderline and the absolute poor can access loans to become self-
employed and escape poverty (Aryeetey 1998; Barua 2006; Karlan and Goldberg 
2007; Iganiga 2008). 
Informal financial networks in Lagos remain the dominant sources of finance 
for informal enterprises (Ijaiya 2010), and according to Birchall (2003) informal 
cooperative economic associations are a self-help invention of the poor. In the 
Lagos metropolis, the study of HBEs further revealed that about 90 per cent of 
respondents belong to either a neighbourhood-based cooperative thrift society or 
a rotating credit scheme (Lawanson and Oduwaye, 2014). Usually manifesting in 
social (neighbourhood, religious and ethnic) or economic (artisan or local market) 
groupings, their members rely heavily on these local fund-raising schemes for 
business expansion, capital asset acquisition and meeting household emergencies. 
As such, social capital is converted into assets as outlined in the sustainable liveli-
hoods framework. 
This communal engagement further highlights Simone’s (2010) submission 
that people collaborate, using each other as infrastructure, in ways that may be 
unstable, tentative and temporary, but that also build a degree of economic secu-
rity or opportunity, and a sense of the city. As de Soto (2001) outlined, when citi-
zens in the informal sector need capital for housing or business, their only sources 
are people in their environment with whom they have a relation of mutual trust. 
Typical scenarios include pooling of resources for bulk purchase of items espe-
cially at festive periods and also for construction, cooperative society purchase of 
land for development, rotating credit schemes organized by residents of a build-
ing or street or members of a local church society, while community artisans such 
as tailors may organize into a thrift society in which the welfare of members is 
guaranteed and periodic levies and contributions collected from which individual 
members may borrow, should the need arise. 
Environmental sustainability: urban vulnerability  
and informal governance networks
The Lagos metropolis is especially vulnerable to the vagaries of climate change 
because of its low-lying coastal location. In fact, McGranahan et al. (2007) and 
Spaargaren and Mol (2008), alongside the IPCC (2009), have predicted that Lagos 
is likely to be one of the worst-affected cities in Nigeria in the event of climate-
change-induced hazards, particularly sea-level rise and flooding. Flooding had 
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earlier been identified as a major obstacle to sustainable development in Lagos, 
especially among the urban poor (LASG 2004). According to French, Awosika 
and Ibe (2011), about 3 million people live in the low-lying areas of the Lagos 
metropolis, the vast majority of whom are additionally vulnerable because of 
their status as residents of informal communities characterized by extreme lack 
of infrastructure.
Typically, informal coastal communities in Lagos present a dire picture of 
environmental fragility. With many households having ten or more members, 
and with houses built mostly of locally available temporary materials, lack of 
neighbourhood infrastructure and poor drainage, the residents have faced various 
negative impacts of climate change in terms of health and productive assets, and 
are therefore thereby doubly exposed to biophysical and social vulnerability as 
described by O’Brien and Leichenko (2000). 
Beyond individual and household vulnerabilities, urban poor residents of 
coastal communities in Lagos are also collectively vulnerable, as neighbourhood 
amenities destroyed during flooding incidents are seldom replaced or repaired 
promptly. The particular case of Ajegunle Ikorodu community was revealed in a 
study by Olajide and Lawanson (2014). The only secondary school was destroyed 
during the floods of October 2010. Students were relocated to other schools in the 
local government area, the nearest being at a distance of about 2 km across a busy 
ten-lane expressway. Although the school was reopened in 2011, the destroyed 
buildings were still under reconstruction in July 2013. 
However, some communities are clearly proactive in their response to cli-
mate change vulnerability, in that rather than waiting for government aid they 
initiate self-help strategies to address local challenges. An example is Iwaya, an 
indigenous community and informal settlement located along the Lagos lagoon. 
Despite the constant threat of eviction by the Lagos State Government, residents 
of Iwaya have been able to harness the traditional leadership structure for com-
munity development and climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Most indigenous communities in Lagos are governed through a top-down 
structure, where the traditional leader (Baale) is the sole custodian and absolute 
ruler of the community, resulting often in exclusion on the basis of gender and 
other social indicators. However, Iwaya is governed through a decentralized hier-
archical structure in which the Baale appointed community heads (chiefs) on each 
of the 32 streets in the community. These chiefs are responsible for coordinating 
environmental sanitation activities and ensuring the health, safety and welfare of 
the residents on their streets. They meet with the Baale on a weekly basis to chart 
the course of development of the community. A study by Nwokoro et al. (2014) 
revealed that 83.5 per cent of respondents in Iwaya were satisfied with this system 
of governance because it had resulted in cleaner surroundings and a reduction in 
sanitation-related illnesses (malaria and typhoid fever) as well as a reduction in 
flood-related accidents.
This atypical informal governance structure has enabled equitable representa-
tion of the people in the affairs of their community and engendered a stronger 
sense of community. The local organization structure, albeit informal, has been 
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identified as a strategic asset which was leveraged to attract support and commu-
nity development in Iwaya (AHI 2011). Iwaya is repeatedly selected for poverty 
alleviation projects because of this decentralized governance pattern as it offers 
a more viable platform for engagement with aid agencies. A non-governmental 
organization, Compass International, is embedded in the community, offering 
vocational training and basic health support, thereby assisting with improving 
livelihoods and reducing health vulnerabilities. A major achievement of this 
partnership was the establishment of a ten-bed primary health centre in the com-
munity. The land for the health centre was donated by the community, while 
construction was sponsored by the NGO, using local labour. The primary health 
centre is staffed by local indigenes who were sponsored for training in basic nurs-
ing and medical laboratory science. 
Conclusion
In the midst of their varied vulnerabilities, the urban poor in Lagos have been 
able to develop certain adaptive traits which can be recognized, replicated and 
regulated for enhanced urban development. This chapter illustrates how socio-
environmental security and resilience cannot be sought outside locally established 
cultural patterns. Therefore, its contribution to the wider debate on livelihoods and 
social vulnerability consists of a reminder about the difficulties that arise when 
scholars and policy-makers try to fit people’s lives within any kind of normative 
framework, even those which are nominally progressive and anti-hegemonic (see 
the debate on ‘slum urbanism and the quite encroachment of the untamed’ in the 
conclusions of this book). One thread that runs through the responses of Lagos’s 
urban poor to economic, environmental and social vulnerabilities is the strength 
of the informal networks. The various manifestations of informality in the Lagos 
metropolis are not dissimilar to those which have been espoused over the past 
four decades in the development literature. However, the cloak of illegality looms 
large over the sector. Rather than being ‘institutionalised’, informality should be 
recognized as an active response mechanism of poor citizens to the multiple vul-
nerabilities they are confronted with in the urban space. The poor have harnessed 
this strength by pooling resources, both tangible and intangible, to mitigate the 
effects of obvious challenges faced within their communities.
Simone’s (2005) position is that any serious attempt to reinvent African urban 
centres must acknowledge and incorporate existing local knowledge that sustains 
and recreates informal urban economic social systems. It is important therefore to 
recognize that the poor, through the instrumentality of self-help efforts, are able 
to take the first step to escape destitution and transform their means of survival 
into viable means of sustenance. In the Lagos metropolis, livelihoods have been 
enhanced by home-based enterprises, and survivalist enterprises have been able 
to transit to growth enterprises, leveraging on informal financial networks. Cases 
of socio-environmental vulnerabilities have been mitigated by the activities of the 
informal governance networks. All these cases of self-help have employed largely 
non-monetary assets.
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Though considered irrational and disordered by dominant powers, the truth is 
that informal networks are actually well ordered and governed by strict enforce-
ment codes because, as De Soto (1989) stated, the informal community would 
rather develop its own laws and institutions to make up for lack of access than sur-
render to anarchy. Therefore, where effectively harnessed, these seemingly basic 
self-help structures can be utilized for engendering long-term development within 
the low-income communities and across the megacity. 
Finally, rather than seeking to enforce complicated and widespread laws that 
usually disenfranchise the vulnerable, it is important that city governments aim 
for inclusiveness. Strategies for resolving the existing tensions between urban 
policy and urban realities are also necessary because local dynamics involved 
in the pursuit of livelihood security are an integral part of how cities evolve. It 
is important that the rhetoric go beyond formal–informal labels and the idea of 
informality as unacceptable within the urban fabric, towards a view of informality 
as a dynamic pointer to shifting urban relationships between the authorized and 
the unauthorized. 
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8 Sustainability of what? 
The struggles of poor Mayan households  
with young breadwinners towards a  
better life in the peri-urban area of  
Merida, Yucatan, Mexico
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Introduction
Urbanization and globalization processes are transforming both the societies 
and the landscapes of the global South. Among the most relevant impacts gen-
erated by these global phenomena are those that directly or indirectly affect 
the livelihoods of poor households living in the peri-urban areas of southern 
cities (Rigg 2007; Potts 2013).1 In their recent book on ethnicity and liveli-
hoods in highlands China, Vietnam and Laos, Michaud and Forsyth (2013) 
posed the question of how these people, so diverse in ethnic terms, fashion 
their livelihoods after their homelands open to economic investment and polit-
ical change.
In spite of being based on studies carried out in a different continent, this 
work shares with Michaud and Forsyth’s two core ideas: a) particular ethnic 
groups within urban contexts develop quite specific patterns of social vulnerabil-
ity; and b) sustainable livelihood studies have retained their relevance despite the 
critiques because they remain a useful lens for analysing how macro- and meso-
social forces constrain individual agency and opportunities. From a considera-
tion of the central role of young breadwinners in terms of the inter- generational 
reproduction of poverty,2 this chapter analyses a particular ethnic group and 
the stage of the household cycle in order to better understand peri-urban live-
lihoods of Mayan families in a Mexican city. In so doing, it seeks to make a 
contribution to a renewed tradition of research on poor households’ livelihoods 
from a perspective that values ethnic diversity as a key dimension of their social 
vulnerability. 
The chapter opens a dialogue with one of the main threads of the books, the 
issue of social justice, in so far as it points out the importance of the ethnic dimen-
sion (being Mayan) and socio-demographic features (being a young adult) to 
understand how social exclusion and socio-spatial segregation are produced on 
the basis of forms of injustice that touch upon Fraser’s (2009) three-tiered con-
ceptualization of justice.
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The sustainable livelihood approach and its critics
To recast the livelihoods debate in terms of the contemporary academic debate 
requires two caveats: risk and vulnerability are long since understood as pro-
duced throughout dynamics that intertwine global and local actors (see also Part 
II introduction and Chapter 6). Therefore the very search for development and 
well-being, even from a wholly humanist and freedom-based perspective (Sen 
1999), cannot be framed without considering that the project of development is an 
integral part of what Beck (1992) defined as reflexive modernity. That is, the risks 
and the vulnerabilities affecting a local group like Mayan households in Merida 
cannot be understood by looking at the local urban and national contexts only. 
As pointed out by Sassen (2014), contemporary forms of exclusions are brutally 
produced by highly complex logic at multiple scales and enacted mostly in urban 
centres where economic and political power concentrate. These exclusions, we 
argue, once brought down to the local level reflect the misrepresentation of local 
communities and their rights and, following Fraser’s main conceptual architec-
ture, in turn generate injustices in the dimensions of redistribution and recognition 
(Fraser 2009). 
In its early elaborations, the sustainable livelihood approach (SLA) consid-
ered households’ livelihoods to be sustainable when they are able to cope with 
and recover from the impact of life events, as well as to maintain and increase 
the assets and capabilities they will use to face future risks and uncertainties 
(Chambers 1989; DFID 1999). The SLA framework was criticized over the past 
decade, often harshly. Nonetheless, it is an approach that has remained relevant 
despite the ambiguities of the term ‘sustainable’ and the vagueness of its meth-
odological operationalization.
A critical issue related to the operationalization of the SLA into a useful frame-
work for policy-making is that, even compared to more conceptually narrow mon-
etarist approaches to poverty measurements (Ruggeri-Laderchi 2000), it does not 
specify what level of well-being is sufficient to lift a household out of poverty. 
The definition of well-being levels is controversial because any specific level of 
well-being is the result of the interaction of factors belonging to material, rela-
tional and subjective domains. Another issue is that only a few households make 
a living in a way that qualifies as sustainable in all the different dimensions of the 
concept (environmental, economic, social and institutional). Over time, competi-
tion for and depletion of assets are common features when households and social 
groups try to access the resources they need. The trade-offs involve impacts and 
risk transfers to other households and social groups, and should be better consid-
ered in the SLA (McGregor 2007; White and Ellison 2007; Marks and Thompson 
2008; White 2009).
Merida’s peri-urban area
Merida’s peri-urban area is a recent formation, and one of the most visible ter-
ritorial transformations that accompanied the development of Merida into a 
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metropolitan city. This process started in the early 1970s and was characterized 
by the physical sprawl of Merida city, as well as the economic and functional 
integration of all the existing communities in its area of influence (Lapo 1983; 
Estébanez 1992; Ferrer 1992).
The peri-urban area extends across six municipalities and includes 270 com-
munities (INEGI 2010; Domínguez 2011).3 According to the 2010 census con-
ducted by the Mexican National Institute on Statistics and Geography (INEGI), 
this peri-urban area has a total population of 101,601 inhabitants, who represent 
10.73 per cent of the total population of the city. 
Like any other peri-urban area, Merida has a complex typology of commu-
nities. We can highlight here the pueblos and comisarias (communities which 
existed before accelerated urbanization), irregular settlements, subdivisions 
(gated or open, vertical or horizontal, and scattered houses), as well as a wide 
range of land uses. Land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few private 
owners, who control the growth of the city while speculating on future land prices.
According to data from the Evaluation National Council of Social Development 
Public Policy,4 29.4 per cent of the total population of Merida are poor, while 
3.3 per cent are classified as in absolute poverty. Following UN-HABITAT’s 
(2003a, 2003b, 2006) definition of slum, a recent study found that the highest 
rates of urban poverty can be found in the peri-urban communities of Merida city 
(Domínguez and Cabrera 2012). 
Population and methods: identifying segregations and injustices
After a preliminary exploration, we selected the peri-urban communities of 
Chablekal and Dzitya for the study eventually carried out between October and 
November 2013. In Chablekal we surveyed 49 homes, and in Dzitya we surveyed 
54 homes. We thus built two independent databases (one for each community) 
with all the information obtained from the surveys. From the final databases, we 
chose ten households with young adult members in Chablekal and another ten in 
Dzitya that met our criteria: they were poor and had Mayan ancestry. 
Young adults’ key characteristics were used to build the poor Mayan house-
hold typology which was utilized to carry out the analysis (see Table 8.1). This 
typology relates the households studied to household lifecycle stages.
Most of the poor Mayan households in general from Chablekal and Dzitya 
have nuclear household structures. They tend to have fewer children and a lower 
dependency ratio (Table 8.2) than earlier generations, and they also tend to live 
near their relatives.
A more detailed analysis of the household structures data, presented in Table 8.2, 
shows that 82 per cent of the total households in Chablekal and 80 per cent in 
Dzitya included young adult members. Over the last decades, adjustments in the 
households’ composition and organization has helped them cope with the dramatic 
changes that the regional labour market has experienced. 
Table 8.1 illustrates that 42.5 per cent of poor Mayan households with young 
adults in Chablekal and 48.8 per cent in Dzitya were in the conformation stage; 
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Table 8.1 Proposed typology for the poor Mayan households with young adult members 
considered in this study
Household lifecycle stages of the 
studied poor Mayan households 
Young adults’ key characteristics utilized to define 




 • Breadwinners of their nuclear households.
 • In their 20s.
 • Children still pre-adolescent, and some couples 
have no children yet.
 • Breadwinners of their nuclear households.
 • In their 30s.
 • At least one child in adolescence.
 • Around half are single and without children, but 
the other half do have children. Some of those 
with children are married, but others are single 
parents.
 • All are still dependent in some way on their 
middle-aged parents’ assets, since they are still 
living on their parents’ housing plots. Among this 
particular sub-group of young adults are those 
that now have a partner and/or children (they 
represent the extended households of this study).
 • Almost all are working, a few work and study at 
the same time , while a significant number are 
continuing studies at higher levels (see Table 8.3), 
sometimes aided by scholarships.
Source: the authors.
25 per cent of these households in Chablekal and 23.3 per cent in Dzitya were in 
the consolidation stage; and 32.5 per cent of these households in Chablekal and 
27.9 per cent in Dzitya were in the early dispersion stage. So in the majority of the 
poor households analysed, young adults were the main breadwinners (following 
the traditional pattern), although there is a growing trend within this social group 
to delay the dispersion (to start their own separate households) of young adults. 
It is useful to begin analysing the dynamics of the early dispersion stage of the 
lifecycle of the studied households in Chablekal and Dzitya by dividing them into 
two typologies. The first one corresponds to extended households composed of 
young adults, their children and spouses (if any), and of course their parents (who 
are middle aged), as well as their brothers and sisters (if they are still living in 
the same house). The second typology consists of nuclear households where the 
middle-aged adults’ children (that is to say, the young adults) are still single, and 
continue living with their parents.
The young adults in these two subgroups of early dispersion households tend 
to stay with their parents largely because of their need to develop strategies 
for accessing key livelihood assets (particularly housing and income savings), 
although this also depends on the specific conditions of their households. A few 
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Table 8.2  Selected demographic characteristics of poor Mayan households in general 
from Chablekal and Dzitya
Selected demographic characteristics of poor Mayan households 
in general (1)

































Source: the authors using data from the surveys.
Notes:
(1) All data presented in this table refers to the total sample of the two independent survey databases 
generated for the research project. In other words this data refers to the entire population of both 
communities studied.
(2) These households are those integrated only by seniors.
work and study at the same time, while a significant number, some of whom have 
scholarships, continue studying at higher levels of education. 
Out of the totality of the heads of households studied in the conformation and 
consolidation stages, most of the young adults had completed primary and sec-
ondary education, and some had studied up to the middle superior level.5 Very 
few of those young adults had reached the superior educational level (Table 8.3).6 
Those with the lowest educational levels, and some of those who had reached the 
middle superior level, were found to have also acquired or been willing to acquire 
manual skills that would allow them to diversify their job opportunities, in spite 
of the low level of remuneration that in general is common in Mexico. As we 
have mentioned, a different trend was apparent among the poor households in the 
early dispersion stage: a significant number of their young adult members were 
concentrating on improving their education (Table 8.3). 
Most poor households in the areas studied (regardless of their lifecycle stage 
and whether they have young adult members) have access to basic services, 
including electricity, piped water and mobile phones, though with limitations 
in their quality (Domínguez 2012; Domínguez and García 2012). Greater (geo-
graphic and socio-economic) challenges are faced when these households try to 
gain access to specialized health services, higher education, the internet and other 
facilities (Domínguez 2011). 
Although it is true that in the majority of cases this new poverty (Sabatini 
et al. 2001) is not as extreme as to lead to extreme deprivations, it tends to be 
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Table 8.3 Education levels of young adults members of the studied poor Mayan households
Educational levels Household lifecycle stages of the studied poor Mayan households
















































Source: the authors using data from the surveys.
Notes:
(1) The middle superior level of education (known in Mexico as ‘preparatory education’) includes 
the three last levels of high school as well as the Anglo-Saxon collage level (which in Mexico in 
known as ‘technical careers’).
(2) The superior level of education is equivalent to the Anglo-Saxon degree-level of professional 
qualifications (which in Mexico is known as ‘licenciatura’).
significant enough to make these households permanently unable to fulfil their 
expectations of being able to live the kind of contemporary urban life that is pro-
moted by the media and commercial advertising and is culturally accepted and 
sought within Chablkal and Dzitya as a model. As pointed out in the next section, 
these data, apparently so context specific, mirror a broader trend marked by social 
exclusion and socio-spatial segregation, characterised by broader opportunities 
for consumption but persisting inequality of access and social mobility and geo-
graphically concentrated disadvantages (Saraví 2004).
As in other Mexican urban geographies, the impoverishment context and 
social exclusion experienced by these (and other) families of the peri-urban area 
of Merida is closely related with the nature of the country’s employment laws, 
as well as with the neoliberal adjustments that have accompanied Mexican glo-
balization since the 1980s (Aparicio et al. 2009; Contreras and Contreras 2009; 
Cordera and Lomelí 2009; Marañón et al. 2009; Sánchez Almanza and de la Vega 
Estrada 2009; Urzúa and Brambila 2009). At the national scale, some of the most 
relevant and negative impacts that neoliberal adjustments have delivered on the 
livelihoods of the original populations living in the peri-urban areas of Mexican 
cities are possible due to the changes made in 1992 to the Mexican Agrarian 
Law. These changes took place at the constitutional level, in combination with the 
historic persistence of poverty in the region for Mayan households, the mediocre 
support that the government had given to them to cultivate their farmland and the 
insistence of the real estate industry push in the past two decades for the ejidatario 
groups of the area to sell their lands in a new liberalized land market. 
As we discuss in the next section, these past actions meant a number of negative 
impacts that keep impinging on the present opportunities of Mayan households 
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with young heads of household, as it is on the basis of this history of dispossession 
that most of these households do not any longer have access to these key liveli-
hood assets (Pinkus Rendón et al. 2012).
Although the Mexican state has concentrated its poverty alleviation poli-
cies during the last decade on ensuring that all the population are adequately 
fed, and its main institutional strategy on conditional cash transfers, it is not 
easy for poor households to access and stay on these programmes, particularly 
the conditional cash transfer programmes. The eligibility criteria for these are 
stiff, and the resources behind them are scarce. They lack financial sustainability 
because they are non-contributory. Two examples of cash transfer programmes 
are ‘Opportunities’ and ‘Seniors’. Similar difficulties have being reported for 
other cities in Mexico and the global South (Lomnitz 1998; Mattos 2002; Entrena 
Duran 2006; Juárez Martínez 2006; Smets and Salman 2008).
The livelihoods of poor Mayan households with young adults
Traditional readings of inequality through the lenses of land and housing, long 
since recognized as key local productive assets for poor households (Moser and 
McIlwaine 1997), need to be re-read through a much broader lens. The broad-
ening of income and non-income inequalities is a key feature that accompanies 
the opening up of Latin American economies from the early1980s until the mid-
1990s, without a real reverse of that trend ever since (Cornia, 2004). Rakkonen, 
in a Mexican-based case study explicitly researching Merida, underlines the 
importance of overcoming the horizon of socio-economic segregation to include 
key racial and ethnic dimensions to understand socio-spatial segregation. Saraví 
(2004), reflecting on how Argentinian youth are affected by forms of spatial seg-
regation that concern ‘who they are’, ‘what they do’ and the culture to which 
they belong, has brought forward a powerful argument to provide an innovative 
contribution to our case study. In fact, what seems to be happening in Mexican as 
in other Latin American cities is the production of multi-layered forms of socio-
spatial segregation, which combine in a way that cannot be easily tamed the ele-
ments of poor redistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation.
These elements of social injustice are also historically produced as young 
Mayan adult members never belonged to the ejidatario groups which were given 
collective ownership rights over the farmland around Merida city under the for-
mer Mexican Agrarian Law. When in 1992 this law was modified to permit the 
ejidatario groups to sell their lands, they sold them almost entirely to private 
individuals. This meant that their descendants (the young adults who are the focus 
of this study) had no opportunity to farm or give another use to their own lands in 
order to make a living.
Housing
Regarding housing, most of the studied households had been granted a portion 
of their parents’ plots on which to build a house. However, the plots are now too 
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small for further subdivision, and any spare land has often been sold to people 
from outside the communities (leading to a process of gentrification). When plots 
were sold, it was mostly for economic reasons.
Some young adults have salaried positions and others work freelance (Table 8.4), 
but in both cases most of their jobs are precarious and provide only a small income. 
Most young adults only have one job at a time, although if they lose this job they 
have some flexibility in finding a new one should they have a variety of manual 
skills (as many individuals do).
Since there are no large employers in Chablekal, most young adults commute 
to Merida city or to one of the few gated communities nearby, where they typi-
cally work in construction, as domestic servants or gardeners, or in retail (often 
in shopping malls in the case of Merida). All these occupations represent the new 
kind of job opportunities that the globalized labour market of the region preferen-
tially offers to the members of this social group.
In contrast, there are some job opportunities in Dzitya, which has quarries 
and craft workshops. These occupations are dependent on global trade, since the 
products generated in the craft workshops are destined for the international mar-
ket, because they are sold directly to the tourists either in Progreso beach or at 
other tourist attractions of Yucatan. In the case of the quarries, their production 
is exported mainly to the United State of America or to the Riviera Maya, where 
people from Canada and the USA spend their holidays. It is important to mention 
that in the craft workshops Dzitya’s young adults work mainly as freelancers, 
while in the quarries they are employees. However, these enterprises employ only 
a proportion of Dzitya’s young people, and others work in Merida, among other 
occupations as construction workers, electricians and in textile factories nearby, 
which are also manifestations of the economic globalization of the city.
Not all young adult women in the households studied had paid employment. 
Those with small children often did not work. A few received help from rela-
tives to care for their children while they worked and others had nursery benefits. 
Women without children usually did seek employment. Many women preferred 
work with ‘more freedom’ such as domestic service, although those jobs do not 
offer them comparable benefits.
Health care insurance
There is a growing trend for employers to limit employee access to health benefits 
(IMSS), in order to lower their tax payments. In exchange for accepting a contract 
that excludes IMSS benefits, employers usually pay slightly more (in cash). Many 
of the studied households have no IMSS benefits, including those with no member 
in work and those whose workers are self-employed. Most of these vulnerable 
households have access to a government-promoted scheme known as ‘Popular 
Insurance’ (see Table 8.4). Although Popular Insurance is free, it provides only 
limited health coverage, and no pensions or social security payments for those 
unable to work or for their households. Those who find themselves in this position 
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Complementary income-generation activities
Our expectation prior to the field research was that the target households would 
gain a significant proportion of their livelihood from complementary activities 
such as growing their own food and some kind of small-scale income-generation 
like selling via catalogues or making food. However, this proved not to be the 
case. Only a few of the households studied performed these kinds of complemen-
tary activities (see Table 8.4).
As Table 8.4 shows, apart from their wages, the households studied had very 
little access to sources of money. As well as cash transfers from the government, 
potential sources were bank loans, household loans and pawning goods. Although 
remittances (from household members who have migrated for work) are signifi-
cant in some contexts, they did not feature in this survey, since virtually no work-
ers from this area migrate to other regions of the country or overseas.
Social assets
The most important social asset that these households have are their social net-
works, which support them in many ways, particularly at moments of greater dif-
ficulties (for instance, by lending them money: see Table 8.4). Nevertheless, the 
support available is limited because most households’ social networks consist of 
other poor households whose ability to provide help is restricted (Gonzales de la 
Rocha 2006). Finally, it is important to mention that in moments of great diffi-
culty these poor households usually get some support from the churches to which 
they belong or from charities.
Livelihoods sustainability of poor Mayan households  
with young breadwinners
The different vulnerability conditions that the studied poor Mayan households 
experience through the stages of their household lifecycle affect their capacity to 
cope with present and future problems. For those Mayan households in the con-
formation stage, an obvious problem is that they cannot easily send more mem-
bers into the labour market. Another common problem is childhood sickness, 
which usually erodes their limited assets. Such households face their everyday 
problems through self-organization and cooperation with their social networks. 
These are resilience attributes (Quinlan 2003). Asset diversity (another resilience 
attribute) is manifested in these households not by the quantity of their assets, but 
by the combination of the limited assets they have to work with. Together with the 
willingness of breadwinners to change jobs as necessary, these poor households 
typically manage to remain in a reasonably stable state. This could perhaps be 
described as sustainability (although we are not so sure).
Poor Mayan households in the consolidation stage have the advantage that the 
wife is able to join the labour market once her children have a degree of independ-
ence. Older children typically also suffer less sickness, so these households usu-
ally have less frequent need to call on their limited assets. When these households 
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manage to maintain their income over a reasonable period (usually more than 
three years), and they can depend on other factors such as self-organization, coop-
eration and asset diversity, they acquire a good degree of stability. Paradoxically, 
though, this stability rarely translates into significant improvements in their stand-
ard of living. This trend of apparent improvement in stability was usually higher 
for those classified as early dispersion households, because their young adult 
members take advantage of the available assets of their middle-age parents (see 
Table 8.1).
We did not find that the government programmes to fight poverty (particu-
larly those providing cash transfers) had succeeded in helping the households we 
surveyed to develop long-term sustainable livelihood strategies or to make sig-
nificant improvements to their standard of living. Payouts from such programmes 
naturally led to a temporary improvement in household incomes, but there is an 
obvious risk in creating dependency on such programmes, since they are not 
designed to (and do not) provide a long-term income supplement. The issue is not 
only to improve the services provided by these programmes but to protect house-
holds from fluctuations in the economic and political situation (Sandberg 2012; 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2013).
Conclusions
This research has shown the diversity and complexity of the ways in which poor 
Mayan households with young adult members make a living in Merida’s peri-
urban area. It also makes a contribution to the understanding of how these house-
holds’ livelihoods interact with an urban context shaped by both global and local 
processes, as increasingly is the Mexican economy under economic liberalization. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out by several scholars analysing both Mexico and other 
countries of the region (Monkkonen 2012; Sabatini, Cáceres and Cerda, et al. 
2001; Saraví, 2004), what we may still be calling ‘the sustainability of people’s 
livelihoods’ cannot be easily tamed as there are subjective and cultural dimen-
sions interacting with the processes of segregation. Depending on their social vul-
nerabilities, which are shaped by the ethnicity, age and gender of their members, 
specific households’ structures and lifecycle stages, but also community aspira-
tions and institutional action trajectories geared at securing assets ownership, their 
sustainability will differ.
Independently of the stage of their lifecycle, poor Mayan households with 
young adults typically have a certain degree of stability in their short-term income, 
allowing them to ‘stay in the game’ and move on after dealing with times of crisis. 
A key question here is whether this can truly be described as a sustainable liveli-
hood. Although it is true that, in general, these households manage to keep their 
identities and function over time, it is also undeniable that they only achieve a 
very precarious standard of living. This is not enough to take them out of pov-
erty. Over time, as they encounter different critical situations, their livelihoods 
are constantly under pressure and their capabilities and assets are eroded, thus the 
medium and long-term sustainability of their livelihoods remains at risk.
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Research findings have practical and theoretical implications. Practically, this 
research should encourage us to make sure that governmental programmes and 
development opportunities are transformative and there is a more equal distribu-
tion of tangible assets (particularly land and housing) ownership among society.
The theoretical implication of this research is a set of questions about the use-
fulness of the classic literature on vulnerability and livelihoods that tends to focus 
on quantitative assets. This may result in a failure to capture the dynamics of 
inequality in a place-specific urbanization process. There is a need for a more 
in-depth analysis, not just of these Mayan households’ livelihoods in Merida’s 
peri-urban areas but also more widely across similar contexts, in order to develop 
an appropriate conceptualization of the livelihood strategies of poor households 
in the urban peripheries.
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Notes
1  A poor household is that experiencing a pronounced decrease in the well-being of its 
members, which is caused by their lack of control over those assets and capabilities 
needed for active participation in society. This definition was adapted from approaches 
by Haughton and Khandker (2009).
2  In this work young adults are defined as those aged between 20 and 40. However, a 
variety of definitions are used in different contexts, perhaps reflecting the fact that there 
are disagreements on the legal, occupational and emotional criteria that demarcate this 
group (Levinson 1986).
3  Merida’s peri-urban area extends through the municipalities of Conkal, Kanasin, Merida, 
Progreso, Ucu and Uman.
4  Data available at: www.coneval.gob.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Medición/Anexo-estadístico- 
municipal-2010.aspx (accessed 10 June 2014).
5  The middle superior level of education (known in Mexico as preparatory education) 
includes the three highest levels of high school as well as the Anglo-Saxon college level 
(which in Mexico is known as technical careers).
6  The superior level of education is equivalent to the degree-level or professional qualifi-
cations (which in Mexico is known as licenciatura).
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Introduction
Rapid urbanization in Africa is a contested issue due to the unreliability of census 
data from the 1970s onwards (Pott 2012). However, in those countries where 
data support a description of rapidly urbanizing realities (Dewan and Yamaguchi 
2009; Taubenbock et al. 2009; United Nations 2008), cities face high concentra-
tions of people who depend heavily on infrastructure systems including energy, 
water, communication and transport (Angel et al. 2005; Crush et al. 2011). The 
available literature shows how this high concentration makes these people vulner-
able to a multiplicity of stressors, including climate change (Brückner 2012; Fay 
and Opal 2000; 2011; Ligeti et al. 2007; Mirzaie et al. 2007; Poelhekke 2011; 
World Bank 2010). Differential access to secure infrastructure and decent hous-
ing makes the urban poor more vulnerable than others to climate and weather 
extremes, increasing their exposure to the impacts of climate change, such as 
increased frequency and intensity of extreme climatic events, flooding from the 
projected rise in sea level, and water shortages (Ligeti et al. 2007; Heinrichs et al. 
2011; World Bank 2010).
A taming narrative has been produced about Dar es Salaam’s urban trans-
formation. The city experienced a rapid rate of urbanization between 1988 and 
2002 with a growth rate of 5 per cent compared to the 3 per cent of the national 
level, self-explaining concepts such as the considerable growth of population in 
unplanned settlements in the city (Gichere et al. 2011) and the limitations experi-
enced by city planners to keep pace with the rapidly growing population (Casmiri 
2009; Bull-Kamanga et al. 2003). Multilateral institutions have pointed out the 
obvious, expressing their serious concern for the implications population growth 
and limited planning capacity might have for the governance of the city. Not sur-
prisingly, this helped justifying the approval of a World Bank project in 2013 with 
the following objective: ‘To improve institutional performance for urban service 
delivery in program urban local government authorities’ (World Bank 2014). 
Following this mainstream and highly institutionalised approach to planning 
(see Rosales, Chapter 11 in this volume), the city’s administration has tended to 
produce a normative view of inadequate planned developments in Dar es Salaam. 
According to this perspective, a high percentage (approximately 70 per cent) of 
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the city’s total population were living in informal settlements in 2001 (World 
Bank 2002), and this percentage is likely to have risen since, given that the popu-
lation of the city has increased significantly since that time. About 8 per cent 
of these settlements are to be found in a low-elevation zone below the 10 metre 
contour line, making residents in this zone especially vulnerable to rises in sea 
level (Gichere et al. 2011). This gloomy picture for the urban poor is compounded 
by Dar es Salaam’s vulnerability to a multiplicity of challenges including floods, 
sea-level rise and coastal erosion, water scarcity and major outbreaks of infectious 
diseases. However, evidence of response efforts in the city by the local popula-
tions point to the deconstruction of this normative view to begin to embrace an 
alternative narrative. Local people have long since begun the process of resisting 
political and institutional structures that limit the access to better opportunities 
and more secure livelihoods and, therefore, adaptation to climate risks. In the 
light of persisting social vulnerability across time, we consider the analysis of 
marginalized, asset-poor social groups a contribution to the key objective of this 
book, the untaming of key city processes. The persistence of different forms of 
poverty, exclusion and inequality tells a story that is not easily captured by views 
that reduce the complexity of city problems to a flat duality based on either the 
absence or the presence in excess of something, be that the bad planning of space, 
the weak governance or the uncontrollable population growth.
We, the authors, have lived in Africa all our lives and the lead author has 
lived and worked in Tanzania for the last four years. Our experiences with many 
African cities, Dar es Salaam included, are mainly those of squalor, poverty and 
inequality. In Dar es Salaam, we have noted that being poor means living in 
unbearable conditions, sub-standard housing with limited potable water system, 
limited access to electricity and only to a rudimentary sewage system. Poor com-
munities are neglected by the government and the people with power, who have 
the capacity to care and provide some kind of assistance. The experiences that 
we have with Dar es Salaam and other African cities have prompted us to focus 
on the case study of Dar es Salaam, conducting a series of rapid assessments of 
the conditions affecting the urban poor in 2011. We sought to explore three core 
questions: 
 • What constitutes climate risk within the city?
 • How does local governance interact with climate risk and social vulnerability? 
 • What are the opportunities for the urban poor to ameliorate their condition in 
the face of climate risk? 
In this chapter, we discuss the findings from such research, which reiterate the 
need for a broader conceptualization of the urban poor and illustrate how local 
socio-political conditions influence the opportunities for response mechanisms 
available to poor women and men in African cities and the type and nature of mul-
tiple agency-oriented projects that residents employ to deal with challenges within 
a multiplicity of structural constraints. In this respect, we embrace the notion that 
acting in the face of shocks is an arduous task faced by poor households that 
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tend to be constrained by structures and institutions within the political economy 
of the city and local-level initiatives that are regulated in the sphere of political 
and class structures that affect how people cope. Herein also lies the link of this 
chapter to the broader theme of the book as the poor men and women in the city 
embark on a journey to resist the urban planning conundrum, riddled with social 
exclusion tendencies, through self-help efforts that have the potential to lighten 
the challenges that these poor people face and initiate trajectories of change in the 
urban discourse.
People initiatives and the search for livelihood security  
in the contemporary urban African context
People’s agency and initiative in the face of harsh critical situations has been 
studied for more than three decades now, and these studies highlight the duality 
of structure in shaping and being shaped by local-level agency (Chambers 1989; 
Giddens 1984, 1991, 1994, 2009). Group actions and considerations in devel-
oping projects for averting poverty and increasing livelihood options constitute 
an important element of how processes of social cohesion and innovation influ-
ence the way in which the urban poor cushion themselves against environmental, 
social, political and economic threats in a changing environment (Mutopo 2014). 
The idea of the poor as hopeless is part of a political and – at the same time – dis-
cursive construction, which is ultimately functional with dependence on donors 
and other external elements, and ignores people’s own agency (Kithiia 2010). 
External support agencies often infuse targeted interventions with such narratives, 
meanings and inscriptions (Bank 2011: 30). 
In the early nineties, Chambers and Conway proposed a then new framework 
for the analysis of rural livelihoods based on the concepts of capability, equity 
and sustainability. According to this seminal work, ‘a livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required 
for a means of living’ (Bank 2011: 6). Here it is important to address the trajecto-
ries of change experienced in the livelihoods approach over the past two decades, 
and why such an approach remains valid in understanding agency and the strug-
gles of the different groups of the urban poor for a more decent living. Recent 
contributions from the literature on the dynamics of vulnerability (Moser 2009) 
reframe the debate on the livelihoods approach, placing it in a dialogic relation-
ship with more specific vulnerability analysis that raises the political question of 
why and how people do or do not get access to assets. Lampis (2009) presents 
a chronological systematization of the vulnerability livelihoods literature, which 
examines the participatory rural approaches adopted in the 1970s all the way to 
current applied vulnerability analysis within the broader livelihoods approach. 
After these contributions, in our view, social vulnerability analysis is still relevant 
because within commoditized social spheres and social protection (see Chapter 6 
in this book for a detailed discussion) access to assets and resources that are key to 
human, political and social rights, social vulnerability remain a concrete challenge 
as much as a political theme for debate.
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Our central assumption is that societally inherent power dynamics influ-
ence the vulnerability of the urban poor and potentially constrain agency. Such 
assumption is situated within the roots of environmental politics and social for-
mations (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Furthermore, factors such as class dynam-
ics, normally perpetuated by city political governance systems, come into play 
as hindrances to dealing with social vulnerability. In spite of a widespread rec-
ognition of the limitations of traditional rational planning in African cities as the 
least equipped in terms of governance, infrastructure and economy to cope with 
staggering and compressed growth processes (Turok and Parnell 2009; Taylor 
and Peter 2014), studies carried out in other East African cities identified several 
important response measures and have kept calling on city planners to carry out 
a number of interventions ranging from strengthening urban infrastructure such 
as roads, culverts, bridges, drainage systems, and water and sewerage networks, 
to neighbourhood-scale adaptation in the form of livelihood-based measures to 
enable communities to build resilience (Douglas et al. 2008; Lwasa 2010). In the 
face of a straightforward call for greater institutional action, especially on urban 
infrastructure, the other side of the coin, clearly highlighted within the aforemen-
tioned literature, is that actions related to community-based adaptation tend not 
to exceed the level of making domestic energy briquettes from waste, support-
ing household consumption with urban agriculture or harvesting rainwater at the 
household level. In this regard, we call for alternative forms of governance, forms 
that empower local-level structures and institutions to play a greater role in ena-
bling a conducive environment for the local voice to thrive in self-mobilization 
processes.
The influence of neoliberal thinking is evident in the average African city, 
where various projects involving ordinary citizens demonstrate the inability of 
the state to ensure clear rules of access and control over the distribution of ser-
vices, in turn allowing different individuals and groups to open up markets in 
which public goods such as water are traded, leading to the commoditization of 
natural resources (Bank 2011). This state-versus-market dualism within current 
urban service delivery systems (see Harris, also in Part II of this volume) has 
mushroomed in peri-urban areas of cities of the global South, such as Bonde la 
Mpunga in Dar es Salaam, where this study is situated, giving way to asymmetric 
socio-technical configurations in access to services that represent key assets for 
livelihood security.
Bonde la Mpunga is an unplanned settlement close the Indian Ocean shore of 
Dar es Salaam (see figure 9.1). With another five areas that make up the Msasani 
ward, it is legally considered as an illegal settlement within the Kinondoni 
District. The characteristics of this area offer a very interesting scenario in which 
to research how low-income groups harness their agency in a typical flood-prone 
low-lying urban area, lending weight to and beginning to indirectly challenge the 
political systems that tend to perpetuate exclusion of the poor from city planning 
benefits. Hence the decision to focus our 2011 sampling on this settlement, using 
a two-stages procedure. First we selected the area on a purposive basis and, sec-
































































Figure 9.1 Location of the study area in Kinondoni District, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
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provide a qualitatively representative sample of 10 per cent of the estimated 450 
households in the study area.
Everyday vulnerability in Bonde la Mpunga
In the studied slum, households’ vulnerability is characterized by exposure to 
climate and non-climate risks and shocks as well as a multiplicity of other chal-
lenges. A majority of respondents (68 per cent) highlighted that they had particu-
larly noticed changes in rainfall patterns: fluctuating precipitation (60 per cent), 
and more frequent droughts (47 per cent) and floods (30 per cent). According to 
the concept of ‘double exposure’ to climate-change-related risks (O’Brien and 
Leichenko, 2000), biophysical stressors are not necessarily either the only or the 
main entry point for the analysis as – which we also contend – it is the interac-
tion between biophysical risk and social vulnerability dynamics that generates 
both exposure to hazards and low resilience in the face of materializing vulner-
abilities. Figure 9.3, presenting a ranking of non-mutually exclusive items related 
to the challenges faced by households in accessing services, reflects this mix of 
social and biophysical variables even in the perception of the interviewed heads 
of household. 
In a guise that is not significantly different from what used to be considered 
common wisdom in the 1970s and 1980s (Chiotti and Johnson, 1995; Garcia 
and Escudero, 1981; Warrick and Bowden, 1981), local and national policy-
makers and politicians consider damage from climate-related events to happen 
because there is such a phenomenon as climate change. The notion that the bio-
physical component of climate change is the main driver of everyday vulner-
ability is contestable because, as pointed out by among others Adams (2009), it 
is functional to those approaches such as ecological modernization and market 
environmentalism, which promote both market- and engineering-based solu-
tions while underplaying the relevance of the social construction of risk. They 
have been influential in lobbying with local administrations to frame responses 
to environmental problems in terms of technocratic interventions and capital 
investments, giving very little voice to communities or room for bottom-up 
approaches. Therefore, conceptualizing risk within a multiple stressor context 
promises to advance the notion of the ‘untamed city’ as opposed to designing 
solutions targeted largely at climate risk. In fact, as far as all adaptation is even-
tually a local process, there cannot be a normative, overarching model of adap-
tation valid everywhere and apt for conceptualization and operationalization in 
planning manuals.
As a case in point of the relation between social and environmental condi-
tions, it is worth recalling how, already, some 16 million people a year contract 
malaria in Tanzania, and between 100,000 and 125,000 die every year from 
it (Jones et al. 2007). Bonde la Mpunga consists of tightly packed groups of 
small dwellings with no discernible streets, factors which heighten the sen-
sitivity of the slum dwellers to floods and excessive rains. The majority (78 
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per cent) of the surveyed households in Bonde la Mpunga indicated that they 
had migrated from other areas to this settlement. We view this encroachment 
into illegal spaces by the poor as one of the ‘weapons of the weak’ in fighting 
the inherent urban inequalities that dominate the African city. This is coupled 
with low levels of education and often critical access to health care services. 
Lack of a sound drainage system and the high prevalence of stagnant water has 
led to the increase of breeding sites for mosquitoes and in turn to an increase in 
malaria and other water-borne diseases (see box 9.1), mirroring findings already 
presented by Tonnang and colleagues (Tonnang et al. 2013). The gloomy picture 
painted by the female respondent in box 9.1 highlights the social inequalities 
and exclusionary tendencies that are so deep rooted within the contemporary 
capitalism paradigm. 
Box 9.1 Thoughts from a household member on multiple stressors
In our area, there is very poor infrastructure; there are no proper roads, 
there is no clean water, no dumping sites, no drainage system. Stagnant 
water is now bringing in mosquito breeding sites, leading to an increase 
in malaria cases. Because of the poverty in most families we have very 
few educated people in the area. We do not have access to clean water, we 
only depend on water vendors yet we are not sure whether the water they 
are selling is clean and safe for drinking or not. Our children also suffer 
from skin diseases because of the hot weather, lack of clean water and the 
dirty street surroundings. Our businesses are more heavily affected than 
anything else, which is problematic given the role that informal businesses 
play as a livelihood-supporting activity and way of generating income. This 
limits our opportunities to increase our income from informal trading and 
subsequently create a robust livelihood system as a form of adaptation to 
various challenges. 
Respondent from survey, 2011
Social vulnerability and its interface with  
local governance in Bonde la Mpunga
While keeping in mind the already mentioned concept of the double exposure of 
the urban poor (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000), it is now important to take the 
analysis down to some key insights produced by scholars analysing Africa at large 
and more specifically South Africa, who have provided valuable insights for the 
broadening of the analysis of the case presented in this chapter. Adequate pro-
vision of urban services potentially guarantees diminishing vulnerability levels 
(Leck and Simon 2012). They highlight that there is an ‘emerging literature’ on 
local governance and climate change agency and that their analysis of this dis-
course in South Africa is an effort in ‘deploying insights from the limited existing 
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literature’ and drawing from empirical investigations undertaken in two neigh-
bouring municipalities. 
The Bonde la Mpunga residents’ sensitivity to the impacts of floods is com-
pounded by the crowded nature and lack of adequate planning of the settlement 
as indicated in the makeshift and poor construction of some of the housing in 
this location (see figure 9.2). The impacts from excessive rain are mostly felt 
through damaged infrastructure such as houses and roads (see figure 9.3). Rosales 
(2010) postulates that adequate planning must incorporate equitable, efficient and 
sustainable human settlements, including bringing on board the urban poor in 
the decision-making process, as a useful prerequisite for enhancing opportunities 
and the well-being of the people. This is within a framework where urban plan-
ning has hitherto not addressed environmental issues such as climate change and 
related disasters, and ecological overshots (Rosales 2010). Our research reveals 
that local conditions determine the opportunities for response mechanisms and 
the type and nature of multiple agency-oriented projects that residents employ to 
deal with challenges. 
There is evidence in Bonde la Mpunga of self-help efforts that are made by 
individual households to deal with both immediate and subsequent shocks and 
challenges. The self-help efforts are triggered by the general low-level contact 
of residents with government and little experience of receiving relief supplies. 
Figure 9.2  Solid waste in dirty floodwater in Bonde la Mpunga, December 2011.
Figure 9.3  Transport woes during the recent floods in Msasani and swampy surroundings 
in Bonde la Mpunga, December 2011.
a 
b 
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Selling household assets and borrowing food and cash appear to be inherent strat-
egies that households employ as part of their survival efforts. Indeed, navigating 
the landscape of income generation as a response to climate risk has been shown 
to play a beneficial double role of providing food for the household and at the 
same time providing income to take care of other household needs (Drimie and 
van Zyl 2005; Thomas et al. 2007). Essentially, we suggest that the historical 
absence (or scant presence, at best) of state institutions in the spaces that the urban 
poor occupy,while having negative connotations, also contributes to the social 
construction of urban space as the result of the necessary action the urban poor 
have to undertake for their own livelihoods.
The case study of Bonde la Mpunga shows households engaging in small-scale 
businesses, such as youths acting as car mechanics, selling water and Mama Ntilie 
businesses for women.1 Small garages and Mama Ntilie businesses are the kind 
of activities low-income people in the city can resort to in order to strengthen 
their livelihoods and on that basis try to find some viable response mechanisms 
to climate risk. Although these kinds of activities have been documented both in 
the past (Chambers 1989) and more recently (Moser 2009), we recast this con-
ceptual framework as a way to challenge the hypocrisy of mainstream conceptual 
frameworks on climate change adaptation in African cities such as Dar es Salaam. 
Against the already described mainstream planning discourses and practices the 
agency of the poor is constrained, and only so much can be achieved given the 
limits imposed by structural constraints with livelihoods entrapped in a cycle of 
poverty (Leck and Simon 2012; Moser 2014). 
The actual societal configurations show the great role played by market 
forces and the even greater state retreat (see box 9.2) from presenting a cop-
ing framework for the households studied as transitioning in the social dimen-
sion as indicated in studies carried out by Chambers (1989), Hendricks (2010); 
Pryer (2003), Moser (1998) and Lampis (2010), Kithiia (2010); Kithiia (2011), 
Nkurunziza (2007). 
Box 9.2 Thoughts from a Bonde la Mpunga resident
My view is that serikali ya mtaaa [the local government] tries to help in 
dealing with a lot of our problems but they cannot do more since they con-
tinuously report that they are underfunded. I have also noticed that they 
have been struggling to deal with the same problems for more than ten 
years now. We wish the government could provide funds to serikali ya mtaaa 
for them to be able to solve our problems regarding infrastructure such as 
sanitation facilities and storm water collectors. We would also appreciate 
it if they could respond to our calls on time as they usually take a long time 
to respond when we face problems.
Respondent from survey, 2011
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As in many other peri-urban areas of the global South, households use processes 
of communal help and rely on the agency of their members in averting crises, 
such as floods or outbreaks. In 1990 Cairncross et al., referring to the relationship 
between urban administrations and local citizens in peripheral low-income areas, 
were already writing that
in most cities, public investments in infrastructure do not benefit the poor 
majority since the settlements in which they live do not receive piped water, 
sewers and drains and benefit little (if at all) from investments in ports, air-
ports, power stations and roads. 
(Cairncross, Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1990: 13).
What is new or what has changed from 25 years ago? When we compare the 
analysis from the quote above with the fact that in Bonde la Mpunga, in the event 
of flooding, residents mobilize people to dig canals to direct water to the ocean 
and clean the neighbourhood, since flood water carries and deposits waste mate-
rial, and still help each other in times of trouble by assisting neighbours with food 
and money to get household provisions, what can be added to the analysis of the 
often overlapping impacts of climate-related risk and everyday socio-economic 
vulnerability?
First, the very fact that, after a quarter of a century, many situations of 
deprivation have not been modified in any significant way cannot but generate 
astonishment and indignation. It is true that the argument that many cities in 
the global South have not been included in the dynamics and benefits of the 
global era is a long-standing one (Robinson, 2002), but it is nonetheless one 
worth reiterating. Second, the injustice attached to climate and social risks 
requires, as was recently put forward by Watson, a reconsideration of the 
importance of long-term planning for urbanizing Africa. However, cases such 
as Bonde la Mpunga reflect the gap still separating this goal from existing 
realities, as actual planning practices tend to overshadow the multi-causality 
of risk generation. And third, as discussed by Parnell and Pieterse, Africa’s 
rapid urban transformation risks, among other things, generating the condi-
tions for rapid, rent-seeking solutions closely bound to political and private 
interests (as reflected by the quote in box 9.2). Fourth, as urban Africa cannot 
just be considered the loci of crisis, war and social unrest, in the face of the 
many daily experiences of livelihood consolidation and struggle carried on by 
the organised civil society, a case study highlighting how this is reflected at 
the micro-level serves the purpose of contributing to the generation of a criti-
cal mass for future and more just scenarios.
Not only do local government institutional and policy efforts, in this case, do 
little to support the adaptation efforts by the slum dwellers. Time and resource 
limitations for players other than the individual households reduce these house-
holds’ abilities to adapt to crises, and subsequently thwart their opportunities to 
enhance their livelihoods. The efforts to provide necessary amenities and help 
households in Bonde la Mpunga to deal with immediate shocks remain limited. 
This reiterates the notion of class and structural inequalities as couched in the 
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contemporary capitalist realm, which tends to ignore the local-level capabilities 
of households to act for their own good.
Box 9.3 Reflections from a key informant
The growth of Bonde la Mpunga and developments in its vicinity has been 
fuelled by the proximity of the informal settlement to the city centre, which 
makes it very attractive to settlers, in the absence of deterrents for these 
settlers. In addition, investors disregard rules in order to acquire pieces 
of land that they use for their enterprises. In the same respect, the tempta-
tion for city authorities to raise personal funds through clandestine deals 
is too high and contributes to this quagmire. These developments block the 
water channel and cause impacts of excessive rains and floods to intensify. 
Initially Bonde la Mpunga was designated for use for recreation, agricul-
ture or restricted residential construction but [the settlement] has contin-
ued to flourish since the 1980s.
Respondent from survey, 2011
The interplay between institutional and socio-economic dimensions branches out 
once more when considering how the conspicuous absence of local government 
institutions in Bonde la Mpunga enables migrants to continue to settle in undesig-
nated areas (see boxes 9.2 and 9.3). 
The inertia of African planning has been highlighted by Pieterse as the 
dominant response to the deepening crisis linked to urban growth and expan-
sion. Key interviewed informants from local government and urban planning 
further highlighted that the lack of expertise and low capacity in terms of num-
bers of city professional technical staff are among the reasons for the failure to 
fully implement interventions in slums in the city (see box 9.4). Meanwhile, 
the Tanzanian government is currently preparing another Master Plan, long 
after the original term of the previous one expired. Four master plans have to 
date been prepared for Dar es Salaam, with very little implementation of these 
plans (AAT 2009). 
Box 9.4 Thoughts from a key informant
Our plans are rarely given full attention and remain on the shelves for sub-
stantial periods of time. Moreover, lack of adequate funding limits us in 
implementing these plans. The national budget portion assigned to urban 
planning and development is meagre and we have therefore concluded that 
urban planning and development is not in the top ten government priorities. 
It is also important to address contradictions in salary scales for professional
(continued)
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(continued)
technical staff doing similar jobs but from different ministries in order to 
avoid disincentives. Another major setback for us is that some of our poli-
cies for resettlement of squatters are against politicians’ desire to maintain 
relations with the electorate.
Respondent from survey, 2011
The prevailing planning approach still tries nowadays to prevent the prolifera-
tion of slums through prohibitions and control, rather than by trying to widen the 
approach to understand the root causes and to work with different stakeholders 
towards alternative, more inclusive and just urban scenarios. For instance, dur-
ing one of the interviews conducted, an urban planner claimed that issuance of 
permits and titles continue in areas such as Bonde la Mpunga, despite policies to 
the contrary (see box 9.4). This resonates with our assertion of class inequality as 
these permits are issued to the rich and elite in the city.
Box 9.5 Reflections from a key informant
There is little coordination between the Ministry of Lands and the Ministry 
of Local Government in the implementation of guidelines, which tend to 
overlap. There clearly are overlaps in the institutional frameworks in these 
ministries. We as urban planners in the Ministry of Lands usually find our-
selves in conflicting situations with personnel from the Ministry of Local 
Government, yet it is clearly documented that these two ministries have 
distinct responsibilities. In addition, the inadequate urban planning in Dar 
es Salaam partly hinges on a degree of misinterpretation of development 
guidelines.
Respondent from survey, 2011
Conclusions
In this chapter, we have attempted to connect everyday vulnerability analysis, 
with an emphasis on how Dar es Salaam low-income settlements are affected 
by climate risk, with how environmental change is politically and socially con-
structed by traditional rational approaches to planning. Across the three following 
main findings we found a connection with a number of key cross-cutting issues 
of the whole book, in particular the need to re-conceptualize how exclusions are 
produced across scales that reach the domains of policy and culture behind the 
geographical limits of the built environment.
1 Vulnerability analysis and the political agenda originally set up by Chambers 
and Moser for rural and urban poverty are still relevant under new conditions 
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such as those created by neoliberalism in African cities like Dar es Salaam. 
Social vulnerability analysis should be the centrepiece within more recent 
elaborations on socio-environmental justice.
2 The concept of double exposure to both climate risk and socio-economic 
downturns seems a relevant entry point in order to contribute to the refram-
ing of a discussion on everyday risks and livelihoods security in peri-urban 
contexts such as Bonde la Mpunga.
3 Within a broader discussion regarding how Africa urbanization is trans-
forming the landscape, our case study contributes to reframing, in this case 
through a local lens, the broader question about the directionality of develop-
ment practices and, specifically, of planning, which risks once more being 
controlled by politicians, planners and lobbyists, whereas local communities 
and households risk being excluded once more.
Note
1  Mama Ntilie is a name that has been given to the local small-scale businesses that have 
mushroomed, not just in the study area but across the city, in which mostly women, but 
also men, set up small restaurants and sell food.
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The larger study from which this chapter is drawn was commissioned by Waste 
Enterprisers and sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Its original 
purpose was to investigate ‘public toilet’ sites in Accra, Ghana, articulating the 
maintenance and management practices of site operators in order to identify sani-
tation delivery challenges and potential strategies for future interventions aimed 
at expanding sanitation access in Accra. One of the assumptions tested was that 
toilet operators will forgo important maintenance tasks because of the cost, and 
that those decisions will directly impact on the availability of sanitation in the 
city. This fear was supported by the literature. When cost structure, management, 
lack of public participation or the socio-political context of toilet provision results 
in inadequate maintenance of sanitation facilities, serious problems emerge in 
community health, environmental degradation and constrained sanitation access 
(Burra 2003; Nance and Ortolano 2007; Schouten and Mathenge 2010).
In this chapter I attempt to diverge from the original purpose of the data col-
lection. Here, the goal is to use the data to express how the everyday urban ser-
vice provision arrangements in Accra and cities like it are far more messy and 
untidy things than the taming narratives of the privatization and critical frame-
works would suggest. This way, the chapter speaks to overarching themes in this 
larger volume because it seeks to inform action through a nuanced understanding 
of complex dynamics, situating praxis between totalizing narratives on the one 
hand and the mundane realities of people’s lives on the other. Accra is a context 
where an overall scheme of privatized service provision masks a diverse and con-
tested everyday reality. The data provide an important case of market-oriented 
and unregulated sanitation schemes which both have problematic outcomes, and 
suggest space for improving access to sanitation and our conceptual approach to 
socio-ecological problem-solving.
Accra, the capital of Ghana and the country’s largest city, has long struggled 
with sanitation. As Awortwi (2006) reports, by the mid-1980s approximately 60 per 
cent of the population relied on public toilets for their daily needs. These were large 
communal toilet blocks managed by local government. The facilities poorly served 
the city’s population, which was effectively ‘engulfed in filth’ (2006: 227).
There are many reasons for this. The plight of the urban poor regarding water 
and sanitation cannot be disentangled from larger urbanization forces that resulted 
in widespread inequalities regarding land and other resources. The urbanization 
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process in Accra has largely benefited colonial and post-colonial elites as a 
result of the manipulation of communal land institutions in urban and rural areas 
(Obeng-Odoom 2013). This contributed to poor rural migrants inhabiting increas-
ingly dense urban neighbourhoods with insecure tenure. These communities were 
also largely neglected in terms of infrastructure investment and provision of urban 
services (Owusu 2010). Significant levels of ethnic segregation, particularly 
along socio-economic lines, exacerbated the underprovision of services (Owusu 
and Agyei-Mensah 2011). These factors all contributed to low levels of in-home 
sanitation and high reliance on public toilet facilities. The facilities were badly 
managed, staff were poorly paid or not paid, and users were unwilling to pay for 
bad services. All of these problems were made worse by public sector reforms that 
laid off staff at the sites in 1986 (Awortwi 2006).
In the 1990s a series of reforms introduced significant private sector involve-
ment in the water and sanitation sectors in Ghana (Yeboah 2006; Awortwi 2006). 
By 2006, it was estimated that there were at least 90 small private contractors 
operating public toilets in Accra. These are loosely regulated enterprises operat-
ing toilet sites under several types of institutional arrangement with the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). While there has been some improvement in the 
sanitation sector relative to conditions prevalent in the 1980s, Accra continues 
to struggle. According to the National Environmental Sanitation Strategy Action 
Plan 2010–2015 (Government of Ghana 2010), 39 per cent of Ghana’s urban 
citizens depend on public toilets for their daily sanitation needs, and in the case 
of Accra, waste collected from public toilets is discharged into the ocean without 
treatment. Further, 11.5 per cent of Accra’s population resort to open defecation. 
Fee-for-use management is ubiquitous, and one estimate suggests that in Ghana’s 
urban population, toilet user fees could constitute as much as 10–15 per cent of a 
household’s income for low wage earners (Korboe et al. 1999).1
As discussed above, this study was designed to evaluate management prac-
tices of public toilet sites operated by private enterprises. Forty-one public toilet 
owners or managers were interviewed in November and December 2012. Each 
respondent was asked to explain the day-to-day management of their toilet site. 
These included questions related to the following:
 • maintenance tasks required to operate public toilet sites
 • basic system technology and requirements
 • the basic cost structure of the site
 • public toilet strategies enlarging the customer base
 • the relationship between individual sites, other public toilets and local 
government
 • any challenges or bottlenecks experienced while providing the service.
Public toilet sites from 6 of the 11 submetro administrative units of Accra were 
included in the sample in order to vary the socio-economic status of catchment 
areas, keeping a primary focus on lower-income parts of the city. Site selection 
relied on the ‘Slum Index’ information created by San Diego State University for the 
Greater Accra region (Jankowska et al. 2012). The neighbourhoods were as follows:
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 • Jamestown, Asheidu Keteke Submetro, a lower-income area in one of the 
oldest parts of Accra
 • Nima, Ayawaso East Submetro, a low-income neighbourhood that is highly 
contested by political parties
 • Old Fadama, Ablekuma Central Submetro, a high-density neighbourhood 
where nearly all the residents have insecure tenure, and some of the worst 
socio-economic conditions in Accra are found
 • Kaneshi, Okai Koi South Submetro, a neighbourhood in the vicinity of the 
Kaneshi Market, one of the largest public markets in West Africa, which is 
middle income, but with a significant presence of public toilets
 • Alajo, Ayawaso Central Submetro, another moderate-income area with pock-
ets of lower-income households and a significant presence of public toilets
 • Osu, Osu Klottery Submetro: a mixed-income area containing high-income 
households including foreign expatriates and non-governmental organization 















Figure 10.1 Submetro areas of Accra, Ghana.
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Key informant interviews were also carried out with the following:
 • the programme manager for a water, sanitation and health NGO operating in 
Accra
 • the head environmental engineer for the Accra Metropolitan Assembly 
(AMA)
 • a resident of Old Fadama and employee of the Ghana Federation of the Urban 
Poor
 • the chair of a septic truck drivers’ union
 • a long-serving septic truck driver
 • the secretary of the Alajo Development Committee
 • the secretary of the Jamestown Public Toilet Owners Association
 • a long-time resident and community leader in Nima.
Over the last several decades the question of who should provide urban ser-
vices and infrastructure has been deeply explored. Mainstream development 
organizations (see e.g. World Bank 1993) increasingly argued that uncompeti-
tive public monopolies were largely inadequate for the task of urban service 
provision, and asserted that if the government was the problem in infrastructure 
provision and service provision, then the answer was to cut the government out 
of the process. This belief was coupled with the assumption that the forms of 
centralized provision of urban services found in the developed world should 
be replicated as the only truly appropriate way to provide adequate services 
(Jaglin 2014). This neoliberal approach, particularly as applied to the water and 
sanitation sectors in the developing world, was widely utilized in urban devel-
opment projects. This approach restructured and privatized service provision 
wherever possible, and brought a market logic to systems that were to remain 
publicly controlled.
This effort was significantly criticized for reasons involving access, quality and 
price (Zaki and Amin 2009). Other criticisms included the sequencing of imple-
mentation, the perceived abandonment of public utilities rather than attempts to 
provide more resources, and the condemnation of private provision on the ideo-
logical grounds that access to water and sanitation is a human right and such ser-
vices should never be commoditized (Prasad 2006). Populations in the developing 
world resented higher charges for still largely inadequate services under privat-
ized systems; considered much reform a veiled grab of power and profit (Mustafa 
and Reeder 2009); and found that the poor were still largely underserved, and that 
in some instances inequalities increased under reformist regimes (Castro 2007). 
The ‘pro-poor sanitation’ literature emerged as largely aimed at expanding the 
economic and social benefits of urban services through either more appropriate 
pro-poor technologies for sanitation, calling for urban governance changes that 
result in governments at multiple scales that are more responsive to the urban 
poor, or both (Nunan and Satterthwaite 2001; Cross and Morel 2005; Gutiérrez 
2007; Paterson, Mara and Curtis 2007).
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Many of these factors and others were included in a general reconsideration 
of certain liberalization policies (Rodrik 2006), with two divergent presumptions 
emerging about the role of private actors in the production of urban services:2 
either the push for privatization of urban services has run its course and we can 
expect increasing public control moving forward (Bel and Warner 2008; Prasad 
2006) or there is a place for privatization in expanding the economic and social 
benefits of urban services, but privatization in its various manifestations can only 
be positive when deeply rooted in contextual appreciation and targeted in more 
specific and effective ways.
One of the problems with both the mainstream and critical scholarship cited 
above is that the narratives are often limited to large-scale monopolistic public, 
private or public–private partnership operations. In reality, many urban regions are 
served through ‘other’ private sector operators (Solo 1999). These are small pri-
vate enterprises offering water, sanitation and other services for a fee. These enter-
prises are quite varied in type and quality, and are loosely regulated (Chenoweth 
2004). These services are understood to be ‘co-produced’ by multiple agents in 
an attempt to meet the everyday needs of people in specific circumstances (Allen 
et al. 2008; Olivier de Sardan 2010). There is a growing realization that these 
types of decentralized approaches to sanitation have much to offer because of low 
comparable cost, flexible technologies, adaptability to varying physical and social 
constraints, and ease in facilitating wastewater reuse and recovery (Libralato 
et al. 2012). But because these systems are produced in local contexts impacted by 
specific technical, social and institutional realties, they defy easy categorization 
or generalization. As a result the neoliberal and critical taming narratives of water 
and sanitation are too often imposed from the outside and fail to connect to the 
reality of people’s lives.
As Jaglin (2014) suggests, these other providers are the real way urban services 
are provided in many cities, and their diversity, vitality and innovativeness are 
too often missing from dialogue on urban services and the poor. Jaglin suggests 
that in every city there exist varied socio-technical ‘dispositifs’, or interactions 
between actors, technologies and institutions that co-produce service delivery 
configurations. This is also suggestive of Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus, the under-
standing that the everyday norms that shape how citizens meet their daily needs 
are created in the interplay between social structures and individual agency. In a 
sense, this is the root of the untamed everyday of water and sanitation provision. 
In places like Accra, global debates about the role of governments and markets in 
the sector ebb and flow, but citizens as both ‘other’ providers and users of urban 
services bend systems to meet their own needs in ways that belie the prescriptions 
of the larger narratives.
In the context of Accra, the everyday reality of service provision maintains 
a market-oriented logic with little or no regulation. In Accra, ‘public toilet’ is 
a misnomer because public toilets are privately managed, or privately produced 
and managed. Services are provided in two ways. Every public toilet is either an 
‘AMA’ toilet or a ‘private toilet’. Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) toilets, 
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representing 41 per cent (N = 17) of the sample, are toilets that were once run 
directly by local government, but have gone through a privatization process or 
which have been constructed since privatization. Awortwi (2006) established 
that there are several institutional arrangements for the operation of these toilets, 
including affermage, where all operation and maintenance is handed to a private 
entity for a period of time; rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT), where a 
private enterprise is ‘given’ a defunct toilet to rehabilitate and operate for a time; 
build, operate and transfer (BOT), where a private enterprise is allowed to build 
and operate a toilet until such time as the AMA takes it back; and build, own and 
operate (BOO), where private enterprises are permitted to build and operate a 
toilet with payment obligations to the AMA.
Private toilets, representing 59 per cent (N = 24) of the sample, are public toilet 
sites on privately controlled land. While the AMA still regulates these and collects 
revenues from their operation in the same manner as for AMA toilets, no contrac-
tual obligations exist between the AMA and the owner. While it is likely that it 
is the formal responsibility of the AMA to issue permits to all new and existing 
public toilets, this study finds no evidence that this is done systematically. Instead, 
the process described by respondents is that private toilets appear as the market 
demands them and entrepreneurs rise to meet that demand. After a private toilet 
site is established, the AMA will begin to collect revenue and provide an element 
of regulatory oversight.
In terms of regulation, the AMA submetro administrators frequently gather toi-
let owners together ostensibly to collect fees or to provide some kind of common 
use information about operating a toilet site. However, in some submetros, these 
meetings are expanded to include information on resource-sharing, problem- 
solving and other types of organizing.
The goal of the analysis that follows is to examine how the ‘other’ private 
sector operators in Accra function in an overtly market-oriented, unregulated 
way, showing this situation to be problematic for a number of reasons, but also 
using the case as an example of how large-scale taming narratives fail to grasp 
the everyday reality of the city, and how even in overtly problematic situations 
there is room to dig deeper into the everyday to find productive avenues forward. 
The three sections that follow discuss, first, how the unregulated market-oriented 
strategy opens space for the co-opting of sanitation services for political purposes 
to the detriment of urban citizens; second, how the unregulated market strategy 
tends to create conditions of too much competition between sanitation provid-
ers; and third, how a better understanding of the everyday provision of sanitation 
opens possibilities for socio-ecological problem-solving that can increase access 
to sanitation in Accra.
Unregulated markets and political co-option
All public toilets, both AMA and private locations, are managed at the submetro 
level as described above. For AMA locations, the contract between the local 
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government and the owner is held at the submetro level. All decisions on grant-
ing or resending management contracts are made by submetro administrators. 
The process is quite political. Public toilets can be a good source of income, and 
contracts are often given as political patronage. It has long been the practice to 
hand over public toilets as the spoils of victory to political party ‘footsoldiers’ 
(Ayee and Crook 2003; Bob-Milliar 2012). If a contract holder is in the wrong 
party or someone else is owed a political favour, they might no longer be able 
to keep control of an AMA toilet. However, toilet sites are quite contested, and 
some are able to maintain control in the face of political change. For instance, 
Respondent FA, a long-time toilet manager in Alajo, described his experience 
as follows:
The change of governments, when it [government] changes they will take it 
[management contracts] from you if you are not strong. When this govern-
ment changed, they wanted to take it, but we did not agree. So I am still han-
dling it. That is why they built this one [a new site next door] . . . so they have 
wanted to take it for political affiliation, but in Alajo, we don’t allow that. We 
fought it and they could not take it . . . they are now putting new ones.
Respondent NJ described the plight of anyone who holds an AMA contract: ‘You 
know in Ghana, when politics change, your business also change; your plans 
change, they collapse.’
Respondent FA also pointed out that sanitation in Accra must always be under-
stood as a resource that actors will contest and vie to control. He stated: ‘When 
money is involved, then they will come. Everyone fights for money. If you are not 
strong they will take it from you.’
As with any resource, there are many interested parties vying for control of 
public toilets. Local news accounts regularly report ‘strong arm’ tactics by party 
footsoldiers to gain or keep control of public toilets. In certain neighbourhoods, 
toilets are particularly connected to the political parties. Respondent TN, a man-
ager of an AMA toilet in Nima, received his contract after the last change in politi-
cal leadership. However, it was made clear to him that the toilet site must be used 
to meet the needs of the party. As he explained:
When the people come in, normally most of the people in this community, 
they don’t pay. They go in free. It is just [a few people] that pay. It is due to 
the party. The party colours. We have to maintain it in such a way that the 
party looks good. We have a problem then, you understand?
At TN’s site, he suggests that only 30 per cent of his customers actually pay the 
user fee for the toilet. Other locations from other neighbourhoods in the study 
suggest that between 75 and 90 per cent of customers pay the required user fee, 
at least in part, because other sites are not as politically oriented and private loca-
tions are not as likely to be pressured through political parties to provide a free 
service to the community.
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The socio-political context of sanitation causes problems for many toilet sites. 
Operators do not know whether or when they might lose control of the facil-
ity. The respondents often expressed the idea that they do not undertake invest-
ment because they fear losing control of their toilet site after having made an 
investment. Further, from the standpoint of public toilet managers, overt political 
intervention into the management of the sites leads many toilets to fall below the 
break-even point at which proprietors, even politically appointed proprietors, are 
able to maintain basic-level standards at the facilities and make a small profit. In 
the long run, this means less sanitary conditions for users and overall restricted 
access.
While the survey on which this data is based did not include questions on user 
satisfaction, other studies have looked at the link between political interference 
and public toilet user satisfaction in Accra. User satisfaction is higher where com-
mercial operators are able to respond to user preferences without overt interfer-
ence by local government (Awortwi 2006).
Here the everyday reality is juxtaposed with the narrative of market-oriented 
solutions. Many toilet sites remain controlled by political parties, and the struggle 
between providers, political actors and the preferences of individual users creates 
the context for everyday service access and the parameters guiding the evolution 
of those services. More will be said about this below.
Unregulated market competition among public  
toilet enterprises
According to the analysis, the average toilet site in the sample has an estimated 
annual profit of about US$8,000. Lower-performing sites, approximately 30 per 
cent of the sample, are estimated to be near the break-even point at an estimated 
US$300 annual profit; much higher performers exist and can bring in as much as 
US$16,000 per year. All the toilet sites in the sample use technologies that require 
human waste to be stored temporarily on-site in pits, tanks, buckets and the like. 
Removing that waste regularly through vacuum trucks or by hand is the most 
expensive, and probably the most important, aspect of site maintenance. If toilet 
sites cannot afford to do this basic activity they cannot function and they go out 
of commission. As discussed above, this was the prevailing conditions of public 
toilets in the 1980s. As an example, Respondent CJ recalled:
There was a time, a few years back when [emptying the holding tanks] was 
not all that easy. All the AMA toilets were choked. The managers said they 
were not getting revenue to come and dislodge [empty the tanks] or to pay 
their workers, so you can’t use the toilets. This is the reason why we started 
to privatize them to individuals.
Here it is important to note two things. First, cost recovery depends not just on the 
user fee rate, but on the volume of customers. More customers are required for 
profitability if the user fee is relatively low. Second, as the user fee rises, thereby 
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enabling cost recovery, with each incremental price increase the price burden on 
customers also rises, and this is likely to constrain access to (effective demand 
for) sanitation. This is particularly true for children and women, who also bear 
the higher burdens of negative social impacts associated with restricted access to 
sanitation (Owusu 2010).
While it is conventional and intuitive to suggest that too many users at individ-
ual sites create unsanitary conditions and site maintenance problems, it is impor-
tant to note that unregulated market mechanics are likely to have the adverse 
implications of there being too few users at a site. As Respondent KJ noted:
When the first people started [to operate privatized toilet sites] the rumour 
went around that there was a lot of money in it, so people started to put up the 
public toilets, but it is not that good.
Respondent AB suggested the same: ‘The customers are low, toilets are now too 
many. Previously it was not like this.’
This is important because although the average site is operating well above 
the break-even point, approximately 30 per cent of the sample reported being 
in potential danger of having to either raise user fees or dip below the revenue 
necessary to cover costs. This is a source of anxiety for these toilet owners, and 
is expressed in the sense that owners generally feel as though competition for 
toilet customers is rising. Respondent DA estimated that her customers were cut 
in half when a new toilet site opened very near hers. She expects she will have 
to raise her user fees soon if she is to remain in business. This underlines the 
political nature of many toilet sites, because it is common for respondents to 
describe how local party bosses will erect competing toilets near existing ones 
as a common form of political retribution when they are unable to evict a current 
toilet manager.
Currently the AMA does not regulate the location or distribution of public toi-
let facilities in an effective way. The narrative of the market suggests that under 
normal conditions we can presume that entrepreneurs will build new toilets as 
long as there are profits to be made. Eventually, it is thought, equilibrium will 
be reached, when there is an optimal number of sites at a cost users are satisfied 
with. Counter to the expectations of the market narrative, this situation is likely to 
continue to create considerable social costs. Approximately a third of the sample 
are performing poorly and in danger of dipping below the break-even point. Some 
‘weeding out’ will be positive, as those with uncompetitive cost structures or 
poor management skills will exit the sector or more likely sell their sites to those 
who can run them more profitably. However, there is also the real possibility that 
increasing competition will apply downward pressure on the overall quality of 
service for these sites. We know from the above analysis that basic requirements 
should continue to be met by any site that remains open even with increasing 
competition; managers will have to perform basic maintenance such as empty-
ing the waste holding tanks. However, under increasing competition, many could 
remain open while sacrificing the sanitary conditions required for public health, 
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such as cleaning, offering hand-washing stations, or affording acceptable levels 
of privacy to users. This scenario would constrain access to sanitation because 
people who depend on public toilets would either have fewer options because of 
the rising costs, or the worsening conditions of the sites would encourage more 
open defecation.
Opportunities for innovation and improvement
The unregulated market-oriented context allows for too much political interfer-
ence and simultaneously introduces unhelpful forms of competition into the pro-
vision of public toilets. These issues no doubt have negative impacts on the lives 
of the citizens of Accra. That said, the data also suggest that even in the current 
system there is room for improved outcomes. The key is in creating scenarios that 
better tie the provision of these services to the desires and preferences of citizen 
users. In other words, there is room within the existing service provision structure 
to amplify the decisions of urban citizens and their impact on the evolution of 
those structures through the exercise of choice.
The following exchange between the researcher and Respondent DO is 
informative:
JH:  What then is the most important challenge [operating your public toilet 
site]?
DO:  The most important challenge is when people come they will enter your 
toilet and see how it is. If it is clean then you will get more customers 
because nobody would like to go where there is smell. If a person comes 
here twice and sees your place is good – where he was going, he can stop 
it there. We also make our toilet so that you can’t get any sickness.
JH:  What are the things you have to do to make it a place where people want 
to come? What are people looking for?
DO:  The spray [chemical disinfectants]; and that the workers are washing it; 
and that there are not rubbers [plastic bags full of faeces]; and that there 
is water to wash your hands.
Another respondent, NO, expressed a similar sentiment: ‘If the place is not organ-
ized, the person can go in, see it, and go on to the next place.’ Her comment was in 
the context of discussing common conditions at public toilets, and she euphemisti-
cally described faeces on the floor as being ‘not organized’. If customers find such 
conditions, they can go to the next public toilet.
The preferences of the people described by the toilet managers are intui-
tive and likely to be universal. While these preferences should have important 
connections to the way businesses operate, currently these links are often quite 
weak. While the above interaction is indicative of toilet operators who are in a 
position to seek greater profits through an increase in user volume, the two forces 
of the unregulated market dynamics explored above undermine these connec-
tions considerably. That is, the current context has both too little market logic, 
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whereby many sites are operated for political purposes to the detriment of the 
site’s cost structure, and too much market logic, where increasing unregulated 
competition is likely to have pernicious effects. The preferences of users are lost 
among the din.
Innovative solutions are required to restore that link in the existing context. 
Mainstream development efforts have attempted to restore links by strengthen-
ing the ‘long’ and the ‘short’ route to improved services (World Bank 2003). 
This is a call for both improved client connections to service providers (short 
route) and citizen connections to those that create the policy context in which 
service providers operate (the long route). While these are worthy long-term 
goals, they are predicated on robust and transparent regulatory regimes in 
places that have had little such experience. Further, they are likely to reduce 
active citizenship to clientism. The pro-poor sanitation literature cited above 
is in some ways similar in its calls for more appropriate technology, the short 
route, and more responsive governance, the long route. These points are well 
taken, but neither camp’s conception of the long or the short route will be suc-
cessful if prescriptions include one-size-fits-all plans. Instead, service provi-
sion in contested contexts is far more likely to follow unpredictable or untamed 
paths guided by innumerable local negotiations, where individuals interact with 
social structures to co-create iterative change. The key is to amplify individual 
agency in these negotiations.
In Accra, the link to give individuals more power in iterative negotiations with 
service providers might come through certain types of specified intervention. 
These interventions must be careful not to interfere with the cost recovery logic or 
the need for owners to remain competitive by offering services customers want; 
this would ignore the everyday mechanics of toilet provision in the context. This 
rules out actively investing in new toilet sites without a deliberate spatial strategy. 
Also inappropriate are efforts to mandate a constant low rate or direct subsidy of 
the toilet owners’ cost structure in order to keep fees low. Direct subsidies that do 
not connect sanitation provision to user preferences miss the point, and mandated 
fees below the cost recovery point would be self-defeating.
Instead, solutions could enable toilets to become more competitive by link-
ing subsidies or in-kind solutions that are directly related to offering increasingly 
hygienic services where the cost of those services can remain stable for users. 
Experience has shown that regulatory bodies that might ostensibly oversee these 
activities are often weak or inept. Other ways are possible in this context because 
the sanitation crisis in Accra is in the midst of dynamic change, whereby the sup-
ply and demand aspects of sanitation are transforming. That human waste is seen 
as a valued resource means new revenue streams are available in the sanitation 
sector (Murray and Ray 2010). There is potential to use these new revenues to 
reinvest in toilet sites in a manner that is directly related to daily realities.
For instance, social enterprises that are currently profitably reusing effluent 
for fuel or fertilizer, whose mission it is to improve access to sanitation and pro-
mote sustainability, could reinvest in toilet sites in ways that increase the clean-
liness and competitiveness of sites. This could be done, for example, through 
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partnerships with cleaning supply companies, and by helping sites source consist-
ent fresh water supplies. These might be subsidies, but they are connected to the 
ability of providers to provide services to users and not directly to the cost struc-
ture of a site, and therefore they are not capturable as profit without improving 
service provision.
An active civil society in neighbourhoods that rely on public toilets is an 
important force in the connection between the operation of public toilets and 
people’s everyday desires for how they are provided. It is important to note that 
Old Fadama is the lowest-income neighbourhood from which the sample of toi-
let sites were drawn. The whole neighbourhood has insecure tenure, the area 
regularly floods, it is adjacent to the city landfill site, and it is largely untouched 
by the city’s infrastructure. However, organizations such as the Federation of 
the Urban Poor, People’s Dialogue on Human Settlements, and Slum Dwellers 
International are active there, and their activists are the community leaders and 
residents of Old Fadama. One of the key informants for this study was a resi-
dent of Old Fadama and an employee of the Federation of the Urban Poor. He 
described how in Old Fadama the group has had some success organizing to man-
age several toilets and bring pressure on the AMA for greater responsiveness in 
terms of toilet inspections and the provision of disinfectant services. Within the 
sample, toilet sites in Old Fadama reported much higher rates of AMA respon-
siveness. This type of social organization will be required to apply pressure to 
force the connection between new revenue streams for sanitation providers and 
improved services.
A coalition of social enterprises and civil society organizations could establish 
a ‘toilet users’ bill of rights’, which acknowledges the profitability of public toilets 
and ‘certifies’ certain sites according to community standards and acceptable user 
fees, thereby making certified toilets more profitable through increased usage. 
This solution would work in conjunction with a social enterprise or a strictly for-
profit entity as waste reuser. In either case, toilet sites would be likely to get new 
revenue streams and/or positive income effects, and it will require an engaged 
civil society along with customer demands that make sure profits are reinvested in 
ways that improve the user experience. It is possible that such action could help 
bring about the desired connection between user preferences and governance, for 
which the mainstream and pro-poor scholarship both call. A re-engaged public 
sector, after recognizing the potential in evolving systemic change, could tie new 
taxation opportunities to resources for better regulation of hygienic standards.
Conclusion
The manner in which sanitation is provided for approximately 40 per cent of 
Accra’s population raises significant questions about its largely unregulated mar-
ket-oriented strategy. It leaves too much room for political interference, which 
on the one hand lowers user fees at many sites below what is needed to main-
tain those sites at hygienic levels while also building new sites for patronage 
rewards that dilute the customer base of existing sites. Also, without a spatial 
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strategy that requires submetro administrators to target where new private or 
AMA sites are located, how many sites overall are provided, and whom those 
sites are likely to serve, the cost structure of all sites is threatened, as are larger 
socio-ecological and public health goals. Taken together, basic sanitation service 
provision is unhelpfully disconnected from users’ preferences, and the space for 
individual choices and collective agency to impact the structure and outcomes of 
service provision is too limited. This chapter has made suggestions about how to 
improve service provision in the midst of these challenges through tying future 
interventions directly to the competitive advantage of toilet sites based on user 
preferences.
The larger narratives surrounding sanitation in Accra and places like it seek to 
explain these situations through wide-angle and often tidy descriptions of how cit-
ies work. These narratives do not anticipate the complicated realities of daily life 
in real places (Scott 1998). This is true of the classic neoliberal approach as well 
as the critical response. The intent here is not to provide another set of one-size-
fits-all recommendations. Instead, the suggestion is that in any socio-technical 
service provision configuration there are likely to be opportunities to amplify the 
voice of citizens through both individual choices and collective agency toward 
more equitable and sustainable outcomes. This requires a greater eye for detail 
and an appreciation for diversity and the messiness of innovative socio-ecological 
problem-solving.
Notes
1  Korboe et al. (1999) was a study of Kumasi, Ghana’s second city. It is used here only 
to provide an estimate of the magnitude of sanitation user fees relative to household 
income.
2  For a more complete discussion of these debates see Allen, Hofmann and Griffiths 
(2008).
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Part III
Disrupting hegemonic  
planning
Part III brings together a set of chapters that discuss from various perspectives the 
problematic and often contradictory role of urban planning processes and mecha-
nisms within rapidly changing cities around the world. 
Chapter 11 by Natalie Rosales (Mexico) – entitled ‘Walking the path to urban 
sustainability: what is still missing in current urban planning models?’ – exam-
ines the recent history of planning approaches, outlining conceptual shifts in con-
temporary urban planning. This includes the shift from technocratic approaches 
towards the emergence of a number of overlapping concepts which all promote a 
greater level of human engagement in the planning process, including ‘advocacy 
planning’, a greater focus on environmental issues, and a desire for more ‘livable 
cities’. Drawing on a case study of Mexico City, the chapter explores the contin-
ued role of power and vested interests in the planning process, despite official 
shifts to more inclusive approaches. Rosales concludes by outlining the necessity 
of commitment by all actors to the promotion of sustainable urbanization.
Titled ‘Are you really listening to me? Planning with the community in urban 
revitalization projects’, Chapter 12 by Mintesnot Woldeamanuel (Ethiopia) and 
José Palma (USA) analyses the contradictions between urban planning as a pro-
cess that promotes urban competitiveness, and the right to housing. The chapter 
draws on theories of public participation, such as ‘community planning’. While 
recognizing the potential of such an approach, it also highlights the difficulty of 
promoting it in practice. This is outlined through examples from the global North 
and global South of large-scale evictions, which are often carried out in the name 
of the ‘common good’. The authors conclude with a call for government to recog-
nize the shortcomings of a neoliberal approach to urban planning practice.
Chapter 13 by Franklin Obeng-Odoom (Ghana) – entitled ‘Sustainable urban 
development: a Georgist perspective’ – examines the potential of applying such 
perspective to contemporary debates on land reform. Based on the work of nine-
teenth-century theorist Henry George, the chapter outlines the potential for land 
being returned to public use as a means of promoting sustainable urbanization. 
Although this is not to be achieved through the nationalization of land but through 
the taxation of land rent, land rent is seen as an interim solution, with the end-goal 
being the return of land for common usage through decommodification. While 
examining some of the potential pitfalls of such an approach, Obeng-Odoom 
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argues that the Georgist notion that urban land should be shared by the commons 
has the potential to become a key element in the promotion of sustainable urban 
planning practice.
In Chapter 14 – entitled ‘Beyond an imaginary of power? Governance, supra-
national organizations and “just” urbanization’ – Philip Lawton (Ireland) exam-
ines framings of the ‘just city’ and the ‘right to the city’ in the context of policy 
frameworks advocated by supranational organizations such as UN-HABITAT 
and the European Commission. In examining the extent to which ideals of ‘rights’ 
and ‘justice’ are already central to such organizations, the chapter analyses both 
the potentials and the pitfalls of their incorporation into planned interventions. 
Lawton calls for a shift from imaging the ideal city based on imaginaries of fixed 
spatial outcomes (such as high-density living, transit-oriented planning and green 
landscapes) to a vision that focuses on just social processes and their impacts on 
people’s everyday lives.
11 Walking the path to urban 
sustainability
What is still missing in current  
urban planning models?
Natalie Rosales
Theories, ideas and concepts around sustainable  
urban planning
Moving from planning theories to sustainability approaches 
Our changing environment has increased the complexity of urban phenomena and 
the environment we inhabit. This means that urban planners are increasingly con-
fronted with the challenge of how to deal with polycrisis: that is, a nested set of 
social, economic and environmental crises. That can take the form of rapid urbani-
zation; shrinking and ageing cities; climate change and related disasters; sprawl 
and peri-urbanization, ecological overshots, poverty and informality among oth-
ers (UN-Habitat 2009). 
In this scenario, there are cities confronted with the redevelopment, regen-
eration and renewal of existing urban fabric which have suffered from abandon-
ment and decay, while others are dealing with rapid urbanization processes that 
are creating vast areas growing inorganically with insufficient urban services and 
equipment. 
Massive urban development projects, driven by government and private 
partnerships, have developed intelligent buildings, communication networks 
and sophisticated green infrastructure, creating isolated areas of prosperity and 
development. At the same time, local actors and communities are embarking on 
emergent projects that are less dependent on traditional planning interventions 
to improve urban conditions by transforming difficult sites, deprived zones and 
conflicted areas through alternative forms of delimiting and using spaces, often 
through unexpected and untamed actions and spontaneous uses.
It seems as if the aforementioned phenomenon of complex urban contexts in 
transition is squeezed in opposite directions. New answers are needed and indeed 
provided by new players, as traditional actors adapt their patterns, to respond to 
the mentioned challenges. So contrast, indeterminacy, multiplicity and simulta-
neity could be some of the notions that best describe the characteristics of these 
diverse, interconnected, ever-changing urban processes that occur at different 
scales, and worldwide.
In this context, the last three decades have seen a significant shift in plan-
ning theory. In broad terms, an important series of changes can be traced during 
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a relatively short period: mainstream approaches to planning appeared to have 
shifted from a rational comprehensive perspective, to calls for ‘advocacy plan-
ning’, and more recently to a focus on collaborative and transformative planning. 
Such evolution has also been marked by the ascendance of the so-called ‘sustain-
able development’ paradigm (Ward 2002). 
It is the aim of this chapter to contribute to the overall intention of the book 
by generating productive disruptions in the way we approach and interrogate 
urban change. While engaging with the notions of untamed urbanisms, the chap-
ter examines how the implementation of hegemonic narratives of ‘sustainability 
policy’ through urban planning, are in effect taming the way in which the city 
is and should be produced. I argue that these narratives preclude possibilities to 
advance a strong sustainability perspective on cities that recognizes the vital role 
of environmental ethics, human rights, shared values, social responsibility and 
justice (Girard 2007).
Contrary to past planning models based on technical rationality as the ground-
ing of knowledge, the examination of contemporary literature shows that plan-
ning theory has been re-conceptualized by ideas associated with the reframing of 
its processes, the analytical tools for decision-making, the role of planners, and 
planning practice as a means for social transformation (Friedman 1992; Fainstein 
2000; Sandercock 1998; Ward 2002; Innes and Booher 2010). As a result, urban 
planning theories, in general, appear to be moving towards the promotion of solu-
tions to achieve improvements in the quality of human life, while assuming con-
flict, instability, tension, uncertainty and imbalances as inextricable conditions of 
urban systems (Fainstein 2000).
Another pressing issue affecting urban planning in the last few decades has to 
do with the increasing recognition of the importance of degradation and pollu-
tion of the environment as a topic for discussion in social, political and economic 
scenarios, accompanied by the arrival of a new paradigm of development that 
encompasses economic, social and environmental aspects in a cross-generational 
perspective facing the urban Anthropocene.
In this context, the sustainable development debate has become a protagonist 
among new urban discourses, calling upon a more critical and reflexive attitude 
across all actors involved in the city fabric to generate both a new understand-
ing of urban development, and different solutions on how to advance socio-
environmental change.
Therefore, current debates on urban planning are increasingly being framed 
through the recognition of the interrelation between the emergence of new theo-
retical perspectives related to urban planning procedures, social transformations 
and the city as a liveable space (Lang 2000), as well as the importance of sustain-
able development, as a predominant discourse for socio-environmental change. 
This in turn has resulted on the propagation of conceptualizations linked to the 
notions of diversity, inclusion, equity, democracy, consensus-building, justice 
and environmental ethics throughout planning circles (Sandercock 1998). 
As a Mexican researcher and practitioner participating in the contemporary 
dialogue of city-building, I have witnessed how this interrelation has shaped a 
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new urban agenda for sustainable cities and a variety of urban planning policy 
packages both in my country and worldwide. However, the examination of recent 
planning practices in the context of Mexico City shows that these ideals may have 
had limited impact. This city, like many others, shows no evidence of becoming 
substantively more sustainable in social, ecological or economic terms. Therefore, 
planning still faces the challenge of doing more than merely coping with urban 
problems through land use regulations or enhanced market incentives. In practice, 
‘sustainable urban planning’ has become activated via a series of stereotypical 
interventions that are still based on problem-solving and ‘one-size-fits-all’ blue-
print thinking – all of which are collected in a set of new policies within outdated 
schemes that minimize and reduce their transformative potential towards an alter-
native and sustainable urbanism.
So, I consider that even when some sustainability narratives – defined as para-
digms which anchor environmental sustainability issues with the physical form of 
cities and regions, because of the association between vehicular travel and mobil-
ity patterns with greenhouse gases, climate change and urban environmental qual-
ity – may be interrelated with planning for urban sustainability perspectives, they 
have not yet managed to transform urbanism. By the latter, I mean that we still 
face significant challenges in the way we conceptualize cities and the way we 
build them, in order to turn the existing urban environment into an enriched sus-
tainable urban fabric. This specific question sets me off into an exploration on the 
shortcomings of current sustainable planning models. 
With this aim in mind, this chapter reflects on the discrepancies between sus-
tainable urban planning theory and development practice. Drawing from recent 
discussions on planning theories that critique mainstream planning, the chapter 
examines the divergences between professional discourses of planning and munic-
ipally adopted plans and the actions implemented to achieve these sustainability 
objectives and goals under real circumstances. In order to carry out this analy-
sis I revised the main procedural documents and practices adopted at state level 
between 2007 and 2012, in which the Mexico City government introduced sustain-
able urban development values through the dissemination of planning concepts 
and new procedural instruments, with the view of creating a ‘new urban order’.
Additionally, the chapter examines how the gap between theory and practice 
might be closed and outlines a new perspective to address the shortfalls of current 
sustainable urban planning. 
Planning concepts and perspectives emerging from  
sustainability narratives 
From the publication of the Brundtland Report in the 1980s, and the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (‘Rio Summit’) in 1992, 
to the most recent Conference on Rio +20 in 2012, the debate about the role of 
cities in addressing global environmental problems, as well as their challenges 
and opportunities to achieve sustainable development, have been integral to urban 
policy discussions worldwide.
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New approaches and perspectives going from the local to the global level, 
or from strong (biocentric, ecocentric) to weak sustainability (anthropocentric), 
have evolved since then (Archibuji and Nijkamp 1989; Pearce and Turner 1990), 
and new terms have certainly emerged and become rapidly popularized – such 
as ‘eco urbanism’, ‘sustainable cities’, ‘eco villages’, ‘sustainable communities’, 
‘resilient cities’, ‘green cities’, ‘eco cities’, ‘sustainable urbanization’, ‘sustain-
able urban development’ and so on – all of which have contributed to disseminat-
ing the notion that planning and urban form are crucial to urban sustainability.
The pursuit of sustainability as a central aspect of contemporary urban plan-
ning has, then, revitalized urban and regional planning objectives to different 
extents worldwide, by introducing concepts like compact urban form and transit-
oriented development, low carbon cities, food sensitive planning, urban resource 
efficiency, energy urban planning and planning for urban resilience, just to name 
a few (FAO 2000; Allen and You 2002; Morgan 2009; Jabareen 2006; UN Habitat 
2007; Owens 1986; Polèse and Stren 2000; Davoudi 2012; Jenks et al. 2000; 
Bulkeley et al. 2010; Wheeler 2013; Pickett et al. 2004; Donovan et al. 2011; 
Birch and Wachter 2008).
In this context, the centrality gained in recent years by the notion of sustain-
able urban development, which has been endorsed by local, state and national 
government agencies in Mexican planning circles, has been influential in driving 
new concerns in planning exercises in Mexico City, such as citizen participation, 
a competitive and inclusive economy, urban environment, environmental protec-
tion, political reforms to impulse the right to the city, equity, security and justice, 
and a new urban order to address efficient services and quality of life for all 
(Gobierno del Distrito Federal 2001a). The debate around these matters has been 
a key factor to address environmental concerns, and has contributed – at least in 
appearance – to refreshing urban planning objectives, and to promoting different 
urban development schemes and more participatory ways of managing the city.
For example, this shift has triggered the emergence of new participatory spaces 
for governments, social groups, networks and organizations (the Mexico City 
Urban Sustainable Development Council, green forums, and sustainable develop-
ment and inter sectorial commissions, among others) (Secretaria de Desarrollo 
Urbano y Vivienda 2009; Gobierno del Distrito Federal 2007c). These spaces 
have, in principle, opened the possibility to debate the challenges that cities and 
their populations within Mexico are facing on all fronts, how sustainability can be 
conceptualized within the city context and the growth potential of the city accord-
ing to its ecological viability.
However, in practice, although Mexico City has adopted urban sustainability 
rhetoric in its policies and plans by adding the term ‘sustainable’ to a myriad of 
existing planning documents (e.g. urban sustainable development master plan, 
sustainable urban model, urban sustainable development, sustainable economic 
development, sustainable transportation planning), it is hard to find any evidence 
of what planning for sustainability might mean in concrete terms.
In contrast, planning models leading to plans and projects which could 
be implemented to bring sustainable changes have been reduced to strategies, 
often unwittingly, by the dominance of certain readings of sustainability such 
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as the economic perspective which postulates growth, productivity in the use of 
resources, and competitiveness as the basis for prosperity of human and ecologi-
cal systems in the city (World Bank 2000; OECD 1996); or the social, which 
emphasizes the role of management and urban governance to address poverty 
and environmental degradation and its impact on human health and quality of 
life (Stren 1995; UNHabitat 2002; Banister 2002; Hardoy et al. 1992). These 
approaches were favoured at the expense of the ecological perspective, in which 
sustainability is seen as feedback processes maintaining a dynamic equilibrium 
similar to the one on ecosystems (Tjallingii 1995; Girardet 1990; Bettini 1998; 
Rueda 1995).
In the context of Mexico City, programmes and planning instruments to guide 
urban development and land use have been only updated by integrating a limited 
extent of urban sustainability notions in the diagnosis, and some environmental 
sustainability objectives and strategic lines on ecological land use, liveability and 
public space, water, mobility, air, waste, energy and climate change (Gobierno 
del Distrito Federal 2007a, 2007b; Comisión Ambiental Metropolitana 2010) that 
have merely resulted on the ‘greening’ of urban planning. 
So far, planning efforts in Mexico City to move towards sustainable urban 
planning, such as ‘neighbourhood decision making’ or ‘pocket parks’ are still 
deployed on the basis of outdated procedures and normative instruments embed-
ded in routinized practices based on linear sequences, including integration of a 
thematic agenda, elaboration of diagnosis, image objective, strategy, the develop-
ment of the plan, public consultation, shipping and approval of the plan by the 
general assembly, publishing, and the dissemination and application of the initia-
tives established.
Therefore, it can be argued that the actual practice of urban sustainable planning 
in Mexico City, as in other cities, still confronts surmountable challenges, such 
as how to integrate economic development, environmental protection and social 
justice domains, issues that usually overlap, in an usually extended Metropolitan 
area. As a result, planning officials tend to overlook complex urban phenomena, 
as a whole, disaggregating sectorial policies and actions for social exclusion, 
poverty, uncontrolled urban sprawl, pollution, and unsustainable consumption of 
land, water and other natural resources.
In order to scrutinize this argument, the sections that follow in this chapter 
examine the multidimensional forms in which theoretical debate on sustainability 
has been embedded in recent urban planning practices in Mexico City and their 
limitations.
Planning in Mexico City: understanding the shortcomings  
of sustainable urban planning 
Drafting sustainability: Government discourse and  
planning documents
As mentioned before, in recent years Mexico City government has promoted 
urban sustainable development values through a range of projects aiming to 
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create a ‘new urban order’, sustainable mobility and environmental protection 
and conservation. As we examine the discourse surrounding the 2006–12 General 
Development City Program, we find that planning documents advocate a more 
sustainable urban model by ‘establishing a compact city, which facilitates mobil-
ity, strengthens the community, and improves the quality of urban life while 
respecting the regenerative capacity of ecosystems that guarantee sustainability’ 
(Gobierno del Distrito Federal 2007c).
This discursive style for a sustainable city stated in planning instruments has 
served as a framework for urban policies, action, plans and investment projects 
for restructuring urban space. As such, it appears to be mainly aligned with an 
economic approach to sustainability and has been coupled with operative watch-
words, such as reducing urban sprawl through the adoption of ‘compact city’ prin-
ciples, low-carbon technologies, and the promotion of urban competitiveness. 
As a result, to foster the city to a sustainable development path, actions which 
have been undertaken by Mexico City’s government in recent years have involved 
the revitalization of economically depressed areas of the city, the recovery and 
renovation of public spaces, transport and infrastructure investments, and envi-
ronmental protection. 
These actions are based on the idea that promoting economic development 
and linking urban development patterns with environmental protection will make 
a more efficient use of economic, social and environmental resources. The City 
government considers these policies will reverse the processes that have affected 
the quality of life in Mexico City and will also make the city more competitive 
at regional and international levels (Gobierno del Distrito Federal 2007a). Even 
more, based on their applied notion of sustainability, policy officials are con-
vinced of the policy impact on development and sustainability.
Consequently, implemented actions to create a ‘new urban order’ mostly focus 
on strategic economic projects to deploy urban revitalization, renewal and resto-
ration of historic monuments, recovery of public spaces, pedestrianisation, green 
areas enhancement, street furniture and accessibility improvement (Gobierno del 
Distrito Federal 2007b).
The main objective of building ‘a new urban order’, through establishing the 
compact city, has been supported by some other multi-sectorial strategies to pro-
mote ‘inclusive and sustainable mobility’. These strategies have mainly involved 
the promotion of environmentally friendly transport, which includes a bus rapid 
transit system (Metrobus system), a low carbon corridor, consisting of tram lines, 
and the replacement of taxis and mini buses by less polluting units; non-motorized 
mobility transport options (walking and cycling lanes, and an individual bicycling 
programme); and new road infrastructure that consist in building flyovers and 
freeways to double the road capacity (Gobierno del Distrito Federal 2010). 
When it comes to actions to promote environmental sustainability, efforts 
have focused on three main activities: ecosystem protection and conservation; the 
aforementioned environmentally friendly transport initiatives, and environmental 
law enforcement. These included the ecological restoration of urban canyons and 
rivers that go across the city, policies for zero growth of informal settlements on 
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ecological land use (Allen 2014), reinforced by a special environmental police 
body for the surveillance and closing down of illegal constructions in ecological 
areas, thus preventing the growth of informal settlements on ecological and rural 
land use, and to carry out routine patrols to monitor and prevent sites with the 
highest incidence of illegal logging and water pollution; and a myriad of monetary 
compensatory measures for environmental services intended to preserve ecologi-
cal areas of the remaining agrarian communities around Mexico DF (ibid.). 
Yet, while the effectiveness of the actions described in this section is still to 
be tested, in many ways they have illustrated a governmental recognition from 
the local to the national level of the need to transform planning through the adop-
tion of more effective instruments for achieving sustainable urban development. 
This has led to renovated planning exercises and documents that claim that the 
approach implemented amounts to putting sustainable urban planning into prac-
tice, though the actions implemented to achieve sustainability objectives and 
goals remain elusive. 
In many ways, it seems so far that sustainability has pushed professional organi-
zations and other stakeholders to rethink practices, values, and methods of govern-
ing the city in a ‘better’ way that prioritises new policies which incorporate spatial 
frameworks and urban planning approaches for more sustainable urban form(s). 
This is reinforced by the complexity of urban challenges Mexico City faces, 
such as informal settlements, urban sprawl, megalopolization, urban disorder and 
lawlessness, gentrification, pollution and unsustainable consumption of natural 
resources, ecological overshot, and decreased quality of life and liveability in the 
city, which combine aspects of environmental degradation, urban poverty, vul-
nerability, and inequalities in growth distribution and governance schemes. All 
these aspects suggest that urban sustainable planning should do better in evening 
up social, environmental, economic, territorial and institutional dimensions, and 
promote real possibilities for moving in progressive directions towards a sustain-
able development.
However, freeways construction to mitigate traffic congestion, environmental 
policing bodies to prevent the growth of informal settlements on ecological and 
rural land use, limited participation to promote new governance schemes, and 
planning process with little regard either to political conflict or to the specific 
character of the terrain on which it is working do not easily add up to a sustainable 
planning paradigm. 
When examining the rhetoric of sustainable urban planning adopted by the 
government in the main planning documents produced to regulate the city’s 
development, it is clear to me that some sustainable narratives have won the 
battle of public ideas and have contributed to creating some changes in Mexico 
City. However, it is less clear how the actions implemented have the capacity to 
address complex, rapidly changing socio-environmental problems resulting from 
interdependencies among socio-spatial imbalances and the uneven distribution 
of growth, while drawing communities into a transformative process that will 
address a common understanding, acceptance and ongoing commitment to make 
significant changes towards a sustainable future. 
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So far, I have considered the focus adopted by Mexico’s governmental plan-
ning agencies towards sustainable urban planning, which has not led to a mean-
ingful integration of sustainable development ideals into planning endeavours. 
First, sustainability notions still remain far from overcoming the limitations of 
mainstream planning models and perspectives to understand cities and regions 
not just as economic systems, or static inventories of natural resources, but also as 
socio-environmental systems. 
Second, planning mechanisms (e.g. land use regulations, master plans, urban 
development programmes) have not moved towards more flexible procedural and 
contextual instruments to enable negotiated outcomes rather than just regulation. 
So even when planning processes have incorporated new instruments and exist-
ing procedural instruments have been embedded with sustainability objectives 
(e.g. Programa general de desarrollo del Distrito Federal, Programa de Desarrollo 
Urbano del Distrito Federal, Programas Delegacionales y Parciales de Desarrollo 
Urbano, Programa Sectorial de Medio Ambiente del Distrito Federal y el Programa 
sectorial de movilidad y transporte) they do not foster collaborative approaches 
that encompass integrative, transdisciplinary and inclusive perspectives of social 
actors and their contexts, or the appropriate means for launching sustainability 
priorities and integrating ordinary citizens in the city’s development.
Example of the above are the policies for zero growth of informal settlements 
on ecological land use, already mentioned, or the attempts to green the planning 
process in Mexico City through a Green Forum held in 2007 to support a par-
ticipatory planning exercise which presented possible measures to solve environ-
mental problems facing the city. In this Forum, citizens inputs were limited to 
expressing their opinion about various policies and environmental measures that 
had already been approved and programmed.
Actually, some measures implemented in Mexico City caused distrust 
because of the lack of transparency, dialogue and consensus among many citi-
zens with respect to the real priorities pursued by city authorities, and the fear 
of just being used to try to legitimize a city development model which serves, 
primarily, the interests of major developers, while sustainability is usually left 
behind or used as a background rhetoric. An example of this is an infrastructure 
project of a speed highway build in 2010 in the south-west of the city, which 
crosses six areas of environmental value and which was rejected by neighbours 
and social activists. 
Even though Mexico City has an Urban Sustainable Development Council 
and inter-sectorial commissions to create a favourable institutional context for 
sustainable development, its government structures have not yet changed to 
enable horizontal and vertical coordination, and thus a more integrated way of 
understanding and managing the city. As a result, it can be concluded that imple-
mented city actions adopt a narrow approach on environmental limits, urban–rural 
flows, socio-spatial segregation, inequality and social and environmental justice. 
Instead, they appear to focus on promoting the role of the market, to make up what 
is called a ‘good business climate’ (Domhoff 2005; Forester 1998) for attracting 
investment projects, and increasing productivity and competitiveness in a global 
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economy (Harvey 2000), an approach that has clearly prevented a comprehensive 
analysis of the impact that growth strategies and investment have on the environ-
ment and on local communities. 
The assessment of these policies and actions also confirms the persistence 
of planning approaches based on instrumental rationality, which have not trans-
formed urban planning to a more flexible instrument for governance; nor do they 
offer solutions to the conflicting interests of the different stakeholders in the urban 
space, or even enable incremental changes that will set the ground to steer the city 
towards a sustainable development. 
Planning for urban sustainability: bridging the gap  
between theory and practice
In this section, the discussion will focus on considering planning as an instrument 
for urban sustainability. According to Friedman (2011), the planning endeavour 
is about changing situations and societies to move towards conditions more likely 
to promote human flourishing within the environmental limits rather than the pur-
suit of material benefits for political and economic elites. This notion of planning 
is closely related to sustainable development values that embrace the ecological 
dimension of development, environmental protection, the satisfaction of human 
needs and aspirations, changes in the distribution of costs and benefits, and the 
notions of equity and diversity.
Beyond the traditional ‘three-legged stool’ model of sustainable development, 
this paradigm of development can provide us with a deeper appreciation of the 
complexity of urban issues and solutions. Moreover, sustainability knowledge can 
be a key contributor to reshape our understanding of and ability to act upon a 
rapidly urbanizing and increasingly unfair world, by embracing the ideas of inter-
dependence, interconnection, integration, change and compromise.
So planning should not just be focused on the promotion of land use regula-
tions, resulting in proposals and urban strategies composed of a large number of 
disjointed sub-projects, usually resulting in unintended, unanticipated, unsustain-
able and undemocratic consequences, as discussed in the case of Mexico City. 
Furthermore, planning should also imply a process: something practised and deliv-
ered (Riddel 2004). This endeavour should involve how to achieve transformative 
development (Sarkissian and Hurford 2010; Innes and Booher 2010; Friedman 
2011). Therefore, planning for sustainability must foresee the potential of com-
munity building as an ongoing process of transforming the relations between soci-
ety and nature, and work on alternative urbanism where cities become elements 
for educating and promoting biophilia (the love of living systems) (Wilson 1984; 
Beatley 2010) and sustainable values. This entails the broader idea that sustain-
able planning is not only related to greening cities, but also demands social and 
environmental justice as an ethical imperative. 
Planning for sustainability should be, in sum, about changes in the current 
parameters of planning systems and structures; to move from being the ultimate 
taming project of simply rehabilitating, enhancing and maintaining cities’ current 
176 Natalie Rosales 
conditions to an instrument with comprehensive opportunities for a complete 
integration of the sustainable development paradigm ideals. While the ambitious 
perspective outlined here could be interpreted as yet another imperative planning 
narrative, my central contention is that if planning is go beyond the shortfalls of 
current sustainable urban initiatives, its practice and theorization require a more 
explicit engagement with the ethical dimension of taming projects and with a 
reconsideration of the type of political processes that can enable incremental 
changes that will set the ground for complex transformations and might in turn 
make a difference between knowing the path and walking the path towards urban 
sustainability.
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12 Are you really listening to me? 
Planning with the community in  
urban revitalization projects
Mintesnot Woldeamanuel and José Palma
Introduction
Increased urbanization creates a growing competition for cities to be attractive 
business destinations. As a result, several major cities are going through the pro-
cess of urban revitalization, seeking to significantly transform formerly run-down 
or poor urban areas and create a better socio-economic and physical atmosphere. 
This approach has become an increasingly common practice in both the global 
North and the global South. Historical projects such as ‘slum clearance in the 
USA’ (Collins and Shester 2009) and current initiatives like ‘Slum-Free Lagos’1 
and ‘Slum-Free Mumbai’ (see Gordon n.d.) are examples. The upshot of such 
projects has been to exclude the poor from the planning process, to name but one 
severe shortcoming of such an approach.
The mention of slum settlements means a problem for many cities that would 
like to be more attractive for businesses. So their local governments are designat-
ing land for business purposes without considering the concerns of the people 
who live on that land. They have focused on economic growth as their objec-
tive, claiming that growth-promoting policies result in greater good for the greater 
population (Fainstein 2010). This in reality is having enormous socio-economic 
effects on low-income and minority communities (Brunn, Williams and Zeigler 
2003). This is a growing problem for many large cities where the majority of the 
populations are still in poverty (Davis 2007). There are also land-use policies 
that fail to address these issues, coupled with inconsistent governments failing 
to take action and to provide sustainable solutions to these issues (Aguilar and 
Santos 2011). Such land use policies not only fail to address the issues of slum 
and squatter settlements; in some places land use controls are the means by which 
community planning achieves social exclusion (Angotti 2008). In New York for 
Sale, Angotti (2008) argues that zoning and land use planning in the city have 
contributed to the segregation of neighbourhoods by race and class.
One of the severe effects of non-deliberative urban revitalization projects is 
eviction or displacement, which is common, for example, in Africa and South 
Asia. Despite several urban social movements that have opposed public and pri-
vate projects that threaten to displace residents, in most cases displacement is 
the result of urban revitalization which affects low-income and racial minorities. 
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Those people evicted are poor, marginalized and have moved from their rural 
areas into the slums to locate hard-to-find jobs (Ocheje 2007). However, for city 
planners and managers, there is always a vision of a ‘good city’, and the vision 
focuses on easy flow of traffic and beautiful physical spaces. Moreover, these 
approaches often include the removal and displacement of poor people (Watson 
2009a, 2009b).
Such planning ideology fails to recognize the rights of people to housing and 
a stable, healthy living environment that is free from threats of eviction and dis-
placement (Angotti 2008). Conventional planning rather follows the ideas of 
neoliberalism, which focuses on market logic and competitive discipline (Purcell 
2009). The planning process does not guarantee full participation to slum dwell-
ers. Nevertheless, community involvement is very important in urban planning 
projects, especially in areas that are connected with urban renewal. It is important 
because case study after case study demonstrates how government policies, laws 
and regulations can impact the lives of so many people, particularly those who 
are forced out of their homes with no notice and no say in the planning process.
The concepts of community planning and public participation, as social justice 
and democratic processes, are well developed and have been debated for several 
decades (e.g. Lisk 1980; Arnstein 1969). However, in practice there are several 
social, economic, ethnic and most importantly political factors that challenge 
the inclusiveness and participatory nature of community planning. Ideas such 
as asset-based community development (ABCD) recognize that there are prob-
lems with planning agencies’ connections with residents, and that real change in 
communities starts with communication between planners and local stakeholders 
(Kretzmann and McKnight 1996). The main stakeholders in urban revitalization 
projects are the people who live in the area being revitalized; therefore the com-
munication must start from the community. The ideas of participatory and delib-
erative planning can be applied to many nations in which urban renewal projects 
are tied in with culture, religion, language, race and other factors that make it 
difficult to make large-scale change (Brunn et al. 2003; Stone 1989). 
The growing gap between the planning process and the community does not 
really provide an opportunity for citizen participation. Many urban planners and 
local government officials seem to overlook the fact that they should be working 
with people, instead of working for people. Often, it seems that there is a neolib-
eral belief that in carrying out urban transformations, governments are helping 
the poor, and ‘the invisible hand’ of market decisions will determine economic 
outcomes that benefit all, including the poor and ethnic minorities (Purcell 2009).
In this chapter we explore the gap between the theories and the practices of 
participatory planning, focusing on the failure of urban revitalization programmes 
in the developing world, and gentrification processes in the developed world, to 
include the community as part of the planning process. Using case studies, we 
explore the socio-political and economic forces that are responsible for the char-
acterization of people living in blighted areas as a problem to deal with rather 
than part of the planning process. We also examine the question of why urban 
upgrading practices have similar outcomes (marginalizing low-income groups 
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and ethnic minorities) in both the developing and the developed world, and how 
creative and sustainable planning practices could be based on needs assessment, 
and tapping local resources and knowledge. The implication of participatory plan-
ning practices on sustainable urbanization is also highlighted in this chapter.
Public participation in planning: theory and practice
Numerous documents on public involvement agree that there are limited oppor-
tunities for the public to get involved in the planning process (e.g. Lane 2005; 
Munro-Clark 1992; Webber and Crooks 1996). Innes and Booher (2000) claim 
that, even if there are some opportunities for involvement, the traditional meth-
ods of public participation in planning simply do not work because they do not 
achieve genuine public involvement in planning or decisions, they do not satisfy 
members of the public that they are being heard, and they do not involve a broad 
spectrum of the public. These authors continue to argue that traditional public 
participation often antagonizes the members of the public who do try to work 
through these methods.
As public participation has become a rather ritualized practice, several scholars 
and activists keep asking a question: ‘Does public participation serve any pur-
pose?’ (e.g. Sewell and Coppock 1977). Of course, the extent of public participa-
tion in planning is largely determined by the nature of the project, planning and 
policy. The definition of the planning problem, the kinds of knowledge used in 
planning practice and the conceptualization of the planning and decision-making 
context are the important determinants of the extent of participation offered to 
the public (Lane 2005). Beierle and Cayford state in Democracy in Practice that 
‘involving the public not only frequently produces decisions that are responsive to 
public values and substantively robust, but it also helps to resolve conflict, build 
trust, and educate and inform the public about the environment’ (2002: 74).
Sherry Arnstein posed an important question in her famous piece ‘A ladder of 
citizen participation’ (1969): to what extent do efforts to involve the public make 
citizen participation meaningful? As Arnstein phrased it, ‘there is a critical differ-
ence between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real 
power needed to affect the outcomes of the process’ (1969: 216). She strongly 
argued that if policy-makers and planners seek public participation, it is necessary 
that there be a redistribution of power. According to this view, unless citizens 
have a genuine opportunity to affect outcomes, participation is simply manipula-
tion of participants (Arnstein 1969).
Many classic and contemporary planning concepts follow a non-participant 
approach. Like any rational comprehensive approach, the planning sequence 
involves a survey of the area, an analysis of the results and, finally, the devel-
opment of the plan. However, by the late 1960s new models of planning began 
to emerge in response to criticisms of the rational-comprehensive approach. 
According to Innes and Booher (2000), planners and public officials found ways 
to test public opinion other than the traditional hearings or review-and-comment 
procedures. They increasingly relied on social science research methods such 
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as public opinion polls, focus groups and other surveys. While these methods 
give public officials a more representative and accurate understanding of what 
the public want than the traditional procedures, they are criticized for being 
detached and scientific (Innes and Booher 2000). These approaches are being 
practised in several cities in developing nations, but cultural, racial and religious 
differences between groups in the planning area can make the practice rather 
difficult (Stone 1989).
A recent public participation approach seems to work better. This involves 
collaborative groups being set up at the local level in various forms to deal with 
everything from neighbourhood disputes to building infrastructure or develop-
ing a proposal for economic development (De Sousa Briggs 1998). Other types 
of collaboration have been introduced by public agencies, and engage not only 
professionals but also citizens in a joint effort to set the direction for their com-
munity. Many other initiatives have been started more spontaneously by players 
in a community (Ostrom 1990). These collaborative efforts involve organized 
interest groups, individual citizens and government agencies. Community work-
shops and visioning efforts engage dozens, even hundreds, of citizens in devel-
oping long-range aspirations for the community or identifying issues to which 
they want their elected officials to give priority. This is not to say that such 
deliberative and communicative planning is not without limitations, but the main 
limitation lies in lack of creative practices in bringing different perspectives and 
views to the table.
Practically speaking, in most developing nations, and arguably in some coun-
tries of the developed world, public participation is not yet at the level where the 
people are part of the entire planning process. Planning, in most places, is con-
trolled by the elite who aim to shape the city in their own image (Yiftachel 1998). 
Researchers have documented the privileged position of the rich, and the deepen-
ing deprivation of the poor caused by urban and regional policies. David Harvey’s 
revolutionary work, based mainly on structural analyses of American and British 
cities, has shown how the modern capitalist state in general, and urban planning in 
particular, is embedded in the facilitation of capital accumulation, and therefore in 
the repeated reproduction of class inequalities (Harvey 1973, 1985). This is espe-
cially manifested in projects related to urban upgrading and revitalization, where 
it is common to see a poorly managed planning process result in huge negative 
socio-economic consequences for the low-income population, including eviction 
and displacement. The predictable outcome of such practices is the unhealthy and 
unsustainable functioning of cities. 
Blighted areas and urban upgrading: state of the  
eviction practice
Before discussing urban upgrading it is necessary to talk about what is to be 
upgraded: slums or blighted areas, sometimes formally designated for housing 
and sometimes informal. Slums, which are characterized by substandard housing 
and inadequate facilities, present some of the most pressing urban environmental 
problems in cities. Overcrowding and insanitary conditions increase the incidence 
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of communicable diseases, such as diarrhoea, tapeworms and tuberculosis, and 
make infant mortality rates in slums almost as high as in rural areas (Takeuchi 
et al. 2008; Sclar et al. 2005). Water quality in slums tends to be poor, and com-
munity toilets often overflow. In inner cities of the developed world, blighted 
areas are characterized by an unappealing physical appearance, high levels of 
crime and economic disinvestment.
Slum improvement programmes in many countries were really little more than 
slum clearance – hardly a solution to the problem of lack of adequate affordable 
housing in cities. For example, in Title I of the National Housing Act of 1949, the 
US Congress launched an ambitious plan to rid American cities of their slums and 
to revitalize the economy of city centres. The goals were broad: to reduce ‘sub-
standard’ housing, which was considered a breeding ground for crime and vice; 
to stem suburban migration; to invigorate downtown central business districts; to 
increase local tax revenues through gains in property values; and to encourage 
new private investment (Collins and Shester 2013; Groberg 1965; Teaford 2000). 
Over time, however, urban renewal efforts became increasingly controversial. 
Critics decried the disproportionate impact on poor residents, the use of eminent 
domain (the right of the government to acquire land for public use or public ben-
efit) to trump private property rights, the destruction of cohesive neighbourhoods, 
the loss of historic buildings and the aesthetics of the new buildings (Collins and 
Shester 2013).
In some places the strategy shifted to one of improving and consolidating exist-
ing housing, often by providing slum dwellers with security of tenure, combined 
with the materials needed to upgrade their housing or – in areas where land was 
plentiful – to build new housing. These improvements might take the form of pro-
viding infrastructure services and other forms of physical capital, and also include 
efforts to foster community management, and access to health care and education. 
At the same time, some have called for replacing slums with multi-storey housing 
either on the site of the original slum or in an alternative location (Takeuchi et al. 
2008). 
Several cities in both the developing and the developed world are currently 
going through a slum clearance programme with the ambitious aim of becoming 
slum-free cities. The ‘Slum-Free Lagos’ programme in Nigeria is an ambitious 
plan to create a world-class Lagos as a competitive city by cleaning slum areas. 
However, the actions are not without collateral damage. Adam Nossiter wrote on 
a report in the New York Times on 1 May 2013:
government backhoes came in to slum neighbourhoods on 23 February 2013 
and ploughed through 1000 dwelling units, instantly making homeless per-
haps 10,000 of Lagos’s poorest residents and destroying a decades-old slum, 
Badia East. For days, residents wandered the chaotic rubble-strewn field, near 
prime Lagos real estate. They were dazed and angry. Small children slept on 
the muddy ground. Men climbed the mounds of rubble, searching. In intense 
heat, women, men and children said they were hungry and sleeping outside. 
The government had destroyed their present, they said, without making any 
provision for their future.
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Making Lagos slum free, in physical terms, might seem a ‘good’ thing, but con-
ventional and non-participatory practices of urban renewal have not only proved 
to be inappropriate to the realities of slum dwellers and of rapid urban growth 
and limited resources in Nigeria (and indeed in most African countries), but have 
also intensified the social problems. Slum clearance in Nigeria creates a vicious 
problem of housing shortage. Since demolition of housing must precede new 
construction in the project area, the existing stock of housing is decreased, forc-
ing displaced people to seek shelter in the remaining housing in the city or erect 
squatter housing. This displaces the problem instead of solving it, sending slum 
conditions from area to area in a spiral process. The only solution is to build new 
dwelling units for displaced individuals before demolishing their present homes 
(Ocheje 2007).
In many instances in a variety of cities, forced evictions have taken place and 
the government has given those affected no compensation. ‘Since 2000, over 
two million people have been forcibly evicted in Nigeria. The evictions have 
occurred in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and federal capital of Abuja’ (Ocheje 2007). 
The political argument to justify these occurrences is that the aim is to achieve a 
‘common good’ which will benefit the city, country or state as a whole. However, 
it certainly does not benefit those who live in slum areas if their dwellings are 
cleared away to make room for public improvement schemes such as new high-
ways. The outcome of these urban revitalization projects is to push low-income 
groups beyond the city boundaries, and make sure that they do not return because 
they cannot afford to live in the replacement homes, which are typically designed 
for middle- and upper-class groups.
In addition, slum clearance creates psychological and environmental damage 
such as the break-up of social relationships and the upsetting of existing economic 
systems and opportunities (Dimuna and Omatsone 2010). This is a very good 
example of the lack of communicative planning and the notion that government 
and the market know better than the community.
As systematic and institutionalized as it is, there is also a noteworthy con-
temporary case of large-scale forced eviction in a US city. We are not talking 
here about the much publicized 1950s slum clearance programmes; it occurred in 
2003 in Philadelphia. This destroys any notion that slum clearance ceased to be 
relevant in the developed world after the 1950s or 1960s. Gentrification – that is, 
a shift in urban areas toward wealthier residents and/or businesses as property val-
ues increase – is affecting many low-income and minority populations in several 
inner cities across America. The Philadelphia case was featured in a documentary, 
All for the Taking (McCullough, 2005). It described how the US Supreme Court 
ruled that local governments can use their power of eminent domain, based on the 
constitution, to forcibly appropriate private property and hand it over to another 
private owner for the ‘public good’. This ruling furthered the widespread abuse of 
the eminent domain concept all over the country.
On 18 April 2001, the government of the City of Philadelphia approved a 
Neighbourhood Transformation Initiative (NTI). This project was intended to be 
one of the most ambitious urban renewal projects in recent Philadelphia history 
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because of the amount of change that would take place in gentrifying blighted 
areas. The NTI was designed to reverse a 50-year pattern of population decline 
through urban renewal. By using eminent domain, the city authorized the acquisi-
tion of thousands of private homes in the areas designated for transformation, and 
built up a massive land bank. Many of these homes were owned or rented by the 
poor and the elderly, and most of them were inhabited by people of colour. Once 
it had acquired large blocks of land, the city turned to private developers to rebuild 
(and change) most of its historical neighbourhoods. However, many agree that 
this process was marked by a lack of communication with the property owners 
and renters.
One elderly African American homeowner interviewed in the documentary 
lived on Hoopes Street. She said that the City of Philadelphia started sending her 
notices in the mail telling her that her property was being appropriated and given 
to someone else. The idea of moving caused her great anxiety, and she struggled 
to find a new place to live. She described the area as a place whose community 
had deep roots, and where people were working together to fix problems that the 
city government simply ignored. The city did not make an effort to communicate 
with the community, and did not give it an adequate opportunity to debate the 
renewal plan. This is a good example of how planning processes can be used to 
exclude various segments and groups in the population from meaningful partici-
pation in decision-making, contributing to their marginalization and repression 
(Forester and Krumbholtz 1990).
Many of the Hispanic residents did not even get a notice in Spanish, and as a 
result they had even less awareness of what was to happen in their neighbourhood. 
The worst outcome was the psychological impact the development had on indi-
viduals who had lived in the area for many generations. According to Fullilove 
(2004), the people being pushed out had developed deep roots through living 
together. Disturbing this kind of community network is known as root shock. It 
is the same term as is used for a plant that is uprooted and transplanted, because 
the idea is the same. The plant reacts badly when it is ripped out of the soil, and it 
often fails to thrive in its new setting.
Of course, the local city government ensured that what happened complied 
with the letter of the law, and claimed it was for the good of the neighbour-
hood. Most of those who had to give up their homes were offered some com-
pensation. However, few regarded this as adequate, let alone desirable. Many 
people were confused, regarded the development as an ordeal, and were not 
sure what to do for the best. They felt the city authorities were treating people 
as if they were commodities, not individuals. The elderly African American 
woman interviewed, who had worked hard for decades to improve her home, 
certainly did not see her enforced removal as an improvement. At the end of 
the documentary she had lost her home, and was ironically being fined in con-
nection with its demolition. She struggled for two years to find another home, 
and meanwhile the community in which she had spent most of her life had been 
destroyed. These are all symptoms of a failed conventional non-participatory 
planning process.
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The elephant in the room: the disconnect between  
local governments and residents
Slum clearance might be carried out with ‘good intentions’ from the economic 
and aesthetic points of view. What is often missing, however, is consideration 
of equity. If this is not part of the process, the planning might not be sustainable. 
Planning has its roots in modernist narratives that exclude certain groups of the 
society. Susan Fainstein discusses this issue in The Just City (2010). She criticizes 
city governments for imposing policies that favour downtown businesses and 
tourists but are disconnected from the needs of disadvantaged groups of residents 
such as those with low income, women and minority groups.
Many such beautification programmes fail to recognize that everyone in the 
city has a right to it, and that there is a need for more inclusionary planning. The 
poor and the marginalized need to be part of the problem-identification and plan-
ning process. They also need to be the primary beneficiaries of the redevelopment. 
Most revitalization programmes have ‘others’ in mind: investors, tourists, devel-
opers, upper-income elites and so on. Simply put, there is a gap between the local 
planning agencies and the very people the planning is supposed to benefit. This is 
a threat for sustainable urban development that seeks to ensure social equity and 
economic development.
A sustainable approach: communicative planning
Real community development starts with a community coming together and fix-
ing the problem. It does not start with negative images of a neighbourhood from 
those who are not a part of its community. Better policies need to be focused on 
the capacities, skills and assets of the neighbourhoods that face economic chal-
lenges, since
even the poorest neighbourhood is a place where individuals and organiza-
tions represent resources upon which they rebuild. The key to neighbourhood 
regeneration then is to locate all of the available local assets, meaning that 
before development can start there should be recognition of power with com-
munity involvement.
 (Kretzmann and McKnight 1996)
The very definition of progressive or sustainable community planning, according 
to Tom Angotti (2008), is planning that seeks to achieve local and global equity, 
social inclusion and environmental justice. Therefore, communicative, participa-
tory and inclusive planning is vital to bring about a sustainable urban renewal with 
the goal of socio-economic justice.
To see how this can work, let us look at a community that faced its challenges 
not only through involving its members, but also by creating a support system 
that involved people of all ages, races and languages. Dudley Street is in Boston, 
Massachusetts, and its story was told in Holding Ground, a documentary by Lipman 
and Mahan (1996). It is an example that really generated interest in the issues of 
telling people’s stories and ensuring their voices are heard. When this area was first 
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settled its inhabitants were white immigrants, mostly Irish and Italian, working 
people who were strong on Catholic values. Over time a number of other ethnic 
groups moved into the neighbourhood. Some of the descendants of the original 
Irish and Italian settlers decided to move out, but they soon realized it had become 
difficult to sell a home or business in the area for a reasonable sum. Some chose 
instead to burn down their properties and claim against their insurance. This cre-
ated a neighbourhood that was both run down and full of empty lots, some of which 
were used as garbage dumps. The neighbourhood was very clearly in decline.
In 1985 a meeting was held at St Patrick’s Church on Dudley Street, and it was 
decided to form a group to change and rebuild the area. One African American 
woman raised her hand and asked, ‘How many of you live in this neighbour-
hood?’ None of those involved in the decision admitted to doing so. One of the 
biggest mistakes that was made at this point was the failure to include the local 
residents in the conversation that would impact on the very place they called 
home. The same woman commented later in the documentary, ‘Planning never 
happens with the people who have to live with the result of whatever is built or 
designed. Residents need to be involved from the beginning.’ So the residents 
decided to take charge. They set up a board, whose members were to be elected by 
the people every two years. Some of the seats were designated for representatives 
of local housing, social services and religious groups, and three were designated 
for representatives of the main ethnic groups in the area. The aim was for them to 
work together to revitalize their community.
Because the change was to be driven by the community, the board representa-
tives wanted to start by hiring planners whom they could trust to not ‘sell the 
community out’. In order to convey that message of unity, all members of the 
board found ways to communicate with the rest of the neighbourhood, for exam-
ple by talking about the plans on the radio in different languages. The aim was 
to ensure that many people would come out in support and get involved in the 
planning process. The results were impressive: so many people attended the com-
munity meetings that the mayor of Boston asked to get in on the action. One early 
demand was that the vacant lots full of trash should be cleaned up. When nothing 
was done by the city government, community representatives went on television 
and demanded that the mayor keep his promise to act. This led to an agreement 
between the mayor and the local community: local people would lend a helping 
hand by clearing these the areas, then the council would ensure that the vacant lots 
were secured to prevent further dumping.
The planners were not left to plan in isolation: they were required to engage 
with the community, particularly involving the younger generations in the plan-
ning process. The aim was to ensure that they understood the importance of public 
policy and the impact that local people can have on their environment. People 
were coming together and dreaming of a better community. The debate did not 
revolve around the negative issues; instead, people were being encouraged to 
think for themselves and rely on the strengths already present to make their neigh-
bourhood a more liveable place.
About a quarter of the land in the area was vacant and ripe for development. 
The problem was that most of it was owned privately. The community board 
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asked the local council to use its powers of eminent domain to acquire the land 
for public good – real public good. As a result, 15 acres were acquired for which 
community-based plans for development could be made. There was a long battle 
to convince banks to invest in the community, but eventually financial backing 
was provided for house-building. People who had left Dudley Street began to 
come back to the area, because they had roots there and because they saw the posi-
tive change that the community had worked so hard to maintain.
This is a good example of Asset Based Community Development. This new 
approach genuinely empowers citizens and strengthens civil society, as the assets of 
communities are identified, connected and mobilized, and the abilities and insights 
of local residents become resources for solving a neighbourhood’s own problems. 
This does not mean that troubled neighbourhoods do not need outside help, but 
rather that any genuine local revitalization project must in fact be citizen-led, with 
outside agencies acting in a support role (Russell 2009). There is the need for more 
inclusionary planning thought and practice. There is a need for an acknowledge-
ment and celebration of difference. There are multiple threads within planning (such 
as advocacy planning, equity planning and communicative planning) that validate 
the need for communicative planning (Sandercock and Forsyth 1992).
Conclusion
If residents, as stakeholders, help make decisions at all stages of the project cycle, 
then development problems are more likely to be understood in their entirety, and 
solutions are likely to be more effective and sustainable (IADB 1997). However, 
many urban revitalization planning processes are disconnected from the very peo-
ple whose neighbourhoods need to be revitalized. These often include low-income 
groups and ethnic minorities, who are not seen as having a ‘right to the city’ and 
the planning process. Community involvement is particularly important in urban 
planning, and should be a universal part of the planning system in both developing 
and developed nations. The government should be on the front line, ensuring that 
when businesses of any kind want to invest in a place, they listen to local people, 
including those who do not have a strong economic voice.
If local governments involved in urban transformation projects follow the neo-
liberal philosophy and leave projects to the market forces, the result will be both 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from the project. Governments need to recognize that even 
under the neoliberal ethos there is a need for signiﬁcant state intervention in order 
to facilitate public participation. Poor people are known to live in the shadows of 
cities, and often the elites do not want them to participate in decision-making, but 
governments must realize that these people do not only shape the characteristics 
of the city but are vital for its survival. That is why slums should not be cleared but 
improved for the benefit of their existing residents, in a way that avoids displacing 
any of them. Slum dwellers must have equal rights to the city, something that is 
the main objective of sustainable urban development. Sustainable planning needs 
to focus on assisting people to realize that they can create a route out of poverty. 
Pushing people out of their home environment not only affects individual families 
but has a tremendous impact on the community as a whole.
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Governments (both local and national) must realize the importance of build-
ing communities from the inside, and understand that ensuring a stable economy 
is not only about bringing in corporate investors from outside and offering them 
land for economic developments. It is also necessary to ensure that the local com-
munity is heard and included in the economic development process. Sustainable 
urban development requires urban planners to work with people and listen to their 
needs. Its aim should be to ensure that everyone has a place to call home. Public 
participation needs to be meaningful so that people feel a sense of ownership and 
belonging.
Note
1 See Welcome to Lagos, a BBC documentary, 2010.
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The notion of urban sustainable development is in vogue, but how to attain this 
vision is a matter of rancorous debate. Approaches vary widely: should we look 
at cities in nature or nature in cities, strive for compact cities, or ask for green 
technology and recycling (Kos 2008)? Like the parent literature on sustainability 
generally (for a review, see Paton 2011 and other chapters in this book), concepts, 
meanings and approaches differ in what we might call ‘urban ecologies’. Some 
borrow from ‘ecological footprints’ to stress the amount of land that is used up or 
degraded in the process of ‘conspicuous consumption’, to use a term coined by 
the institutional political economist Veblen, whereas others use ideas of ‘urban 
sprawl’ or urban expansion, and then of course there is the idea of ‘urban ecosys-
tem’ used to stress the relationships between the city and nature as an interlocking 
whole (Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnam 2013: 1–3).
In these conceptions of urban sustainable development, however, the environ-
ment is typically decoupled from the environment–society–economy complex. 
The World Bank’s official position on cities is stated in Reshaping Economic 
Geography (World Bank 2009), for example. The Bank makes a strong case for 
economic growth and the need to prioritize it over and above the environment, 
although it notes that the environment is important too (World Bank 2009: 34). 
The United Nations does much better in approaching the problem more holisti-
cally, but does not carefully theorize the structural connection between capital-
ism, nature, society, and economy, polity and institutions (Obeng-Odoom 2013).
Such is the nature of the neoliberal ideology. It takes hold of the spaces for 
possible progressive change, including urban planning – both as theory and prac-
tice. The structural links between planning and markets under neoliberalism and 
the tendency for planning to concentrate on form and ignore structure in order to 
ensure capitalist accumulation have long been theorized. For instance, in one of 
the seminal texts on neoliberalism, The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 1945), Austrian 
economist Friedrich Hayek argues that it is only planning for competition and 
profit that works under capitalism. The work of Campbell and her colleagues 
(Campbell et al. 2014), recently published in the Journal of Planning Education 
and Research, shows that such is evidently the state of planning today, prompting 
the researchers to make a passionate plea for new ways of planning generally.
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In responding to this call and the more specific concern of this book – explor-
ing ways of attaining ‘untamed urbanisms’ – this chapter introduces and outlines 
the benefits of a Georgist approach to urban sustainable development, previously 
overlooked in the literature. The approach emphasizes how social investment 
affects land values and rent, how surplus is generated, and how net income is 
distributed and impacts on sustainable urban development.
Although highly relevant in the current global political economy, the Georgist 
approach is rarely used in neoclassical resource economics, and these days 
scarcely used in heterodox urban political economy too (Stilwell and Jordan 
2004; Stilwell 2011). This chapter presents Georgism as a challenge to existing 
discourses on sustainable development.
George’s approach to sustainable development throws up complex distribu-
tional issues which are hardly acknowledged in the dominant discourses on sus-
tainable development. The chapter argues that the primary emphasis on rent helps 
to show how the wrongful appropriation of nature tends to lead to speculation and 
profiteering which, in turn, lead to misuse and abuse of nature. Thus, under capi-
talist urban development, attaining ‘sustainable urban development’ is an oxymo-
ron. Since emphasizing one segment of society neglects the other, and grafting 
‘everything’ onto a grand approach buttered with markets generates further con-
tradictions, the entire rentier basis of the capitalist system ought to be challenged. 
Henry George, however, did not provide a road map for moving from ‘here’ to 
‘there’, and to this extent Georgism ought to be linked up with other green move-
ments, an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The rest of the chapter is divided into three parts, dealing with a review of 
the dominant perspective of sustainability, Georgist analysis of sustainable urban 
development and its appraisal.
Sustainable development: a review of the dominant views
While various conceptions of sustainable development characterize the literature, 
it is the meaning of sustainability stated in Our Common Future (WCED 1987) 
that is the most widely used, as explained earlier in this book.
This view is often styled as the economic approach to sustainability, and is the 
dominant paradigm in the sustainability literature. It is characterized by the primary 
emphasis on the economic over the environment, and leads to conclusions such 
as eco-technological transformation of society, where cleaner and greener technol-
ogy is encouraged to continue on a business-as-usual pro-growth path. It opposes 
state intervention, preferring instead to use market-based mechanisms such as emis-
sions trading schemes for a clean environment (Paton 2011; Rosewarne et al. 2014). 
This approach is presented as being apolitical, pro-technocratic, and predominantly 
based on using modern technologies to ‘save the planet’ (Salleh 2011).
The history of modern technology generally has been documented elsewhere 
(e.g. Hård and Jamison 1998), so it is not repeated here, except the highlights 
of the relevant aspects of that scholarship to provide context for the subsequent 
discussion. Green technology first gained roots with the publication of the book 
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The Whole Earth Catalog. It made a strong case for individuals to change their 
lifestyles to save the planet. Accompanying such reforms was the need for quality 
technological change, leading to the founding of a new movement of ‘appropri-
ate technology’ in the 1970s (Steinberg 2010). A highly influential person in the 
movement, the economist E. F. Schumacher, took a different view. He argued for 
structural change, as he saw the current system to be incapable of major changes 
to save the planet. Technology was important for him, but more important was 
the entire socio-ecological system in his days. With time, the movement slipped 
away from his ideals and instead got fixated on the notion of clean technology 
alone – without taking into account the political and systemic issues. This drift 
was part of a bigger issue of the loss of faith in the Keynesian state and the suc-
cessful march of the neoclassical economics establishment and its generals, such 
as Milton Friedman, to establish that type of economics as the orthodox, the com-
mon and the dominant paradigm (Steinberg 2010).
In those countries in the periphery of the world system, the World Bank report 
Environment and Development (World Bank 1992) was the carrier-in-chief of 
the neoliberal case for sustainability. It announced its full support for the WCED 
Report and declared that ‘continued, and even accelerated, economic and human 
development is sustainable and can be consistent with improving environmental 
conditions’, based on two conditions (1992: iii). The first of these conditions is the 
aggressive pursuit of the links between more growth and effective environmental 
management. To achieve this outcome, the Bank preferred that all subsidies on 
natural resources such as water should be removed because they would tend to lead 
to overuse. Further, the Bank called for new technology to manage the environment.
Second is a call for institutions to voluntarily change their damaging practices 
towards the environment, so state corporations whose activities damage the envi-
ronment ought to be made ‘competitive’. A major step in that direction is to create 
property in land, as excluding others from the use of land is the only way to ensure 
that the land is put to its highest and best use. Further, the case is made for farmers 
to create property in land, as it is only private property that will encourage them 
to better invest in land (World Bank 1992: 1). In this approach, population growth 
is also blamed for causing poverty, and women in particular are blamed for being 
too fertile and hence in need of family planning (World Bank 1992: 23, 29, 173). 
Indeed, the World Bank report argued the case for prioritizing economic growth 
and voluntary change of behaviour. More recent analysis has been substantially 
influenced by this tradition. Dercon (2012), for instance, has noted that green 
growth is likely to be coupled with growing poverty. The growth fetishism has 
led to calls for limitless green growth (Squires 2013), anchored on an urban form 
that is green or typified by, among others, green gadgetry, green cars and green 
buildings (see, e.g., Emmanuel and Baker 2012).
In this literature, the notion of urban sustainable development is embraced, but 
in a reductionist way. The environment is typically decoupled from the environ-
ment–society–economy complex. The World Bank’s report on cities, Reshaping 
Economic Geography (2009), makes clear the interest in economic growth and 
the need to prioritize it over and above the environment, although the Bank notes 
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the importance of the environment (2009: 34). It is a classic case of the environ-
mental Kuznets curve, positing that the environment and its sustainability can 
wait until such a time that income per capita has reached a certain level and the 
market, the sum total of disjointed individual actions, will ensure that the environ-
ment saves itself (for reviews see Acemoglu and Robinson 2002; Stern 2004).
The United Nations does much better in attacking the problem more holisti-
cally, but does not carefully theorize the structural connection between capital-
ism, nature, society, and economy, polity and culture. For cities in Africa, the 
guidance lies in the State of African Cities Reports (e.g., UN-HABITAT 2008, 
2010). The predominant focus is local development, emphasizing green technol-
ogy, without a fundamental shift. Rather, ‘reducing energy use wherever possi-
ble; adding as much renewable energy as possible and offsetting any CO
2
 emitted 
through purchasing carbon credits’ (UN-HABITAT 2009: 41) are emphasized. 
The thrust ‘is to find ways that cities can integrate these two agendas – to respect 
the natural environment and to improve the human environment, at the same 
time’ (UN-HABITAT 2009: 40). Like other capitalist cities, therefore, the city in 
Africa is framed mainly as ‘an engine of growth’, with saving the environment 
understood as greener or cleaner energy (UN-HABITAT 2008: 89). In turn, the 
vision for the Nairobi 2030 plan is to obtain ‘sustainable wealth’ (UN-HABITAT 
2008: 129).
This view of sustainability is part of a broader framing of it as attaining a 
‘green economy’: continuing capital accumulation albeit with an ecological mod-
ernization twist. More explicitly, Africa is at the receiving end of polluting and 
degrading activities dispatched from the North to the South (Salleh 2012: 142). 
This is the green economy in Africa (Tandon 2011), anchored on the concept of 
‘green growth’ or continuous growth at reduced environmental costs – greatly 
propagated by the OECD countries, especially during the Third Annual Meeting 
of the OECD Urban Roundtable (Hammer et al. 2011).
The politics, origins and connections between green growth and sustainable 
development have recently been documented (Cook et al. 2012), so no attempt is 
made to repeat that account here, except to stress that the idea is based on a prem-
ise that the inequities in society, economy and environment spring from human 
failings and lack of resources. With the problem so framed, there is now an emer-
gent subfield of ‘green jobs’ in Africa (Charisma and Culhane 2013).
The orthodox view of sustainable development has been widely contested by 
heterodox political economists, but not from a Georgist perspective. Rosewarne 
and colleagues (2014) have provided a detailed review of critical approaches to 
sustainability, but the Georgist paradigm for sustainability is as yet undeveloped. 
Research on the role of land in critical political economy such as the Marxian per-
spective similarly sheds great light on the failings of the orthodox paradigms (see 
e.g. Munro 2013), but it does not do so from a Georgist ecological perspective. 
Little has been said about the Georgist perspective in current research on sustain-
able urban development (e.g. Stilwell 2011; Pullen 2013), so the rest of the chap-
ter is devoted to an explication and critical appraisal of the Georgist paradigm.
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The Georgist paradigm
One distinctive approach to the challenge of the orthodoxy is the one that Henry 
George developed in the nineteenth century. George’s primary emphasis on the 
commodification of land as the source of all social and environmental crisis is 
unique. Unlike other heterodox approaches that emphasize corporate production 
in their critique of orthodoxy, George saw sustainable development first of all as 
returning land to common property.
George’s ideas also stand in sharp contrast to orthodox theory which first 
regards land as capital, posits conservation or the management of land use as a 
way to make society sustainable, and claims that treating land as private property 
is the only way to attain its highest and best use (Hofmeister 2010: 143–58). To 
quote George:
It is a delusion that land must be private property to be used effectively. It 
is a further delusion that making land common property – as it once was in 
the past – would destroy civilization and reduce us to barbarism. Lawmakers 
have done their best to expand this delusion [sic], while economists have 
generally consented to it.
(George 2006: 219, emphasis in original)
So, contrary to the view that private property in land is necessary for sustainable 
land use, Georgists argue that it is private property in land that causes unsustain-
able land use and urban development. Besides, for George, land and water, oil 
and coal are all land, as is air – unlike the orthodox view that sees land as only 
the physical part of the earth (Hofmeister 2010: 158), nothing special and indeed 
substitutable (Gaffney 2008).
Although highly relevant and interesting, the ideas of George are as yet not 
very developed in the heterodox challenge to orthodox approaches to sustain-
ability. George occupies a rather strange space in heterodox political economy. It 
is hard to place him, as his approach does not fit neatly into the left–right divide 
in the literature. In a 1992 address, the dissident philosopher R. V. Andelson 
described George as a heterodox who is willing to incorporate aspects of the capi-
talist logic into his fundamentally more socialist-leaning oeuvre, which spans the 
period from 1879, when he wrote his first book, to 1897, when he died. Twice 
George made an attempt at becoming a mayor, and therein lies the strength of his 
ideas for urban sustainable development.
Theory
George laid down his theory of natural resources and economic development 
(hereafter sustainable development) in his stimulating book Progress and Poverty 
(1879, republished 2006). He restated and reinforced the theory in Social Problems 
(1883), A Perplexed Philosopher (1892) and The Science of Political Economy 
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(1898), and some other publications. As with the Physiocrats and classical econo-
mists, George put land, labour and capital as the factors of production. He defined 
land as all the free gifts of nature, labour as human exertion, and capital as stock 
of wealth used for further production. To George, the factors of production are all 
important, but not equally so. Labour initiates production, but cannot do so with-
out land. Capital is important and enhances production, but without it, production 
is still possible. Henry George argued that the source of growth is not capital, 
but labour. This implied that, contrary to claims typically made by neoclassical 
economists that developing countries ought to make conditions flexible in order 
to allow capital to ooze in, it is rather labour, acting on land, that should be the 
crucial driver of production.
He argued that all the factors of production worked well together, and it was 
not their workings that caused ‘poverty amid progress’. George argued that on 
its own, capital was nothing. Labour creates capital, so the source of all progress 
in society is labour. Nevertheless, capital has greatly expanded and enhanced the 
exertions of labour, so capital is necessary and deserving of reward. The nature 
of land, George argued, is rather different. Like labour and capital, it is crucial in 
production, but unlike labour and capital it is not the creation of anyone. It is a 
free gift of nature. In turn, the creation of exclusive ownership in land, and hence 
the generation and subsequent appropriation of rent – which he defined as the 
returns arising from the monopolization of natural resources – by a landowning 
group is highly problematic, and indeed the source of the ‘progress amid poverty’ 
problematique (George 2006).
Arguably, George’s conception of sustainability is rooted in the notion 
of ‘equal rights in land’. Land, to George, encompasses the obvious – the 
physical part of the earth. However, it goes beyond that to embrace all natural 
resources.
The notion of equal rights, George argued, is not the same as joint or collec-
tive rights. For George these matters are merely secondary, and they arise only 
when several people with equal rights want to use the same lot of land. But that 
is different from suggesting that it is the collective or the society that confers 
equal rights. To George it is nature itself, the existence of humankind, that leads 
to the principle of equal rights. So, even when equal rights become transmogri-
fied into joint rights, the change is only one of limitation, not of abrogation, and 
the right people have is not bestowed by others but by nature and the existence 
of the human. The joint right is still an equal right because the limitation on it 
is a similar right. There are two key implications of the limitation, according to 
George:
but (1) an absolute right to use any part of the earth as to which his use does 
not conflict with the equal rights of others (i.e., which no one else wants to 
use at the same time), and (2) a coequal right to the use of any part of the earth 
which he and others may want to use at the same time.
(George 1892: 31)
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It follows that the right is first, not springing from society or others, but the limi-
tation – equality – does spring from societal considerations because there are 
others with like rights. To uphold these principles, to George, will be sustainable 
development. Holding exclusive right to property in land, on the other hand, is 
unsustainable.
In the Georgist conception of sustainability, as private property is created 
in land, rent begins to accrue. Public investments, technological advancement 
and population growth, among other factors, contribute to the increase in rent. 
Speculation enters the equation, as hoarding land from the public becomes highly 
lucrative, and the margin of production – the point beyond which production will 
not take place – gradually extends (George 2006). The process intensifies with 
rent skyrocketing: land is channelled into uses that are not satisfying of human 
need, but are intended to generate rent for landlords. Gentrifiers move into the 
city, as do investors, developers and residents intending to even further expe-
dite the process, for example through gating (Obeng-Odoom 2014). The poor are 
forced or spat out to marginal lands on the periphery, the outskirts, the sprawling 
areas. There is no longer a compact city. Sustainable urbanism becomes an oxy-
moron as land uses are dictated not by human need but by the desire to extract 
more and more economic rent. Prime land is held out of the market for specula-
tive reasons, while the poor hopelessly till poor lands. But private property is a 
contrivance. As it causes rent to increase, the cost of living generally to go up, and 
the system to become inflationary as a rise in rent tends to affect all production, it 
forces down wages and interest, not necessarily as an amount, but as a quantity, 
according to George.
Labour cannot forever surrender its wages to landlords as rent. It will tend to 
become discouraged at some point and hence will reduce production. And that is 
when the system can be thrown into a tail spin: a fall in production leads to a fall 
in wealth, and can lead to the suspension of the production process and hence of 
the engagement of labour, which in turn can lead to further falls in purchases. A 
system of crises ensues locally, nationally and globally. So creating private prop-
erty in land cannot be sustainable.
Critique of existing approaches
From this perspective, Georgists question the neoclassical approach to sustain-
ability. To Georgists, the neoclassical approach to sustainability emphasizing 
eco-technology and gadgetry and low population is highly problematic because 
more technology means more demand, and more demand suggests more produc-
tion, which in turn further exerts pressure on nature (Stilwell and Jordan 2004). 
George’s theory, then, is a direct challenge to the existing orthodox theory.
An extension in the demand for land suggests more rent may arise. 
Orthodox policies for attaining sustainable urban development have similar 
effects. The Clean Development Mechanism is a case in point. It entails 
the purchase of private land for the development of lots. Sequestration is 
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the same. They both intensify the demand for land, they both endorse and 
extend private property in land, and hence they both intensify the rent–
speculation–social problems dynamics. Other policies such as cap and trade 
and emissions trading schemes are praised by orthodox economists for their 
 efficiency, but, for George, with greater efficiency there is more likelihood 
for increased rent. Hence these policies will set in motion the vicious cycle 
of unsustainable urban development.
To the left, too, George was critical. He spoke, for instance, against nation-
alization, contending that government property infringes the equal rights to land 
principle, and to the extent that it does not abolish rent, is ineffective. Further, he 
contended that nationalization risks collusion, corruption, bureaucracy and hence 
inefficiency. Thus rather than create another public outlet, he saw the taxation 
of rent as a way back to the land (George 2006: 224). Redistribution was also 
not favoured by George. According to him, land redistribution could work but 
only for a while. As population grows, there are two options. First, land will 
become concentrated in the hands of the original population that benefited from 
redistribution, and that population will become a new class of landlords extract-
ing rent and causing pressure on labour, capital and the environment generally. 
Alternatively, if land continues to be redistributed, since there is a fixed quantity 
of it, the amount to any individual would become so small that it would be practi-
cally useless. In turn, there would be pressures for richer people to buy out small-
holders and combine their lots. Finally, George was against the public purchase of 
all private land, for the reason that it is inefficient and ineffective.
Thus, in his analysis of sustainable urban development, it is hard to place 
George as either a ‘right’ or ‘left’ -wing social reformer. He was critical of both. 
However, to the extent that he claimed he believed in socialism, was against the 
privatization of the commons and against the treatment of ‘land’ as an ordinary 
factor of production, George was a radical or heterodox thinker. Aside from his 
heterodox diagnosis of sustainable development, his preferred solution was het-
erodox too.
George’s solution
George preferred that all land be made common land to which all citizens have 
equal rights and access. That is different from government land which is bureau-
cratically managed by government functionaries. George offered a two-point 
process for reaching the goal. First, he recommended that all non-land-based 
taxes be abolished, because they penalize human exertion, discourage industry 
and kill initiatives. Also he believed revenue from land tax would be enough 
to support the state. Second, he recommended the taxation of rent arising from 
the use of land. Common land where rent is not generated at all is George’s end 
goal, but to get there he recommended a single tax on land or site value. To him, 
this capture of the rent from land is a way to reconcile the individual and the 
collective, and possibly return to the situation where there is common land for 
the common person.
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Some readers of George make the mistake of thinking that George’s cardi-
nal solution to the crises in sustainability was to use taxation, which is also a 
market-based approach (O’Sullivan 2012), but in fact George’s preferred solu-
tion was to return land to common property. Land tax, to George, was an inter-
mediate solution, a way to try to save land from its status as private property 
before returning it to common property. In his words, ‘Nothing short of making 
land common property can permanently relieve poverty’ (George 2006: xvii). He 
recommended the taxation of all nature, including the taxation of monopolies. 
‘The profit of monopoly’, according to George, ‘is in itself a tax on production. 
Taxing it would simply divert into public coffers what producers must pay any-
way’ (George 2006: 228). Also, the idea of a profit tax on rent extracted by the 
mining and oil complexes would be consistent with George’s theory of sustain-
able urban development.
Appraisal
George’s ideas have been widely criticized. O’Sullivan (2012), for example, has 
offered three criticisms. First, confiscating rent is a disincentive for landlords to 
effectively manage land. Second, it is unjust to dispossess landowners of their 
land. Finally, it is extremely difficult to accurately determine land rent. Neither 
George’s recommendation for a tax regime based only on land nor the abolition 
of all other taxes has had much global acceptance. Indeed, even Georgists have 
suggested that this view is an exaggeration (Stilwell and Jordan 2004). Other 
reasons have been offered for why the land tax idea is best considered as only one 
of many tools. First is the capacity of the state and its institutions such as land use 
and urban planning authorities. What makes George so sure that the state that can 
be corrupt in doing land redistribution will be above board while extracting taxa-
tion? Besides, there are questions about capacity to design and collect rent, issues 
about whether the electorate is ready to pay, and questions about the adequacy of 
existing infrastructure, such as property address systems to do a land valuation 
and taxation exercise.
Georgists have tried to respond to some of these issues. The Henry George 
schools around the world, for instance, argue that reserving 5–10 per cent of rent 
to compensate landlords for their estate management services will simultaneously 
provide the needed incentive for management and offer society the rent it col-
lectively creates. George himself dealt with the issue of the seeming injustice in 
dispossessing landlords of ‘their’ land. He argued that as the land is not the private 
property of landlords, there can be no injustice in restoring land to the status of 
common good. But George insisted that any improvements by landlords should 
not be confiscated (2006). While in poorer countries especially, logistical and 
institutional capacity can be a barrier to the estimation of rental value, and hence 
critics of George do have a case, modern land economists have developed sophis-
ticated and practical approaches that can be used to overcome this concern with 
taxation capacity (Obeng-Odoom 2014). So while there are important challenges 
in applying George’s ideas, most of them are surmountable.
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Henry George’s ideas have an enduring relevance to contemporary soci-
ety. They have been applied to the analysis of urban development in Australia 
(Stilwell and Jordan 2004; Stilwell 2011) and China (Cui 2011). Efforts to apply 
Georgism to cities in Africa have been limited, but recent work (Obeng-Odoom 
2012a, 2014) has tried to do so. However, this casts some doubts on aspects of 
the work of George, such as the claim that ‘once the assessment [of tax] is made, 
nothing but a receiver is required for collection’ (2006: 230). Of course, George 
had in mind the state in the advanced countries, whereas the work on Africa deals 
with the state in relatively ill-resourced countries, so this appraisal ought to be 
understood within historical and geographical contexts. There are those who 
argue that George did not take into account global forces, and a few who worry 
about the ambiguity in George’s taxation design laws, but these matters can be 
overcome given efforts to show how the Georgist approach anticipated the recent 
global crises (Gaffney 2009).
George’s own contribution was looked upon suspiciously by heterodox politi-
cal economists, some of whom regard his attempt at fusing together elements of 
individualism into collectivism as compromising with orthodoxy. However, this 
argument against George is unfounded, as George tried to reconcile and synthe-
size rather than compromise. Indeed, the concerted attack waged by the neoclas-
sical economics cabal with the aim of undoing George’s work (Gaffney 1994), 
sometimes calling him an unscientific thinker (Pullen 2012: 119), and mocking 
his ideas in the mainstream Wall Street Journal (Georgist Journal 2013: 12–14), 
should assuage fears that George was mainstream. The lack of concrete analysis 
of how to move from the present frame of thinking to the Georgist ideal is clearly 
a weakness in the Georgist paradigm of sustainable urban development, but it is 
simultaneously an opportunity to provide a bridge between Georgism and other 
progressive perspectives that better theorize movements not just for any policy, 
but for just policy.
Conclusion
Urban planning has much to gain from embracing Georgist ecological thinking in 
breaking away from the hegemony of neoliberal ecological planning. A Georgist 
approach to sustainable urbanism is unique among the existing shades of opin-
ion on the drivers and possible solutions to the sustainable urban development 
problematique. To George, the structural cause of the environmental, social and 
economic pillars of sustainable urban development is the turning of land into pri-
vate property. Contrary to the view that private property in land brings about the 
highest and best use, George demonstrates that it is property in land that causes 
land to be put the least and worst use, and the environment to be subjected to 
destructive uses.
‘Private land’, George argued, is not intended for human need; it is typically 
available for use as a vehicle for speculation, investment and profiteering. While 
labour tills unproductive land under degrading and harsh conditions, private land 
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lies waste, waiting to accumulate profit. In turn, under a regime of private land 
ownership, the price of land rises dramatically and the poor are driven out of 
high-priced areas into dehumanizing ghettoes. Land that could have been used for 
effective production, for example of food, is used for profit-making ventures that 
might not directly lead to satisfying pressing human needs. Increasing land values 
dwarf the wages of labour and interest on capital, and in the end tend to discour-
age production. The corollary is a general global depression followed by a boom, 
and then a bust again.
So, apart from enclosures of land being morally unjust because land is a free 
gift of nature, and hence people should not exert private ownership over land 
as though they produced it, George contends that the outcomes of creating pri-
vate property in land are also unsustainable. This view differs markedly from the 
liberal-labour ghost that haunts the sustainability literature, and in which urban 
planning is deeply steeped. From a Georgist perspective, capitalist cities can 
never be sustainable and so reformist planning ideas about greater efficiency will 
only compound the problem. It is, George argued, only cities with common land-
ownership systems that can be sustainable.
Common tenure itself can be attained via numerous ways – primarily public 
purchase, public confiscation and redistribution – but George did not find these 
avenues viable. He recommended taxing the net income from land and reinvesting 
the resulting revenues in social development, even though in practice some insti-
tutions may not have the capacity to implement this. Abolishing all taxation other 
than land tax is another part of the Georgist strategy, but this approach is widely 
contested even among Georgists. However, George’s diagnosis is persuasive, as 
is his ultimate proposal of returning land to common property. It is the interim 
steps that require further analysis, and that provide urban planning with a window 
of hope, of taking control, of ‘untamed urbanisms’.
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Throughout the last decade, there has been renewed interest in notions of justice 
and human rights in an urban context. Indeed, in the aftermath of the economic 
crisis of 2008, these issues have become particularly salient. Following from the 
work of Lefebvre (1996), much of this has revolved around the notion of the ‘right 
to the city’ (Mayer 2009; Marcuse 2009a). Similarly, albeit with a more direct 
focus upon urban planning, the notion of the ‘just city’ has received attention 
through the work of authors such as Fainstein (2010) and Uitermark (2010). This 
chapter seeks to analyse the potentials and pitfalls of the notions of the ‘just city’ 
and the ‘right to the city’ in the context of existing political-economic circum-
stances (Fainstein 2010, 2014; Novy and Mayer 2009). In keeping with the theme 
of this volume, the chapter begins with the presumption that sustainable urbaniza-
tion can only be achieved through the integration of notions of equity (Fainstein 
2010) and governance (Jessop 2002).
The chapter is the outcome of a convergence of two fields of research, which, 
although overlapping, have formed somewhat distinct elements of my writing. 
The first of these is a focus on the ‘creative city’, and the second is an analysis 
of public space, with a particular focus on the ideal of the ‘European city’ (see 
Lawton and Punch 2014). While each of these subfields draws upon a different 
research trajectory, there are some points of convergence, which have led me to 
the examination of the ‘just city’ (Fainstein 2010, 2014) and the ‘right to the city’ 
(Harvey 2008).
A significant amount of attention has been paid to the notion of the ‘creative 
city’, particularly since the publication of Richard Florida’s (2002) The Rise of the 
Creative Class. In building on core areas of related research, the analysis I have 
carried out in this field has sought to focus on a number of key elements. First, it 
has highlighted the extent to which the ‘creative class’ is something that can be 
seen as both globally and locally constituted. This part of my research has been 
particularly engaged with the extent to which the notion of the ‘creative class’ can 
be seen as a form of mobile policy (Lawton et al. 2010; Bontje and Lawton 2013). 
Second, I have analysed the relationship between residential choices and the ‘cre-
ative class’ (Lawton et al. 2013), examining the relationship between the lifecycle 
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and residential preferences among members of the ‘creative class’. Critically, fol-
lowing from the work of Peck (2005), the research has argued that the popularity 
of the ‘creative class’ within policy stems from its ability to repackage and further 
already existing approaches which themselves are highly entrepreneurial.
The second field of research, which is focused on analysing the ‘European city’, 
has engaged critically with the European city as an ideal form of urban environ-
ment. In particular, and in drawing on cities such as Dublin and Amsterdam, my 
work has aimed to engage in the wider dynamics of urban development beyond 
the rhetoric of the ideal ‘European city’. Moreover, the discourse surrounding 
much European urban development has sought to promote ideals of the city which 
promote entrepreneurship over wealth distribution (Novy and Mayer 2009). The 
emerging urban image is thus of an ideal of unproblematic interaction within pub-
lic space that is focused on consumption amid a transformed and modernized 
historic European city centre of squares, boulevards, upmarket shopping and café 
culture. With a focus on these factors, previous work examining Dublin (Lawton 
and Punch 2014) illustrates the manner in which the ‘European city’ became rep-
resentative of the increased desire to remodel the city along neoliberal lines:
Overall, it can be argued that academic narratives such as the ‘European city’, 
though flawed and open to criticism in themselves, can sometimes offer a 
seductive ideological ‘new suit of clothes’ for planning. The ‘European city’ 
narrative can also be seen as a discursive hook in the business of competing 
for status internationally and selling the city as dynamic, interesting and dif-
ferent, yet quintessentially ‘European’.
(Lawton and Punch 2014: 881)
While I have treated these topics somewhat separately within the various associ-
ated publications, there are overlaps between the ‘European city’ ideal and the 
‘creative class’. As is evidenced in the Dublin case study (Lawton and Punch 
2014), and in cities such as Amsterdam (Bontje and Lawton 2013; Novy and 
Mayer 2009), the entrepreneurial dynamics of the ‘European city’ and the promo-
tion of the ‘creative class’ have become increasingly integrated into urban poli-
cies throughout Europe. When taken in combination, the analysis of the various 
ideals and the extent to which they neglect much of the realities of urban pro-
cesses has led me to a greater interest in questions surrounding the ‘right to the 
city’ and ‘justice’ in an urban context.
As a means of investigating the connections between ideals of justice and 
equity and the urban question, this chapter analyses the approach of international 
bodies, including UN-HABITAT, and various European bodies, including the 
Council of Europe and the European Commission. In the context of this book, the 
chapter picks up on the question of ‘scale’. It is posited that the above-mentioned 
bodies are key actors in the emergence and transmission of policies and ideals that 
often seek to ‘tame’ the city. Moreover, as will be critically examined throughout 
the chapter, these bodies play a central role in the promotion of different urban 
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forms as encapsulating certain principles that, at least at face value, are supposed 
to promote a ‘better’ urban future. The chapter concludes by suggesting a move-
ment beyond the association of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ with particular urban forms, 
and instead seeks an approach to the urban that is more process-oriented. It advo-
cates a form of planning which moves beyond a domination by highly visually 
oriented ideals of city building, and instead seeks to untangle the way in which 
neoliberalism naturalizes highly unequal forms of urban development (Jessop 
2002). Crucially, in terms of connecting this chapter with the wider themes of the 
book, it is argued that addressing this scale of engagement offers an important 
strand in discussing the notion of ‘untamed urbanisms’.
Governance and the ‘competitive city’
Throughout the last few decades, through the influence of neoliberalism (Jessop 
2002; Brenner and Theodore 2002) cities have been caught in a maelstrom of 
urban competitiveness. This shift, which can be traced back to the 1970s, can, 
at least in ‘western cities’, be viewed in the context of the increased pressure on 
the welfare state. It has resulted in the transformation of urban governance from 
a focus on ‘managerial’ factors, such as housing provision, infrastructure devel-
opment and other forms of provision, to a more ‘entrepreneurial’ approach. This 
entrepreneurial approach is instead focused on the promotion of business interests 
and the attraction of increasingly footloose industry (Harvey 1989). 
This transformation has included the wholesale remodelling of central city 
areas, as a means of both attracting residents and promoting the city to tourists. 
Indeed, in so doing, this approach to urban development has often brought together 
notions associated with sustainability, such as higher-density living and walkable 
neighbourhoods, with increasingly entrepreneurial and neoliberal ideals of city-
making (Lawton and Punch 2014). When these concepts are taken together, cities 
are increasingly promoted as visually alluring places to live and work in, and to 
visit. Indeed, this discourse has become such a dominant feature of contemporary 
urbanization that municipalities now take very seriously the various global rank-
ings about ‘quality of life’ and the attraction of wealthy residents, such as are 
produced by organizations such as Mercer and Monocle lifestyle magazine.1
These shifts, and their influence on urban governance, cannot be perceived 
as simple or linear in their development. They involve a vast and complex set of 
processes and actors who engage in largely differing ways. In order to understand 
these shifts, it is therefore important to look at the wide array of actors engaged 
within the social and spatial dimensions of ‘governance’. It is important here that 
while we recognize the extreme shifts of recent years, we do not overstretch the 
role of ‘neoliberalism’. The development of cities has historically been influenced 
by a set of actors and institutions that hold a disproportionate amount of power. 
As Molotch commented, ‘The people who participate with their energies, and 
particularly their fortunes, in local affairs are the sort of persons who – at least 
in vast disproportion to their representation in the population – have the most to 
gain or lose in land-use decisions’ (1976: 314). With increasing resonance over 
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the last few decades, governance has come to be understood as a set of processes 
which involve different agencies and actors coming together to influence deci-
sion-making in cities and city regions. Harvey commented, in decrying the focus 
on government alone:
the real power to reorganize urban life so often lies elsewhere or at least 
within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and 
administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play. The 
power to organize space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilized 
by diverse social agents. It is a conflictual process, the more so in the ecologi-
cal spaces of highly variegated social density.
(Harvey 1989: 6)
Harvey (1989) also highlighted that it is essential to understand the role of cities 
within wider social processes. Indeed, when examining cities, it becomes neces-
sary to understand the manner in which, from a dialectical perspective, the highly 
differentiated spaces of contemporary cities are produced by, and serve to repro-
duce, a diverse range of social forces (Harvey 1996; Lefebvre 1991).
Pointedly, the city often becomes simultaneously something that is seen as 
solving various social problems, and a separate entity that can stand alone without 
regard to the forces that would be necessary to produce such a reality. On the one 
hand, cities become what Peck et al. (2013) refer to as ‘over-responsibilized’, 
meaning that there is an expectation that city authorities have to solve various 
urban problems, including environmental issues, unemployment and poverty. Yet 
at the same time the city becomes representative of promoting a utopian ideal of 
society, without any meaningful outline of how this will become a reality.
Indeed, notions of the ‘good city’ tend to emerge as a common means of rep-
resenting the idea of the urban across time and space (Amin 2006). A striking 
example is twentieth-century modernism, which for all its failings espoused a city 
that promoted the needs of people from a wide cross-section of society. However, 
as Amin elaborates with reference to the present period, ‘Utopia has lost its logos, 
meaning, appeal and organising force, as meanings of the good life shift to imme-
diate, temporary, private and hedonistic projects’ (2006).
Much of the current phase – which is manifest in different guises in different 
locations – espouses a notion of a city that is targeted most particularly at the 
consumption habits of wealthy and middle-class citizens. Yet at the same time 
such an image is naturalized as representing a city that is somehow better for 
‘everyone’, even if it is organized in a highly unequal manner.
Much of the recent approach to urban development, particularly in a European 
and North American context, has focused on the reappraisal of historic city centre 
areas. Such spaces are often presented through a geographical imaginary of higher 
densities with a mixture of uses predominantly focused on consumption-oriented 
practices and gentrification (Smith 2002; Zukin 2009, 2010; Lawton and Punch 
2014). Pointedly, the image of gentrification can often fit directly into what is 
presented as a form of sustainability framework: the reappropriation of historic 
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buildings within walkable (socially mixed) communities. This ‘gentrification as 
policy’ approach revolves around somewhat seductive urban environments – har-
monious street interaction (Jacobs 1961) in restored historic buildings (Zukin 
1982) or hi-tech apartment developments offering a ‘better way of life’ – but 
in reality it promotes one-sided ideals of urban life which result in exclusionary 
outcomes (Lees et al. 2008; Smith 2002). 
When combined with the significant amount of attention to Richard Florida’s 
(2002) ‘creative class’, this urban ideal has become a key point of reference 
among planners and policy makers (see Lawton et al. 2013) as representative of 
the ‘good city’. Yet in reality there is a mismatch between the need to promote 
sustainable urbanization and a city that is increasingly oriented towards neoliberal 
ideals associated with gentrification (Smith 2002), while also tending to hide or 
downplay social inequalities and tensions between different social groups (Lees 
et al. 2008).
Pointedly, one of the key features of contemporary approaches to the city is the 
assumption that there is a direct link between social cohesion and urban competi-
tiveness (Fainstein 2001). While this perspective is contradicted by much litera-
ture in urban studies from the 1970s onwards, as Fainstein also pointed out (2001), 
it has become a dominant means of promoting an increasingly entrepreneurial 
approach towards urban development. Here, the perspective is that social cohe-
sion is a necessity and an outcome of an urban competitiveness agenda (Fainstein 
2001). Thus, while urban governance has been dominated by the naturalization of 
an entrepreneurial (neoliberal) approach, it often draws upon ideals of cohesion, 
tolerance (Florida 2002) and ‘inclusive’ means of planning as a form of justifica-
tion of such processes.
Rights, justice and governance
While much urban discourse has been dominated by critical accounts of neolib-
eralism, recent years have also witnessed the emergence of a significant amount 
of debate about the future shape of cities in relation to potentials and limitations 
of democratic engagement, particularly through planning practices that are set up 
as open and deliberative. Purcell (2007) summarized how much of this debate has 
revolved around ideals of ‘communicative planning’. Drawing extensively from 
Habermasian theories of communicative democracy, ‘communicative planning’ 
promotes the notion that all actors have an equal stake in planning processes. 
Advocates thus promote communicative approaches to planning on the basis that 
they neutralize power and produce a fairer outcome. Pointedly, with direct rela-
tionship to the European scale, these notions have emerged within key documents 
and agreements among various bodies that seek to promote more socially bal-
anced and sustainable cities. For example, such elements were a dominant theme 
in the 1994 Aalborg Charter (European Commission 1994). This is emphasized 
in Aalborg +10, which sought to re-emphasize the original commitments through 
the evocation of ‘participatory democracy’ and a commitment to five key princi-
ples, which are summarized as:
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1 Further develop a commonly shared long-term vision for a sustainable 
city or a town; 
2 Build participation and sustainable development capacity in the local 
community and municipal administration;
3 Invite all sectors of local society to participate effectively in 
decision-making;
4 Make our decisions open, accountable and transparent;
5 Cooperate effectively and in partnership with adjoining municipalities, 
other cities and towns, and other spheres of Government.
(European Commission 2004)
Notions of ‘inclusion’ and participation are placed as central features of approaches 
to governance at the European scale, and fit within the remit of the wider dynam-
ics of urban transformation that are espoused by various supranational European 
bodies. However, as Purcell (2007) commented, communicative planning seeks 
to promote consensus among a population around a common theme, rather than 
inclusion in the decision-making process. It can therefore be critiqued on the basis 
of not so much challenging a set of processes, as becoming wholly embedded in 
them and merely seeking some form of deliberative outcome.
The difficulty of this approach is often highlighted in respect to its failure to chal-
lenge already existing inequalities within cities. Thus, communicative planning, 
while seeming at face value at least to promote democratic engagement, is held 
to be naïve about the structures of power in society. Critics such as Purcell (2007) 
therefore state that, as an approach, communicative planning can become too easily 
subsumed within a neoliberal agenda. Fainstein outlines this critique as follows:
Much of this critique is in my view appropriate but the remedy proposed – a 
more open, more democratic process – fails to confront adequately the initial 
discrepancy of power, offers few clues to overcoming co-optation or resist-
ance to reform, does not sufficiently address some of the major weaknesses 
of democratic theory, and diverts discussion from the substance of policy.
(Fainstein 2010: 24)
From this perspective, approaches to the restructuring of urban governance must 
therefore seek to challenge the inherent inequalities, rather than assume that dif-
ferent groups can have an equal say in how cities change.
In drawing on the notion of equity, Fainstein (2010, 2014) argues for balanced 
inclusion in decision-making, with the interests of different groups represented 
(2014). She is at particular pains to stress the need for a shift in the discourse from 
a focus on notions of efficiency and competitiveness to a focus on equity and 
justice. In opposing forms of utopianism, she instead seeks out the potential for 
change in the context of the existing political and economic structure (Fainstein 
2010; Novy and Mayer 2009). As a means of illustrating this, she draws on the 
example of Amsterdam – due to her perception of its balance of equity, diversity, 
tolerance and sustainability. 
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Fainstein’s formulation of justice in the city has, however, not been with-
out its critics. Novy and Mayer (2009), for example, critique her idealization of 
Amsterdam and her treatise on the ‘just city’ more generally. This is based both on 
the actually existing evolution of Amsterdam to a more ‘competitive city’ agenda 
and on what they perceive as the problematique of promoting a Eurocentric notion 
of the ‘just city’. Moreover, in questioning the forms of negotiation and debate 
that might be possible within Fainstein’s framing of the ‘just city’, Harvey and 
Potter (2009: 46) are somewhat disparaging: ‘Certainly her proposal incorporates 
disagreement and debate, but these differences are ultimately to be harmoni-
ously resolved, so to speak, over a cup of cappuccino at a sidewalk café.’ Critical 
scholars, such as David Harvey and Peter Marcuse, have thus sought to challenge 
the potential of a ‘just city’ in the context of the existing political and economic 
structures.
In the context of a desire to move beyond ‘justice’ (Marcuse 2009b), much 
scholarship has evoked Lefebvre’s (1996) dictum of the ‘right to the city’ 
(Harvey 2008). This work has been at pains to stress the importance of particu-
lar social movements and what they can offer towards a democracy in the city 
(Marcuse 2009a, 2009b; Mayer 2009; Purcell 2007). This has been particularly 
salient since 2008, with the emergence of various groups such as Occupy claim-
ing a right to be heard through invoking a right to the city. However, it has also 
emerged as a key element in organizations such as UNESCO (see Mayer 2009) 
and UN-HABITAT (2008), as a means of pointing to the current problems with 
globalized processes of urbanization. There is potential within the approach to 
bring notions that are often discussed at the level of academic discussion and 
operationalized in various social movements to the level of broader structures 
of governance. Much of this ideal is expressed through a rights-based approach 
to the city:
The ‘right to the city’ has evolved over the past 50 years as a challenge to 
the exclusionary development, selective benefit-sharing, marginalization and 
discrimination that are rampant in cities today. More than a new legalistic 
device, the right to the city is the expression of the deep yearnings of urban 
dwellers for effective recognition of their various human rights.
(UN-HABITAT 2008: XVII)
However, this institutionalization of the ‘right to the city’ is not without its short-
comings and associated critiques. Thus, with direct reference to the use of the 
ideal of the ‘right to the city’ in the World Charter for the Right to the City by 
UNESCO and UN-HABITAT, Mayer states that
unlike the Lefebvrian notion of the right to the city, this institutionalized set 
of rights boils down to claims for inclusion in the current system as it exists, 
it does not aim at transforming the existing system – and in that process 
ourselves.
(Mayer 2009: 369)2 
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Thus, as furthered by Mayer (2009), such a vision aims at challenging severe 
urban problems, such as poverty, availability of shelter and so on, yet it does 
not seek to challenge the structures that produce them. While organizations such 
as UN-HABITAT recognize the key elements that might symbolize sustainable 
urbanization, there is often a disjuncture between ideal and reality. For exam-
ple, in a recent report, UN-HABITAT said, ‘Municipal authorities can prioritize 
expenditures on social security nets, local/regional infrastructure and other types 
of development, with a view to securing longer-term growth while stimulating 
consumption and/or employment in the short term’ (2013: 8). Here, in following 
from Mayer (2009), there is a necessity to recognize the structures that in the 
first place lead to urban inequalities, and second, could be altered in order to 
address them.
Formulations of rights have also become evident in various supranational bod-
ies at the European scale. Through the development of various charters and policy 
documents, each of these points to the desire for a sustainable urban future. For 
example, the European Urban Charter of 1992 sets out the vision of cities as 
follows:
The charter is guided by the belief that citizens have basic urban rights: the 
right to protection from aggression; from pollution; from a difficult and dis-
turbing urban environment; the right to exercise democratic control of their 
local community; the right to decent housing, health, cultural opportunity 
and mobility.
(Council of Europe, 1992: 7)
The city is presented as something that can stand for, and at the same time pro-
duce, the essential elements of a balanced urban existence, where democracy and 
rights are central elements of everyday life. Yet the contradictions between the 
processes outlining how such scenarios will become a reality are absent from 
such formulations. At various levels of engagement, the discourse around urban 
development in Europe in recent decades has thus been dominated by ideals of 
integration, through for example social mix, without any significant focus on 
redistribution (Novy and Mayer 2009).
On the ground, as discussed earlier in this chapter, European cities have to 
greater or lesser extents been subjected to what Brenner and Theodore (2002) 
refer to as the forces of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Novy and Mayer 2009; 
Lawton and Punch 2014). Thus while the idealization of European cities revolved 
around the balancing of economic progress, alongside policies that supported 
some form of redistribution, such as social housing, the reality has been vastly 
different. By 2008, this reality was becoming apparent and undeniable. Following 
from the 1992 European Urban Charter, a second Urban Charter was agreed in 
2008. In this the Council of Europe commented:
We are particularly alarmed by spatial disparity processes that are leading 
to gentrification of certain urban areas, by the uncontrollable rise in land 
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prices in our urban centres and its parallel phenomena of ghetto formation in 
peri-urban areas and by the appearance in certain places of ‘gated communi-
ties’ that encourage a spatial segregation which is breaking up our towns and 
cities.
(Council of Europe 2008)
Such a synopsis at least acknowledges much of the critique of the contempo-
rary European city that has been central to critical urban studies of recent dec-
ades (Jessop 2002). Moreover, it also acknowledges, at least implicitly, the sheer 
power of forces at work in influencing the daily reality of contemporary cities.
A core challenge for the future of cities is to develop policies that promote 
ways to challenge the normative assumptions about cities as economic engines. 
As Purcell commented, ‘Urban scholars have analyzed in detail how neoliberal 
globalization has negatively impacted cities and city-regions. What we require 
now is an active search for creative and progressive alternatives to the current 
situation’ (2007: 197). Questions might thus be asked about in what way suprana-
tional organizations such as UN-HABITAT frame notions of ‘rights’ and the ori-
gins of such notions. Outlining a set of ‘rights’ seems at most to promote an ideal 
of engagement of different social groups, but does little to challenge the structures 
that serve to produce inequalities in the first place. As well as challenging the 
spatial manifestation of injustices, there is a need to challenge the structures that 
serve to produce such in the first place.
Discussion: a governance of recognition?
It is evident in the various documents of organizations such as UN-HABITAT and 
the European Commission mentioned above that there is at least some form of 
desire to incorporate formulations of urban justice and rights into urban govern-
ance. One of the key challenges that emerges is how to make this a reality. Such 
an ideal already exists, at least at the level of rhetoric:
The right to the city can provide municipal authorities with the platform they 
need for a wide range of policies and initiatives that promote an ‘inclusive’ 
urban environment. The right to the city calls for a holistic, balanced and 
multicultural type of urban development. Therefore, it must pervade all pol-
icy areas, including land use, planning, management and reform, and it must 
do so in close cooperation with government agencies and civil society.
(UN-HABITAT 2008: 127)
Such a perspective holds out the possibility that notions of justice, equity and 
rights could become central to urban governance. Yet in such a formulation there 
is the assumption that governance itself can be altered in a manner that recognizes 
the imbalances in power structures and seeks to address them. If it could exist 
under the current system, as Fainstein (2014) perceived, a formulation would put 
forward a form of governance in which normalization, or structures that place 
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actors such as property interests, overlapping political interests and land owner-
ship at the centre of governance, are dismantled through what Purcell (2009: 158) 
calls a ‘de-hegemonizing’ of political life. This formulation would seek to iden-
tify those who gain disproportionately from political decisions (Molotch 1976; 
Harvey 1989). 
The state, and particularly the manner in which it operates at the level of the 
city or city-region, is of key importance here. Such a perspective is highlighted 
by Fainstein as follows: 
We thus need to return to the concept of the enabling state rather than simply 
the entrepreneurial state and recognize that overemphasis on participation 
and decentralization evades the issue of just distribution, which may be sub-
sumed by a capabilities approach to social justice but nevertheless is a neces-
sary condition. 
(Fainstein 2001: 888)
Such a formulation would necessitate that governance be restructured through a 
recognition of the need to offer a greater level of opportunity to those groups for 
whom it is most necessary. In thinking through what such a formulation might 
look like, it is important to promote the inclusion of a wide array of social actors, 
including the disadvantaged, the poor and the homeless, not just in the forms of 
‘inclusive’ communicative planning processes, but in a manner that tackles the 
reproduction of injustice in the first place. Such recognition should also be mind-
ful of the factors that serve to increase the powers of particular interests, and of 
the need for active engagement with seeking to challenge them.
From the clearance of informal settlements in various cities throughout the 
global South, to the wholesale selling-off of lands in Western European con-
texts, the negative impacts of contemporary capitalism (Peck et al. 2013) become 
clear. In order to address the approach to urban governance in favor of ‘justice’ 
and ‘rights’, there needs to be a clear recognition of the manner in which these 
processes actually impact on cities, over and above the dominance of an urban-
competitiveness mantra. Indeed, there are evidently within current debates some 
challenges around notions of the ‘untamed’ itself. While hegemonic planning 
seeks certain levels of ‘order’, it also leaves in its wake, an untamed urban envi-
ronment. Thus, the desire, as is outlined within this book, for cities to become 
somewhat ‘untamed’ does so in a manner that would allow for better urban 
futures to emerge in the wake of processes that themselves are so often unstable 
and contradictory.
To return to the subtitle of this chapter; ‘Beyond an imaginary of power’, the 
necessary shifts would require a refocus on the actual impacts of urban processes 
over and above the dominance of particular spatial ideals of the city. Much of the 
discourse around justice and rights in the city rejects spatial utopianism. While 
Fainstein disputes its use in the context of actually existing political-economic 
circumstances, Harvey perceives utopian ideals of city-making as repressive 
(Harvey and Potter 2009). Yet, in espousing the potential of less rigid forms of 
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planning – or the ‘untamed’ – there is perhaps a form of utopianism emerging. 
This is a form of utopianism that seeks for a fairer, more inclusive city.
Notes
1  See: http://monocle.com/magazine/issues/15/the-worlds-top-25-most-liveable-cities/ 
and: www.mercer.com/articles/quality-of-living-survey-report-2011
2  For more on the World Charter for the Right to the City, see: www.urbanreinventors.
net/3/wsf.pdf (accessed 25 June 2014).
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Part IV on ‘liberating alternatives’ contains chapters that explore the narratives 
developed by people living in – and thus creating – cities beyond the limits of the 
contemporary disciplining practices that produce and shape urban development 
processes.
Engaging with the re-politicization of intersectional analysis, in Chapter 15 – 
entitled ‘Negotiating and creating urban spaces in everyday practices: experi-
ences of women in Harare, Zimbabwe’ – Manase Kudzai Chiweshe (Zimbabwe) 
explores the negotiation and contestation of urban spaces by four women in this 
city. Instead of simply gesturing towards the way in which class, gender, ethnicity 
and age operate in the city, the author applies a portraiture method to substantiate 
empirically the lived experiences and interconnected identifications of the four 
women’s narratives, as they carve out ways to be in a city where bodies and public 
spaces are tightly controlled under a hegemonic masculinity order.
Chapter 16 by Moises Lino e Silva (Brazil) – entitled ‘A conversation in a den-
tist’s chair: employment, marginality and freedom on the borders of a Brazilian 
favela’ – also takes an ethnographic approach but this time to examine the 
untamed practices of those who claim time freedom over the dictates of formal 
work, the latter explored as a deeply embedded and naturalized requirement to be 
included in the city. Offering an immersion into the lives of various women and 
men in Rocinha, a favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the author reveals the freeing 
potential of everyday practices that escape the otherwise seemingly unavoidable 
urban social order that portrays formal employment as the only way for the poor 
to have a legitimate place in the city.
The following two contributions revisit the question of gentrified and reclaimed 
public spaces. Cities have been the central sites of class struggles over who con-
trols urban resources and life and the locus of potentially radical urbanisms since 
well before the emergence of the Occupy Movement. Entitled ‘Contested taming 
spatialities: the micro-resistance of everyday life in Buenos Aires’, Chapter 17 
by Jorge Sequera and Elvira Mateos (Spain) explores the tensions unfolding 
between the gentrification of Costanera Sur – a downtown area in Buenos Aires 
city, Argentina – and the micro-resistance of everyday life practices that every 
weekend continue to reclaim this area through popular street barbecues, informal 
markets, music and dance. The authors examine the clash between the mutually 
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encroaching practices and aspirations of real estate developers, upper- and mid-
dle-class urbanites, working-class women and men, and slum dwellers.
In Chapter 18 – titled ‘Public spaces and transformative urban practices in Cape 
Town’ – Diana Sanchez Betancourt (Colombia) also focuses on the micro-prac-
tices of re-appropriation of public spaces, this time in Cape Town, South Africa. 
The chapter scrutinizes the transformative potential of a diversity of social experi-
mentations that playfully seek to overcome the material and narrative Apartheid 
legacy of fragmentation and segregation. The author offers a new map of the city 
constructed through organic forms of citizen action and engagement that expand 
urban agency through social media and networking.
Chapter 19 by Irene Sotiropoulou (Greece) – entitled ‘Everyday practices in 
Greece in the shadow of property: urban domination subverted?’ – takes a refresh-
ing and theoretically risky path, adopting a Jungian approach and a feminist 
critique of property to explore the subversive potential of everyday practices oper-
ating outside the rule of monetary exchange and obligatory (re)payment in two 
Greek cities. Here the appropriation of public space through practices that escape 
the taming power of capitalism is treated as a vehicle to examine the tensions 
confronting collective efforts to supersede scarcity and greed as two fundamental 
conditions underpinning the reproduction of capitalist patriarchy in the city.
Also in the realm of alternative – non-monetary – economies, Chapter 20 by 
Ferne Edwards (Australia) – entitled ‘Free-ing foods? Social food economies 
towards secure and sustainable food systems’ – takes the reader through a deep 
exploration of social food economies in Sydney, Australia. Stepping outside the 
prevailing industrial food system, the author looks into the practices of gleaning, 
growing and gifting food in the urban context. The chapter offers a critical exami-
nation of the untaming potential of these food procurement options by scrutiniz-
ing them through the lens of different forms of autonomy: autonomy of money, 
autonomy of thought and autonomy from the system.
15 Negotiating and creating urban 
spaces in everyday practices




Women in Zimbabwean urban spaces are located at varying intersections of class, 
citizenship, background and race. This chapter examines how women experience 
urban spaces using the case of Harare in Zimbabwe. It focuses on how every-
day practices can question and challenge hegemonic ideas about the urban. It 
uses a portraiture approach to weave an intricate outline of how four purposively 
selected women have experienced the city. The chapter shows how gender as a 
practice intersects with issues of urban life to create gendered spaces.
Connell (2005) argues that gender is not who we are but rather what we prac-
tise. Urban spaces define and impact on this practice in multiple ways. The chapter 
uses the concept of hegemonic masculinity to outline how women are controlled 
and contained in specific urban spaces, yet find ways and means to negotiate and 
create space. Women respond to interlocked oppressive structures within the city 
by continuously finding spaces to survive. For the women in this chapter, space 
is intrinsically linked with their livelihoods. Access to urban spaces, especially to 
the streets, is critical for income generation, as will be highlighted by their stories.
The work outlined in this chapter was inspired by my own experience of grow-
ing up in one of the poorest suburbs of Harare. When I was born my father was 
unemployed and had spent years being jobless. I am the fifth of seven children, 
and our survival for most of my childhood was dependent on my mother’s street-
vending enterprise. Her experiences of the city, while unique, highlight the var-
ied stories of trial, struggle, sacrifice and negotiation within an often anti-female 
space. My mother’s experiences motivated my choice of research and the meth-
odology utilized, which concentrated on storytelling. The stories of four women 
used in this chapter reflect the many spatial and temporal tensions involved in the 
gendering of bodies within urban spaces. Through the stories an emerging pat-
tern can be ascertained which helps in understanding the experience of women in 
urban Zimbabwe.
Colonial Harare and gendered spaces
Under colonial rule, Harare was known as Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia. 
Barnes (1992) argues that the hallmark of colonial governance in Rhodesia was 
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denying certain spaces to certain groups. From its foundation, the city was built 
on the basis of exclusion, especially of African women. As Vambe (1976) notes, 
‘Originally Harare was not intended for respectably married people, but for that 
type of ‘native’ who kept his wife and kids somewhere in the reserve of his birth’ 
(cited in Ruzivo 2005:1). Such colonial construction of respectability
was characterised by the same notions of respectability that had existed dur-
ing pre-colonial times. At that time, respectable women were those who were 
fertile, who rejected any methods of controlling their fertility (through abor-
tion, for instance), and who participated in laborious agricultural activities 
and other duties for their natal and matrimonial families.
(Hungwe 2006:34)
The city was a male space, and the ‘native’ woman had no place in it. Gaidzanwa 
(1995) notes how women who defied this were often branded prostitutes and 
‘unrespectable women’. This colonial and patriarchal concern with women’s 
respectability is part of an ongoing struggle over the control of women’s bodies 
within urban spaces.
This marginalization of black women from the cities was not only perpe-
trated by white colonialists but rather found congruence with African patriarchy. 
Gaidzanwa (1992) explores this marriage of convenience based on the need to 
control the movement and operation of women’s bodies. The colonial govern-
ment wanted women to provide free social reproductive roles in the rural areas 
by caring for the old and injured workers without any cost to the government, 
while bearing more children. African males wanted their wives to remain in rural 
areas to secure their land claims. Respectable women thus stayed behind when 
their men folk went to the city, caring for their family in rural areas. Ruzivo 
(2005:2) adds:
Older men, chiefs and colonial officials colluded to control women’s mobil-
ity to the cities. In 1927 several chiefs and headmen called upon the colonial 
authorities to enact a pass system for any female who entered either mining 
towns, farms or any city. Ordinance 16 of 1901 was to be amended so that 
women who sought employment in the city would be required to obtain per-
mits from senior administrative officials.
Hungwe (2006) also points out that colonial government thought it cheaper to 
provide bachelor accommodation for black workers, and also paid lower wages as 
the men were living alone. Having children and wives was seen as distracting, and 
black women were often accused of brewing and selling illicit beer. In colonial 
times alternative income-generating activities for women were often criminalized.
In the later years of colonization there was a steady increase in the number of 
women living in urban centres. Wells (2003) argues that the bulk of research on 
women during colonial times depicts their primary form of resistance as mov-
ing from rural to urban areas. Through this movement they played an active role 
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in undermining patriarchal customs, which they experienced as oppressive. Yet 
the colonial construction of women as rural folk has continued after independ-
ence. The colonial practice of segregating spaces was continued for example in 
2013, when the police started a programme of arresting women walking alone in 
the city centre at night. The implication is that only ‘prostitutes’ and ‘unrespect-
able women’ (Hungwe 2006) walk alone at night. The city at night is thus out of 
bounds for women.
Conceptual framework
In understanding the gendered dimensions of urban areas, I outline how the urban 
experience is based on the construction of hegemonic ideas of masculinities and 
femininities in such spaces. The articulation of masculinities and femininities 
affects access to and control of certain spaces. According to Connell (2000:46), 
hegemonic masculinity refers to a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, 
organizes and legitimizes men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole. 
Hegemony shapes the way gender is performed in the context of regulation of 
actions through prohibition and taboo, and its performance iteratively shapes the 
ideals, values and cultural norms that inform and shape hegemonic masculinity 
(Butler 1990). Since masculine and feminine norms are defined and shaped by 
power relations that exist in material contexts (Datta 2008), revealing the spatially 
embedded and obscured performed patterns of hegemonic masculinity is impor-
tant for understanding, for instance, the subordinate position of female coopera-
tive recyclers. Since gender is a word used to describe everyday social practice 
and ordering of space (Connell 2005), it is necessary to focus on physical spaces 
such as the home and the work place to understand the production of masculine 
and feminine identities (Datta 2008).
Massey (1994) explores the pervasive and deeply embedded nature of gen-
der throughout space, between cultures, classes, races and taking place over 
time. She argues that spaces and places in every aspect are thoroughly gendered. 
Hegemonic masculinity, in many cases, has a significant role in shaping gendered 
space. Urban areas, like all spaces and places, have a distinct spatial order. Datta 
(2008:191) confirms this notion by arguing that spaces are interpreted through 
‘representative aspects’ that communicate ‘natural’ hierarchies among bodies 
within the spaces they occupy. Within urban spaces there are distinct performed 
gender roles, discourses and rituals of space that help to configure these hierar-
chies. Spatial practices, everyday understandings of gendered space, demeanour 
and attire are just a few examples of the deep-seated indications of a gendered 
social order among women in urban spaces.
To better understand how women experience the city, the chapter also utilizes 
Crenshaw’s (1991) intersectionality theory. Urban women in Zimbabwe are 
found at the intersection of multiple and mutually reinforcing systems of oppres-
sion such as capitalism, racism and patriarchy. Thus, to understand how women 
are affected by urban life we need to understand where they are situated, and 
that they are affected by an intersection of factors besides gender, which include 
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class, ethnicity, race and nationality. Crenshaw (1991) provides a theoretical 
orientation that explains the interplay of various factors defining an individual’s 
position. The theoretical basis of the intersectionality approach involves viewing 
societal knowledge as being located within an individual’s specific geographic 
and social location. This theory also analyses how various social and cultur-
ally constructed categories interact on multiple levels to become manifest as 
inequalities in society, as race, gender and class mutually shape forms of oppres-
sion in society.
To reduce the analysis of women’s lives to gender alone is to strip them of the 
racial and class historical antecedents which characterize their marginal position 
in most African societies. The intersectionality approach is that difficulties arise 
because of the many complexities involved in making multi-dimensional con-
ceptualizations that explain the way in which socially constructed categories of 
differentiation interact to create a social hierarchy. For example, intersectionality 
holds that knowing a woman lives in a sexist society is insufficient information 
to describe her experience; instead, it is also necessary to know her race, sexual 
orientation and class, as well as her society’s attitude toward each of these mem-
berships. It is only through analysing how these complex concepts intertwine and 
interlink that we are able to understand the gendered experiences of both men and 
women in different contexts.
Methodology: portraiture and narratives of urban women
The study utilized a qualitative approach based on Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot’s 
(1983) portraiture method. Sandoval (2000) argues that portraiture provides in-
depth analytical tools to better understand the experiences of marginalized per-
sons. Women’s lives in urban Harare can be understood from the standpoint of 
every vignette that defines their everyday existence. To provide a critical analysis 
of their struggles and relationship to the city, it was important for me to seek a 
method that brought out their voices. The city in its physical element and urban 
studies in general has a tendency to drown out the voices of marginalized and 
poor women. In explaining the advantages of the portraiture method, Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis (1997:3) note:
Portraiture seeks to combine systematic, empirical description with aesthetic 
expression, blending art and science, humanistic sensibilities and scientific 
rigor. The portraits are designed to capture the richness, complexity and 
dimensionality of the people who are negotiating those experiences. The por-
traits are shaped through dialogue between the portraitist and the subject. The 
encounter between the two is rich with meaning and resonance and is crucial 
to the success and authenticity of the rendered piece.
Because the intensity of the methodology makes it time-consuming, although 
all women have a distinctive history, it was important for me to be selective 
in the number and nature of women interviewed. I selected four women from 
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diverse social contexts in an urban setting to highlight the varied experiences 
of gender and urban life. While the four cases are unique and context-specific, 
they provide a basis for analysis. The small sample provided rich exploratory 
data and allowed for the full participation of the storytellers. I selected one 
young woman living on the street to highlight the construction around gender, 
dislocation, poverty and homelessness. The second woman involved in infor-
mal trading and the third woman involved in sex work were selected to provide 
insights into alternative livelihood options in urban spaces, and a woman for-
mally employed in a nightclub was chosen to highlight how urban livelihoods 
intersect with gender.
These participants – the sex worker, the street trader, the working woman 
and the girl living on the streets – ranged in age from 17 to 34. Their diverse 
backgrounds highlight how various factors intersect to influence how women 
experience the city. The interviews and stories were in Shona, which is the local 
language. They were later transcribed and translated into English using a lan-
guage expert. This was done to ensure consistency of meaning and context. No 
names are given, as a way of protecting the research participants who were kind 
enough to share their lives and time.
The portraiture method allowed for a critical approach to analysing the every-
day lives of these women. The women in the study became storytellers and not 
respondents, who through sharing their stories were creating a way of seeing the 
city as providing African spaces. Such a method promotes creativity in research 
while being empirical and rigorous. It demands that the researcher be an active 
listener and learner. It is an enriching process geared towards the emancipation of 
the participants. In the context of this research, portraiture was useful in decon-
structing my own views about the women in the city. Rather than simplifying 
their existence as mere victims of urbanized patriarchy, they emerged as active 
agents who against the odds create spaces for survival in an environment full of 
intersecting oppressions and exclusion.
Findings
Portrait one: Living on the streets: the intersection  
of age, class and gender
The experiences of girls living on the streets provide an interesting insight into 
how age, class and gender intersect. Here is the story of one girl who has lived on 
the streets since she was born, which shows how these young women are actively 
creating space in difficult circumstances:
The streets have been my home for the past twelve years. I was born on the 
streets and my mother was blind. It means that my life has been in and around 
the central business district. I know these streets like the back of my hand. 
My existence is difficult and living on the streets has taught me how to sur-
vive serious hardships. Girls on the street suffer various forms of abuse which 
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are mostly sexual. You learn about sex at a very young age, and sex is an 
important part of surviving the streets. People call us ‘streets kids’ and make 
us outcasts. No one trusts us and everyone shuns us. It is a lonely existence 
having never had a family. As a young girl, my whole life has been a struggle 
yet I have survived by sleeping in backstreets and dark allies, begging and 
even stealing. I have at times used my body to earn money. On the streets 
there is little protection from the police. On the contrary, I have experienced 
harassment at the hands of the police. There is no way to report so we suf-
fer in silence. Clothes and food are at times hard to come by. Also living in 
the street you begin to abuse intoxicating substances. Despite all these chal-
lenges, I am here on the streets surviving.
Portrait two: Negotiating informal trading on the streets of Harare
Street trading in Harare has been dominated by women since colonial times. 
Under colonization, certain spaces (especially in the central business district) 
were not open to black people. Street trading is often conceptualized as ‘informal 
trade’, as a way of differentiating it from legal and mainstream business activities 
(Mupedziswa and Gumbo 2001). Such conceptualization leaves most women and 
men trading on the streets outside the realm of legitimate business enterprises. 
This stigma is at the heart of the tendency for city authorities to be discrimina-
tory and abusive towards female traders. Their lived experiences are littered with 
running battles with council officials who are mandated to rid the city of illegal 
traders. Moyo (2013) narrates the story of one female trader in Zimbabwe:
Mollin Siyanda, 46, a single mother of three from Harare’s low-income sub-
urb of Hatcliffe, is scared of being arrested by the council police as she sells 
fruit, vegetables and second-hand clothes on the pavement of the city centre 
without a permit. ‘I take the [fruit and clothes] to the city centre to resell on 
the street pavements during evenings at peak hours as people are rushing 
back home,’ she says of the goods she purchases every day at Mbare Musika, 
a major market in Harare. ‘But I’m always operating under constant fear of 
council cops who often accuse me of being an illegal vendor.’
In post-colonial Zimbabwe women are being denied certain spaces on class and 
gender lines, yet for most women their livelihoods are directly connected to the 
streets. With an economy that went through several shocks after 2000, Zimbabwe 
finds itself with unemployment in the formal sector as high as 84 per cent (Moyo 
2013). The street has thus become an important space for survival as traders com-
pete against each other and council officials.
The post-2000 traumatic crisis, which peaked in 2008, was characterized by 
high inflation, food shortages, the breakdown of social services and high unem-
ployment. The informal sector became the biggest employer, as people survived 
by setting up various small enterprises to eke out a living. Access to space thus 
became an important survival commodity, as people required places to do their 
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trade. For most women, buying and selling in the streets has become an impor-
tant source of income. I focus on these specific traders because they epitomize 
the battle for the city and its intersection with the gendered dimensions of urban 
livelihoods. The story below outlines the everyday battles for survival, belonging 
and making a living that these women have to face, and the difficult choices they 
have to make. Urban streets, constructed under the guise of urban planning, have 
remained highly patriarchal and exclusionary.
Selling on the streets has become an important part of my survival and 
that of my family. I concentrate on selling vegetables such as tomatoes, 
onions, rape and tsunga [a green leafy vegetable] because they are bought 
very quickly. I cannot afford the asking price for a seller’s licence which 
is US$20. My husband works in the informal sector where he sometimes 
does not get paid. It is up to me to ensure that my three kids eat. I wake up 
every morning at 4 am and leave for Mbare market where I buy most of my 
produce. There are also farmers coming from nearby plots who are selling 
produce at cheap prices. Selling on the streets is difficult mainly because of 
the city council officials. They are in plain clothes and everyday they keep 
confiscating our goods and arresting us. We are constantly running away 
from these people. Nowadays we only have a few vegetables on display to 
avoid losing our goods. We are told that it is illegal to sell on the streets, so 
we need to apply for licences and get market stalls. It is difficult to access a 
stall if you are not well connected. What do they want us to do? Maybe if we 
all become thieves. We are simply looking for survival in a difficult context. 
Despite these challenges we are devising ways to ensure our continued pres-
ence on the streets. We will not stop trading because that is the only thing 
keeping our families going.
Portrait three: Working women and the city
Women are employed in Harare in a variety of industries and positions. In this 
chapter I focus on a formally employed woman working in a nightclub to high-
light how she navigates this male domain. This gives an insight into both the 
experience of working in the city at night, and being an income earner. The story 
illuminates how work within certain spaces in urban areas poses serious gendered 
challenges for women who do these jobs every day. The nature and experience 
of work is based on commonly held stereotypes of women. Women who work in 
nightclubs often face a societal backlash with accusations of being ‘loose’:
I am a young woman of 24 years and still single. I passed my O level exams 
but could not afford to continue to A level. Without any skills employment is 
difficult to come by, so I have to make do with any work I can get. I started 
working in a nightclub two years ago but the most difficult part is working the 
nightshifts. Nightshifts are difficult because the patrons can be rowdy when 
drunk. Waitresses suffer various forms of sexual abuse including fondling 
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our breasts, being pinched on our buttocks and vulgar language. Almost all 
men think that we are easy, and they are always proposing to have sex with 
us. Another problem is the police who at times arrest us for ‘loitering’ or 
suspect us of being sex workers when we leave work late. The police are con-
stantly arresting women walking alone at night, and this is very frustrating 
for those of us who work at night. Our club has bouncers who at least try to 
help us get taxis home and protect us from violent patrons. I have very little 
choice but to continue with this job despite the problems I am facing. What 
is also difficult is how people in the community where you live perceive you 
when they hear you work in a nightclub. You are labelled a prostitute and 
it is difficult to have meaningful romantic relationships without your work 
becoming an issue. I have had to lie about my work to some of my relatives 
but that is just part of what I have to do to survive.
Portrait four: The morality of making a living and the  
everyday struggle of sex workers
The struggles in the urban streets can be understood from the everyday experi-
ences of sex workers in Harare’s central business district. Sex work is illegal in 
Zimbabwe yet only the women providing these services are arrested and impris-
oned. The male clients are left alone, which makes this an important issue of 
understanding how women negotiate spaces in urban centres. The illegality of 
sex work rests on the argument of maintaining the national moral fibre, yet if you 
unmask the true intentions it is clear how patriarchy has continuously used state 
institutions to police and control women’s sexuality. In this section I outline the 
experiences of a sex worker who has been working in the Avenues area of Harare 
for the past five years. Her story, although elements of it are unique, is representa-
tive of the many and varied experiences of sex workers who work under harsh 
conditions without any protection from the state:
I started working on the streets at the end of 2008. Working on the streets was 
not an easy decision but life forces you to be where you never thought you 
could be. Sex work is difficult especially when you operate from the streets 
waiting for clients night after night. You face so many challenges including 
clients who do not want to pay, police raids and at times thieves. I have been 
a victim of robbery while working on the streets, and without much protec-
tion we are vulnerable to all sorts of dangers. You cannot tell anyone in your 
family you do this type of work. It is a secret but I have a child who lives with 
my mother and feeding her requires money. The police are always having 
operations aimed at removing us from the streets yet we keep coming back. 
Arrests do not deter us from work, and with the number of girls increasing it 
is becoming more difficult to make money working the streets. When we get 
arrested at times we pay the police through sex to be released. We just pay 
fines or some girls without money spend a week or two in jail and finally get 
released. Society judges what we do as immoral yet in the past I have been 
Negotiating and creating urban spaces 227
picked up by very rich and influential people including prominent church 
pastors. Every week younger and younger girls are joining the streets, so sex 
workers will always be there. It will continue even with the serious dangers 
associated with it.
Discussion
It is important to highlight the emerging issues from the stories of these four 
women in Harare. While the choice of methodology sought to provide first-hand 
storytelling of everyday experiences, there is scope to analyse how the stories 
speak to the notion of ‘untamed urbanisms’. Through careful analysis, I shall 
highlight both the theoretical and the practical implications of these stories for our 
understanding of how women experience, survive, challenge, subvert and recreate 
space in male-dominated places.
Hegemonic masculinities and space in urban Harare
The stories outlined above highlight how gender constructs shared expectations 
and norms within urban spaces about male and female behaviour, characteris-
tics and roles. Urban areas thus have their own unique imprints on how gender 
is performed. The existence of hegemonic masculinities as forms of gendered 
identities in urban areas maps out appropriate styles of being a man or woman, 
which are exhibited in institutional patterns, behaviours, experiences, appear-
ances and practices. Masculinities and femininities are conﬁgurations of prac-
tice that are accomplished in social action, and therefore can differ according to 
the gender relations in a particular social setting (Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005: 836). The stories have shown the context-defined space and practice of 
women in Harare. For example, the sex worker, informal trader, working girl 
and girl living on the streets all respond differently to their situation using their 
gendered experiences.
Masculinities and femininities are society-specific, multifaceted and multi-
dimensional, and entail having the power to define what is ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ 
male or female behaviour. In urban areas, the normal definitions of masculinities 
have been challenged by women who continuously redefine what women can or 
cannot do. This is contrary to the mainstream conceptualization of the private–
public debate in which women are expected to be economic ‘children’, dependent 
on the breadwinning capacities of men who are in various social relationships 
with them. While these everyday practices do not challenge the foundations of 
patriarchy, they are part of subversive actions questioning the hegemony of cer-
tain masculinities.
Women as active agents in urban spaces
While it is important to analyse the structural constraints facing women in access-
ing space in urban areas, it is equally important to highlight that women are active 
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agents. In everyday practices they defy spatial boundaries and exclusion. They 
are continuously negotiating and renegotiating space and ways of making a living 
under difficult conditions. The urban experiences in this way thus involve con-
trol over women’s physical bodies and their location within ‘acceptable’ spaces. 
Hungwe (2006) has shown that in Zimbabwe this process of naming and sham-
ing women as a means of controlling their movement has colonial roots. Women 
have, however, always found ways to challenge these controls. Occupying the 
streets and male spaces, women are defying gendered norms about space and 
belonging. They are normalizing the presence of women in all spaces, and thereby 
slowly subverting hegemonic masculinities and femininities. Women are actively 
questioning gender hierarchies and exclusion from certain spaces as regulated by 
patriarchy through various institutions including the police.
The existence of patriarchy in many societies in Africa is not disputed, and that 
it subjugates women and relegates them to the private sphere is well documented. 
Yet from the stories above we can see how women are constantly negotiating 
their positions. The stories told highlight the various fascinating modes of iden-
tity which are constantly being created and recreated by active agents in urban 
women’s everyday lives. Stories from urban Zimbabwe have shown that gender 
should be viewed as a product of location, negotiated by women and men with 
discursive and performative vocabularies that they deploy but do not command 
into existence. Urban spaces therefore shape and are in turn shaped by gender 
practices. What women and men do each day configures gender in specific ways. 
The everyday experience of women in diverse urban spaces is thus important 
in reconfiguring the spaced nature of gender and deconstructing certain ways of 
viewing women in urban areas.
Women in the city are found at the intersection of different oppressive systems. 
They have a specific age, class and race, and come from different backgrounds. 
The theoretical basis of the intersectionality approach involves viewing societal 
knowledge as being located within an individual’s specific geographic and social 
location. The stories of women outlined in this chapter highlight how various 
social and culturally constructed categories interact on multiple levels to manifest 
themselves as inequalities within the city. To reduce analysis of women’s lives 
to gender alone is to strip them of the racial and class historical antecedents that 
characterize their marginal position in most African cities. Intersectionality is of 
the view that difficulties arise because of the many complexities involved in mak-
ing multi-dimensional conceptualizations that explain the way in which socially 
constructed categories of differentiation interact to create a social hierarchy.
What do the stories say?
While I do not seek to generalize the stories of the four women shared above, 
they illustrate how women are constantly negotiating space within a highly patri-
archal and male-dominated space (see Sotiropoulou, Chapter 19 of this volume, 
for a more nuanced discussion of urban life and capitalist patriarchy). The stories 
are an important reflection of how women in various contexts are challenging 
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the dominant narratives about space and bodies in urban areas. Through various 
activities these women are opening up space and enhancing their livelihoods in 
the face of harsh treatment from police and other social agents of surveillance. 
From the stories it is clear how public spaces are highly surveyed and women 
who dare engage in non-feminine activities are often subjected to harassment. 
This is particularly true in the third story, where a woman walking alone at night 
is regularly censured by the police.
The fight for space is not only about physical space but also about livelihoods, 
belonging and identity. Women are often relegated to the periphery of the city, 
and kept within the bounds of domesticity, yet they are continuously faced with 
the need to feed their families. Access to space is intrinsically linked with the 
ability to earn a living. Portraits two and four highlight two women who engage 
in different ways of earning a living, but both face a constant struggle to ‘own’ 
the space they work in.
The stories also speak about how women in urban spaces are found at the 
intersection of interlocked oppressions. The first portrait, for example, shows how 
gender, age, class, lack of education, race and family background intersect to leave 
young women living on the street vulnerable to poverty and abuse. Yet women are 
constantly struggling with these interlocked oppressive systems as active agents. 
Through their actions they are ‘untaming urban spaces’ by disrupting the status 
quo and challenging hegemonic patriarchal structures in urban areas. Such dis-
ruptions occur in the everyday practices of women who resist subjugation and 
redefine access to the city. Women are involved in everyday struggles that con-
tinuously increase their access to space within cities. Urban spaces are often built 
around dominant ideas about how people must and should conduct themselves. 
Going against expected norms is seen as deviant. The concept of untamed urban-
isms thus speaks to these subversive actions that question the norms of urban life, 
such as at what times women may walk in the city centre, or from which spaces 
they can sell their wares.
Concluding remarks
Urban spaces in Zimbabwe were built on colonial systems of exclusion which 
have evolved within the post-colonial state. What is clear from the Zimbabwean 
cases outlined above is how hegemonic masculinities dominate and define space 
in gendered ways. Women in Zimbabwe, through their everyday practices in dif-
ferent contexts, are challenging these ideas and carving out spaces for survival. 
The city is gendered in complex ways, yet this process evolves over time as peo-
ple negotiate and renegotiate meaning in interactions. The chapter has shown how 
everyday practices can become important in recreating and subverting dominant 
ideas about gender and space in urban settings. I used stories of four women in 
diverse contexts and with differing experiences to highlight how the underlying 
assumptions of space as gendered influence everyday life in urban areas. The 
chapter shows that women are not mere victims of urban processes, but rather are 
creative agents using limited tools at their disposal to create space and livelihoods. 
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They are continuously negotiating and creating space within urban spaces domi-
nated by hegemonic masculinities.
The four portraits highlight unique experiences of women in urban settings. 
Every story is different, yet gender remains the most important identifier. How 
gender plays out for women in urban spaces remains highly situational. This high-
lights the importance of situatedness, which rejects generalizing tendencies that 
seek to universalize women as a monolithic group. The differences in ways of 
making a living, age, marital status, educational level and parenthood highlight 
how patriarchy is not itself homogenous in how it impacts on women. Through 
the intersectionality approach it was possible to note how patriarchy polices 
space and limits women from diverse backgrounds in specific ways depending 
on their location. For example, women working as vendors on the street face 
resistance from authority in a different way from women who work in nightclubs. 
Intersectionality shows that all women have a distinct story which is largely influ-
enced by their own distinct position. The context and history in each case above 
shows how the individual’s specific geographic and social location is important in 
determining how they experience the city. The stories show that women confront 
and are confronted by multiple practices encountered through urban life, but they 
do so differently depending on their social position. Thus, an intersectionality per-
spective allows us to capture how their positionality is negotiated in the interstices 
between the tamed and the untamed.
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16 A conversation in a dentist’s chair
Employment, marginality and freedom  
on the borders of a Brazilian favela
Moises Lino e Silva
The broken filling
During the many months when I conducted ethnographic research in Favela da 
Rocinha (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), a favourite pastime was to eat at one of the many 
food stalls near the place I was renting in the favela. Unlike the better-known 
Brazilian ‘açai na tigela’, the açai berry smoothie consumed in Rocinha was usu-
ally sold in flimsy plastic cups and not in bowls. These cheap cups could often be 
seen floating in large quantities in the open sewers of the favela. The smoothies 
came with a variety of sweet toppings, including chocolate syrup, condensed milk 
and jujuba, which is a gelatinous sweet at room temperature. Mixed in a cold 
smoothie, it becomes as hard as ice. While I was eating an açai smoothie in early 
2010, I broke a filling on one of those colourful jujubas.
The next morning I set about finding a dentist. A neighbour recommended a 
clinic in the upper-middle-class area just across the street from Rocinha, called 
São Conrado. The clinic was located near the large supermarket where most 
favela dwellers did their grocery shopping. The dentist I found had short hair, 
light skin and a few wrinkles; she was not more than 40, but looked tired, with 
deep dark circles under her eyes. She offered to make a full assessment of all my 
teeth, which she did with the help of a small mirror and a strong light that bothered 
my eyes. She chatted while she worked, telling me what was wrong with my teeth, 
and asking where I lived and worked. It was difficult to answer with my mouth 
open, but during pauses in the examination I told her I lived in Rocinha and was 
an anthropologist, a researcher.
She then inquired about the theme of my research. With her hands in my mouth, 
I could only say the word ‘freedom’. ‘Freedom? How so?’ I felt like laughing: 
it was a really difficult conversation for many reasons. At the next opportunity 
I explained that I was interested in learning more about how freedom was lived 
by Rocinha’s residents.
She nodded and said, ‘I am very interested in this question of freedom too! Do 
you know why? Because there is something about Rocinha that I do not under-
stand myself.’ I was curious. The dentist added:
I am the owner of this clinic. Most workers here come from Rocinha, right? 
It turns out that none of these workers are interested in full-time long-term 
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employment. They work for a little while and then they want to leave. People 
do not want to work. Seriously, they prefer to stay out of formal work in order 
to have more free time! Do you understand that?
I was amazed by the way this dentist had engaged with my research topic. She 
went on, ‘This is a big problem here at the clinic. We need maids, secretaries and 
security people – but no one stays for too long. They all want an easy life. Nobody 
wants to work hard like me!’ I told her I was very interested in the questions she 
was raising, and in return she said she would like to read my work if it was ever 
published.
Alternatives to the alternative
How can we understand why many favela residents are not looking for formal 
job opportunities in Rio de Janeiro? How can we explain that while a middle-
class dentist feels that she needs to work full-time, others across the street from 
her clinic, with much lower levels of education and work opportunities, choose 
to live from bico (temporary informal jobs)? What does this  difficult conver-
sation between the favela and the formal city, fostered by life in a metropo-
lis, tell us regarding the issue of labour and the wider urban dynamics in Rio 
de Janeiro?
In an essay on the theme of ‘Work and unemployment’, Winefield and col-
leagues (2002: 2) come to this conclusion:
Clearly, we need some different ways of understanding and thinking about 
work. We are entering a millennium in which work may become a less cen-
tral part of who and what people are. We need to better accommodate new 
cultural understandings of personhood and connections, and of meaning and 
self-fulfilment.
My conversation at the clinic suggests that many favela dwellers are rethinking 
their commitment to the established work market. However, it is also clear that 
this fact comes as a surprise to the middle and upper classes in Rio de Janeiro. 
My dentist perhaps reflects a more general attitude: that in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro, and perhaps on a broader scale, people do not really expect the changes 
in the labour market in the new millennium to be pushed forward by favela 
dwellers. They do not see the future involving the poor refusing to engage in 
formal (often full-time) work. They continue to think that the more formal work 
is available for the poor, the better. Businesses operating in the neighbourhood 
of São Conrado still expect that there will be cheap labour available for their 
supermarkets, their clinics and their offices, so they can continue to make profits 
in this new century.
A couple of centuries ago, European elites were already expressing a great 
concern regarding similar issues. In 1862 Henry Mayhew tackled the situation 
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of the urban poor in London who refused to work. Those That Will Not Work is 
the title of Volume 4 in a series of books called London Labour and the London 
Poor. The series provided important contributions to the understanding of met-
ropolitan life during Victorian times. Particularly, ‘the middle class readers of 
Mayhew may have learned for the first time how the other half lived’ (Lyons and 
Lyons 2004: 44). Regarding the issue of metropolitan life and labour, Mayhew 
(1862: 3) argued:
All society would appear to arrange itself into four different classes:
  I Those that will work.
 II Those that cannot work.
 III Those that will not work.
IV Those that need not work.
Within the wider Victorian framework that legally divided the poor into two cat-
egories – the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor – all those Londoners who 
occupied class III in the structure above were presented by Mayhew (1862) not 
just as deserving their poverty, but also as thieves, beggars and/or prostitutes. We 
have to wonder how pervasive similar narratives about the urban poor continue to 
be in metropolitan life today, and why resistance to engaging in certain types of 
work relations still seems to shock the elites in Rio de Janeiro almost as much as 
it shocked the elite in London a century and a half ago.
Over many other conversations I had during my fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro in 
2009 and 2010, I heard from different people that the poor who did not want to 
work could only be rogues. Alba Zaluar (2002) also debates this point of view in 
her book The Machine and Revolt, which is based on fieldwork in the infamous 
City of God, a favela in the west zone of Rio de Janeiro. The rationale for this 
attitude could be summarized like this: the poor who do not wish to engage in 
serious work can only make a living through activity that is illegal, or at best 
marginal. How else could they do so? The rich can choose not to work because, 
by definition, they have already accumulated resources on which they can draw, 
but that is not true of the poor. According to this view, the very need to have a job 
is part of what defines a poor person: in other words, to be poor is to need to work 
to survive. In this sense, the poor are not supposed to be in a position to break the 
rules of how a capitalist society operates.
In this chapter I expose some problems associated with this argument. I explore 
the employment situation of specific slum dwellers, and try to understand the 
complexity of the topic from the point of view of those who live in Rocinha. I sug-
gest it is necessary to produce a deeper critical analysis of both the current social 
arrangements in our cities and the existing alternatives to those arrangements. The 
critique of the alternatives already imagined and already established in the daily 
life of our cities, especially those alternatives that tend to be seen as unavoidable, 
can unleash a whole new set of possibilities for urbanism.
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Making a living in the city
In Rio de Janeiro, slums have historically existed as urban reservoirs of cheap 
labour, mainly for employers in the most privileged parts of the city. Slum dwell-
ers who do not meet this social function are seen as anomalies. In the ‘script’ of 
daily life in Rio, the alternative established for the urban poor who do not engage 
in formal employment (especially for young people who do not have formal work) 
is to become rogues. I argue that we need to better understand the variety of alter-
natives that exist to the social arrangements that prevail in our cities nowadays, so 
that we can better exploit the possibilities and potentials of untamed urbanisms.
The one-bedroom house that I rented belonged to a couple who were preparing 
to move out of the favela. My landlord, Laertes, owned a small stationery shop in 
Rocinha, a single-door business, but apparently profitable. In the house just above 
mine lived a couple of migrants from the north-east. Neither of them had a per-
manent job on a full-time basis. Ferreira did the kind of bico I mentioned earlier – 
working occasionally, without a legal contract. He had one regular commitment, 
helping a friend to sell pork in the Sunday market. Ana, Ferreira’s wife, worked as 
a cleaner, again not on a fixed contract. Sometimes she worked three days a week, 
some weeks she decided not to work at all. Everything depended on the availabil-
ity of work and also on her own willingness to work on a certain day. In spite of 
this lack of formal work commitments, Ana and Ferreira had successfully raised 
two children. Not without difficulties, they used to say, both their boy and their 
girl were independent grown-ups already. The parents were very proud of them.
Navigating the favela was not an easy task. There was a complex network of 
alleyways crisscrossing the place, but not many wide streets. Near the alleyway 
where I lived was the home of a photographer called Adriano. During the week-
days, Adriano was always at home or else helping as a volunteer in a school across 
from his house. It was mainly over the weekends that he did paid work. He was 
hired to photograph big parties which mostly took place at the weekend. I often 
joked with Adriano that while most people that I knew worked from Monday to 
Friday and rested over the weekends, Adriano did the opposite. He used to laugh 
too, saying he was doing very well that way.
Gustavo, one of Adriano’s neighbours, was barely out of his teens but had 
already worked in a wide variety of jobs both inside and outside the favela. He 
never stayed long-term in any of them. Sometimes he worked for a single day 
and never returned. In other cases, it took him a few months to quit. In any case, 
Gustavo always found an excuse to leave both permanent and temporary jobs. 
Gustavo’s family worried about him: not exactly about his lack of permanent 
employment, but more about why he did not seem to like any work at all. Had he 
simply become accustomed to depending on financial support from his family? 
Or had he found illicit work in the favela?
‘The worker and the bandit’
The literature on how different groups of people relate to work around the world 
is vast and diverse, varying from the analysis of very specific industries to the 
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implications of globalization for the question of labour and employment in gen-
eral (Mintz 1960; Applebaum 1981; Ong 1987; Fine 1996). Winefield and col-
leagues (2002) remind us that in the United States and Australia, work is a central 
element in the constitution of people’s lives, identity and sense of well-being. It 
is not by accident that in English it is common to ask, ‘What do you do for a liv-
ing?’ People ask this in daily conversation because they try to infer from people’s 
type of work not just their earnings, but also their class status and other aspects of 
their personhood. Nevertheless, in other countries and other social groups, work, 
income and personhood are seen as much more distinct categories. As a contribu-
tion to the body of literature on employment, this chapter does not focus on the 
very local or the very global scale of analysis. It considers the specific dynamics 
of employment at an urban scale, in a large Brazilian city, even if some prefer to 
consider it a fractured city (see Koonings and Krujit 2007).
As explained by Zaluar (2002), in Rio slum dwellers tend to use the term 
‘worker’ to define a certain identity that is essentially different from the iden-
tity of the ‘bandit’. In this sense, being a ‘worker’ does not mean precisely that 
someone has a formal job, or necessarily that they do more work than others. It is 
important to keep in mind that in this context, calling someone a ‘criminal’ does 
not mean they do not work. Quite the contrary: people in Rocinha often remarked 
on how hard many bandits worked, especially those in the lower ranks of drug 
trafficking. Therefore, the concept of a ‘worker’ in the favela was not necessarily 
related to how much people worked, but to the type of work that they engaged in. 
In order to be a ‘worker’, work did not need to be a priority in the life of a person 
either. In this context, to refer to someone as a ‘worker’ was to indicate that they 
made a living through activities considered somehow morally superior (even if 
only in the eyes of the police) to those such as drug trafficking, robbery, begging 
and prostitution.
The use of these two categories to refer to ways of living in the favela can be 
linked to broader historical dimensions in the relationship between the asphalt 
(the so-called formal city) and the favela (the so-called informal city). In the wider 
context of urban life in Rio de Janeiro, the ‘informal’ parts of the city are, on a 
deeper level, frequently associated with the image of ‘illegality’. In this context, 
favelas end up being perceived as morally inferior urban spaces, by virtue of 
their very origins as illegal urban settlements. As I discuss elsewhere in greater 
detail (Doherty and Lino e Silva 2011), the understanding of favelas as informal 
(and illegal) areas of the city has very practical consequences in the life of favela 
dwellers, who seem to be blamed constantly for the lack of affordable housing 
options in Rio de Janeiro, and end up having to deal with the stigma of ‘illegality’ 
regardless of their individual conduct and life histories.
A very tangible consequence of perceiving favela dwellers as bandits in general 
is the second-class treatment granted to Rocinha dwellers by the police. During 
the time I lived in Rocinha, it was not uncommon for the police to break into 
private houses without warrants, for example. During periods of confrontation 
between police and drug traffickers, the situation got even worse, with police heli-
copters indiscriminately shooting from the air, without a precise target other than 
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the boundaries of the favela. It is in the particular context, with favela dwellers 
trying to protect themselves from violent indiscriminate treatment by the police, 
that the distinction between ‘workers’ and ‘bandits’ becomes vital to improve the 
prospects of survival in a shantytown. To describe a person as a ‘worker’ high-
lights the fact that they are not a legitimate target for police violence. Only a tiny 
proportion of Rocinha’s residents were involved in drug trafficking. Therefore, 
in this context, using the categories ‘worker’ and ‘criminal’ could be understood 
partly as an attempt to protect people from police abuse in the so-called ‘illegal’ 
parts of the city.
Mary, Adriano, Laertes and Ana were all considered to be ‘workers’ in 
Rocinha, despite not having the type of formal employment that my dentist might 
wish them to have. Gustavo, however, showed a deep lack of interest in any form 
of employment that would be considered legitimate in the favela. He could hardly 
claim to be a ‘worker’. Nobody called him so, but nobody openly called him a 
‘bandit’ either. In fact, it seemed to me that great anxiety, gossip and curiosity 
resulted from the fact that no one knew exactly how to classify Gustavo. Many 
simply called him lazy. He would reply that he was not lazy, he was simply too 
smart to sacrifice his time in working.
Alternative moral judgements
From my conversation in the dentist’s chair in São Conrado, I derived a clear 
sense that many people living outside the favelas do not think of favela dwellers 
who do not have a formal job as ‘workers’, in contrast with what happens on the 
favela side of the story. In the view of many people in Rio de Janeiro, the poor 
only achieve the status of ‘worker’ if they fulfil certain legal requirements: most 
of all, if they have a legal contract officially stamped on a document issued by the 
federal government called a Carteira de Trabalho (workbook).
Employees must hold such a Carteira de Trabalho in order to obtain a legal 
work contract in Brazil. It is only granted to those above 16 years of age. It is very 
similar to the Brazilian passport, and is stamped and signed by employers each 
time they formally hire or dismiss a worker. Those who do not work under such a 
formal employment scheme are considered ‘informal’ and/or ‘illegal’ workers by 
the state. Therefore, this legal apparatus establishes different categories of work 
relations. I would suggest that this legal differentiation of workers has immediate 
consequences for the way in which certain groups of people recognize people as 
workers (or non-workers). The ‘higher’ status granted to those who work with a 
Carteira de Trabalho assinada (a stamped and signed workbook), also creates the 
expectation that the poorest residents of Rio de Janeiro should strive to achieve 
the status of formal worker. From this perspective it is a surprise (of the kind 
expressed by my dentist) when some residents of Rocinha prefer not to engage in 
formal work.
Nevertheless, for most of the residents of Rocinha whose life I shared, the rea-
soning was somehow different. These were people who lived in territories of the 
city that in many ways lay outside the official rule of law. For them, the difference 
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in status between formal and informal work was not the most significant one in 
their lives. To work under a Carteira de Trabalho assinada was sometimes rec-
ognized as a good thing, because there were legal protections and social benefits 
associated with such a legal contract. However, formal employment certainly did 
not have as much value as my dentist seemed to believe. As we have already 
discussed, in the favela context the moral status of someone’s occupation was not 
judged primarily on the formal or informal nature of the work, but on the type of 
work that people engaged with. In other words, my friends in the favela saw as 
wrong (or illegal) activities those performed by bandits (such as drug traffick-
ing, robbery and kidnapping). They did not see other types of informal work as 
wrong. So in Rocinha people felt perfectly entitled to consider themselves ‘work-
ers’ and to be proud of their work regardless of whether or not it was done under 
a Carteira de Trabalho assinada.
Nothing to do with criminality
To say that many residents of Rocinha are not enchanted by the prospect of hav-
ing a full-time formal job is not to say that they prefer to spend their time doing 
nothing, or that they are necessarily bandits. Adriano, for example, helped a lot 
in a school that offered a variety of free activities. Moreover, almost every week-
day morning he used go to the beach, which was within easy walking distance of 
Rocinha. There he met friends and exercised for at least an hour. He also used his 
free time to make contacts and phone calls to facilitate his weekend photographic 
work. Adriano also studied basic English in a course offered by the same school 
where he helped as a volunteer.
Ana spent most of her time at home. When she was not doing any house clean-
ing outside of Rocinha to earn cash, she was working in her home. She cooked 
for her family, she did all the laundry for them (and also for one of our neigh-
bours) and she also took care of the child of one of her relatives. Occasionally she 
stopped work to watch television. She loved soap operas. Ana had a sister living 
in Ipanema, whom she visited often. She liked to talk, and spent a fair amount of 
time gossiping with and about our neighbours. Ana’s husband also liked to stay 
at home. Ferreira watched a lot of television and loved football. He almost never 
missed a match on television. The time he spent around the house was also used to 
fix small problems such as a blocked pipe or a drip from the ceiling. He also liked 
to play dominoes with friends in a plaza at the entrance to Rocinha.
In contrast to Ana and Ferreira, Gustavo spent almost all his time away from 
home. He could often be seen hanging out with other teenagers around the favela. 
Sometimes he disappeared for days. There were quite a few occasions when his 
family started to get concerned about the lack of news regarding his whereabouts. 
He was very popular with the girls. There was no need to worry when he disap-
peared from home, he was having fun – this is what he used to say. Gustavo also 
loved the beach, and during the summer he would go there almost every day. I 
used to see him playing beach football with his friends, taking dips in the sea 
and sunbathing. When Gustavo was short of company, he invited me to go to 
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the beach with him, and he used to tell me that he had a good time, even though 
money was short for him.
Living more with less
In the years that I lived in Rocinha, I collected enough ethnographic evidence 
to argue against the taming narrative that the only livelihood alternatives for 
the urban poor without formal employment are to become rogues, bandits or 
prostitutes. Such an argument would only hold credibility if all forms of infor-
mal work were understood as marginal activities. We have seen that for many 
people living in Rio de Janeiro this is not the case. But a question remains: how 
do favela dwellers manage to make a living if they do not have formal jobs on a 
full-time basis?
Part of the answer can be derived from the vast array of activities in which 
people engage while they are not formally working. Cleaning the house, looking 
after children and fixing blocked pipes, could all be seen as non-monetary forms 
of work that help people make a living. Apart from that, we must not underes-
timate the benefits of being able to live on few resources. The reduced resource 
dependence in the life of most favela dwellers may not have been originally by 
choice. However, when people refuse to work eight hours a day in a formal job, 
even if doing so would provide them with a lot more resources at the end of the 
month, they are in effect making a choice: to keep on living with fewer material 
resources. For example, Ferreira was able to watch as many football matches on 
television as he wanted, and still survive without resorting to criminal activities. 
Rather than seeking the highest possible income by selling as much of their labour 
as possible, many people in Rocinha worked just enough to be able to afford the 
basic costs of everyday life. Rather than bothering to accumulate money, many 
people preferred to have free time to enjoy. Therefore, it could be said that time 
did not necessarily convert into money for many of my friends in Rocinha. Often, 
they perceived that more money would not make up for the value and priority that 
they attributed to free time in their lives.
What puzzles most people who do not live in favelas is why a population 
historically stigmatized as ‘poor’ would choose ‘wealth in time’ over ‘wealth 
in goods’. Reisch (2001: 369) argues that ‘economics tends to be exclusively 
focused on material wealth’. The same focus seems to dominate the concerns of 
much of the middle class in Brazil. In expanding his reflections on the concept 
of ‘time wealth’, Reisch (2001: 369) suggests that ‘new models of wealth call 
for a new balance of “wealth in time” and “wealth in goods”’. In many ways, my 
friends in Rocinha recognize the trade-off between these two forms of wealth.
Tracey Warren (2003) provided a very interesting analysis of the relationship 
between time poverty and class stratification in the United Kingdom. She argues 
that couples with a higher overall income (usually because both individuals are 
working) seem to have less free time available for their family lives. However, 
if we consider that there are many factors to time wealth, it is not necessarily the 
case that lower-class couples are better off in terms of time resources than other 
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classes in her study.1 What seems to be distinctive about the position defended by 
my friends in Rocinha is the high value that they attribute to their autonomy over 
personal time, as opposed to people working in upper-middle-class São Conrado 
across the road, for example.
One possible reason many favela dwellers can afford ‘wealth in time’ is that 
many of them do not expect much in terms of ‘wealth in goods’. The differ-
ences between the cost of living in Rocinha and São Conrado (which is just 
across the street from the favela) are striking. While in Rocinha it was possi-
ble to rent a small one-bedroom apartment for around BRL300 (Brazilian reais) 
(around US$150) per month in 2010, in São Conrado it would be hard to find 
anything cheaper than BRL1,500 (around US$750) per month. This was not only 
because the rent price per square metre was much higher in São Conrado, but 
also because there were few very small apartments for rent in that area. Another 
important consideration is all the extra costs of living in the neighbourhood on 
top of rent. In São Conrado residents paid a lot for tax, electricity, water, sew-
age, security, insurance and condo fees. In Rocinha, I did not meet anyone who 
paid any form of tax on their property. Furthermore, there was no charge at all 
for the public water and sewage (where these services were available). Most of 
my friends did pay for electricity (although some had illegal connections), but 
there was a special ‘social’ rate for favela dwellers, so the cost was low. Indeed 
many of my neighbours owned their houses in the favela, and did not have to 
spend anything on rent or mortgage payments. Many of those who did not own 
their houses shared their living space (and the rent) with friends or family, greatly 
reducing their fixed costs.
Food prices in Rocinha were similar to those elsewhere in Rio. The large super-
markets, for example, were both located in São Conrado adjacent to the favela. 
These are examples of spaces where both favela dwellers and the upper middle 
class shopped side by side, although the consumption patterns of both groups 
were often very different. Although I did not come across alternative productive 
food arrangements along the lines of those discussed by Edwards (see Chapter 20 
of this volume), most residents of Rocinha bought much cheaper products than 
those purchased by their neighbours in São Conrado. I noticed this in observing 
people’s shopping baskets while waiting in line to pay for my own purchases. 
There was also a food market in Rocinha on Sundays, where Ferreira worked. 
Fruits and vegetables were more affordable there than at the supermarket, espe-
cially during what was known as the xepa time – the final hours, when prices 
dropped considerably. Ana, for example, was a master in taking advantage of the 
xepa time. She always had lots of fruit and vegetables in her home.
In addition, a strong network of help operated among residents of Rocinha. 
Larissa Lomnitz (1975) argues that in Mexican shantytowns social networks 
based both on residence and kinship serve as means to guarantee the basic liveli-
hood of the poor. I was able to observe similar processes in Rocinha. With fewer 
expenses, less excitement about accumulating wealth and a denser social network 
of neighbours and friends to rely on, people in Rocinha had more freedom to 
choose how much to work and whom to work for. The poorer ones in terms of 
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monetary resources in Rio de Janeiro were also the wealthier in terms of time 
available for family and other activities. In Rocinha it was possible to make a liv-
ing, to be a worker (in the favela sense of the word), and still have a lot of time 
available for friends and to go to the beach, for example. Perhaps, this could be 
an answer to the questions that deeply bothered my dentist in São Conrado. I was 
sorry I could not articulate any of this while sitting in her chair.
For an untamed urban future
One point of agreement among scholars concerned with a more sustainable urban 
life is that we need to explore our creative potential as we face challenges that 
arise from daily life in cities (Doherty and Mostafavi 2010). The broader goal of 
this chapter was to show that, although certain alternatives to current urban social 
arrangements seem to be unavoidable (such as marginality as the alternative to 
‘legitimate’ employment), a closer look at everyday encounters in our cities might 
reveal otherwise.
Prompted by a broken tooth, the reflection that I proposed on the theme of 
employment in Rio de Janeiro sparked a fortuitous urban dialogue between topics 
of concern in Favela da Rocinha and some topics that preoccupy people living and 
working in the neighbourhood of São Conrado. To sustain my argument, I used 
ethnographic evidence obtained during my long-term fieldwork engagement in 
Rocinha. Through many urban conversations and my own everyday life experi-
ences in the favela, I discussed themes such as who counts as a ‘worker’, what are 
the alternatives to formal work, and how people’s time is allocated when they are 
less dependent on monetary resources for their livelihoods.
More historical evidence suggests that there is a master narrative that perme-
ates the constitution of metropolitan life. This cuts across different places and 
centuries, from London in the nineteenth century to Rio de Janeiro in the twenty-
first century. This narrative establishes a labour scheme for ideal life in cities: 
that all people should work (except those with sufficient resources to not need 
to work). Those who cannot work are often excused under certain conditions, 
and may even be deserving of philanthropic and/or state assistance. Those who 
will not work have been accused of all sorts of social evil, and became objects of 
intense concern and scrutiny from those who do work. (Of course, embedded in 
this narrative we also find a particular version of what counts as legitimate work.) 
In both London and Rio de Janeiro, those who will not work are marginalized and 
treated as a social problem, if not a social disease. At least since the nineteenth 
century, there seems to have been an implicit understanding that a fundamental 
objective of urban studies is to enforce taming scripts regarding the identification, 
regulation and management of the undesirable consequences of life conditions in 
urban environments.
The pervasive taming narrative that this chapter challenges is one that pre-
scribes that the urban poor do not just have to work, but have to work under 
conditions that are often determined by others. As such, this narrative aims to 
regulate the work regime of those considered too poor to not work. If we are to 
242 Moises Lino e Silva
expand our repertoire of alternatives for a more sustainable future, there could be 
much to be learned from favelas, and how some people manage to live satisfying 
lives that are at once less resource-intensive and more filled with time for friends 
and family. This move implies a deep process of resignification. We need to stop 
seeing the excess of free time in the life of favela dwellers as a social problem, 
and become open to new interpretations, such as the interpretation put forward by 
Reisch (2001) – for whom free time becomes a new form of wealth. Certainly, 
such wealth could be seen as being at odds with material wealth. Perhaps this is 
a good thing, too, considering that experts have long been suggesting that the 
increasing patterns of consumption in the world are unsustainable, and we will 
have to undergo a dramatic downshifting, with a serious impact on current forms 
of social organization (Nelson et al. 2007).
Cities are rarely thought of from the point of view of those living in areas 
considered informal, marginal and illegal: with notable exceptions such as 
Chiweshe’s analysis of spatial dynamics in Zimbabwean cities from a feminine 
perspective, and Sotiropoulou’s discussion of urban property from the point of 
view of Greek grassroots movements (both in this volume). The formulation of 
urban theories and policies tends to take place in circuits that are often discon-
nected from (or at best asymmetrically connected to) the daily life experiences of 
certain ‘marginalized’ urban groups. There is currently a serious lack of adequate 
knowledge regarding the quotidian details of how those considered ‘poor’ actu-
ally make a living in our cities despite all the challenges they face. For example, 
the understanding of favelas as urban depositories of cheap labour for the formal 
city proves to be very limited when confronted with the complex dynamics of life 
in a large city such as Rio de Janeiro. It is time to consider more seriously how 
the wealth of knowledge, time and experiences of the so-called ‘urban poor’ can 
help inform our push towards untamed forms of urbanism: in this particular case, 
less resource intensive and, we can hope, with more freedom and time for friends, 
family and the beach.
Note
1  ‘Reisch [2000, cited in Warren 2003] has usefully highlighted a number of compo-
nents to time wealth. These include the chronometric dimension (having the right 
amount of time), the chronologic dimension (having time at the right time of the day, 
week or season), the personal time autonomy/sovereignty dimension (control over 
time) and the synchronization dimension (time that fits with the time rhythms of fam-
ily and friends).’
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17 Contested taming spatialities
The micro-resistance of everyday  
life in Buenos Aires
Jorge Sequera and Elvira Mateos
Introduction
Recent neoliberal urban policies and the containment of the excluded in Latin 
American cities create a paradox. This is apparent at Costanera Sur in the city of 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, a long walkway between two worlds. On one side is 
the Buenos Aires Ecological Reserve on the shore of the Rio de la Plata, which 
adjoins Rodrigo Bueno, a slum in danger of eviction due to political pressure 
from the city government and real estate developers. On the other side is Puerto 
Madero, the most expensive neighbourhood in the city, with skyscrapers, state-
of-the-art security systems, exclusive shops, luxury hotels, international banking, 
opulent houses and so on.
The promenade that separates these two adjoining areas that exemplify a frag-
mented city, is radically transformed every weekend (Centner 2012). On those 
days, the Costanera is filled with activities (parrillitas al paso or street barbecues, 
informal markets, music and dance) that attract the working classes from through-
out the city. In this chapter we contrast these practices with the symbolic construc-
tion of the ‘right bourgeois use’ of the public space by the upper class, and its 
recounting of the legitimate subject to enact a civilizing process. We argue that 
the encounter of these ways of being in the city confronts the everyday life prac-
tices of the working class but also slows down the production of hegemonic urban 
subjectivity (Sennet 2006; Wortman 2004, 2010; Lash and Urry 1994; Bourdieu 
1979; Wright 1992, 1994).
In this regard, we examine popular informal activities as counter-hegemonic 
practices in opposition to urban neoliberalisation, constituting new actors that 
develop and produce alternative geographies of citizenship. Resistance through the 
intensive use of public space by different rituals from those planned by the crea-
tors of Puerto Madero somehow breaks certain government technologies (Foucault 
1990) that respond to private interests, instead of being governed by the common 
use of public space (Stavrides 2010). In this way, such practices are considered as 
‘anomalies’ (or untamed practices) by the upper and middle classes and managed by 
urban policies that restrict socializing acts and the social relations that they embody.
In order to elaborate our central analytical purpose, we have chosen to examine 
an urban conflict that is unfolding in this area today and that is likely to continue 
in the future. A walk through the two antagonistic places, Puerto Madero and 
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the slum of Rodrigo Bueno, allows us to capture a polymorphic imaginary that 
includes a multiplicity and diversity of subjects as triggers of a spatial transforma-
tion in the use of the area.
The Rio de La Plata (or River Plate) bounds the city of Buenos Aires on the 
east. In the early twentieth century, a number of reforms that modernized the area 
made it a lively port, but those attempts were made obsolete years later, when the 
docks became unsuitable for foreign vessels that had typically increased in size. 
The area remained practically ignored by the public authorities for many years, 
which led to a gradual degradation of its appearance, complicating its original 
function as a place of public use. Nevertheless, Costanera Sur was never fully 
abandoned. Both low-income groups and the middle and upper classes gathered 
on the shore of the river during weekends to enjoy what was usually known as 
the Costanera Sur Riverside Resort (though the classes were always separated, 
in different spaces). Gradually parts of the route to the river became inaccessi-
ble, and this resulted in a decrease in the leisure activities performed in the area, 
although they never totally disappeared. However, at the end of last century, the 
area became the locus of ambitious interventions.
Everyday life contains resistance practices which are traversed by processes 
of both personal and collective subjectivities, as argued by Stavrides (2007: 119) 
‘molecular spatialities of otherness can be found scattered in the city’. Our case 
study takes us to explore a space understood as a common area which confronts 
the exception policies that residents and politicians try to implement in Puerto 
Madero. As Díaz and Ortiz (2003) have contended, the interaction between dif-
ferent social and ethnic groups is limited by the condition of fragmented and frag-
mentary spatial use, which weakens social cohesion. Public space can increasingly 
be read as a gap between buildings to be filled in accordance with the objectives 
of developers and governments: aseptic spaces to enforce the notions of utility, 
safety and control (Delgado 2011: 9). Following the same line of thought, Delgado 
(2004) highlights the fact that different prevention policies have institutional-
ized the new design of urban spaces and social control, as exemplified through 
the development of new forms of urban surveillance, such as those materialized 
through the expanded use of video cameras and closed-circuit television (CCTV).
The research informing this chapter was designed precisely by the interest that 
these images and radically different practices aroused in us, as visitors to the city, 
and it soon became the subject of scientific inquiry. The methodology adopted 
included participant observation in these public spaces, in-depth interviews with 
residents and users of Puerto Madero and the slum of Rodrigo Bueno, and vari-
ous audiovisual techniques such as photography and video analysis, which were 
designed to nourish and supplement the analysis of discourse. We also used sec-
ondary sources, especially engaging with the analysis of the mass media (newspa-
pers, websites and television).
Puerto Madero: the construction of a class taming discourse
We have already mentioned that the city is a multiple concept that is configured 
through different subjectivities, which sometimes come into conflict. Naturally 
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this does not mean that the mixture of conception, realities and urban uses occurs 
in a space of freedom, as the influence of different agents in giving sense to space, 
and the results, are very unequal. Domínguez (2008: 8) stated that the city is a 
central node in the global economy, for there are usually very few areas where 
social spaces escape the logic of capitalist exploitation and domination. This 
dynamic facilitates the creation of devices to discipline the citizenship (Delgado 
2007: 54). In the cases of gentrification and requalification these bring market 
players into connivance with the public authorities, a process that Harvey (2010) 
depicts as urban entrepreneurialism.
Puerto Madero is the paradigm of a planned urban project of this kind, which 
has been designed from the beginning to run as the perfect joint venture between 
business, political power and the needs of the middle and upper classes. We are 
referring to the relocation in the central areas of the city of these social sectors that 
could have chosen to live in gated communities. This formalized the transforma-
tion of the old harbour into an archipelago of privilege and the privileged, through 
strategies that were used to create an ‘other space’ (Foucault 1980), seemingly 
perfect, meticulous and orderly, which clashes sharply with the existing space; 
that is, a series of administrative policies managing this new civility, in which the 
middle and upper classes impose their hegemony on the inner city, as the only 
acceptable form of social behaviour.
One of the most significant issues in the Puerto Madero project was that it 
involved a public–private partnership. Large urban projects are widespread 
throughout Latin America. This dynamic can be encompassed within what was 
previously defined as ‘the new entrepreneurship paradigm’ or urban entrepre-
neurialism. The Corporación Antiguo Puerto Madero SA was conceived as a state 
development company, under the guise of a public limited company, governed by 
private law (Cuenya and Corral 2011), bringing together the state and the munici-
pality along with private companies and architects through a clear example of 
public–private partnership.
This phenomenon exemplifies a new form of urban governance, which differ-
ent local political parties have also adopted elsewhere (Harvey 1989, 2001; Borja 
and Castells 1997; Rodríguez et al. 2001; De Mattos 2009), and whose principal 
goal is to maximize private profit. As other authors have already highlighted, 
nowadays these large-scale urban projects create new economic areas with envi-
ronments protected from violence and urban poverty, which encourage national 
and international private investment (Lungo and Smolka 2005).
Puerto Madero’s design involved an intense dialogue with Catalonian planners, 
and it has been called the Argentine ‘Catalonian project’ (Corral 2009; González 
2011; Jajamovich 2012). Initially land prices in this area were low, but the pro-
ject’s planners knew there would be an immense appreciation in value due to its 
strategic location. As a result this was considered an ‘opportunity area’ (Cuenya 
2001). From a speculative viewpoint, Puerto Madero is nearly completed, and 
nowadays it is exhibited as a planning success. It is considered as a new symbol 
of the city of Buenos Aires, which pushes the city up to the same level as other 
Contested taming spatialities 247
leading metropolises around the world, epitomizing power and money (Cuenya 
and Corral 2011).
Puerto Madero is exceptional mainly because many of its features are totally 
different from those characteristic of the contiguous neighbourhoods: it is an 
island of order and security. This has been achieved not only by providing an 
exclusive security force for this area, the Argentine Naval Prefecture (Prefectura 
Naval Argentina or PNA), a comprehensive security system and a morphology 
that makes it seems a like a fortress (there are only four entrances by foot), but 
in a more subtle and effective way. The strong regulation of green areas, and the 
monopoly of high-class shops and buildings have led to segregation, hamper-
ing the use of this area by a large proportion of the population, and restricting 
alternative uses of the space. In this sense, concepts such as De Giorgi’s ‘puni-
tive metropolis’ (2006) and Smith’s famous ‘revanchist city’ (1996) are fit to 
describe these surveillance strategies of recovery as a key process in the global 
city. Roughly, we can identify in Puerto Madero some of the most characteristic 
features of the privatization model of public space that have been emerging during 
the last few decades in many other cities in which neoliberal urban policies have 
been dominant, such as the commodification of public space, video surveillance 
and architectures of control (Sequera and Janoschka 2012).
Puerto Madero is physically a peninsula of Buenos Aires, separated from the 
main city by an arm of the river. There are only four bridges providing access, all 
with checkpoints staffed by the PNA. This public security force does not operate 
anywhere else in the city, and the proportion of security personnel to population is 
far higher here than elsewhere in Buenos Aires. According to field data, it is well 
known that the Prefecture operates more effectively against insecurity that the 
Federal Police. In addition, Puerto Madero is the only place in Buenos Aires with 
an integrated CCTV system. There is such a dense network of cameras that every 
square metre is monitored 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (www.ntsmadero.com.
ar/servicios.html).
Public space in Puerto Madero is being increasingly regulated. The aim 
appears to be to avoid any ‘alternative’ or traditional (cultural) uses, by creat-
ing or designating exclusive spaces, which are in effect public ‘private’ spaces 
(Low and Smith 2006: 21) or semi-public spaces. Many references to Europe 
can be drawn from the discourses and practices in Puerto Madero, including 
those related to security, as well as the transnational promotion of an upper-class 
lifestyle. Often, parallels are established between this project and the architecture 
and aesthetics of the ‘European urban model’, with Barcelona seen as a paradigm 
of this. This is seen, too, as a security issue: a local bodyguard told us reassur-
ingly (perhaps noticing that we had the look of residents of the global North): 
‘this is Europe’.
We are looking here at the concept of a citizen as a consumer of signs, con-
stantly marked by new forms of exclusive consumption. Precisely because of their 
exclusive characteristics, these make this fragment of the city a commodified 
product. In this way we witness the materializing inequality in the everyday life of 
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major cities. Admittedly in Puerto Madero – mainly to the east, around Costanera 
Sur – some goods and services are offered at prices most people can afford, but 
the general trend is towards exclusive goods and services. Puerto Madero aims to 
become a new central example of the affluent lifestyle. In complete contrast to the 
daily practices that have developed in the periphery, in shopping malls, entertain-
ment complexes, parks, major supermarkets and so on, the urban reconfiguration 
here has been redirected to commercialize public space. We see the proliferation 
of a similar aesthetic that converts certain urban places into specialized areas for 
consumption by casual tourists and suburban citizens.
In addition to the leisure model devoted to consumption (and mainly targeted 
at the middle and upper classes), there is hyper-regulation of the public space in 
this area of  the city. Our analysis of this will focus on three aspects.
First, there is a new project to install parking meters throughout Puerto 
Madero.1 Currently many cars are parked there without charge, apparently by 
people living in peripheral areas who come to work in the capital, as well as by 
families who come at weekends to enjoy the waterfront. This causes endless jams 
around the bridges. Parking meters would discourage these individuals, but it also 
implies the replacement of a public use of space with a paid private use. Many 
less affluent people would effectively not come, because they cannot afford to pay 
parking fees. Some residents also resent the ‘gorillas’ (people who work infor-
mally, finding parking spaces in return for a tip), and this would eliminate them. 
The area also lacks public transport, so whatever the arguments advocating the 
introduction of parking meters, the result would be further segregation, removing 
the less well-off from this area.
The second issue is surveillance, part of the securitization trend that we have 
found in Puerto Madero. According to Janoschka (2005), there are two funda-
mental criticisms of modern surveillance methods. One is the lack of ‘success’ 
of the strategies used, and the other is that they destroy anonymity as one of the 
bases of coexistence in modern urban life. Increased use of CCTV and simi-
lar techniques can be seen as a refinement of the knowledge-power strategies 
employed by governments. The new technologies used in Puerto Madero are 
radically different from those practised in the rest of Buenos Aires, and else-
where in Argentina.
The third regulatory issue concerns crime prevention through environmental 
design. The current city government has made it clear that this is an objective, and 
to this end since late 2012 it has fenced off Centenario Park followed by another 
green area called Lezama Park. Many believe that Puerto Madero will be the next 
area to be ‘gated’, as was suggested by the city government at a meeting with 
local residents. Security here is seen as a multi-faceted concept: as a legal, regula-
tory, political and social value.
The Rodrigo Bueno slum: a history of resistance
If Puerto Madero exemplifies the ‘first world’ vision of Buenos Aires, the devel-
oping-world vision is not far distant (Cuenya and Corral 2011). In fact, before 
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the new Puerto Madero was built there was a slum called Rodrigo Bueno in the 
same area, and its residents and stallholders are resisting eviction even today. 
Two areas of the natural reserve were initially encroached in the mid-1980s, and 
are now home to 1,795 families according to the last census, many of whom are 
Peruvian or Paraguayan. After a social and judicial struggle for the settlement to 
be acknowledged, which lasted ten years, in 2010 a group of legislators proposed 
the ‘redevelopment’ of the Rodrigo Bueno neighbourhood. They recognized that 
this informal neighbourhood existed, that the residents had a right to remain there, 
and that the local government had an obligation to intervene to ensure decent liv-
ing conditions (Lekerman et al. 2012).
However, the rehabilitation proposal has still not been implemented. In Buenos 
Aires, the dangers are obvious when lower-income sectors occupy strategic areas 
where gentrification would make it possible to realize ‘surplus value’ (García 
and Sequera 2013; Herzer 2008). As happened in Puerto Madero, moderniza-
tion and urban regeneration can displace the existing population, leading to social 
and spatial fragmentation, with very specific characteristics in the case of Latin 
America (Janoschka et al. 2013). This can be seen as a battle over the meanings of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy in the urban context. Those managing the urban pro-
ject of Puerto Madero have tried acquiring the land occupied by Rodrigo Bueno’s 
slum through many means (including evictions, subsidies, police surveillance, 
soil walls built encircling the slum, power cuts). To date these strategies have had 
no more success in displacing the residents than the residents have had in obtain-
ing a firm legal status.
Jurisdictionally, residents of the slum would come under Comuna 1 of Puerto 
Madero for electoral purposes, but they have instead been regrouped with the 
neighbourhoods of Barracas and La Boca to the south of Buenos Aires city, 
which are predominantly inhabited by the working classes. However, the links 
with Puerto Madero are much more evident. Most residents of Rodrigo Bueno 
not only live near the Costanera Sur, but also make a living in the neighbour-
hood: in construction, maintenance and care work, at the Retiro fair, in the food 
stalls along the promenade, collecting cardboard (Rodríguez 2010), or working 
in restaurants.
The history of Rodrigo Bueno is a history of grassroots resistance and chal-
lenge to government policies, which have changed over the last few decades. At 
first the government’s approach seemed to be apathy or disregard, but later it 
turned into harassment. Several strategies of subordination and intimidation and 
coercive mechanisms have come into play in recent years (Carman and Yacovino 
2008). Among other actions, the settlement has been enclosed by a 30-foot-high 
wall, built with the earth excavated for the construction of Puerto Madero. We 
have already mentioned the use of security personnel to guard the entrances to 
Puerto Madero. Residents of Rodrigo Bueno also had to contend with the suspen-
sion of cleaning cesspools, garbage collection and pest control, power outages 
and so on (Carman and Yacovino 2008).
On top of that, there is now a new urbanization project in the area. The Santa 
María del Plata proposal from the IRSA2 development company proposes a hotel 
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resort and residential towers, as well as the opening of internal channels and 
lakes, creating public and private parks and boulevards. The total estimated cost 
of this project is US$500 million. Once more we find in this intersection a conflict 
between two approaches and sectoral interests. On the one hand, the profitability 
of this new project is threatened by the presence of the nearby slum (Szajnberg, 
Sorda and Pesce 2006), and on the other hand, the invasion of bulldozers threatens 
the slum’s residents.
The promenade of Costanera Sur: discourses and  
practices disputing public space
Public space is both a physical concept – the configuration of streets, squares and 
parks in the city – and a political concept. In the public sphere it is also a site of 
democratic deliberation (Aramburu 2008). The liberal sense of public space as 
somewhere for everyone equally avoids a palpable reality: that there are differ-
ences in allowed uses and restrictions on certain social groups. Social relations 
are conditioned by the kinds of access to and use of public squares and streets, as 
well as social gatherings in private or privatized places. However, this theoretical 
model does not necessarily fit easily onto a city bustling with life. The aseptic 
nature of the model becomes a reality of noise, colour and bustle, in a mixture 
of informal work and partying, at weekends around the Costanera Sur. Through 
discursive and non-discursive practices, there is a fight for the territory involv-
ing a variety of actors, such as the promoters of Puerto Madero, its inhabitants, 
the municipality, and the inhabitants of Rodrigo Bueno, users and sellers of the 
Costanera Sur promenade and the mass media.
These practices constitute the heart of a conflict whose dominions extend to 
the symbolic, and where we can see the materiality of a dispute between mean-
ings. It is in the articulation of the different discourses and practices, which have 
different points of view of the space, that the conflict of interests acquires full 
meaning. A study of the recent history of this dispute should help us better under-
stand two discourses. On one side, conceptions and justifications of the present 
are based on certain versions of the history of Puerto Madero. On the other side, 
memories are continually shaped by the present conditions.
A first narrative to be considered is that articulated by one of the most influ-
ential players in the urban conflict: CAPMSA,3 the company in a public–private 
partnership that is responsible for fulfilling the megaproject of Puerto Madero. 
Since its inception, the company has maintained a discourse concerning social 
policies that some regard as fake. We can find three basic themes. First, it has 
always focused on the value of public and green space as one of its main targets. 
However behind these arguments in defence of the ‘public space’, urban dynam-
ics of a business nature prevail, in a context where urban requalification processes 
generate an even greater need to expel certain people from certain areas of the city 
(Rodríguez 2010).
The second strand concerns the pursuit of zero cost to the state. This discourse 
was necessary for a fundamental reason: the land on which Puerto Madero was 
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built was public. Some authors have argued that this too is a false discourse from 
a political standpoint: private investors and high-income consumers were subsi-
dized by public funds (Cuenya and Corral 2011). Some critics of the project have 
complained that the land was provided without any promised return. The corpora-
tion passes the profits from the operation to its partners, the municipality and the 
national government. The original promise that benefits would accrue to other 
social areas was never fulfilled (Cuenya and Corral 2011).
Third, we find a narrative that describes the area as one of ‘social mix’, used 
as a legitimation in response to those voices that warned Puerto Madero would 
operate as a gated community (in ways more symbolic than physical) and lead to 
exclusion. There is no mix of classes in Puerto Madero: it is an island of exclu-
sivity. The working-class activities during the weekends along Costanera Sur are 
usually cited as refutation of this claim. What we observed is a subtle urban segre-
gation, where different social classes have different uses for the area on different 
days of the week.
In short, the promoter’s discourse tries to suggest that there have been urban 
improvements for Puerto Madero’s neighbours, offering a model that contrasts 
with what seems to be happening in Costanera Sur. This latter model includes 
both the social periphery (Zibechi 2007) and the city centre, which is the social 
complex construction of the working classes, where the following concepts can 
be found: dirty, dangerous, slum dweller (these are terms taken from recorded 
interviews and the media) and invasive (Carman 2011).
In many cases, the symbolic frontiers are held to impose or maintain social 
frontiers. In accordance with this, social differences materialize in the unequal 
and different access to the material and immaterial resources in the urban space 
(Rodríguez 2010). In Puerto Madero, most of the characteristics of the neighbour-
hood relate to a quite exclusive use: poor access by public transport, very expen-
sive restaurants and cultural activities, luxury housing supply, absence of public 
schools and so on (Pico and Yacovino 2010). These are some of the remarkable 
characteristics of the neighbourhood, which additionally has the PNA and a kind 
of security system never seen before in the city of Buenos Aires.
Today, Puerto Madero has the tacit support of the city government, plus it is 
reinforced by the mainstream media, which continue to reproduce its symbolic 
frontiers. In contrast, the government continues to question the permanence of 
Rodrigo Bueno, representing its inhabitants as enemies or even usurpers of a pub-
lic space, while the media in many cases sensationalize the slums, criminalizing 
and stigmatizing their inhabitants. The segregation policy of the public authorities 
is expressed mainly in a set of discourses and practices that strengthen the physi-
cal and symbolic distance of the urban settlement from its immediate neighbours 
(Yacovino 2010). Puerto Madero builds its own notion of exclusivity based on 
this contrast, which is linked to security and differences in lifestyle. Although 
not all residents of Puerto Madero are rich, the lifestyle promoted is that of the 
upper classes. Moreover, as stated by Svampa (2001), the structural weakness of 
the Argentinean middle classes is based on the middle place they occupy. They 
are characterized politically by a conservative and reactionary mentality, and 
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culturally by a mimetic culture and ostentatious consumption. From another per-
spective, we can appreciate the contrast of tastes and its imposition by the upper 
classes using Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1988). Among the features 
of Costanera Sur is the contrast between the habits of different classes (Bourdieu 
1979), exemplified for instance by fancy expensive restaurants, and street stalls 
selling cheap food. 
Additionally, the neighbours of Puerto Madero have an important role in the 
imposition of the rules which aim to ‘order’ public space (Pico and Yacovino 
2010). We were able to verify this in several political meetings with neighbour-
hood associations. Although the original plan for the neighbourhood proposed to 
restructure the public space as ‘modern’, the rules – both explicit and implicit – 
that regulate the use of these areas, and the expectations of residents enforce a 
specific kind of public space, structured as a contemplative space, with enjoy-
ment ‘regulated’ under certain parameters. At the same time the council has rein-
forced the importance of surveillance and official control in these areas (Pico and 
Yacovino 2010). Therefore we witness here an unequal dispute that confronts 
different visions of what public space should be.
As we have seen, the discourse defending the public space by developers and 
supporters of Puerto Madero in many cases ends up stigmatizing the merchants 
and users of the Costanera Sur as well as the population of Rodrigo Bueno. They 
cite public order, care of the environment, cleaning and security as if these were 
threatened by non-residents of Puerto Madero, who have even been described as 
‘invaders’. When the use of public space is so tightly regulated, activities that 
are outside the norm can constitute a counter-hegemonic articulation, a sym-
bolic struggle for the reappropriation of the area. This leads us to argue that in 
the Costanera Sur, there is a ‘spatiality of emancipation’ (Stavrides 2007: 119), 
which is constructed by a series of appropriation practices, new meanings and the 
responses of daily life to ongoing processes of gentrification. 
We refer to a discontinuous space strongly marked by the extreme situational 
dimension of class. This is very apparent in the contrast between services for 
the working classes and for the upper classes along Costanera Sur. Hence, ‘the 
space identifies and is identified through its use’ (Stavrides 2007: 121). Stavrides 
developed the concept of a city composed of thresholds (2010), or gaps. At 
weekends the Costanera Sur loses its planned legibility, while vanishing points 
allow the working-class practices to reclaim a different urban sense of the area. 
These informal practices have correlations in social movements (Zibechi 2012), 
in contentious fights and in the construction of new citizenship paradigms (Isin 
2009). Therefore, these political and social subjects have the ability to raise up 
urban life models that are non-hegemonic. The main merit of these individual 
and collective actions is to unmask government technology models imposed on 
citizens which are rooted in individualism and precariousness. There is a clear 
intention to depoliticize the measures taken by managing urban appearance from 
the standpoint of ‘technical, non-ideological solutions’ (Stavrides 2010; Ong 
2006). Hence, everyday life along Costanera Sur, populated by street chacare-
ras (Argentinean folk musicians) and street vendors of all kinds, can be read as 
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attempts to counter the effects of neoliberalism, reclaiming new social conditions 
in contested neighbourhoods.
Conclusions
Through this chapter we have studied the use of public spaces that are constructed 
in an unequal and conflictive manner, generated by a specific appropriation by 
some social groups with different types of capital (cultural, economic and sym-
bolic). We have not only reconsidered the way in which a commoditized logic 
produces and reproduces hegemonic social structures and positions, but also 
explored a social tension between antagonistic class representations within the 
neighbourhood, rather than just between the capitalist management of urban 
space in Puerto Madero and Costanera Sur.
Consequently, the management of contested areas, such as the Costanera Sur 
which is shared by Puerto Madero and Rodrigo Bueno, in a Foucauldian (1990: 
48) sense, reveals the use of true public power ‘technologies’. Policies that attack 
the most vulnerable individuals of the societies are adopted, prioritizing hegem-
onic social practices and socially cleaning ‘undesirable’ individuals from defined 
areas. Through prevention strategies, some practices are legislated as misdemean-
ours in an attempt to regulate and naturalize this reconstruction of ‘the public’ as 
the ‘civic’. This explains some of the consequences of neoliberal spatiality for 
the (re)construction of the city through public space. Through the processes of 
subjectification of citizenship, urban power discourses are materialized and we 
see the emergence and consolidation of classic policies of ‘Haussmannization’ 
(Low and Smith 2006: 25; Harvey 2008). These are responsible for reorganizing 
the public space to promote the free movement of capital, goods and population 
around areas of the city. These policies are not casual, and they turn shops, bars 
and other enterprises into defining elements of the public and private space as 
well as ways of controlling it.
This type of ideological urban practice legitimizes tough actions against cer-
tain types of behaviour, including punitive (legal), deterrent (CCTV) and preven-
tive (urban planning) measures (Galdón Clavell 2010: 5), while also facilitating 
the processes of gentrification and urban segregation. In all these policies we find 
a bias towards an economic view of public space, making each parcel a commod-
itized object, and finally making the city a class project. It is precisely in these 
areas where actors express their position in the social system, or in other words, 
where we see classification and declassification (classement–déclassement in 
Bourdieu’s terms – Bordieu 2000), or what is the same, social stratification mate-
rialized in a strong urban segregation.
To conclude, we face two models of citizenship and other social stratification 
in the evolving city. The city is never a finished territory in consensus, but it is 
always shaped by different representations of the same, different subjectivities 
that co-produce what ultimately is spatially and socially. These disputes that gen-
erate the urban can be observed through the practices, discursive or otherwise, 
that different groups use to defend their territory. The conflict that occurs here is 
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the result of a symbolic process in search of discursive legitimacy, and beyond 
that, of social and political legitimacy. Thresholds can become urban porosities 
that allow the existence of the untamed ‘in-between zones’, supplying permeable 
flows of a community defined through its practices in the urban space.
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Notes
1 Source: www.puertomadero.com/not1.php?id=331
2  Inversiones y Representaciones Sociedad Anónima: http://www.irsa.com.ar/irsa/index_
eni.htm
3  Corporación Antiguo Puerto Madero Sociedad Anónima: see www.corporacionpuerto 
madero.com/
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18 Public spaces and transformative 
urban practices in Cape Town
Diana Sanchez Betancourt
The urban space is both a product and a medium, created by social praxis and a 
structuring element of society (Haydn and Temel 2006: 47). Public spaces are vital 
geographical and social spaces in the city; platforms for individuals and diverse 
communities to interact and come together as equal citizens and for civic agency 
to manifest and be exerted. They are also the main stages for collective political 
expression (marches) and battle sites over scarce resources such as land. They are 
the primary scenery where urban diversity either shines or is obscured and where 
the heterogeneity of urban practices is either tamed or expressed through different 
ways of ‘producing the city and living it’.
In this chapter I look at some citizen-driven initiatives and practices that have 
emerged in Cape Town over the last decade. These in my view illustrate disrup-
tions to dominant urban practices and understandings. As a Colombian residing 
in South Africa, a researcher interested in diverse intellectual approaches and a 
citizen involved in some of these initiatives, I offer a translocal perspective and 
narrative which is stirred by experiences and knowledge from different places and 
disciplines. This paper is driven by my curiosity to explore how citizens interact; 
how could they shape more human-centred and accessible spaces in highly frag-
mented urban environments, and by my interest in exploring urban public spaces 
and understandings. I therefore focus my attention on processes of social trans-
formation and the humanity of and within cities by sharing the journeys of a few 
urban actors in Cape Town. 
I use public space as a lens to explore emerging urban practices at the micro 
level (street and neighbourhood scales), proposing that these are local expressions 
of resistance to the current urban form and likely to make urbanization processes 
more sustainable by integrating notions of equity, as explored by Lawton in 
Chapter 14. Sustainable urbanization is here understood as a dynamic process that 
is shaped as local actors respond and try to adapt to the challenges posed by scarce 
resources and complex economic and social urban conditions. The practices and 
agency of the urban intermediaries here analysed illustrate the significance of 
public spaces as sites of social experimentation and transformations. These are in 
my view aspirational practices that although related to existing notions of urban 
resilience and innovative urbanization, resist the taming narratives that dominate 
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many urban practices, uses and understandings of public spaces in a city like Cape 
Town. 
Drawing on interviews with some of the individuals involved in these urban 
initiatives and on personal experience and observations as a participant and/or 
follower, I argue that these practices, which are staged in, or use public spaces, 
offer an opportunity for alternative and more integrative social and physical 
spaces. They do so in tune with ideas of resilience and the innovative urbanization 
framework which, as explored by Harris in Chapter 9, invites to embrace urban 
problem-solving through an approach that moves away from technological fixes 
towards a focus on the daily realities of urban life and the mechanics of creativity, 
human agency and transformative change (see page 00). 
I explore these practices as expressions of the human story of an urban land-
scape deeply marked by the legacy of racial segregation (Cape Town) and embrac-
ing the everyday urbanism approach (see Chase et al. 2008) to help unpack the 
implications of these actions, the social relations and networks of the individuals 
driving them and the new urban opportunities they offer. 
Social fragmentation and resilience in Cape Town
New social relationships call for a new space, and vice versa.
(Lefebvre 1991: 59)
The Apartheid system which dominated South African politics and development 
from 1948 until the 1994 democratic elections was implemented through institu-
tionalized practices of racial segregation and forced removals, which shaped the 
urban form and fabric of cities. The legacy of violent dispossession is especially 
visible in the overcrowded settlements that characterize South African cities. 
These artificially engineered human settlements were developed under Apartheid 
primarily as labour locations, separated from white suburbs and from each other 
as coloured, black and Indian families were dumped to live parallel yet separate 
lives on the periphery of the growing city. While 1994 marked the beginning of 
a new system of inclusive governance, cities have remained fragmented, with 
most of the poor and non-white confined to these overcrowded settlements (see 
SACN 2011). Twenty years after the first democratic elections, uneven density 
patterns and racial boundaries still dominate local/neighbourhood realities, while 
socially mixed communities remain a distant dream. The social resilience of urban 
communities in South Africa has been deeply affected as generations of urban 
dwellers have grown in an urban system that rejected diversity and social and 
racial mixing, and slowly undermined the potential for cultural diversity in a rich 
cosmopolitan city.
In the South African context urban resilience, and the social aspects of it, refer 
to the capacity of a city to embrace a different pathway in challenging condi-
tions, and the human capacity to assimilate and embrace change. While resil-
ience involves adapting the urban development trajectory, which may also imply 
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‘transforming local conditions based on experimentation, creativity and innova-
tion’, social resilience refers more specifically to ‘the ability of urban communi-
ties to tolerate and assimilate diversity and the capacity of diverse communities 
to interact and build trusting relationships’, therefore strengthening the potential 
of cultural diversity (SACN 2011: 12–13). 
Today Cape Town remains a city of stark contrasts. It is made up of sepa-
rate enclaves populated by different and often antagonistic racial and income 
groups, as Figures 18.1 and 18.2 illustrate. It has a population of 3.4 million 
(Kane-Berman 2012), with about 44 per cent classified as coloured, 35 per cent 
as black African, over 19 per cent as white and under 2 per cent as Asian (Bekker 
and Fourchard 2013: XIV). It is also a linguistically diverse and young metro-
politan area, where 35.69 per cent of Capetonians have Afrikaans as their first 
language, 29.8 per cent have isiXhosa and 28.40 per cent have English as their 
mother tongue. Over 30 per cent are aged between 18 and 34 and another 30 per 
cent are 17 years and younger (Bekker and Fourchard 2013: XIV). With post-
apartheid development still failing to build a more integrated and just city, 35.7 
per cent of the households live below the poverty line, 8.8 per cent have no access 
to sanitation on site and the unemployment rate stood at 24 per cent for 2012–13 
(Statistics South Africa 2012).
Figure 18.1  City of Cape Town population density: while the average population density 
is 39 persons per hectare this varies between 4 and 12 in the former white 
suburbs and 100 and 150 in the shack areas.
Source: SACN (2011: 59).
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Urban public spaces, and in particular streets, have often served as sites of 
protests for discontented urban dwellers. In the South African context these con-
testations are commonly known as service delivery protests dealing with issues 
of access (mainly to housing) and poor delivery of basic services, and in some 
cases they are a call for specific redress. For instance, the Occupy Rondebosch 
Common action organized by local social movements in 2012, which questioned 
the unequal urban form and access to land in Cape Town, called citizens to ‘lib-
erate public spaces for everyone and not only for the privileged’ (Sacks 2012). 
While the participants aimed to temporarily and peacefully appropriate the com-
mon (a large green space at the heart of a wealthy suburb which was a site of 
forced removals under Apartheid), the gathering resulted in heavy confrontation 
with the police and local authorities. According to Van Donk, as the levels of 
frustration keep rising it could be expected that these protests will be increasingly 
defined by violence (Van Donk 2013: 11).
While many of these contestations express frustration at the grassroots levels 
and are usually staged on townships, others are driven by middle-class activists 
and residents who are challenging urban development decisions around public 
land use issues. This is the case of the challenge posed to the mayor by the Cape 
Figure 18.2 Racial self-identification in Cape Town in 2011.
Public spaces and transformative urban practices 261
Town Civic Alliance around the political support of the city for the construction 
of a shopping centre in the Princess Vlei Wetland (a functional public space with 
great social and environmental significance for working-class communities). The 
proposal was challenged on the grounds that this move would further reinforce 
inequalities by privatizing a functional public space, calling for the protection of 
public spaces as integral elements of a just and sustainable city. As a local activist 
explained:
Critical to the psychological health of a community is access to recreational 
spaces where people can connect with nature; interact with each other in a 
relaxed way . . . For those living in over-crowded homes with no gardens, 
[this] can only be found in natural public spaces . . . these spaces become 
the pressure valve that enables people to cope with the stresses of social and 
economic hardship in densely populated environments.
(Pitt; 2013)
These types of contestations unfolding across Cape Town are illustrative of the 
discomfort and agency of various actors, including wealthy middle-class individu-
als and organizations. They are evidence of the gap between citizens and policy-
makers, they show the struggles of communities to exercise the right to participate 
in the shaping and utilization of public spaces (as explored by Sequera and Mateos 
in Chapter 17), and they highlight the importance of public spaces as a last resort 
for less advantaged communities (as discussed by Sotiropoulou in Chapter 19). 
Overall, these practices and other initiatives not explored in this chapter are 
expressions of social resilience, urban heterogeneity and examples of forms of 
civic agency that go beyond assimilating change, to igniting urban change. 
Human agency and public spaces
The concept of public space is a complex and multi-layered one. Its importance 
is situational and it has social, physical and political dimensions (see Staeheli and 
Mitchell 2007). The physical dimension refers to tangible spaces such as streets, 
parks and squares which are made and controlled (at least in legal terms) by gov-
ernment bodies. The political dimension refers to spaces (mainly physical but 
also virtual) where democratic freedom is exercised and where gathering enables 
political deliberations, mobilizations and contestations. Lastly, the social dimen-
sion refers to public spaces as sites where social contact with strangers occurs, 
where communities are forged and social and behavioural modifications are pos-
sible (see Staeheli and Mitchell 2007; Aramburu 2008). 
In this section I look at some emerging initiatives that illustrate the potential 
of utilizing existing public spaces (such as streets, parks and public transport) as 
instruments to challenge dominant practices and create experiences of inclusion 
and integration in public spaces.
While all dimensions are relevant and inform each other, the social dimen-
sion of public spaces is particularly relevant in socially fragmented cities where 
262 Diana Sanchez Betancourt
public spaces have been sites of segregation (like whites-only parks/beaches dur-
ing Apartheid rule) and where rapid processes of commercialization and priva-
tization are unfolding without much interrogation. In his research, Aramburu 
(2008) notes how urban spatial developments in the form of malls, gated com-
munities or public amenities that require citizens to pay are resulting in more 
homogenous spaces where encounters with socially different people are more 
unlikely. In Cape Town, while the abundant natural beauty still offers a broad 
array of open public space options, political and economic forces are pushing to 
convert natural public spaces (like Pincess Vlei wetland) into privatized com-
mercial hubs. 
This trend towards retrieving into ‘safe’ controlled areas and the privatization 
and commercialization of public spaces is an issue of concern; it restricts the 
social life of the city in ways we still need to understand and is slowly diluting the 
socialization function of public spaces. Initiatives that propose alternative uses of 
public spaces and urban infrastructure as places ‘to be’ and not only to ‘pass by’, 
potentially maximizing their capacity as sites for community socialization (see 
Aramburu 2008) need to be encouraged.
Since 2005 several urban practices carrying this spirit have emerged or gained 
force in Cape Town. Some are linked to global processes of urban contestations 
or urban development trends, while others are rooted in local practices responding 
to local needs. They express emerging dynamics that might require new concepts 
rather than recycling old categories to box them somewhere (see Isin 2009). The 
four initiatives here explored range from politicized actions to fun initiatives with 
no developmental aim, but with urban implications nonetheless. They manifest 
themselves through specific sites (the streets, social media and networks) and are 
expressed through particular acts (bicycle rides, car-free streets, urban mobs and 
open cultural spaces). As they promote small transgressions in the traditional uti-
lization of public space and resources, I argue that they have the capacity to trans-
form realities at the micro level (of streets and neighbourhoods) and potentially 
beyond, and they offer in my view, disruptions to conventional and hegemonic 
urban practices and understandings.
In the first place, representative of the power of temporary public spaces 
but lacking a developmental agenda is the monthly (every full moon) bicycle 
ride Moonlightmass.1 It was started in January 2012 by two individuals as 
‘a social experiment on Twitter’, and the small group has grown rapidly to 
include thousands. They are primarily about enjoying a fun activity in the 
Atlantic seaboard and central area of the City, and to a lesser extent about 
raising awareness for cycling and promoting non-motorized commuting 
(see www.moonlightmass.co.za/moonlightmass/About.html). The action has 
resulted in the temporary appropriation of central public spaces, prompting 
the city to provide costly resources such as traffic officers, but it has fallen 
short of promoting urban agendas such as non-motorized transport.
There is no formal organization or legal entity behind the initiative, and while 
this has provided great flexibility for the individuals behind it and fluidity to 
the experiment, it has made it challenging for the city to relate to it. This was 
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illustrated by a fall-out between the City and the organizers/participants around 
the need for an event permit for the ride. While for the City the individuals adver-
tising the ride on Facebook were event organizers and therefore responsible for 
road safety, for the moonlight riders and supporters this was not an event and 
they rejected being boxed into the ‘event organizers’ category. In their view they 
never intended the social ride to become an event and it was therefore for the city 
to manage road safety aspects. Furthermore, in an interview with local media 
the founders argued that the experiment was now community owned and driven, 
therefore beyond political or individual control:
We founded the event but if Daniel and I don’t arrive on Sunday or at any 
other ride, it will continue, the community will come because even the mar-
shals and the paramedics were organised by the community. We have just 
been the channel between the city and the community.
(Kirshenbaum 2013)
Following the public exchanges, hundreds of individuals expressed their sup-
port and commitment to do the ride on social media (regardless of a permit), 
airing their frustrations with city structures and the city’s ‘inflexible approach to 
community-driven initiatives’ (Lewis 2013). This episode shows the willingness 
of urban communities to appropriate spaces for alternative utilizations and the 
difficulty of streamlining emerging social practices in public spaces into existing 
institutional structures. 
This initiative further shows that a large number of residents are craving for 
such spaces and are eager to contest traditional uses of urban infrastructure and 
obsolete city processes, highlighting the difficulty of dealing with new resident-
driven initiatives in public spaces. It also shows, by creating a new practice and 
narrative, how public spaces could be transformed on a temporary (yet some-
times regular) basis as spaces for social gathering. However, it is important to 
note that although the social ride is an integrative space, it operates in isola-
tion from other areas of the city, standing as a bubble, and therefore limited in 
addressing physical and social divisions. While the aim of the ride has never 
been to engage with the geographical and economic divisions of the city, the 
absence of a progressive urban agenda hampers the transformative potential of 
this exercise. 
The second example takes temporary activations and social encounters to the 
next level. Open Streets Cape Town is a volunteer-based and citizen-led organiza-
tion founded in 2012, inspired by the international Open Streets movement and 
particularly influenced by Bogota’s Ciclovia model in Colombia. It has an urban 
agenda summarized in a manifesto that invites people to embrace the concept of 
Open Streets as a way to:
Build shared places that embody respect for all and help bridge the social and 
spatial divides of the city . . . through streets that; (i) enable safer and more 
cohesive communities, (ii) provide platforms for creative expression of local 
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cultures and values, (iii) are places for recreation and social interaction and 
(iv) contribute to job creation and choice in how to move around the city.
(http://www.openstreets.co.za/about/manifesto- 
open-streets-cape-town)
This initiative is an example of individual and collective agency to transform the 
utilization of public spaces. Building upon international experiences of activat-
ing the ‘recreational’ space and economy in major shared public spaces (such as 
streets), it highlights the potential of temporary public spaces to bring communi-
ties together in a platform that encourages organic social, cultural and economic 
interactions. With no financial resources it has been powered by the agency of 
five volunteers who rely heavily on personal and professional networks to engage 
with communities and key stakeholders (such as city officials) in an attempt to 
get institutional support to roll out public space experiments in the form of Open 
Streets Days. 
The organization implements localized participatory interventions like their 
Talking Streets2 community engagement series, where residents engage to do 
observation and reflective walks around a local street. They have piloted four Open 
Streets Days where stretches of public roads (around 1 km long) have been trans-
formed into temporary car-free corridors that provide free and safe recreational 
spaces for everyone (at least in principle). Their aim is to slowly build through 
experimentation, community participation and partnerships a major network of 
car-free corridors that will eventually connect distant (socially and physically) 
areas of the city. They have effectively and intensively use social media tools such 
as Twitter, Facebook and the crowdsourcing platform Thunda-Fund to reach out 
to residents (those using social media), inviting them to utilize streets differently, 
and have successfully and quickly channelled significant public support.3 
While in most cities around the world Open Streets movements are domi-
nated by cyclists and other forms of non-motorized transport (NMT), in Cape 
Town these events so far have been dominated by recreational and artistic 
activities staged and delivered by local residents and newcomers. The tem-
porary urban space that is created on the street is shaped through community 
meetings with local residents (but open to everyone) preceding the events. In 
these physical gatherings, and the virtual interactions that inform and comple-
ment them, individual agency is encouraged and later on materialized into free 
activations (games, music and performers), spontaneous acts on the day (e.g. 
people rolling out their living rooms into the street) and improvised home-
street businesses. While the pilots have been small in scale, their impact and 
significance has been widely recognized in local media and captured the 
imagination of various urban stakeholders who see the potential and see this 
as a call for action ‘to go beyond the tendency to sit back and wait for deliv-
ery’ (see Mkalima-Ngewana 2013). 
But although the City has acknowledged the potential of this platform (fol-
lowing intense lobbying from the organization), vowing financial support to 
implement an Open Streets Days Programme in 2014, implementation has been 
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a bumpy road. As one of the co-founders explains, it has been very difficult to 
work with the City and to overcome the administrative and financial challenges to 
utilize the streets as places of urban experimentation (Sanchez Betancourt 2014). 
Tensions between the City and organizers were aired in the media at the early 
stages of the process, further illustrating the difficulties of citizen–city engage-
ments (see Williams 2013). No Open Street Days Programme was rolled out in 
2014, and the first event only happened in January 2015 at a major street in the 
City’s CBD.4 Overall, the complex regulations and institutional processes illus-
trate the struggle of the City to do things differently, to utilize urban infrastructure 
in different ways and to support community-driven initiatives that fall outside 
traditional institutional boxes.
Similar to the Moonlightmass initiative, Open Streets illustrates the power 
of temporary uses of public spaces, hinting at the potential of non-motorized 
corridors to create socially mixed areas and communities, even if temporarily. 
Streets are the largest publicly owned urban asset, and in the South African frag-
mented urban setting they could be reshaped (in their use and accessibility) to 
become places of gathering and spaces to develop new social relations (see Borja, 
Aramburu 2008). The political agenda reflected in the Open Streets manifesto 
and their capacity to activate civic agency and volunteering shows the untapped 
potential of opening new urban spaces even with limited human and financial 
resources. These two initiatives illustrate both the strength and potential of actions 
at the micro level, but also the challenges of taking them forward under traditional 
urban governance structures.
As a third example, following a similar urban agenda, aiming to integrate 
distant urban socio-economic spaces through grassroots entrepreneurialism, 
inter-institutional collaborations and the arts, we find initiatives such as the ‘cof-
fee mob’ (from the Department of Coffee) and the Maboneng Township Arts 
experience.
The Department of Coffee (DOC) is a small township coffee-shop officially 
launched on July 2012 by three local residents. It is located in Cape Town’s 
biggest township, Khayelitsha, and operates on the premises of a major urban 
upgrading project. The infrastructure has provided a neater platform for local 
entrepreneurs to experiment on ways to expand their business beyond the town-
ship borders and economic limitations. According to the founders, the aim is ‘to 
help boost economic and social development, shatter class and cultural barriers, 
establish the township as an integral (and visit-worthy) part of the city . . . and to 
break down the wall between Khayelitsha and Cape Town’.5
With this in mind and with the networking and marketing skills of a city-based 
partner (a middle-class white young Capetonian), the group is trying to run reg-
ular open days where, using Facebook and Twitter, they invite residents from 
the wealthy city centre area to join an organized ‘coffee-mob’ to experience the 
township. The coffee-mob idea emerged through a Twitter conversation between 
individuals who did not know each other but ‘followed’ each other on cyberspace 
and had coinciding agendas; the coffee shop which wanted to get consumers from 
wealthy suburbs to visit the shop, an urban think tank researcher who wanted to 
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implement a flash-mob experiment in Cape Town, and the marketing manager of 
the public train company who wanted to broaden its marketing scope and make 
use of the under-utilized tourist train (Ingram 2013).
Closely aligned to this ethos is the Maboneng Township Arts Experience, 
which first happened in Cape Town in November 2012 in the Gugulethu township:
A national public arts exhibition that turns homes in townships into galler-
ies and the outdoor spaces into performance districts, it aims to integrate the 
township and the city and end the negative notion of townships through 
the arts. The Maboneng experiment has turned over 70 townships homes in 
the country into galleries. The exhibition happens annually over two days and 
includes film screenings, visual art, dance, theatre and music.
(www.maboneng.com/)
Local artist and founder Ngwenya says, ‘I’m hoping to foster an artistic culture 
that connects the township and the city into one creative bubble. I see this as a 
great opportunity to create social cohesion through a shared experience.’6
The experiments of initiatives like Maboneng offer a new terrain for explor-
ing the possibilities of the creative economy, utilizing the space in between the 
private (homes) and the public (streets) while offering opportunities for social 
encounters between divided communities (townships and the wealthier city). 
Similarly, coffee-mob experiments offer a small but practical opportunity to 
establish new urban practices to address social fragmentation by bringing town-
ship and city together in a space of playful interaction. They are evidence also of 
the potential of creating new social and economic spaces through the arts, shift-
ing the barriers between public and private spaces, and changing perceptions of 
‘the other’ through public space platforms. Lastly they illustrate the power of 
social media to connect human agency and transformative change. While all 
of these initiatives operate individually, they have converged on specific occa-
sions as individuals driving them keep contact physically or virtually in their 
search for synergies.7 
Overall, although these experiments should not be boxed into static categories, 
they share certain elements worth noting. They propose to utilize public spaces 
and cultural infrastructure in new ways, they build on informal social networks 
and social media, and lastly, while they operate at the micro scale (street and 
neighbourhood level) they have broader urban implications.
Urban agency and alternative public spaces
Public spaces, when strategically used, offer a platform where new social relations 
are likely to emerge and be reinforced, where environmentally sound practices 
could be rooted (like the NMT agenda) and where untamed and more sustain-
able urban narratives could be strengthened through the actions of new urban 
intermediaries and evolving forms of civic agency. These spaces and the human 
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interactions that unfold within them could help to transform the polarized, hierar-
chical and fragmentary social urban spaces of cities like Cape Town.
The interventions analysed here illustrate the power of temporary interventions 
as a way to start opening permanent spaces of change, the possibilities of social 
media in community action and the potential of small interventions, volunteer-
ing and interdisciplinary collaborations to build collective efforts from individual 
agency. They also illustrate the ‘rich reservoir of voluntary activism’ available 
in Cape Town (Pieterse 2012), highlight the need to utilize existing urban infra-
structure differently, and show the emergence of a younger generation of urban 
intermediaries (activists?) who advocate for urban changes by doing things them-
selves. In other words, they seem to be part of a broader global generation of DIY 
(do it yourself) citizens who as identified by Iveson are ‘not content with lobbying 
for a better city sometime in the future, and they often refuse to wait for permis-
sion to do things differently’ (2013: 945).
These citizen-driven initiatives resist being categorized as social movements, 
social enterprises or activism in the political sense. They are expressions of the 
horizontal dimensions of urban agency (citizens engaging with and among them-
selves) as explored in the South African context by Van Donk (Van Donk 2013), 
but seem to go beyond this concept, illustrating the potential of citizenship as a 
practice rather than a status (Isin 2009). They are in an in-between or untame-
able space where, although lacking a rights discourse, they promote actions that 
enhance the right to the city and represent the voices of discontent residents and 
passionate citizens pushing for better spaces for participation and to use urban 
assets differently. They are part of a broader range of micro-spatial urban prac-
tices that are reshaping urban spaces (Iveson 2013: 941) and that require further 
interrogation. They could be seen as acts of citizenship, which Isin (2009) defines 
as efforts to make a difference: breaking routines, understandings and practices, 
and using public space as their central stage and tool.
Concluding remarks
The practices examined in the previous section could be defined as expressions 
of untamed urbanisms insofar as they propose new physical and social spaces and 
therefore narratives to address historical legacies and current urban practices that 
reinforce fragmentation. As pointed out in the book introduction, they are signifi-
cant as they navigate new urban spaces and tensions to bring about transforma-
tive change. These initiatives propose different utilizations of public spaces and 
the creation of new ones; they are an invitation to transgress physical and social 
borders (township and city); they are opening new spaces for creative and social 
economy experiments; and are providing alternative forms of citizen engagement, 
particularly through social media and grassroots level networking.
While their narratives are not purposefully framed under sustainable urban-
ization or untamed urbanism discourses, their actions call for more sustainable 
urbanization processes by challenging spaces and practices of segregation and 
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building urbanization from the micro level. They are illustrative of the hetero-
geneous practices and contestations that make cities and urban life and that are 
shaping the city. Thus, they require further investigation and mapping to help us 
understand emerging processes and opportunities to bridge urban divides and to 
shape more meaningful forms of civic engagement. 
As cities continue to adapt their development trajectory, these initiatives offer 
opportunities for experimentation, creativity and innovation to transform local 
conditions. They are valuable expressions of urban resilience as they create shared 
spaces that welcome diversity to harness its potential, which is likely to increase 
the social resilience of the urban system over time.
Positive and sustainable urban changes are likely to emerge not from pol-
icy impositions but out of organic and day-to-day initiatives and social spaces 
grounded in urban communities. The alternative utilization of urban spaces and 
resources as discussed here is opening up new spaces and tensions that will bring 
about some form of change. This is the promise of public spaces as incubators for 
urban change in Cape Town and of these initiatives as liberating alternatives and 
expressions of untamed urbanism.
Notes
1  Inspired by the critical mass rides now common in cities around the world.
2  The Talking Streets series (see the Open Streets Cape Town website) involves research 
and engagement at the street level through walking seminars, as people are invited to 
share their experiences, perceptions and knowledge of local streets and propose ideas 
and take ownership in reshaping them. Intense advocacy work with local government 
and other stakeholders is also done to advance the streets/public spaces transformation 
agenda.
3  Together with the Observatory Improvement District (OBSID), Open Streets Cape 
Town managed to raise R41 500 in 30 days by utilizing the crowd-funding platform 
Thundafund. The entire event was paid for by Cape Town residents, with contributions 
from local businesses (http://westcapenews.com/?p=6757).
4  http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-01-19-car-less-bree-street-brings-colour-
and-life-to-cape-town/#.VMs_SGiUeSo
5  www.capetownmagazine.com/cafes/department-of-coffee-in-khayelitsha/93_22_18910 
(accessed 20 June 2014).
6  www.creativecapetown.com/maboneng-township-arts-experience-turning-homes-into-
galleries-in-gugs/ (accessed 20 June 2014).
7  For instance, Maboneng and Open Streets joined forces in October 2013 to stage a 
shared initiative in the Langa township, and there are current conversations with the 
Department of Coffee to extend the experiments in the Khayelitsha area.
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19 Everyday practices in Greece 
in the shadow of property
Urban domination subverted?
Irene Sotiropoulou
The more difficult and more disappointing the conditions of life are and the more 
discouraged the Conscious gets, the more the Shadow is empowered until, finally, 
its darkness has become overwhelming.
C. Jung (1972: 94)
Introduction
This chapter is a first attempt to explore the stance towards property in urban space 
adopted by grassroots everyday practices in Greek urban centres. The schemes do 
not use official currency, and neither do they follow the rule of obligatory (re)pay-
ment in kind. The discussion also examines mainstream perceptions of property, 
because on the basis of those perceptions the sharing practices are attacked, sup-
pressed and accused of illegality.
The research question of this chapter is whether grassroots perceptions and 
practices about property have any potential to defy or subvert the mainstream 
private property institutions and the mentalities that are linked to them. The com-
plexity of the issue, as well as the attempt to use psychoanalytical tools to explore 
collective efforts and arrangements, show that untameness in the city may take 
various forms, mixing the symbolic with basic needs and the institutional with 
collective unconscious and conscious behaviours. 
Consequently, half of the chapter is dedicated to theory. The next section pres-
ents the theoretical framework adopted for the analysis. Given that the use of 
psychoanalysis in studying economic phenomena is still at experimental stage, 
the following section contains a number of reflections on my theoretical caveats 
and the methods I used to access the empirical data. Three contrasting case studies 
are presented so that we can have a concrete picture of how our analytical tools 
can give us useful insights on the perceptions of property. Those same case stud-
ies are further discussed in the final section with the intention to explore whether 
grassroots initiatives may offer new thinking and practices in contrast to private 
property establishment.
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Theoretical background
Private property as a patriarchal institution in capitalism
Private property can be understood as a patriarchal institution, which has been 
reconstructed through capitalism to support, sustain and promote a set of behav-
iours which can be performed only by specific people from the general popula-
tion, and which reinforce the hierarchical superiority those people enjoy within 
our society. In other words, capitalist private property is not only an institution 
related to men. It is also a construction in favour of men who are white, mid-
dle-class, possibly engaged in entrepreneurial activities, and of course Western 
European or Anglo-Saxon. These individuals tend to favour their own privilege 
and the hierarchical system which privileges them (Richardson 2010; Pateman 
1988: 60–4, 148–52, 185).
As a result, perceptions of self, freedom and citizenship are built on and around 
this private property axis, which is sexualized and politicized in such a way that 
various hierarchies are reproduced and reinforced through the idea that a free man 
can treat as his private property everything he mixes his effort or works with. 
Conversely, no person can acquire rights through their personal work and effort 
unless they are a free man. To this, the class axis adds the fact that people who 
do not already have private property titles in their hands are unable to acquire 
property over what they mix their personal effort with. Commodification and 
privatization are based on this perception: that the private property owner is able, 
even by contracting for the work of other people, to mix this bought human work 
with his property and augment his property instead of having the other people 
establish claims over what they have produced (Bhandar 2011; Mayes 2005; 
Pateman,1988: 1–17, 39–153).
No matter how problematic it sounds, the feminization of the working class 
and of anyone and any social group that is not what capitalist private property 
describes as an owner proves that the main axis of social inequalities is still that 
of gender. This means that gender inequality and subordination is reproduced 
on various levels of economic activity and institutional structures, and it tran-
scends other inequalities, such as class, ethnicity and educational level. In other 
words, to treat homo economicus as the private property owner and producer/
entrepreneur means that all people who are not like him are subjected to the binary 
constructions of patriarchy. If you are not a homo economicus, whether you lack 
the ‘homo’ or the ‘economicus’ part, or both, you enter the economic space as a 
second-rate citizen.
An additional deeply ingrained assumption within capitalism is that owners 
of private property do not have any obligations to or (inter)dependencies with 
society, or social connections to other owners. In economics, this is expressed 
technically with the term ‘externalities’. Therefore, all social costs of private 
property and its use by its owner are calculated independently of the enactment 
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and performance of private property. This is one aspect of the private–public 
divide, where the private owner is deemed to be self-constrained and independent 
in theory, but in practice he treats his private property as non-constrained over the 
commons, and as dependent on the suppression of the other members of society 
and on the (ab)use of the public or common resources (Agathangelou and Ling 
2006; Baland and Francois 2005; Fitzpatrick 2006).
Private property as the shadow expression of a suppressed archetype
The second theoretical approach about private property stems from this ambiva-
lent or contradictory aspect of private property. The private property owner is 
institutionally without dependencies and social bonds, but practically he bases 
again and again his private income or profit on all the other people who produce 
but cannot acquire property over their effort, given that they are not already prop-
erty owners. His social bonds establish and reinforce inequalities and exploita-
tion, which are full of deprivation and violence if seen from the point of view of 
the non-owners (Pateman 1988: 39–115).
On a collective level, the property institution is part of an economic structure 
which is based on scarcity and greed. Private property is never enough if freedom 
is constructed through owning things, particularly if each private property has 
its individual and collective externalities, passed on to other members of society 
and the public or common spaces and resources. Then, owners and non-owners 
are forced to seek private property, obviously with much better results for the 
former than for the latter. And if private property is never enough, then land and 
urban space are never enough either, no matter what the size of the population is 
or whether humans have certain needs for social survival and reproduction which 
cannot exceed certain levels imposed by their mere biology.
However, instead of resolving the contradictions which lead to so much poverty 
and exploitation, it seems that people are more prone to enhance the contradic-
tions and perform them again and again. To understand this effect over people’s 
behaviour and how the private property institution might influence their percep-
tions and economic activities, I use B. Lietaer’s adaptation of Jungian analysis 
theory to economic issues (2011). Lietaer explains how the suppression of women 
and of an archetype directly connected to them (the archetype of mother goddess) 
in our society leads to behaviours which tend to reinforce economic problems at 
the expense not only of women, but of all people who are less advantaged in terms 
of power and/or finances. This Jungian analysis shows that economic institutions, 
patriarchy and economic injustice are intertwined and form a trap for all of us, 
programming our behaviour so that we remain in the trap and reinforce those 
same institutions that trap us.
The symbol of mother goddess (and the women behind it) is the archetype 
which mostly affects our productive activities or our economic life in its broad 
sense. A suppressed archetype, just like any other major symbol of human societ-
ies, cannot disappear, but turns into its shadows – that is, its negative, aggressive 
and anti-social alter ego. In other words, it is transformed within the collective 
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psyche (and in individual psyches too) into negative aspects of will which cannot 
be avoided by people and societies, but affect them deeply and unconsciously. 
Sometimes there are completely destructive results because those suppressed psy-
chic forces are uncontrollable (Jung 1980: 18–103; 1988: 17–63). Then, a sup-
pressed mother goddess becomes either a condition of scarcity or a condition of 
greed (Lietaer 2011: 55–121, 133–9, 366–87; Jung 1972: 94–5). It seems that in 
a crumbling capitalist patriarchy, both scarcity and greed can coexist at the same 
time, in the same economy.
Theoretical caveats and methods used for this project
In terms of typical private property rules, there is no need for authorities to sup-
press the two initiatives I present in my first two case studies, as they do not defy 
private property directly and turn to common spaces for their activities to take 
place. While it could be argued that such collective activities are practised by a 
marginal group of people in comparison with the total population of the urban 
areas examined, I believe their analysis can be illuminating. In other words, my 
intention here is to use the theoretical approach outlined in the previous section in 
order to examine why people undertake such initiatives, and why public authori-
ties and individuals appear to be compelled to try to ban or expel them from public 
space.
Theoretical caveats
To analyse my case studies, I used a feminist critique of property and the Jungian 
analysis of capitalism, as an analysis of a suppressed feminine archetype. I hope 
both theoretical approaches complement each other, in the sense that the first 
describes the situation as it is and the second explains forces which work against 
or for collective efforts to supersede capitalist problems.
Such an approach comes, however, with a number of risks. My worries lie 
particularly with the second approach: that is, with the use of psychoanalysis to 
understand capitalist economic activity and its alternatives. First, the last thing I 
want is to depoliticize my topic, much less to make it a vague new age discussion 
about new consciousness and an individualist stance in the face of collective prob-
lems. Second, I am aware that Jung’s theory, just like all psychological theories, 
is embedded in patriarchy, just like all the episteme we have in academia. I do not 
want to replicate stereotypes about which activity or social stance is feminine and 
what is masculine – something that is not easy to avoid when using archetypes. 
Third, no matter whether I think that stereotyping genders does not help in any 
analysis, I cannot close my eyes in the face of a situation where people still live 
collectively through such stereotypes. Much less can I close my eyes to the fact 
that the archetypes we have are ones that have been embedded for thousands of 
years in patriarchy (San Miguel 2011). Therefore, bringing into consciousness 
archetypes and shadows could be seen as a first step to being able to escape col-
lectively from the trap of the unconscious (Jung 1912: 163–230).
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Fourth, social struggles not only include psychological conditions, but also 
include stereotypes, either as points to fight against, or as ideas to develop and use 
in movements and political debates. To ignore this aspect of a struggle does not 
make the analysis more militant; rather it makes it more shallow (Beverley 2004; 
Icaza and Vazquez 2013). Fifth, to my knowledge, even if we accept the Marxist 
distinction that our capitalist societies consist of production relations which cre-
ate the base structure on the one hand and cultural constructions like ideas or 
artistic expression which are the social superstructure on the other hand, there is 
no satisfactory explanation on how base structures and superstructures interact. 
In other words, how are people affected by production relations and how do they 
then construct their ideas and arts accordingly? And if we are trapped into base 
and super-structure spaces, can we create new base/infra-structures if the existing 
ones are inescapable in mental and psychic terms? The Jungian school has worked 
extensively on the relationships between collective and individual psychology, 
and even if we could say that the direct use in economics of this school’s work 
might be quite risky, we cannot refine this theory to discuss the economy unless 
we actually use this theory to discuss the economy. 
Finally, just like all academic explorations, I expect this one to be refined, 
corrected or rejected by further research in the future. For this reason, and taking 
into consideration the aforementioned caveats, I take a number of analytical risks 
as I believe it is necessary to challenge the privatization and masculinization dis-
courses here and now (Talpade Mohanty 2002).
Methods used
In constructing this chapter, I decided to use concrete examples and data originat-
ing in my own empirical research to understand the implications of the theoretical 
arguments previously outlined, with the intention of raising more elaborate ques-
tions for further research.
In the discussion that follows, I have used two case studies for which I have 
collected data through field observation and participation between 2011 and 
2013. The schemes that are the subject of both case studies have also their own 
Facebook pages and member listings from which I obtained regular information 
on their activities. In addition, I regularly have free discussions with people who 
participate in these schemes, not only concerning problems arising from the func-
tion of the schemes, but also with reference to general issues in Greek society and 
economy which affect the schemes and their members.
I have made extensive use of internet tools and Facebook discussions not only 
because the scheme members use those tools for their internal issues, but also 
because negotiation and debate with local authorities and private businesses takes 
place through mass media and online/social media. The use of the internet permit-
ted me to have a shadow case: in other words, to have data available from exten-
sive public debates concerning a gentrification project where artists participate 
and defend the gentrification policies. This third case epitomizes a number of key 
aspects underpinning everyday discursive practices on private property. As such, 
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this case offers an opportunity to explore the contrast with the everyday practices 
examined through my initial two case studies.
I have always conducted my empirical research in the open, which means that 
I announce my researcher identity so that collectives and their members are aware 
of my work. The initiatives described in the first two case studies are groups 
with which I have had regular collaboration and discussions and which have been 
very positive to my participating and observing. Public debates are accessible to 
all, while if a debate takes place on an individual Facebook wall, even if this is 
public, I also announce that I am researching the topic and I am interested in the 
discussion for research purposes. However, it is a basic principle that I maintain 
the confidentiality required to protect individuals and communities. I access the 
material through my Facebook research account, where people can access my 
name, contact details and writings.
The case studies
Case study 1: Sharing food in a small city
The first case study concerns a social kitchen which emerged from the ‘movement 
of the squares’1 in the summer of 2011 in a small city in Greece, a long way from 
Athens. It is run and supported by individuals, local food producers and inhabit-
ants of the city who contribute work, money and raw food, or run artistic events to 
raise money to buy food for the kitchen. The kitchen group uses one room for the 
purpose of food sharing, communal meals and the gatherings of the social kitchen 
assembly. This is located at the back of the downtown school building complex, 
but is independent of the rest of the complex.
The meals are not cooked in that room, except in emergencies. Many people 
have their meal delivered to them, and therefore only some of the people benefit-
ing from this scheme actually eat in the room. Only one meal is served each day, 
and in total more than 200 households receive a meal every evening. To avoid 
disturbances to the commercial stores which are located on the same street, the 
organizers share food after 20.30 in the evening, and the meal is served in the 
room after 21.00.
However, the shop owners in the area have not been happy with this arrange-
ment. They have complained publicly many times that the social kitchen should 
not be in this location, as people who wait outside could disturb their business 
and discourage locals and tourists from shopping. The shop owners found official 
support from the local chamber of commerce and the city mayor. Both pressed to 
have the kitchen relocated to a public building well outside the town centre (which 
would make this scheme less accessible to those who need it most). However, 
plans to relocate the kitchen did not succeed despite the claim made by the cham-
ber and the mayor that the kitchen disturbed the happy celebratory atmosphere of 
the street. The shop owners then blamed two thefts that had happened in the area 
on the social kitchen and the people who receive meals there. In reality it was very 
unlikely that any illegal act would have taken place during the hours when the 
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kitchen is open (around 20.30–22.30) because there are plenty of people around 
at that time, and they would have noticed any activity of that kind. 
Case study 2: Sharing used goods in Athens
The second case study concerns a regular free-exchange bazaar, a kind of initia-
tive which also emerged from the ‘movement of squares’ in the summer of 2011. 
This is a give-and-take gathering which takes place regularly at a designated pub-
lic place in Athens. People bring and give for free unused and unwanted items, 
and take what they need out of the things other people have contributed to the 
bazaar (Sotiropoulou 2012: 44–6). This bazaar is run by a citizens’ assembly, 
and it has been organized many times over about two years in Syntagma Square, 
which is the central downtown square of Athens.
Problems with the local mayor started as far back as late 2012. The bazaar 
plan to hold a New Year’s Eve event was suspended because the city council 
organized a charity event with the same purpose in Syntagma Square. Apart from 
the obvious crowding out of the bazaar organizers by the official charity, the main 
difference was that those organizing the free-exchange bazaar did not perceive the 
activity as charity, but as an act of solidarity. In contrast, the official event was 
an explicitly charitable venture, directly based on the discourse that ‘rich people 
give to the poor’.
In late April 2013, the Athens Municipal Police forced the bazaar organiz-
ers to cancel their next planned bazaar and retrieve the goods that had already 
been accumulated in Syntagma Square. These consisted primarily of second-hand 
books, which were transferred to an artists’ squat near Syntagma Square. After 
this incident, the bazaar never took place in the square again.
The mayor of Athens justified this action by claiming that the square is the 
property of all citizens and that the organizers did not have a permit to hold a 
bazaar there. (Of course, no permit would have been granted for a bazaar had 
they applied for one.) Syntagma Square is well known as a downtown meeting 
place and a site of political struggle. It is situated in one of the main commer-
cial areas in Athens, and is also a space where non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and also private companies can set up kiosks to promote their services. 
Many private companies use the subway entrance in the square as a location 
to give away leaflets, offers and sample products. None of those activities has 
been considered as a trespass against citizens’ property, and the mayor has not 
as yet replied to citizens’ questions about whether these activities all had the 
necessary permits.
By contrast, in the case of the free-exchange bazaar, the mayor declared that 
he would not tolerate anomie, while portraying the exchange of books in a public 
space as an occupation of the square. This means that, in effect, the ban applied 
only to non-commercial free-exchange but not to the established commercial 
activity that takes place in the square. In other words, what became questioned 
through this conflict was whether people can collectively exchange things with 
each other for free in a public space.
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Case study 3: Nothing belongs to the people?
The third case study emerged quite late, in early September 2013, when I had 
already written the first draft of this chapter, and is related to an artistic project and 
real estate development plan in one of the oldest and most disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods of downtown Athens. This area is undergoing gentrification, with real 
estate investors and companies showing an increasing interest in investing there. 
The artistic project was one of the first to be openly and privately funded by a real 
estate company that had bought properties in the area.
I decided to include this case study for a number of reasons. It is clear that the 
poverty and the poor people of the area are considered ‘the problem’ for any revi-
talization of the neighbourhood by the municipality who sent the police and by 
the real estate investors of the area who demanded such handling (Chatzistefanou 
2013). The gentrification requires police action against the poor people who live 
and work in the area, usually under very bad conditions. My main reason, though, 
was that some of the organizers of the artistic project publicly defended the proj-
ect in online debates using the discourse of private property. In particular, they 
insisted that the poor people who live around this area were degrading the prop-
erty and the work embedded in the artistic private spaces.
One of the organizers complained publicly about homeless poor people liv-
ing on the streets and against sex workers working in the same area where the 
artistic event is taking place. She clearly did not like their lifestyle, although she 
focused on issues of hygiene. Another organizer wrote in public that she would 
be happy to see the poor homeless people persecuted and displaced to other areas. 
Nevertheless, I stuck with the case once I read the written statement of another 
organizer that ‘nothing belongs to the “people” (and to their beloved “immi-
grants”), much less in the name of their misery, and nothing belongs to Art in the 
name of Art’.
I included this case study as a shadow case, in the sense of the Jungian shadow 
of archetypes (Jung 1972: 94–5, Lietaer 2011: 37–54, 119–21). In other words 
I treated it as an opposite, or as the mentality against which the organizers in 
the first two case studies try to fight back. That is, they try to stand against the 
prevailing power of private property in structuring public space, or at least this 
is what they differentiate themselves from. The organizers of the artistic event 
(all the three who publicly expressed such views were women) were furious with 
poor people because they used the streets and the public space to live in, while 
the private property owners needed that same public space to make their private 
business and space accessible to the wider public, sponsors and the mass media.
Beyond property in urban space?
Private property’s aggressiveness towards 
non-property-demanding practices
It seems that, in general, the private/public divide still works for private com-
panies and businesses. Private property is private, while public property serves 
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profit-making private agents (Atkinson 2003). This stance has been adopted by 
the local authorities in all three case studies: they seem to support the idea that 
public space is better fitted to be used by private, often profit-making, businesses 
rather than by all city dwellers. This stance is also very problematic in practice, 
because the commons and public resources are in every community the last resort 
of the least advantaged who in many cases face not only poverty, but also gen-
dered poverty (Bayat 2000; Baland and Francois 2005; Platteau 2006; see also 
chapter 15 by Manase Chiwese).
Therefore, the property discourse works both as public property and as private 
property, against the public spaces and urban commons (Zick 2006) and, in real 
terms, against those people and/or groups who have no property of their own or 
have very limited material resources within the urban space (Atkinson 2003). As 
a result, the contrast becomes evident between, on the one hand, institutional and 
legal rights which frame social relations through the paradigm of property, and on 
the other hand, the grassroots perceptions of using urban space, which implicitly 
or explicitly reject such paradigms.
The three case studies also make evident that the policy summarized as ‘there 
is no space’ for grassroots initiatives and everyday survival enforces the con-
structed scarcity of urban space, which in turn is linked to the shadow archetype 
of the suppressed producer (mother goddess). I have already mentioned in the 
theoretical section how the archetype of mother goddess is the archetype of pro-
ducers, and what its suppression means for our societies. The social kitchen and 
the free bazaar shake up our programmed behaviour to seek property and entitle-
ment for everything: anyone, irrespective of their economic or political status, can 
participate in one way or another in the sharing. Contrary to this, the people who 
run the gentrification artistic project perceive that there is not enough urban space 
for all, much less enough for the most disadvantaged.
As a result, even if practices like the ones described in the first two case stud-
ies might not have emerged as a direct resistance to capitalism, they might form 
a type of deep resistance to capitalism and patriarchy, and to all those connota-
tions working together in favour of an old and complex system of injustice. Such 
practices are negotiated and persist, even when displaced, without arguments over 
property entitlement. They are at the same time a practical attempt to de-stereo-
type poor people and all activity that takes place without the rule of obligatory 
payment or reciprocity. They decolonize alternative practices of resource use and 
sharing from being signs of poverty, ignorance and marginal lifestyles (Thelen 
2011), (re)constructing them as signs of abundance, inventive thinking and soli-
darity among different people and social groups. In other words, the two first case 
studies reveal that abundance exists where poverty does not, making possible 
such a thing as a free meal and a free book (Lietaer 2011: 55–126).
At the same time, we can see from all the case studies that the shadowy prop-
erty archetype continues to exert aggression and to expand to colonize every 
aspect of associational urban life. Capitalism displaces people in the city and 
suppresses collective coping strategies attempting to recolonize it, both as liv-
ing proofs of lower status or even as activity which devalues and destabilizes 
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the prosperity of privatized urban space. The persecution of such practices takes 
place through property discourse and violence institutions (typically the state or 
municipal police), and it in the process reproduces and increases poverty and 
scarcity (Atkinson 2003). 
First, we need to take into account the systemic violence by property own-
ers using a public discourse of ‘being attacked’ by the poor people who just use 
the urban space for dwelling or survival. Second, we need to notice the support 
this discourse receives from official associations and authorities (Blomley 2003; 
Garnett 2009). Both aspects combined make us see that private property becomes 
weirdly, incommensurately aggressive to people and activities which apparently 
do not demand or attack property. This is increasingly the case in cities, where the 
commodification and privatization of space and life often reaches its most overt 
and intolerant expression.
The revival of a suppressed archetype as possible 
collective subversion of private property
What could be underneath this aggressiveness? As already mentioned, homo eco-
nomicus and privatization are institutionally normalized shadows which attack 
humans, urban space and communities under the TINA (there is no alternative) 
assumption of neoliberal policies. Every practice that conscientiously revives the 
suppressed archetype of compassion, creativity, sharing, abundance, sociality and 
justice without entitlement and ownership shakes the shadow (suppression of the 
archetype) and disturbs the psychological programming that capitalism and pri-
vate property institutions have imposed over the urban space and its inhabitants.
However, just as material claims over the communal resources are not enough 
to achieve communal life, it also takes loads of collective conscientious effort to 
refurbish, develop and free the archetypes that are not shadowy and aggressive 
(Jung 1972: 36–97). The extremity of official retribution and persecution towards 
those practices mirrors some very interesting features of the grassroots sharing 
schemes:
– Scarcity and greed as institutional results of private property. A first con-
clusion is that grassroots sharing schemes reveal that there is some poten-
tial to reverse the situation of believing that scarcity and greed are normal 
behaviours or human instincts against which it is impossible to fight (Lietaer 
2011: 345–92). Both the social kitchen and free-exchange bazaar case stud-
ies expose how scarcity and greed are institutionally created and sustained. 
The third (shadow) case study shows that the perception of public space as 
something that should serve private property and its owners is not based on 
any instinct but on the deeply ingrained archetype of private property itself. 
The tautology which is implied in the third case study discourse is that ‘as a 
private property owner I have the right to decide about public property too, 
and this right does not exist for the people who have no private property in 
the area where I have private property’. This tautology or circular argument 
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reveals the class aggressiveness that can be publicly and unapologetically 
exerted in the public domain, and also how and why property owners feel 
entitled to ask for more rights over the rest of urban dwellers.
– The practicality of small, grassroots, marginal experiments. A second 
observation emanating from the previous analysis is that grassroots ini-
tiatives which are organized beyond institutional structures and beyond 
property agreements seem to have the potential for new conditions to be 
created for social and economic collective action (Fafchamps 1992; see 
also chapter 20 by Ferne Edwards). Food is secured for people in the first 
case study. This does not only ensure their survival within a framework of 
harsh capitalist conditions, no matter whether they are examples of homo 
economicus or not; it also reinforces their potential to think of resources 
and human effort in a way far from the individualist approach of the ‘sur-
vival of the fittest’ and ‘the winner takes all’. The first two case studies 
show that reproduction of humane living conditions stems from collec-
tive arrangements that function beyond strict reciprocity which is actu-
ally linked to the ideas that what we need to reproduce ourselves as social 
beings (food, books, etc.) is scarce and that all humans are greedy if they 
are not restrained by a pay-back rule. Securing this biological and social 
reproduction requires complex arrangements that small experiments can try 
to improve and educate communities about (Weiner 1980). As argued by 
Jung (1972: 94), securing a main reproduction resource every day creates 
a collective condition where the collective shadow of scarcity is gradually 
disempowered.
– Private property cannot really work if it is not absolute. Privatization of 
everything is ideally what capitalism (and the suppressed shadowy producer 
archetype) wants (Demsetz 1964; Webster 2007). The case studies analysed 
indicate that total privatization is not only about destroying the lives of 
humans and natural resources, but also about eliminating any human crea-
tivity which might be able to resist this absolutism. Public spaces are then 
renamed and reconstructed as addenda to private property, and they get pri-
vatized in the name of the people who cannot access them. The negative 
stance adopted by the authorities and private business, and their discourse 
in all three cases, show that even small-scale demonstrations that people can 
survive in many ways other than by negotiating with private owners can be 
detrimental to the capitalist privatization project.
– While privatization of urban space expands, the free archetype of the mother 
goddess who is not a private property owner is remembered and practised. 
According to the Jungian analysis, the archetype re-emerges not only to 
reverse destruction but to create from scratch new resources, spaces and com-
munities (Lietaer 2011: 55–139). Women prevail in this type of grassroots 
practices, in the first two case studies as both members and coordinators, 
and so do they in most similar schemes across Greek cities (Sotiropoulou 
2014). The interesting thing is that in the third case study, the ideology of 
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aggressive property ownership was also promoted by women [artists running 
the artistic event]. However, just as capitalist patriarchy is not only about 
suppressing women and people from outside Europe, the mother goddess 
archetype of prosperity and abundance refers to all people, regardless of their 
gender. While private property attempts to eliminate the inventiveness and 
the resources of people trying to survive, the ideas that stand for collective 
arrangements based on common resources and spaces proliferate and become 
more resilient than expected.
Conclusion
Returning to the title of this chapter, it could be argued that subversion is too 
narrow a notion to describe social forces and everyday practices working outside 
the paradigm of private property in contemporary cities. Moreover, it might be 
premature to put this label on the grassroots everyday sharing schemes analysed 
in this chapter. Nevertheless, the emergence of abundance, non-property-sharing 
and feminine archetype practices such as the ones explored here show that those 
same practices are not for mere survival only. The people of the schemes negoti-
ate and resist publicly the property discourse, showing that what they do exceeds 
the limits of property thinking and the institutional frameworks which regulate 
public space and other commons within cities.
Whether such practices will eventually become subversive in the future against 
the shadows and capitalism itself is not known. That is of course the very nature 
of the ‘untamed’, which means that control by the powerful is not entirely suc-
ceeding in the first place, without, at the same time, anyone being able to fore-
see what the resisting groups will decide to do after that. Further research could 
explore and reveal their potential, or at least it could refuse to turn a blind eye to 
the attacks those practices face and to the reasons for those attacks.
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1 In late May and the entire summer of 2011, people were gathering in the main square of 
big cities in Greece demanding the cancellation of austerity policies, discussing alterna-
tives, organizing demonstrations and other events, and opening the political space to 
people who were until then quite far from collective efforts. The entire movement has 
been called the ‘movement of the squares’, and concerning Athens it has been brutally 
suppressed. By the end of summer 2011 the entire effort started to mutate into other col-
lective initiatives.
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20 Free-ing foods? 
Social food economies towards secure  
and sustainable food systems
Ferne Edwards
The current global industrial food system is being challenged by incidents of inse-
curity, as food supply is at risk from weather extremes in times of climate change, 
as fluctuating prices dictated by the global market result in food riots around 
the world, and as food scares from hidden production processes cause consumer 
concern and food loss. Rather than recognize the industrial food system as the 
only food procurement option, in this chapter I draw attention to the persistence 
of non-capitalist food economies and the emergence of new, innovative models. 
These untamed – in the sense of unfunded, unregulated and diverse – social food 
economies are found in cities both where issues of food insecurity and sustainabil-
ity are paramount, and where the people and resources required to resolve these 
issues can be found. I tell the stories of people who are gleaning, growing and 
gifting foods in Sydney, Australia, to ask how social food economies contribute 
to secure and sustainable food systems.
The rise of the urban food movement
Since the 1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in urban agriculture in 
the West. This was previously predominant in the developing world, accompa-
nied by discourses of survival, cultural diversity, food poverty and insecurity (see 
Abrahams 2006; Crush et al. 2011; Egziabher et al. 1994), while food was abun-
dant in the cities of the Global North (see Gaynor 2007). But now citizens across 
the developed world have started to acknowledge issues of the global food system 
and look for possible alternatives.
Cockrall-King (2012) identifies three phases of the new urban food move-
ment. The first is epitomized by Tim Lang’s coining of the term ‘food miles’ 
in 1993, with its message supported by the research papers ‘The food miles 
report’ (Paxton 1994), ‘Eating oil’ (Jones 2001) and ‘In praise of slow’ 
(Honoré 2004). In addition to urban agriculture, alternative food networks 
(AFNs) also emerged during this period as a reaction against the globalization, 
standardization and unethical nature of the global industrial food system. AFNs 
represent a wide range of alternative food pathways that build on ethics of sus-
tainability, social justice, animal welfare and the aesthetic values of local food 
cultures. AFNs seek to transform and diversify modern food provisioning by 
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connecting ethical producers and consumers in more localized and direct ways 
(see Goodman et al. 2011).
In the second wave of the urban food movement in the 2000s, consumers 
became more aware of the political implications of their diets, with farmers’ 
markets and community-supported agriculture projects growing in popularity, 
as the Slow Food movement pushed for ‘consumers’ to become ‘co-producers’. 
We saw the introduction of the term ‘locavore’, to describe people who eat 
foods grown close to where they live, in 2009. In the third wave, cities became 
central to food politics when for the first time in history more people lived in 
cities than in the countryside. In late 2007 and 2008 global food insecurity 
reached new heights when food riots erupted in over 30 countries, with the 
United Nations announcing that in the world 862 million people were hungry 
(FAO 2009).
While there is now greater focus on the role of the city to address food inse-
curity challenges, the transformative capacity of many so-called ‘alternatives’ to 
the industrial food system has been questioned by scholars and activists. Among 
the issues raised are that ‘alternatives’ remain within the capitalist market, remain 
dependent on the capitalist state for funding to exist, or are created to fill a gap 
of need left by capitalism as part of the welfare state (see Goodman et al. 2011; 
Guthman 2004; Tregear 2011). Rather than contest issues embedded within the 
industrial food system, green capitalist and social welfare models may instead 
reinforce existing, unequal capitalist power relationships and dynamics. By ignor-
ing political relations and issues of equity, they continue to overlook issues of 
class, race and privilege.
 Indeed, from my perspective as both an academic researcher in sustainable 
cities and a participant in many not-for-profit sustainability organizations, when 
attending conferences and workshops I have been constantly struck by how many 
organizations devote much time and energy to seeking funding rather than ques-
tioning the narrow forms of dealing with these issues and how they could get 
beyond them. At other events I have witnessed comprehensive discussions that 
have omitted the topic of who holds the power to determine access to funding. 
Indeed, in these ways such organizations are being ‘tamed’ – herded to act in 
specific ways to conform to funding requirements. This taming process reduces 
complexity in order to homogenize and push ahead ‘progress’, quietening alterna-
tives that could be perceived to threaten dominant interests, rather than allowing 
for diversity and difference. I argue that such complexities offer possible solutions 
and innovations that are essential in a dynamic world. As an anthropologist, I 
recognize that political-economic systems change, and that it is crucial for people 
to constructively criticize current practices and to consider aspects from emerging 
radical examples in order to adapt well to changing circumstances.
To bypass issues of capitalist dominance and constraints, I focus instead on 
social food economies: food economies that are non-capitalist in that they are 
unregulated and non-monetary, and social in that they directly connect people 
with procurement processes and prioritize social and environmental justice over 
economic values. Social food economies are often overlooked or trivialized in 
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the media and by government bodies because of their small quantities and scat-
tered distribution, with other economic priorities such as increasing house size, 
falling wages, food as an export commodity and urban development coming first. 
Instead, this paper employs a ‘weak theory’ perspective from economic geogra-
phy (see Gibson-Graham 2006: 71) to look beyond assumed, ‘known’ facts to 
recognize the space ‘in-between’, where relationships and actors not dominant in 
the capitalist market can be found.
Case studies: gleaning, growing and gifting food 
I have chosen three case studies from Australia to represent a food systems 
approach, providing examples from production through to distribution, exchange 
and waste that occur across a range of ecosystems, urban forms, social demo-
graphics and modes of participation. ‘Gleaners’ are people who collect edible or 
medicinal weeds, surplus fruits and nuts overhanging people’s fences or found 
on public land. Those I studied operate primarily in the central south-west of 
Sydney (NSW), and obtain edible mushrooms from state forests on Sydney’s 
fringes. ‘Growers’ are people who grow a substantial part of their own food: in 
this case, in Sydney’s peri-urban region of the Blue Mountains, Mount Tomah 
and the Hawkesbury. ‘Gifters’ are people who redistribute processed foods dis-
carded as waste from the capitalist food system. They include ‘dumpster divers’, 
people who choose to retrieve edible food discarded by retail outlets as a protest 
against overconsumption and waste, and those involved in two organizations: 
Food Within, a not-for-profit micro-enterprise that helps disadvantaged people by 
bartering access to fresh, healthy food; and OzHarvest, a charity that rescues food 
from function centres, caterers, offices, restaurants and cafes to donate to charities 
for people who are disadvantaged or at risk.
From January to August 2011, I interviewed 8 ‘gleaners’, 21 ‘growers’ and 4 
‘gifters’ in addition to conducting participant observation of activities. The glean-
ers were identified from ‘weed tours’ and ‘food mapping’ websites, online maps 
that reveal the availability of uneaten foods. The growers were selected from food-
sustainability groups, and the gifters from food rescue and barter organizations.
How ‘free’ are they? Exploring alternative economic  
theory and concepts of autonomy
Alternative economic theory contributes to an understanding of social food econ-
omies by acknowledging social and environmental values, space and concepts of 
autonomy. Calling to first ‘step away’ from the capitalist economy, degrowth eco-
nomics, proposed by Georgescu-Roegen in 1971, challenges capitalism’s prior-
itization of economic values over others to recast ‘economic activities in political 
terms’ (Fournier 2008: 534). Gibson-Graham (2006) then challenges capitalism 
as the only political-economic system to acknowledge the diversity of economies 
that exist both within and outside of capitalism. By acknowledging the validity of 
diverse economies, they argue that people can exist in a ‘zone of cohabitation and 
Free-ing foods? 287
contestation among multiple economic forms’ (Gibson-Graham 2006: xxi). Such 
economic alternatives posit ‘a renewed interest in the possibilities of alternatives 
to capitalism that go beyond the failed models of state socialism’ (Leyshon et al. 
2003: 12).
The concept of ‘autonomous zones’ then broadens alternative economic 
geographical spaces to encompass social, political and ecological dimensions. 
Cattaneo (2011) identifies three stages towards autonomy away from the capital-
ist system: that of social autonomy of thought, where people learn to question 
the authority of the media and assumed capitalist values; autonomy from money, 
where people trade time for money, reducing their need to spend and hence work; 
and autonomy from the ‘system’, where rural squatters with access to material 
resources ‘drop out’ of the capitalist market. The topic of social food economies 
emerges from a critique of AFN literature, drawing on Gibson-Graham (2006) to 
recognize the existence of diverse food economies. These social food economies 
are then discussed through the lens of autonomy.
Autonomy from money: do social food economies meet  
food security needs?
Food security is defined as when ‘all people at all times have physical and eco-
nomic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO 1996). This concept is often 
broken down into the aspects of quantity, quality, access and health. Social food 
economies are not food secure in terms of supply, with foods procured comple-
menting rather than replacing supermarket-bought foods. However, in terms of 
quality, they add diverse new flavours, textures and nutritional elements which 
often better suit alternative procurement due to freshness, time and knowledge 
required for harvesting, and supply and demand. Although they provide a diver-
sity of crops, there is much potential to grow even more, with motivations includ-
ing inquisitiveness, environmental and social justice, community and pleasure 
preceding food security concerns.
Foraged foods include edible weeds such as sorrel, saltbush, wild fennel, war-
rigal greens and mushrooms, while growers produce many unusual fruit and veg-
etables, and animals for consumption such as fish and squab. Alternatively, gifters 
rescue and redistribute food from the commercial sector, including fruit and veg-
etable markets, supermarkets, wholesalers, corporate events, catering companies, 
distributors, warehouses, shops, delis, film and television shoots, and restaurants. 
The amount of food that would normally go to waste is staggering: OzHarvest 
delivered 5.34 million meals nationally in 2012, diverting 1.6 million kilos from 
landfill (OzHarvest 2012).
Foods from social food economies offer a fresh source of nutrients, adding 
fruit, vegetables and salad to conventional diets, while foraging in Sydney pro-
vides greens in spring, mulberry, fruits and fennels in summer, and mushrooms, 
fennel seeds and dandelion roots in autumn. Furthermore, many wild plants are 
highly nutritious. For example, 100 grams of dandelion greens contain 11,000 mg 
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of potassium, 18 mg of vitamin C and 42 mg of calcium (see Wild Edible and 
Medicinal Plants n.d.). They also offer substantial indirect health benefits which 
include herbal remedies, mental health benefits and opportunities for social 
engagement and physical exercise.
However, food safety can be an issue, with consumption of unregulated foods 
requiring sufficient knowledge for harvesting and preparation. Likewise, forag-
ers may also encounter collection sites that are polluted or poisoned. To coun-
ter food safety concerns, foragers are encouraged to first eat what is found in 
backyards before foraging in public areas. Likewise, companies that donate foods 
to organizations such as OzHarvest are protected under the Civil Liability Act 
2002. Dumpster divers are largely protected from food poisoning because of the 
wide variety of stock, their vegan or vegetarian diets, food preparation knowledge 
and excessive packaging, and by applying the senses of touch, taste and smell 
(Edwards and Mercer 2007).
Although social food economies are economically ‘free’, access to these may 
be hindered by time, interest and energy, in addition to required technologies, 
such as computers for food mapping. Furthermore, members are predominantly 
middle class, well educated, and have strong political beliefs which can exclude 
others from participating. Food Within is an exception to this trend, offering dis-
advantaged people a ‘Hand up, not a hand out’ (Food Within 2012) through a 
ten-week education and food bartering programme.
Autonomy of thought: reinterpretations of diet free  
from corporate control
Key motivations behind these diets include gleaners’ strong desire to reconnect 
to the landscape, to explore new flavours, and to prevent feral food from going to 
waste; growers’ environmental, social and economic concerns, with some striv-
ing to grow extensive self- and community-sustaining gardens; and gifters’ desire 
to rebalance issues of greed and need, voicing urban food security concerns. 
Foraging appeals to people who want to learn more about their environment, and 
to immigrants who wanted to continue their cultural traditions in Australia. The 
inclusion of edible or medicinal ‘weeds’ or mushrooms to their diet adds both cul-
tural and biological knowledge to it. Stefanie explained how foraging continues 
to link her to childhood:
We use to go mushroom picking with my grandparents in Poland too . . . I 
think everybody in Poland goes mushroom picking. It’s a cultural thing . . . 
When they brought the pines, they brought the mushrooms rhizomes, what-
ever they are, and the two species that came with it. And we have beautiful 
mushrooms here.
Bonetto, an environmental artist with an Italian background who runs weed tours 
in Sydney, had the aim ‘to rediscover traditional knowledge, to celebrate the 
multiplicity of cultures in botanical terms’ (Radio National 2012). Furthermore, 
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Bonetto desires to delve into the socio-cultural framing of ‘weeds’ – to ask why 
non-indigenous plants are considered illegal. Bonetto comments:
Weeds are defined by a nation’s law, and what is declared weed in one place 
may be a precious resource in another. There is a significant metaphorical 
connection between this definition of ‘weed’ and the arbitrary restriction 
imposed on human migration by national governments.
(Wild Stories n.d.)
For other gleaners, rather than represent an alternative to the capitalist food sys-
tem, harvesting wild resources allows them to participate and profit within it, 
with top-end restaurants placing unusual ingredients on their menus at exorbitant 
prices. Such wild produce offers new tastes and textures that often cannot be 
matched by commercial sources, as was explained by Jaimie, a young restaurant 
forager:
What was growing there was the flavours. Really wild flavour. Anything for-
aged obviously, its wild nutrients. No fertilizer obviously. It’s always tasting 
like very different compared to anything commercially grown because it’s 
just wild. Obviously a lot of it’s a lot stronger, bitter.
While some believe that wild harvesting contributes to an environmental aware-
ness (see Ellena 2012), it is unclear to what extent the environmental value of for-
aged food reaches customers. When asked about customers’ reactions to the food, 
Jaimie stated, ‘I’d hate to say this but 90 per cent don’t actually know. They’re 
there for the “wow” factor. There is also the wow factor of having found some-
thing that no one knows. You say, “wow, what’s that?!”’ Instead, it is the foragers 
themselves who explore Sydney’s hidden corners that benefit most from knowing 
where the produce comes from.
Food mappers’ motivations are clearly labelled on their websites: for Scrumpers 
Delight it is ‘a community mapping project to share the joys of scrumping’, for 
Urban Food Maps it is ‘to encourage selfless collaboration and foster kindness of 
strangers’, for the Blue Mountains Fruit and Nut Network it represents an ‘infor-
mal (non-monetary) economy network [that] connects growers and consumers’, 
and for LandShare Australia it is an initiative that ‘brings together people who 
have a passion for home-grown food, connecting those who have land to share 
with those who need land for cultivating food’.1 Additional motivations include 
reducing food waste and the demand for lengthy food chains, and encouraging 
the sharing of public and private space to free up urban land for food. They also 
strive to encourage healthy lifestyles through greater exercise, consumption of 
fresh food, social interaction and community. These latter food maps thus reflect 
a different way to read the city as a proactive, engaged space where resources both 
do and can exist.
Nearly all growers garden with environmental or animal welfare motivations 
in mind. Aspects include maintaining biodiversity, caring for the soil, and caring 
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humanely for chickens and other livestock. Many participants also practise per-
maculture, a design philosophy that espouses the ethics of earth care, people 
care and fair share (Holmgren 2003). The involvement of some surfaced from a 
perception of crisis or uncertainty, with some citing ‘peak oil’ as a motivation, 
the belief that maximum petroleum extraction has been reached with expected 
catastrophic implications for agriculture and transport. Hence, many respond-
ents desired to learn how to be self-sufficient in their food production. Growers 
explicitly voiced their desire to be less dependent on the capitalist food system, 
and are often identified as ‘downshifters’, ‘people who make a voluntary, long-
term, lifestyle change that involves accepting significantly less income and con-
suming less’ (Hamilton and Mail 2003: 8). Downshifters had experienced a shift 
in values from making money to pursuing a better quality of life for themselves 
and others. As expressed by Lance, a grower in peri-urban Sydney, it’s about 
revaluing people and the land:
I just felt that from an environmental point of view, I didn’t think the way 
we were living was a particularly good way of living, society in general, so I 
wanted to change the way I lived that reflected what I though was important 
and not what society was telling me was important . . . I see value in working, 
and that is why I call this work, but it is a different type of work, and I see 
value in community work and doing work that is not paid.
Gifters’ motivations were strongly focused on urban food security concerns, 
redistributing food to disadvantaged communities in a range of ways. For exam-
ple, OzHarvest donates food to agencies that prepare meals for those in need, and 
Food Within offers local residents places to work in its not-for-profit organiza-
tion so they can barter for food, effectively training and empowering people to 
get beyond their food insecurity state. Dumpster divers, the most radical of the 
‘gifting’ examples, also redistribute food among their social, often activist, net-
works, often foremost for political and fun reasons. Commenting on her political 
motivations for dumpster diving, Kelly, a young ‘diver’ also living in the Blue 
Mountains, exclaimed:
I just can’t just believe the stuff that’s thrown away. It’s all so edible and 
so fit for consumption. And it makes me angry that they’re doing that and it 
makes me proud to be involved in getting it back out again. Bringing it back 
into circulation.
Hence, the three social food economies analysed offer a disparate autonomy of 
thought, ranging from those that incorporate social food economies into the capi-
talist market, selling foraged foods to restaurants, to those (such as OzHarvest) 
that revalue once ‘conventional’ foods with new social and environmental moral 
values through the process of rescuing and redistributing food to those in need, 
to those who consume a largely different diet to set them apart from capitalist 
constraints, such as growers, food mappers and dumpster divers. Regardless of 
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their variable motivations, representatives of all social food economies valued 
their produce beyond dominant economic values, and included cultural, social, 
economic and environmental justice values.
Autonomy from the system: how alternative are  
alternative food economies?
The social food economies in my sample with the least autonomy from the sys-
tem are OzHarvest, which works closely with corporations to redistribute waste, 
and foragers who sell wild harvest to restaurants. OzHarvest recognizes its role 
in assuaging corporations’ ‘green guilt’. However, although it represents a social 
food economy within and dependent on capitalism, its involvement provides a 
means to revalue waste as a resource, with this message being accepted by a main-
stream audience, while providing extensive support to many in need. The food res-
cue model has now been replicated throughout Australia, with OzHarvest branches 
in Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Newcastle, adding recognition to a new 
wave of independent food rescue agencies such as SecondBite and Fare Share.
However, for foragers who sell wild harvest to restaurants, this practice appears 
to represent simply yet another green consumerist trend with some dubious conse-
quences. For example, once wild harvest ingredients become popular, rather than 
benefit the environment, they may instead harm it. Jaimie explains:
If it’s on the menu on one of the Three Hats restaurants in Sydney . . . The lit-
tle guys will go, ‘Well, these guys have got Three Hats. They must be serving 
something that we need.’ So they’ll go, ‘OK, they’re serving saltbush.’ And 
everyone knows everyone, so they’ll find out where this restaurant gets it and 
it will be on their menu. And it will keep going through and then it will be on 
twenty people’s menu. And after that the resources will go because everyone 
would have got it from the same spot.
The people with the most autonomy from the system are growers in the Blue 
Mountains who, through their everyday gardening and sharing of skills through 
like-minded social networks within a geographically bounded territory, are effec-
tively creating an autonomous food zone towards a more productive city. These 
spaces of change extend to working with local councils, which have agreed to 
not spray poisonous chemicals on public land to encourage foraging, and to grant 
permission for people to grow food on street verges. Growers also have the most 
developed vision of what an alternative food future could look like. This desire for 
change often extends beyond the individual to care for the local community and 
to consider the establishment of new political-economic systems and territories. 
Visions of a sustainable food future from a number of growers included these 
comments:
What we need to do, from our point of view, is we need to live with as much 
local sufficiency as possible. Our vision would be, you have to get rid of 
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money, right? Organize what we need and how much can we produce right 
here. We need to swap [with] a neighbour, [with our] neighbouring region[s 
to meet] their basic needs . . . The internet can be employed very usefully. It 
can mean that every household can work out what it might consume over a 
six to twelve month period. And if you take twelve months – that’s the natu-
ral season – so that’s a natural thing to look at and if people are really clear 
about what they need and what the substitutes are, then you can get together 
a bigger list of all the people in a bioregion and you could start planning in 
such a way so people are as self-sufficient as possible and then collectively 
sufficient.
These social food economies thus illustrate a range of autonomy from the system: 
from those who make profit from the city’s free natural resources, such as forag-
ing for restaurants, to those that remain within the capitalist model to address 
major socio-ecological needs with the potential for transitional change, such as 
OzHarvest and Food Within.
Discussion: how are social food economies  
productively disruptive?
From the research, it is evident that the case studies represent diverse food initia-
tives with examples both coexisting with the conventional system and remaining 
outside it. These diverse economies on the whole use very few resources, re-read-
ing what can be considered useful or edible from the local environment, such as 
foraging, to reuse resources that would often go to waste. In the case of growing, 
this includes employing techniques of permaculture, composting and wastewater 
reuse, while for gifting this entails collecting and redistributing discounted or free 
food from the commercial sector. Hence, in some ways, social food economies 
are parasitic in resource use by taking away from, rather than contributing to, 
further production.
However, although participation in social food economies does little to increase 
monetary incomes (with the exception of foraging for restaurants), it reduces – 
and hence raises questions about – the need for a constantly accelerated economy. 
In this way, social food activities actively ‘de-grow’ the economy by using what 
resources are already available. This downshifting requires access rather than 
ownership, as some foods are grown on public lands and others on private lands 
that share rights for collection and harvesting, with non-monetary costs incurred 
including time, energy, knowledge and an ability to access that land.
These social food economies are thus economically disruptive, in challenging 
the logic behind economic growth while revaluing food in different ways ahead 
of economic values. For example, ‘gleaned’ revalues food as cultural heritage, as 
a way to understand the environment, to appreciate new flavours, and to question 
land management and dietary practices; ‘grown’ values food’s diversity, its link 
to community and to the environment, as a channel to voice a personal politics, 
and to step away from outside control; and ‘gifted’ revalues food in the case of 
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dumpster divers as an independence, as a political and social outrage, and for 
dumpster divers and all other gifters here recasts food as a resource and not a 
waste. For those who obtain food through OzHarvest and Food Within, the cost of 
food becomes one less pressure that needs to be navigated every day.
Social food economies are also socially disruptive in their integrative features 
of bringing people, product and place together to foster social change. Growers 
represent the best example of potential transformational change, as they incorpo-
rate aspects of autonomy of thought, money and the system into their everyday 
practices. Their clustered location in peri-urban Sydney further represents the 
creation of autonomous zones, which could possibly – with the development of 
future social networks – be scaled up and out to other regions. This integrative 
potential for change is encapsulated in Gabrys’ concept of ‘sinks’ (2009). This 
proposes that sinks possess transformative power not simply to close the resource 
loop, but through their uniting of various features to give rise to ‘new systems, 
and new natural–cultural relations’ (Gabrys 2009: 668). Such sinks can then be 
used to ‘mobilize and transform our environmental practices and imaginings’ 
(Gabrys 2009: 668). Urban food could be considered to be such a catalyst or sink: 
reusing wasted resources, reuniting people and reappropriating space to recon-
sider, redesign and react to issues embedded within the conventional food system.
Returning to Gibson-Graham’s concept of diverse economies, the social food 
economies discussed here might then lead to all of the above outcomes. They 
could complement, overtake, and be overtaken by the conventional system, offer-
ing many avenues for change (and integrative feedback loops) to the conventional 
food system from both inside and outside. Hence, this story of social food econo-
mies that represent a wide diversity of people, places and products highlights the 
importance of nurturing diverse, untamed urbanisms and their associated ener-
gies, entrepreneurialism, innovations, and assemblages that emerge from the fric-
tions and contestations in the untamed city (as expressed in the Introduction).
Furthermore, social food economies are disruptive methodologically. They 
highlight the dangers of dualisms between the city and the country, and the for-
mal and the informal. Dualisms are both value-laden and blind the dynamism 
of form, preventing acceptance of new assemblages and the changes they bring. 
Our diets also are not confined to one place, nor should they be, recognizing that 
urban, peri-urban, rural and global environments all contribute in specific ways. 
In a similar way, social food economies also contest the boundaries of mainstream 
definitions of food security, which evaluate social food economies against the 
extent to which they do or do not fulfil a need. Rather, ‘food security’ in my view 
needs to consider how food can be valued and revalued, while acknowledging 
food’s role for social change.
Importantly, this analysis goes beyond the romanticization of ‘local, qual-
ity, direct, and organic food’ to consider their specific historical, socio-cultural 
and environmental contexts and to ask questions of social exclusion, audience 
and politics. Finally, for me personally, ‘untamed urbanisms’ represents a way 
to explore pertinent issues of food security and sustainability beyond capitalist 
constraints, to recognize dynamism, networks and a diversity of approaches that 
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challenge and rethink how our cities are run. Through the rupturing of inflexible 
concepts and theories, new attitudes and approaches can be acknowledged and 
applied to emerging situations to address the real issues at hand.
Conclusion
Thus, non-capitalist food economies contribute to socio-ecological change by 
providing alternative understandings and values embedded within the procure-
ment of food, in addition to providing greater urban food security through die-
tary diversity and access seldom offered by capitalist enterprises. The study of 
social food economies also reveals new social networks, new ways of reading 
and extending the city as a site of resource, and new ways of reaching a wider 
breadth of society to address both urban food security and sustainability concerns. 
Admittedly, the social food economies examined here still only provide a limited 
food supply, but they demonstrate the possibility to do more. By embracing more 
untamed spaces throughout the cityscape, social food economies could reach a 
greater range of people and places, to break down barriers of mind, culture, the 
legal system and bureaucracy, towards a more socially and environmentally just 
food-productive city.
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Untamed Urbanisms
Enacting productive disruptions 
Adriana Allen, Andrea Lampis and  
Mark Swilling
There is currently little disagreement within contemporary debates on sustainable 
development on the fact that we now live in an urban world. This is epitomized 
by the now highly popular claim that ‘the sustainability battle will be lost or won 
in cities’, an argument that in turn has inspired over the last two decades multi-
ple planning pathways to tame ‘unsustainable cities’. However, whether this just 
signifies a world demographic shift, the expansion of capitalist urbanization, a 
fundamental socio-political change or the dominance of cities in shaping nature at 
planetary scale raises different interpretations of emerging realities and the prac-
tices and regimes that make the urban world. 
The notion of untamed urbanisms was posed throughout this book as a provo-
cation to tease out how we make sense of the ongoing urban transition and such 
socio-political urban practices and regimes. What is untameable – capitalism, 
nature or urbanites’ agency? Is untameability to be regarded as a negative or posi-
tive condition? If the former, what is to be tamed, by whom and why? If the lat-
ter, where do untaming practices live? In the lived and unregulated urbanisms of 
ordinary women and men? In the realm of more progressive planning? In insur-
gent urbanisms and the conscious and unconscious search for alternative ways of 
producing the city?
If we accept that there are many urbanisms that produce cities, then each of 
them might reveal different answers to the above questions. In searching for such 
answers, this book could be read through different streams of consciousness, such 
as Hopscotch, the famous novel by Argentine writer Julio Cortázar. But unlike 
Cortázar’s novel, Untamed Urbanisms does not include a ‘Table of Instructions’ 
but leaves the reader the option of choosing her/his unique thinking-path through 
the different chapters. Some chapters might appear ‘expendable’ to different read-
ers, but upon closer examination they might reveal crucial clues to what untamed 
urbanisms mean to them within their particular context. In this final chapter, we 
offer some of the paths that we found more productive and exciting in travelling 
through the book. 
Swilling and Annecke (2012: 121) contend that at least four differentiated but 
interdependent urbanisms or ‘ways of life’ can be identified in the contemporary 
production of cities. Inclusive urbanism inspired the materialization (at least in 
part of the world) of the ‘modern networked city’ and the Keynesian vision of 
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universal ‘rights to cheap, good quality and accessible infrastructure services and 
its associated obligations of prompt payment and respect of technical boundaries’ 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001: 29, cited in Swilling and Annecke, 2012: 122–3). 
Splintering urbanism emerged in the late 1970s out of the neoliberal assault and 
dismissal of the social democratic contract and the aspiration to reconfigure cities 
as globally networked hubs and markets shaped by profit-seeking corporations and 
the capacity and willingness to pay. Slum urbanism captures the ‘quiet encroach-
ment’ (Bayat, 2000) of the one-third of the world urban population often defined as 
‘the urban poor’ who live mainly in self-built largely unregulated settlements. And 
green urbanism that more recently has become firmly positioned as a viable pro-
ject to control and minimize the impact of cities and urban life styles on the envi-
ronment to fit the contemporary urban transition into the constraints of one planet. 
The next section takes these four ‘plots’ as a navigation map to reflect on the 
ways in which untamed and untaming urbanisms are explored by the different 
contributions in this book in conversation with other voices ‘outside’ the book. 
This is followed by a discussion of the potential of writing as a political methodol-
ogy and an act of untaming in its own right. The chapter concludes by examining 
the emerging threads to reclaim the materiality of urban transitions in planning 
theory and praxis
Hopscotching through the book 
Without forcibly shoehorning the cities and processes analyzed throughout the 
book into single categories derived from deductive theories of urban change, 
here we seek to identify and explore common threads that reveal crucial tensions 
between the malleability and obduracy of the city. 
Inclusive urbanism: taming injustice?
A key message emerging throughout the book is that urbanization is not a pro-
cess that automatically delivers justice through agglomeration; instead justice is 
a moral compass that should guide the way we thinking about alternatives. Thus, 
untamed urbanisms are not about rejecting all framings – a sterile and probably 
impossible task – but rather about exposing the many faces that unjust urbaniza-
tion has and the processes and actions that counteract them. Quite often justice in 
the city is equated with inclusion, the most significant achievement (in some parts 
of the world) of the Keynesian project of inclusive urbanism. Inclusion, however, 
is not the same as justice. Not only was the justice of inclusive urbanism associ-
ated with inclusion, in assuming ‘growth’ and ‘material affluence’ as the closest 
epigones of modernity; it also denied the significance of unjust exploitation of 
natural resources. If, as suggested by several contributions in this book, justice 
is accepted as a key value to guide both the assessment of our understanding and 
action, what are the governance implications? How is a commitment to justice 
guaranteed or ensured in a world that may have become too complex to envisage 
the re-assembly of strong unitary states of the kind that were built by post-WWII 
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social democrats? How can social and environmental justice be successfully 
claimed if space, flows and processes within the city are strongly influenced by 
global actors and institutions, whereas the defense of rights largely remains within 
the jurisdiction of weakened national and local governments?
All the chapters in this book grapple with the consequences of accelerated 
urban expansion, decay and renewal in the wake of an era characterized by sus-
tained assaults on the notion that the state has a positive to role to play in guiding 
the evolution of society. Like many other books on cities, the lament in this one is 
the same – the second urbanization wave is a process of social transformation that 
is unprecedented in scale, and yet the state will more than likely remain incapable 
of responding appropriately if it continues to reproduce the economistic tropes of 
neoliberalism. Similarly, in the so-called global North, the disillusionment with 
government stems from a pervasive belief that states did not prevent the economic 
crisis and seem incapable of resolving it. In short, there is an implicit and explicit 
call for the state to be rebuilt as an instrument for interventions based on justice 
and sustainability, especially across the cities of the world. But is it possible to 
imagine a relational approach that results in the incremental assembly of new 
institutional arrangements to deal with the challenges at hand? 
Some of preceding chapters relate directly or indirectly to this challenge. For 
instance, Lawton’s chapter explicitly tackles the challenge of conceptualizing 
modes of political power that are appropriate for promoting just forms of sustaina-
ble urbanization. Proceeding from the ‘right to the city’ principle, he ends up call-
ing for an ‘enabling state’ that is derived from relational dynamics that favor the 
urban poor rather than derived from technocratic assumptions. Obeng-Odoom’s 
contribution extends this call for a reconceptualization of the state with refer-
ence to Georgist perspectives on collective investments and benefits. Swilling 
calls for a reconceptualization of urban infrastructure governance on the grounds 
that urban infrastructures cannot be governed by institutions that were invented 
in the nineteenth century. Haysom suggests that food supplies might well be the 
Achilles heel of traditional modes of governance that left them mainly to market 
dynamics and argues that in a world of rampant market failures in the food sector, 
the state will be forced to intervene. Mukherjee’s case study of Kolkata clearly 
reveals the role the state has historically played in abetting the destruction of 
eco-systems that sustain livelihoods and treat urban sewage on scale and ends up 
calling for a state that acts in the public rather than the private interest. Rosales 
questions whether urban planning has caught up with the need for a new set of 
tools that can cater for urban sustainability. In short, these are all calls to tame the 
city using progressive means and frameworks. 
And yet many chapters also give emphasis to the enormous complexity – 
indeed, untamability – of the city. Many of the contributions in Parts II and IV 
refer to processes that will not easily be tamed to fit into a consolidated govern-
ance framework, no matter how legitimate or progressive. Maybe it is time to rec-
ognize that there is no return to the golden era of the social democratic Weberian 
state that tended to establish integrated publicly funded and controlled service 
delivery institutions. Although it remains a powerful imaginative attractor, it is 
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more than likely a distraction. It might be time to accept that institutional bri-
colage is here to stay, that institutional heterogeneity is not just a passing phase, 
but potentially the best way to build a governance arrangement that is appropri-
ate to the complex realities of contemporary cities. This theme emerges in many 
papers: from the chapter by Lampis where social security is decoupled from a 
state-centric discourse, to Sotiropoulou’s discussion of alternative and non-cur-
rency schemes, to Lawanson’s call to transcend the formal-informal dualism that 
suffocates incrementalism, and finally to Hajer’s reflections on developed coun-
try cities where states will not be the most effective actors to transform the socio-
cultural templates of highly industrialized cities. 
This discussion raises a very tricky challenge: if an inclusive urbanism cannot 
be built by a return to strong states with integrated service delivery systems, can 
it be built by working with rather than against institutional heterogeneity? The 
answer to this question will depend on whether it will be possible to jettison a 
deep-seated belief that heterogeneity is a symptom of state failure when in fact it 
might reflect the realities of highly complex untamable urbanisms that will need 
to be gathered together not into a new institutional uniformity, but into institu-
tional assemblages that are profoundly relational, negotiated and therefore always 
provisional. If this results in a sense of vertigo because all the desired securities of 
hierarchy have fallen away, then so be it – that may be the governance implication 
of an era of untamed urbanism. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that 
this is a weaker option, with less potential than ‘strong states’ to effect change. 
If supported by new relational leadership capabilities well trained in facilitation, 
vision building, coalition making and conflict resolution, this might be the most 
effective way to tackle the challenges. 
Splintering urbanism: untamed apartheids? 
Oren Yiftachel (2009) argues that across the South-East, contemporary urbani-
zation takes place through the ‘grey spaces’ for the unregulated and stubborn 
urbanisms of those who ‘are neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-
permanent margins of today’s urban regions’ (89). These gray spaces, he claims, 
are facilitated by a process of ‘creeping apartheid’ in which large segments of the 
poor and marginalized ‘are only partially incorporated into the urban community, 
economy and space, and are excluded from membership in the city polity’ (ibid.).
This permanent temporariness is produced as much by state action as non-
action and vividly describes not just those marginalized in the Beer Sheva metro-
politan region (Israel/Palestine) – that is, the scene where Yiftachel unravels his 
notion of emerging urban apartheids – but equally the experience of peri-urban 
farmers in La – towards the east of Accra – who for decades have supplied the 
city with most of the perishable vegetables it consumes and yet are awaiting to 
be evicted from the customary land to which they belong; or the 5,000 women 
and men who call Cantagallo – a small spit of land alongside the River Rimac in 
central Lima – home, despite many living informally for over 50 years and under 
the periodic threat of being evicted.
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Across the global South or ‘South-East’, as Yiftachel puts it, splintering urban-
ism is indeed producing grey spaces and urban apartheids along multiple lines of 
ethnic, class, religious and gender exclusion. These apartheids are of course not 
just shaped by outside forces but also permeated by practices of ‘slum real estate’ 
(Gulyani and Talukdar 2008) and countered by practices of ‘occupancy urban-
ism’ and ‘actually existing urbanisms’, rooted in alternative social dynamics that 
‘resist worlding practice’ (Watson 2012).
Many chapters in this book capture case studies of struggles against the conse-
quences of splintering urbanism that are representative of a growing tide of local 
struggles across the globe and, perhaps more significantly, that have the potential 
to coalesce into regional and global movements for change with varying degrees 
of efficacy. Without going into the intense current debates about how to achieve 
this, some of the book chapters provide insights into the diverse ecology of actors 
that populate movements for change towards less splintered post-neoliberal cit-
ies. The case by Sequera and Mateos provides the most dramatic insight into how 
micro-resistance builds up against neo-liberal property markets that local states 
allow to roll out across urban space to the detriment of historically embedded 
communities. In a very different context, Edwards describes the emergence of 
socialized food economies in Australian cities that challenge the commodification 
of food. It is activist practices like this that shock one into realizing how far the 
commodification of food has really gone and what the consequences of market 
failure at scale might be. 
However, it would be mistake to impose a ‘resistance’ lens on the wide range 
of actors that engage the implications of splintered urbanism. Lino e Silva’s case 
reveals how urban cultural practices emerge within quite mature urban niches 
like Rio’s favelas that resist the logics of capitalist work discipline, wage-based 
time and the notion that freedom is defined by market positionality. By contrast, 
the case by Harris reveals how it is possible to ‘work with the market’ to real-
ize social objectives in a context of endemic state failure. Sanchez Betancourt’s 
discussion of active interventions to claim public space in Cape Town is pos-
sibly another typical way of contesting the commodification of space – it is not 
resistance of the type discussed by Sequera and Mateos, but rather similar to 
socialization of food movement discussed by Edwards. It is a multi-class move-
ment that wants to make a statement about the value of non-commodified spaces 
that symbolically value a sense of the public, a sense of community – a sense of 
freedom from both regulation and the market. In short, a sense that splintering 
can be transcended. 
Whether these various responses coalesce into local-global movements that 
reinforce Lawton’s call for an enabling state that guarantees the ‘right to the city’ 
remains to be seen. 
Slum urbanism: the quiet encroachment of the untamed?
All across developing world cities in Latin America, Africa and Asia there are 
millions of transactions underway that result in a distinct social formation referred 
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to here as slum urbanism. Because slum urbanism is distinct rather than merely 
a stepping stone towards urban modernity, it deserves close scrutiny and under-
standing. In particular, it is necessary to comprehend the agential drivers of quiet 
encroachment across spaces that are at one level remarkably similar (unregu-
lated, self-built, poorly serviced, home to groups that tend to be poor although 
not always) while at another level each settlement is embedded within a unique 
political, cultural, economic and spatial context best understood by those who live 
there. Attempts to impose templates on these fluid and complex environments to 
implement development projects invariably come to grief. Although slum urban-
ism is often depicted as the spatial manifestation of splintered urbanism in devel-
oping countries, the chapters in this book suggest that the story is more complex 
than this. Even without neoliberal commodification of urban services, large parts 
of the urban population in developing countries would most likely have ended up 
in slums. Furthermore, the assumption that slum urbanism will disappear under 
the forward march of a state-managed or market-driven urban modernity creates 
unrealizable expectations about what is possible. Even in China, a state-driven 
urbanization programme that delivers millions of formal housing units has not 
been able to prevent the build-up of de facto slums of temporary workers in the 
hidden nooks and crannies of a highly regulated urban regime. 
Several chapters in this book have attempted in various ways to engage the chal-
lenge of slum urbanism. Drawing down the global discourse on climate change 
vulnerability into the Tanzanian context, Mubaya et al. discuss the dynamics of 
agency in the slums of Dar es Salaam. While there is plenty of evidence of self-
organized quiet encroachments, the potential for this to translate into longer-term 
processes of incremental upgrading are limited by the historical legacy of institu-
tions and policies that subvert the best efforts of slum dwellers. Aguilar and Castro 
develop similar arguments with respect to Merida City, Mexico. Slum dwellers 
find a way to survive, but the potential to go beyond survival will depend on the 
emergence of new modes of engagement with state agencies. Lawanson’s study 
of Nigerian slums confirms this when she argues: ‘It is important that the rhetoric 
go beyond formal–informal labels and the idea of informality as unacceptable 
within the urban fabric, towards a view of informality as a dynamic pointer to 
shifting urban relationships between the authorized and unauthorized.’ All three 
case studies are underpinned by optimistic assumptions about the potential of 
incrementalism – that is, that progress from the current condition to an improved 
mode of urban living is not just desirable but also possible. Swilling and Harris 
build on this optimistic logic by demonstrating that there are examples of ‘co-
production’ where slum communities have successfully engaged state agencies 
to configure improvements in service delivery systems. This includes the Water 
Justice movement in Latin America analysed by Swilling, and the community-
cum-market-based sanitation projects in Accra examined by Harris. Both provide 
examples of the kinds of institutional reconfigurations through state–community 
engagements that are anticipated in the case studies drawn from the Tanzania, 
Nigeria and Mexican contexts. Drawing on the work of Allen (2012) and Allen 
et al. (forthcoming), Swilling argues that co-production should be considered as 
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a key element of the post-nineteenth-century modes of infrastructure governance 
that will be required to handle the complexities of urbanization dynamics in the 
twenty-first century. 
The chapters by Lino e Silva, Chiweshe and Sotiropoulou, however, raise 
critical questions about the modernist logic that underpin the notion of incre-
mentalism. Based on ethnographic work in Rio’s favelas, Lino e Silva identi-
fies sub-cultures that subvert the Victorian notion that all slum dwellers would 
like a job, a proper house and a place in the formal urban system. In short, it 
is not possible to assume that there is a shared interest in incrementalism and, 
ultimately, in urban modernity. Chiweshe, on the other hand, argues that urban 
spaces are masculinized in ways that differentiate between the potentials available 
to men and women as they negotiate their everyday lives in the city. Like Lino e 
Silva’s message, Chiweshe’s argument is a significant cautionary that highlights 
the importance of incorporating a gender analysis into an understanding of slum 
urbanism. Sotiropoulou invites the reader to explore not only how and why the 
patriarchal institution of private property reinforces the hierarchical superiority 
of some urbanites at the expense of others, but also re-enacts highly sexualized 
and politicized perceptions of self, freedom and citizenship that are paradoxically 
rendered as neutral and enjoy almost naturalized legitimacy to attack and sup-
press those everyday practices that live outside the rule of obligatory (re)payment. 
These three contributions remind us of the pervasive scope of multiple forms of 
‘othering’ that are equally reproduced by morally, functionally or aesthetically 
superior practices taming the quiet encroachment of women and the urban poor 
within and beyond slums. 
Green urbanism: taming the cyborg? 
Green urbanism has become mainstream over the past two decades. To a large 
extend this closely follows the belief that the city is by definition a ‘cyborg’ 
entity – a hybrid composed of organism and machine – which opens simultane-
ously the possibility to enhance urban performance beyond physical limitations 
and to expand the boundaries of human creativity and innovation (Gandy 2005). 
Green urbanism is, however, miles away from the intellectual project triggered 
by Donna Haraway when she coined the cyborg metaphor back in the 1980s 
(Haraway 1992), opening the scope to articulate feminist epistemological strat-
egies into science, technology and urban studies and to develop new sensitivi-
ties in the understanding of the material interfaces between bodies, cities, nature 
and culture. 
Driven largely by the property development industry and the architectural pro-
fession, green urbanism is about minimizing the environmental damage of built 
spaces, infrastructures and landscapes, a project underpinned by the promise of 
the possible ecological modernization of our urban future. This tradition has now 
been absorbed into aggressive smart city discourses that have been packaged and 
marketed by the IT industry with amplified vigor since the start of the global 
economic crisis in 2007/8. Echoing the profound impact on urban imaginaries 
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of the Crystal Palace project in the early twentieth century, Siemens has built 
The Crystal in London as a museum of the future to make an equally significant 
impact on the twenty-first-century urban imaginaries. Significantly, these IT com-
panies tap into research on the potential efficiencies of urban systems of the kind 
discussed by Reusser et al. to mount their arguments. Hajer’s chapter critically 
engages with the smart city discourse by equating it to the sanitation syndrome of 
the late nineteenth century and the highway boom of the mid-twentieth century. 
His is a cautionary argument that questions the power role of the IT companies in 
the building of urban imaginaries, but accepts that more inclusive and sustainable 
options will in future depend heavily on IT systems that might drastically reduce 
transaction costs and distribute the data flows that future economic activities will 
depend on. But as the chapter about Mexican urban planning by Rosales points 
out, none of this will be possible if sustainability is not incorporated into urban 
planning processes in more meaningful ways. For Mukherjee this involves not 
just the re-engineering of planning to become more efficient and effective but, 
above all, the need to reflect ‘more on the ecology “of” cities rather than ecology 
“in” cities’. Mainstream interpretations of green urbanism appear by contrast to 
focus on mastering the morphological and functional malleability of the machine, 
and the commodification of nature, body and space, overlooking the sensitivities 
developed in recent years from the field of urban political ecology.
Writing as untaming
In assembling this book, we have taken a number of risks. Conceptually and ide-
ologically, the authors depart from different and often contrasting framings of 
what constitutes desirable and undesirable urban trajectories. Analytically and 
methodologically, they choose very different means to respond to the provocation 
of untamed urbanisms, ranging from the examination of grand narratives through 
discourse analysis, the interrogation of big data and the analysis of long-term tra-
jectories of socio-ecological change all the way to the ethnographic interrogation 
of spatial, mediatic and embodied urban micro-practices. 
As argued in the Introduction, this book was not produced through a pre-selec-
tion of akin thinkers but rather as an open encounter that does not seek agreements 
or shy away from dissonance. In doing so, we have refrained from harmonizing 
views but insisted on the importance of pausing to explain where we write from. 
Brazilian scholar Marcelo de Souza (2012: 315) reminds us that ‘[n]o contribu-
tion in the field of social sciences, urban studies included, is free of ‘accent’, 
since every piece of knowledge directly related to social life is both culturally 
embedded and historically-geographically situated’. Most authors in this book 
have taken the risk to be explicit about their accents, not just in terms of the mul-
tiple ‘wheres’ from which they write but above all their political–philosophical 
choices and affiliations. 
Situated writing has in our view untaming power, and this transcends the global 
north–south divide, inviting a reflexive engagement with the multiple geogra-
phies of difference from which we write, upon which we write and to whom we 
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write – even if unfortunately, this is often an approach more systematically 
adopted by those who write from outside Europe and North America. In other 
words, our writing can be highly performative in reclaiming a plurality of urban-
isms, thus, writing can indeed be a site of untaming. However, not all accounts of 
untamed urbanisms have untaming power, in the same way that not all untaming 
writing focuses on the untamed. Let us clarify this apparent tongue-twister. 
On the one hand, a now robust body of urban literature focuses on the urban-
isms of the poor, or, as suggested in Section 2, their ‘untamed everyday’ practices. 
While revealing the agency of the urban poor and, more widely, the typically 
marginalized from prevailing urban regimes is valuable, we are often confronted 
with the risk of romanticizing their struggles or, even worse, of feeding into the 
economization of their lives, as reflected by a plethora of urban policies under-
pinned by the assumption that substandard living conditions can be overcome 
by tapping more effectively into the human and social capital, adaptive capacity 
and resilience of the urban poor. In short, if slum urbanism is the urbanism of 
the untamed, then the pragmatic response to it is to tap into the untameability of 
the urban poor – their inexhaustible ingenuity, elasticity and capacity to innovate 
under stress – to foster the further internalization of the production of the infra-
structures and services required to secure their place in the city, and thus enhanc-
ing the viability of splintering urbanism. But there is more in this book connecting 
the ‘untamed everyday’ with the ‘liberating alternatives’, insofar one cannot exist 
without the other. As chapters in Parts I and III are connected by the uneasiness 
with mainstreamed narratives and policy-making practices, those in Parts II and 
IV are linked by the attempt to shake off social labelling and common academic 
insights that at the end tend to pity the poor and the excluded, trying to rescue 
the dignity embedded in their agency and in every person and community who 
attempts to live a freedom not necessarily defined by others, by frameworks, by 
master-plans or strategic developments often proposed by people who do not even 
know the places they are planning for. 
Thus, on the other hand, untaming through writing might be effected when we 
seek to generate new understandings by recognizing ‘the importance of different 
kinds and levels of epistemic (and political) “otherness”’ (Souza, 2012: 316). This 
is not an easy enterprise and requires constant and critical reflection on the world of 
ideas in which we seek to understand how cities work. Marxist urban studies have 
been perhaps the most significant and long-lived source of inspiration for radical 
urban theory and updated readings of the urban condition. However, it could also 
be argued that reading urban change as a series of endless expressions of capitalist 
urbanization seems to strike almost always the same cord and to marginalize what 
Souza defines above as ‘epistemic (and political) “otherness”’, often also alienat-
ing the possibility of engaging with action beyond the boundaries of what might be 
regarded as radical or insurgent. Most chapters in Part IV take a careful approach 
not to fall into this trap, interrogating the very notions of freedom, rights and auton-
omy through quotidian practices and in the process repoliticizing how ordinary men 
and women carve different ways of being in the city by quietly rejecting formal 
work, monetized interactions or the masculinization of urban space.
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Thus, what makes writing an act of untaming is not necessarily its subject 
but the epistemological risks we take. In other words, untaming urban narratives 
might often be found not necessarily in writings about the marginalized but writ-
ten from the margins of mainstream urban theory. But is it then possible to simul-
taneously enact critical analysis and reclaim actionable urban theory? 
Reclaiming the materiality of urban transitions in  
planning theory and praxis
Much has been written in recent years about the need to move our understanding 
of a world of cities beyond the realm of Western urban theory (Edensor and Jayne 
2012), and this is particularly urgent in the field of planning. Vanessa Watson 
(2012) argues that the gap in non-Western theorizations of urban planning is rap-
idly being addressed by a body of incipient but fast-growing work. She groups 
this work in two strands: ‘those which aim to understand and explain (South-East) 
urban contexts from a planning perspective, and those which move to normative 
or action-oriented positions’ (86). The notion of untamed urbanisms might be 
fruitful in this respect as a means to bring both strands of work into more explicit 
dialogue. Untamed urbanisms call for a simultaneous epistemological, axiological 
and methodological interrogation of the ways in which we seek to understand dif-
ferent forms of urbanism and to transform them. Or, in other words, for deploying 
a conscious and systematic effort to engage explicitly with the tension between 
analysis and action. Such enterprise talks directly to planning theory and praxis 
and invites explorations that acknowledge that transformative change resides 
not in conceptions of the state, markets and communities as coherent and mono-
lithic agents but on fluid and spatially and socially embedded webs that might 
equally challenge the fruitfulness of grand theorizations and the pragmatism of 
best practice approaches. Furthermore, bringing nature – and the material flows 
of energy, water and food that make any urbanism possible – into the repertoire 
of the untamed is essential, as this continues to be a dimension of urban life either 
forgotten or brought to the fore as an overriding taming and operational narrative. 
To sum up, the notion of untamed urbanisms creates a conceptual space for 
searching for a synthesis between actionable theory and aspirational practice. 
Such an enterprise can only be activated if we – urban practitioners and academ-
ics – take the risk to actively question hegemonic practices, their scope and limits, 
abandoning the comfort equally granted by domesticating projects and grand nar-
ratives, while simultaneously developing our sensitivity to capture and nurture 
more relational and materially grounded pathways to transformative change. Such 
pathways are likely to look patchy, imperfect and incomplete to the eyes of many, 
but the reassurance provided by contemporary taming urbanisms may prove to be 
false promises that lure cities in, resulting in contrived reproductions of unsustain-
able and unjust urban development pathways. 
Rupturing historical and contemporary representations of the urban world 
involves – as argued by Ananya Roy (2014: 18) – ‘an analysis of the worlding 
of the world but equally an effort to imagine other worlds’. Such analysis and 
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imaginations do not just live in the realm of urban theory and planning; they 
exceed the epistemic boundaries of urban professionals and encompass the ways 
in which ordinary citizens make sense of the everyday, of the past and of the future 
to come. Untamed urbanisms is therefore above all a call to engage with a more 
reflexive approach towards the relative unknowability of the city, of nature and 
of human agency and to tender the possibility of transformative change beyond 
the undifferentiated ‘we’ that often permeates the actions proposed by green and 
inclusive urbanisms and the differentiating ‘them’ denounced by splintering and 
slum urbanisms. 
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